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INTRODUCTION
An Urgent Situation
This is not a hopeful or optimistic book. It is instead a sober assessment and wake-
up call for the left as a whole, including centrist liberals. Likewise, this book is not 
going to spend the majority of time engaged in critique and then try to wrap up with a 
general plan for how to address the situation we are in. Such actions mean little when 
the critiques themselves are often fundamentally naïve and flawed to begin with. We 
are only beginning to realize the nature of the problem. In presenting a retrospective 
of Andrea Dworkin’s work in The New York Review of Books, Blair (2019) features 
one of her more famous quotes:
This book is an action, a political action where revolution is the goal. It has no 
other purpose. It is not cerebral wisdom, or academic horseshit, or ideas carved 
in granite or destined for immortality. It is part of a process and its context is 
change. (p. 28)
In a similar manner, this book is meant to serve as a form of cultural criticism where 
socialist feminism is used to read media texts. These texts track a growing problem 
of authoritarian populism and fascism that fails to be confronted in an organized, 
coherent, and meaningful way. When it is common to have mainstream media outlets 
entertain the thought of inviting fascists or climate deniers to “debate the issues,” it 
should be apparent that the gravity of the situation has not yet taken hold.
Two primary questions drive this book. First, what is behind the rapid rise of 
strongman authoritarian populism and fascism, not just in the United States, but 
globally? Second, what leads these movements to always incorporate misogyny as 
part of their ideologies? In addressing these questions, this book is not going to 
spend the majority of its content critiquing the Democrats or other centrist groups. 
It is not going to devote two or three token sentences acknowledging the danger 
of far-right views, and then proceed to foster “both sides are equally bad” thinking 
that often masquerades as hard-hitting critique on the left. Though it should be 
acknowledged that centrists have facilitated our current situation, their contributions 
pale in comparison to what right-wing movements as a whole have done and are 
continuing to do.
In advancing a Marxist feminist analysis, this book unapologetically prioritizes 
minorities, women, and the LGBTQI working class. This means not hesitating to 
include the white working class as a target of critique when necessary. The focus of 
this book is confronting fascism and authoritarian populism along with the groups 
and ideologies that sustain it. We are well past the time on the left where we can skirt 
around the problem of the white working class’ receptivity to racism and misogyny 
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by conveniently sweeping it under the “false consciousness” rug. Along these lines, 
this book will not insert “not all men” or “not all white people” every time racism 
or sexism is mentioned. Sociological generalities will be used as this book deals 
with sociological concepts. If you can’t paint with a broad brush where needed, the 
painting won’t get done.
Further, I argue that the left’s current approaches are insufficient for effectively 
confronting authoritarian populism and fascism. Rather than being in a “rough patch” 
that the next election will cure, what we are seeing is deeply systemic, enabled by 
a social media architecture, the enormity of which we are only starting to grasp. As 
Bello (2017) soberly warns us, “progressives must squarely face the fact that these 
movements are either in power or on the threshold of power—and once they get 
power, through elections or other means, they have no intention of relinquishing 
it” (para. 27). Hopes that Trump and other administrations will somehow play 
themselves out when people realize their sheer incompetence ignores the historical 
reality that the left once thought the exact same thing prior to the Nazis coming to 
power (Ulrich, 2016).
With few exceptions, the left is extremely naïve about the intentions of the far-
right as well as the reliability of mainstream conservatives when it comes to their 
own enabling for opportunistic reasons. As Sefla (2017) warns,
To build the kind of activist movement so the left can win future battles, it 
will have to learn key lessons in the skirmishes today. The first of these is that 
the existing institutions of this society can’t be relied upon to stand up for our 
rights…it’s a dangerous illusion to think that the courts will side with justice 
and freedom absent mass pressure from below…it’s an even more dangerous 
illusion, echoed in some liberal circles, to think that certain parts of the military 
or security apparatus will tame Trump’s excesses. (p. 7)
Indeed, the aftermath of the Mueller investigation demonstrates that concepts such 
as a sitting president cannot be indicted only highlights the tenuous loopholes that 
have held the system together up to this point. Trump’s conduct has laid bare the 
fragility of Constitutional protections, and have seemed to taken us by surprise, if 
not unawares.
This naivete extends into ineffective media and academic practices such as 
assuming that facts alone will be enough to fight the far-right, that having a hands-
off open marketplace of ideas will somehow facilitate people in selecting the best 
ones, or that the media owes fascist views an equal hearing (Camacho, 2016; 
DiMaggio, 2017; Sedillo, 2017). Hamilton (2016) sums up nicely the situation we 
are now in, where the media remains wedded to both-sides-ism and reinforces the 
right wing:
Facts and truth are suddenly unrelated. Power no longer implies responsibility. 
Legitimacy and decency are now somehow passengers on separate ships. In 
this dynamic, People magazine can champion both the perpetrator and the 
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victim and see no contradiction or betrayal. Lilla can use the victory of a 
campaign steeped in identity politics to highlight the ineffectiveness of identity 
politics. And Lerner can argue that a campaign “advanced” by sexism, racism 
and xenophobia can tell us much about the targets of that bigotry, i.e. that they 
need to behave differently, but little about the supporters of that campaign. 
(para. 6)
Through the analysis presented in this book, it is hoped that readers will gain a 
sense of the scope and intensity of organizing on the right. Accurately comprehending 
their ideological components and strategies of discourse are essential for developing 
an effective response. Further, grasping how the media—intentionally or 
unintentionally—assists in the promulgation of authoritarian populism and fascism 
is required, especially in light of a move away from traditional journalism to online 
distribution of information. Most critically, there is a need to dialectically investigate 
the source of the willingness in the media to stretch the bounds of legitimacy to 
accommodate the actions of right-wing populists and fascists.
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Each of the chapters in this book can be read in isolation without disrupting the 
overall flow of the text. Taken together, they present an unveiling of the problem 
of authoritarian populism and fascism. Chapter 1 establishes the need for using 
socialist feminist analysis to fully understand the current situation we find ourselves 
in. This chapter asserts that feminism and Marxism by themselves are insufficient 
for comprehending authoritarian populism and fascism, precisely because of their 
shared interest in misogyny. Different forms of feminism are briefly discussed, along 
with highlighting some of the activism happening around issues like reproductive 
rights that have introduced renewed energy into the Left.
Building on the foundation presented in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 dissects authoritarian 
populism and fascism by first examining shared characteristics between the two 
movements. This is followed by presenting key differences, important in the context 
of Hitler comparisons commonly seen in the mass media. This chapter asserts that 
while vigilance is important, misapplication of the fascist label can serve to hinder 
the ability to confront the current situation.
Chapters 3 and 4 then move to de-centering the white male working class, a 
key construct utilized in the media in its framing of economic policy. Chapter 3 
deconstructs the white, straight, male, industrial sector worker which has for too long 
served as a stand-in for the working class as a whole, on both the left and the right. 
This chapter makes the case that in using the white male working class as a universal 
construct, the actual diversity of the working class is ignored and along with it, 
actions that can benefit all of the working class. Chapter 4 breaks down some of these 
problematics associated with Bernie Sanders 2016 presidential campaign, including 
destructive tendencies on the left that end up assisting, not hindering, the right-wing.
INTRODUCTION
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Chapter 5 takes on the problem of authoritarian populism and fascism within 
online contexts, including harassment of women and minorities. The ideology 
of e-libertarianism is critiqued as creating an enabling climate for right-wing 
movements. In particular, the discursive and organizational strategies of the alt-
right are presented, along with the cultivation of the troll persona as fundamental for 
recruitment. The chapter concludes with a look at the manosphere and its impact on 
online contexts.
Because of its regular reappearance as a touchpoint for controversy, Chapter 6 
examines abortion from a Marxist feminist framework. The social and legal 
constructs of the fetus represent a strategic move on the right from which to attack 
not only women, but the working class as a whole. This chapter argues that far 
from being a fringe issue or identity politics as is often portrayed, abortion and 
contraception are fundamental for the survival of the working class. The coverage of 
these issues is designed to create solidarity wedges between women, building on the 
historical power of sexual repression and shame.
Chapter 7 mounts a defence of science, reason, and the press, all of which have been 
under intensified assault since 2016. The mass media’s approaches have enabled the 
right-wing to the point where fascism has become normalized as yet another issue. 
By framing anything outside of the tribal belief system as “fake news,” authoritarian 
populists have successfully created impenetrable bubbles around themselves. The 
consequences of this situation are only beginning to play out, as the conclusion of 
the book addresses.
© FAITH AGOSTINONE-WILSON, 2020 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004424531_002 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 License.
CHAPTER 1
ON THE RELEVANCE AND NECESSITY OF 
SOCIALIST FEMINISM
INTRODUCTION
After the 2016 election, there has been a dramatic increase in mass organizing 
around women’s issues and gender equality not seen since the activism of the early 
feminist movement. This activism has also been able to harness the power and reach 
of social media to rapidly coordinate participants both online and on the street with 
unprecedented results. On inauguration weekend, January 21, 2017, close to four 
million people from 680 locations joined the Women’s March, in the United states 
and across the globe (Smith, S., 2017, p. 12; Roesch, 2019, p. 8). In what started as a 
Facebook announcement after the 2016 election, this march surpassed the size of the 
demonstrations of the 1960s, making it the largest US protest turnout to date (Sefla, 
2017; Roesch, 2019). In major cities, one out of every 100 US citizens marched, 
many of them never having attended a protest before (Sefla, 2017, p. 2). Not only 
were the numbers boundary-breaking, but the marchers themselves represented a 
“broad cross-section of women: urban and rural; white and of color; middle class 
and working class; more liberal and more radical” (Roesch, 2019, p. 9). Further, 
many of the leadership roles were occupied by women of color.
The march, considered the opening salvo of a “global woman’s rebellion” was 
not only a direct repudiation of Trump and the right-wing he represents, it extended 
much further, to bring to the forefront “issues such as gender violence, wage 
inequality, reproductive rights, and women’s reproductive work, as well as sexual 
liberties, at the center of the political and cultural debate of every country hit by 
the mobilizations” (Roesch, 2019, p. 8). Just one week after the march, protestors 
occupied major airports, in support of people from Muslim-majority countries 
who had been included in Trump’s executive order banning refugees and citizens 
from entering the US (Sefla, 2017). Six weeks later, the globally planned “A Day 
Without A Woman” resulted in street and workplace demonstrations as part of 
the International Women’s Strike, held on International Woman’s Day (Roesch, 
2019; Kumar et al., 2019; Fierro & Vasco, 2019). As with the Women’s March, 
these actions were coordinated by minority women and “added demands for legal 
abortion, gender wage inequality, and the recognition of unpaid domestic work to the 
established demands against gender violence” (Fierro & Vasco, 2019, p. 35).
What these mobilizations have revealed is that what often starts out as a single-
issue campaign quickly widens into larger, intersectional social demands regarding 
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gender, sexuality, and the economy, providing the potential for on-the-ground, 
radical analysis. This is exemplified in the growth of the testimonial-based #MeToo 
and #TimesUp campaigns, which draw together diverse coalitions of women and 
men. As Schulte (2018) points out, while the awareness of #MeToo may have been 
due to celebrities and other prominent people with media access, “it had the potential 
to provide a platform for other women to tell their stories—including working-
class and poor women who face harassment and assault on the job at alarming 
rates” (p. 17).
#MeToo quickly had reverberating effects within Congress, when California 
Representative Jackie Speier first released a video on social media which recounted 
her own experiences with sexual harassment at the hands of a chief of staff. Then, 
other female politicians added their own accounts. Within a few months, six 
Democrats and Republicans had been pressured to resign because of these sexual 
assault allegations (Schulte, 2018, p. 18). This is in addition to more than 20 women 
who have accused Trump himself of sexual assault, resulting in the Democratic 
Women’s Working Group in the House drafting a letter calling for an investigation 
into the allegations. Eventually the letter garnered over 100 signatures, including 
from male signatories (p. 19).
However, these significant actions have not just been the result of the 2016 
election, and have been building for some time. Actions such as the Ni Una Menos 
mobilizations in Mexico around femicide and sexual harassment, Women United 
Against Bolsonaro’s street actions and Facebook Page with 4 million followers; 
Poland’s mass protests of the country’s abortion ban, Argentinian activism around 
femicide and abortion, and Ireland’s mobilizations concerning the repeal of the 
Eighth Amendment which prohibits abortion are all the result of organizing over 
time and across different coalitions (Brum, 2018; Fierro & Vasco, 2019; Roesch, 
2019). Most of these have built onto earlier mass actions from the 60s, 70s, and 80s.
In 2015, Argentina’s Green Handkerchief mobilizations around abortion rights 
“spread like wildfire throughout the country” with supporters showing their 
solidarity by wearing green scarves featuring the movement’s logo (Fierro & Vasco, 
2019, p. 34). The handkerchief was an accessible and effective way to show strength 
in numbers, with even older rural men seen wearing them. Demonstrations in the 
hundreds of thousands stretched across 80 cities, putting pressure on Latin American 
governments to do something about femicide, gender violence, and reproductive 
rights (p. 35). In the US, McDonalds employees coordinated a mass strike across 10 
cities, and Marriott workers participated in a two-month strike in seven states, both 
connecting the issue of sexual harassment, gender, and low-wage labor (Roesch, 
2019, p. 10). The two things that all of these actions have in common are (a) they 
involve both social media and street action and (b) they are led by working-class 
women of color, contradicting the myth that feminism is only relevant for white, 
older, middle-class women.
This chapter is designed as an opening for the rest of the book, by making the case 
that socialist feminism is both relevant and necessary for confronting the growth of 
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authoritarian populism and fascism. Neither feminism nor Marxism in isolation are 
sufficient for conceptualizing the current situation we find ourselves in, because 
the global spread of authoritarianism also harnesses economic, racial, and gendered 
factors under capitalism. The chapter, organized in three major sections, first opens 
with a presentation of broad forms of feminism, asserting that there is no single 
version of feminism and that it is shaped by different coalitions. This is followed by 
an overview of key issues impacting women and LGBTQ people, which are taken 
up throughout the rest of the book in more detail. Finally, a critical examination of 
brocialism, or sexism within leftist spaces, is framed as a unique challenge and a 
primary threat to solidarity within activist movements.
FEMINISMS
One of the primary challenges (as well as the exciting features) of feminism is that it 
can represent a variety of concepts, identities, philosophies, and interests, especially 
in media contexts. This section posits that there are several forms of feminism, which 
can be broadly organized into liberal feminism (within which there are different 
strands, beyond the scope of this section), postmodern theorizations (including Third 
Wave), conservative forms (neoliberal/imperialist and right-wing), and Marxist/
socialist alternatives, which are the most appropriate for confronting and fighting 
authoritarian populism and fascism.
These forms can often be distinguished by how proponents view origins and 
sources of oppression along with strategies for fighting it, with liberal feminists often 
locating oppression in sexist politicians and laws, postmodern feminists pointing 
to modernist constructions of identity and movement activism as problematic, 
conservative feminists rejecting collectivism in favor of individualism and the 
market, and Marxist feminists’ location of oppression within capitalism (Goodman, 
2016). Leavy and Harris’ (2019) apt definition of feminism prioritizes its broad 
coalition building while also remaining clearly anchored to liberation and justice:
Beginning with the status of girls and women, but not ending there, feminism 
is an engaged human rights position that seeks to expose and remedy gender 
inequities. The study of gender, as a starting point for approaching feminist 
research, cannot be understood without consideration of other aspects of 
human existence that influence the ways in which human beings interact 
socially, including race, physical ability, class, geolocations, and sexuality. We 
are not bodies that are only gendered, but rather, we simultaneously occupy 
race, ethnicity, social class, sexuality, and other positionalities. (p. 4)
This definition is inclusive of liberal, postmodern, and Marxist feminism but not 
neoliberal or right-wing conservative forms, which illustrates why one size does not 
fit all when it comes to feminism.
When examining media forms, one quickly sees that feminism has been coopted 
to serve a range of political purposes, not all of them centered on humanism, anti-
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racism, or liberation. For example, the history of the women’s movement in the US 
is inextricably tied to that nation’s colonial status as a white settler state, genocide 
and forcible displacement of indigenous groups, along with slavery and immigration 
controls, all occurring alongside the patriarchal domination of women’s bodies (Tax, 
2017; Theweleit, 2010a). Capitalism itself would not have been possible without 
accompanying colonization (Bohrer, n.d.). Feminism has been used by Europeans 
and Americans since the 1800s to buttress imperialism, the notion being that women 
in regions such as the Middle East, Africa and Asia needed (and still need) to be 
rescued from backward practices (Aftab, 2017; Kumar et al., 2019). Acknowledging 
this history along with current incidents is critical for conceptualizing the field of 
feminism as whole, along with understanding why there are conservative forms 
that coopt the superficial trappings of empowerment, only to further entrench white 
supremacy.
Conservative forms of feminism often emerge from cynicism and backlash, 
including among younger people, as Richards (2017) found:
The fact of the matter is; feminism is not the majority worldview. When 
talking to young university students about feminism there is an overwhelming 
discomfort with a movement that should inspire enthusiasm. Both boys and 
girls do not want to be associated with it, do not want to hear about it, and do 
not have any legitimate understanding of what feminism is or does. (para. 4)
This reaction can be partly attributed to liberal feminism’s initial failure to include 
the perspectives and interests of minority women and women from working-class 
backgrounds (Roesch, 2019). Many of the younger women, lesbians and transgender 
people who make up feminism’s Third Wave have also found mainstream feminism to 
be limiting, exclusionary, or irrelevant to their needs, while still rejecting conservative 
feminism (Goodman, 2016). These feminists often draw on postmodernism for 
“reframing the theoretical framework of feminism” when addressing key issues 
like reproductive rights, rape, domestic violence, the environment and inequality 
(p. 219).
Neoliberal feminism represents the outer boundary that demarcates the separation 
between mainstream liberal feminism and conservative forms of feminism. What 
makes neoliberal feminism distinct is that it uses progressive sounding discourse to 
shift activism away from larger collective solutions like changing laws and policies—
which liberal feminism advocates for, albeit in limited fashion—and instead moves 
this to the individualistic realm in the form of self-improvement (Rottenberg, 2018). 
This would include the growth of concepts like “leaning in,” “achieving work-life 
balance,” mindfulness, decluttering/simplicity movements, and changing one’s 
attitude or outlook rather than insisting on significant social change. The message 
is to adapt to one’s existing conditions as a way to foster one’s liberation. Climate 
change represents the limits of neoliberal thinking, where capitalists can visualize 
a dystopian end to the world as we know it, but they simply can’t comprehend that 
capitalism will end. Therefore, any solutions they attempt to craft has to be contained 
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within the market, like changing personal consumption habits or recycling (Terzakis, 
2018).
Imperial feminism, essentially neoliberal feminism on an international scale, 
incorporates three characteristics. The first is it being market-centered, with the 
market promoted as the primary means to liberate women. This relates closely to 
the second characteristic of the appropriation of feminism used to offset domestic 
labor onto non-Western women in the wake of massive privatization. Finally, 
imperial feminism emphasizes the role of corporate-sponsored NGOs in tamping 
down activism. As with all forms of conservative feminism, the neoliberal form 
also accelerates the “insourcing” of labor to minority and immigrant women so as 
to free the professional (often white) woman from the constraints of unpaid labor 
(Rottenberg, 2018). Aftab (2017) presents the example of Nike’s social media 
marketing of their Pro Hijab as a form of feminist messaging in support of empire:
Why did an image of a woman in a headscarf appeal to the American masses 
so much? Perhaps what made it so palatable was that it turned protests and 
marches into feel-good events for white people. Perhaps it circulated so 
widely because it helped to deflect attention from the atrocities that the United 
States is actively committing abroad, allowing Americans to revel only in the 
benevolence of US liberalism. At times, visibility or diversity projects do the 
opposite of what they claim to be doing—in this case, demonstrate how they 
can include the faces of hijab-clad Muslims while remaining actively complicit 
in structures that harm this very community. (p. 35)
Another powerful form of conservative feminism incorporates right-wing 
ideologies. It is important to note that this form does not fit the definition of 
feminism presented at the start of this chapter—which necessitates centering on 
human rights and liberation. Yet enough women utilize feminist-sounding discourse 
or even identify as feminist to make this its own category. Traister (2018) notes 
the historical continuity between the involvement of white women in maintaining 
segregation during the Jim Crow era and those who regularly call the police to 
report black people doing innocuous things like eating or walking, providing an 
apt reminder that “women’s anger certainly isn’t always progressive” (para. 27). 
Because of their association with white men, white women occupy a social position 
that simultaneously allows them to participate in regressive movements, while 
being framed as feminist. As such, women like Phyllis Schlafly have been active in 
pushing against the Equal Rights Amendment and LGBTQI rights during the 1970s, 
utilizing “protecting the children” and “family values” discourse, and participating 
in anti-choice movements, all claiming to promote traditional values that are under 
threat (Goodman, 2016).
Kimmel (2017) addresses the irony of conservative Tea Party women who work 
outside the home, often as the lone breadwinner, while vocally rejecting the working 




These working women do not—cannot—embrace the traditional roles that 
the party might have envisioned for them…they want to. The women of the 
Tea Party believe themselves entitled to live in a traditional, conservative 
household. Their sense of aggrieved entitlement runs parallel to the men’s: 
they want their men to be the traditional heads of households, able to support 
their families. They want to be moms, not ‘women.’ (p. 65)
Similarly, during the Kavanaugh hearing, women who supported the Supreme Court 
nominee created social media groups centered around prioritizing how husbands and 
sons could be victimized by rape accusations, totally overlooking their own, their 
daughters’, or their sisters’ greater potential for victimization (Roesch, 2019).
Indeed, the 2016 election revealed that 45% of women holding college degrees 
voted for Trump (McClaren, 2016, para. 13). Even though most women ended up 
voting for Clinton, 61% of white women who did not have a college degree voted 
for Trump, “a man who bragged about grabbing women’s genitals without consent” 
(Windham, 2017, p. 10). In some cases, conservative feminism can extend beyond 
the electoral sphere into white supremacist organizations, where women regularly 
coordinate picnics, camping trips, parties, children’s events and other activities 
to create a sense of community cohesion around whiteness. For Kimmel (2017), 
conservative feminism represents an additional way to reinforce nostalgia and a 
restoration of white rule:
Feminist in practice, antifeminist in theory, conservative feminism hopes 
to secure the economy so that women can return to their families and their 
homes and leave the labor force…the Tea Party mobilizes angry white women 
alongside angry white men, wannabe stay-at-home moms alongside wannabe 
domestic patriarchs, looking back to a long-gone era in which white men went 
to work, supported their wives and families, and all the government programs 
that enabled and supported that…were paid for invisibly, so it appeared that 
they had built it all by themselves. (pp. 66–67)
An alternative to liberal, postmodern and conservative feminism is Marxist or 
socialist feminism. For the purposes of this chapter and book, the terms are used 
interchangeably, as they address the same questions: “how is the political economy 
gendered in late capitalism? And, how does the social reproduction of people 
and communities renew capitalism, rather than support anti-capitalist praxis?” 
(Armstrong, 2020, p. 7). However, this form of feminism is often overlooked or 
dismissed as being irrelevant or consigned to history. For example, a common 
misunderstanding about socialist feminism is that its association with Marxism 
means that it automatically employs a colorblind class analysis when the growth of 
this form of feminism was itself in response to more reductionist approaches to class 
being used among the male-dominated left (Bohrer, n.d.; Goodman, 2016). Enough 
time has passed to allow a mixture of corporate cooptation of and forgetting that 
International Women’s Day was first held in 1909 by the Socialist Party of America 
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to commemorate garment workers striking in New York. Not long after, the Russian 
Revolution had women on the front lines. Therefore, “it is not novel to tie socialism 
and feminism together; they are inextricably linked as movements and always have 
been” (O’Hagen, 2019, para. 5).
Likewise, a common critique of Marxism is that it rejects intersectionality, itself 
a concept claimed by postmodernists but that originated from a socialist feminist 
perspective of women of color dating back to Sojourner Truth and Anna Julia 
Cooper, along with the later Combahee River Collective:
In its most basic form, then, intersectionality is the theory that both structurally 
and experientially, social systems of domination are linked to one another and 
that, in order both to understand and to change these systems, they must be 
considered together. Intersectionality thus critiques theories that treat forms of 
oppression separately, as well as attempts to locate one axis of oppression as 
primary. (Bohrer, n.d., para. 3)
As Bohrer reminds us, the “call to extend Marx’s analysis beyond its original scope 
is precisely the project that all Marxism since the nineteenth century has taken up,” 
even if some leftist men refuse to recognize this (para. 35). In other words, socialist 
feminism advocates for an extension of Marx’s ideas, not a rejection of them. Both 
intersectionality and socialist feminism are compatible (Camfield, 2013).
Debates around the positioning of identity have long surrounded feminism as a 
whole, particularly the relationship of identity to the capitalist system (Bohrer, n.d.; 
Goodman, 2016). Marxist feminists, while supporting the aims of liberal feminism, 
disagree with mainstream feminism in terms of how to most effectively address 
oppression. Liberal feminists, to varying degrees, approach equality as achievable 
within the existing system, whereas leftist feminists assert that due to the relationship 
of gender with other aspects of identity such as race, a fundamental restructuring 
of the economy is essential in order to achieve full liberation (Burns, B., 2017; 
Tax, 2017). For that reason, one cannot solely use class analysis to account for the 
historically interconnected role of race and gender:
Economic class structure is merely one part of a complex and multifaceted 
system of domination in which patriarchy, white supremacy, colonization (both 
direct and indirect) and heterosexualism are fundamental…This approach does 
not de-emphasize more traditional class analysis but follows the key insights 
of intersectionality in arguing that class, race, gender, sexuality, colonization 
and imperialism are constituted in and through one another in such a way that 
class cannot be considered the master-term of capitalist accumulation and 
antagonism. A truly adequate analysis of capitalism, both theoretically and 
historically…treats capitalism as the original synthesis of these systems of 
dispossession. (Bohrer, n.d., para. 39)
Socialist feminism therefore opposes the concept of class reductionism, especially 
when it comes to issues of gender and social relations under capitalism, known as 
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social reproduction and including the concept of unwaged labor (Bohrer, n.d.). A 
more nuanced way of looking at gender in capitalism is that gender, along with 
race, just so happens to be one of several ways through which capitalism manifests 
itself as a totalizing system, in its process of constantly adapting (Theweleit, 2010a). 
An example of this is the patriarchal family form since the emergence of class-
based societies, which underwent a massive restructuring from centuries of the 
extended family model, to the nuclear family. Changes we are now seeing regarding 
the eroding centrality of marriage to family formation represents a more recent 
manifestation of the interconnectedness of sociological factors under capitalism. 
As with other feminisms (except for conservative forms), socialist feminism has 
significantly revised its 1960s-1980s conceptualizations of the family from assuming 
a default white, heteronormative, and two-parent forms to an expansion of the notion 
of family itself (Bohrer, n.d.).
What socialist feminism does is add the dimension of economics to liberal 
feminist issues such as sexual harassment, which are often framed within patriarchy. 
O’Hagen (2019) provides the example of how sexual assault is typically connected 
to power and patriarchy, encapsulated in the statement, “rape isn’t about sex, it’s 
about power.” However, often there is not much analysis of what structural societal 
features comprise such power, that leads to women being targeted for violence, 
such as being overrepresented in low-wage, non-unionized work, which is further 
tied to bosses controlling multiple aspects of their lives. Additionally, the lack of 
affordable housing, universal childcare, parental leave, a strong social safety net 
and limited access to health care often create situations where women are afraid to 
speak out against harassment and domestic violence. This also acknowledges that 
while more affluent professional women do experience sexual harassment, the brunt 
of the economic consequences fall on poor and minority women. Taken to a global 
scale, climate change hits those who have the fewest resources the hardest, because 
of women’s historical exclusion from land ownership and ability to shape policy 
(Burns, B., 2017).
In addition to postmodern critiques, the concept of fusing intersectionality within 
socialist feminist analysis has often been rejected by the Marxian left itself, in a 
form of calling for “socialist, not feminist” politics (not unlike the calls for the 
Democratic Party to reject identity politics in order to win over the white working 
class) (Bohrer, n.d.). This significantly underestimates the distinct connections that 
patriarchy has with capitalism that would result in thin analyses if this were not 
taken into account (Camfield, 2013). As O’Hagen (2019) asserts, “it’s complacent 
for any socialist to argue that ending capitalism will simply erase sexism from 
existence…Sexism persists because it is propped up by a deep-rooted set of beliefs 
and stereotypes that imagine women as inferior” (para. 6). At the same time, the 
necessity of understanding the need for feminist analysis within Marxism also 
underscores the necessity of socialism, “because women can’t fight against sexism 
as a whole if they’re too busy trying to keep their heads above water in an economic 
system that exploits them” (para. 6). For this reason, women’s-only spaces—such 
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as the Zapatistas—can be an essential component of organizing and need to be 
respected (Camfield, 2013).
Socialist feminism also provides one of the best ways to read the recent exciting 
rise in global activism, which shares the five traits of more radicalized demonstrations 
with the participation of young people; international cooperation; multi-movement 
coalitions; critiques of capitalism and patriarchy and a growing class consciousness 
happening within different demographics (Fierro & Vasco, 2019). These traits are 
critical because, “class struggle is how workers change themselves, realize their 
own social power, dramatically raise their class consciousness, and recognize 
the commonality of interests across divisions and the solidarity needed to win” 
(Blanchard, 2018, p. 25). Indeed, in looking historically at periods of leftist growth 
and radicalization of the working class, a common denominator has been feminists 
and leftists recognizing their shared experiences and priorities (Tax, 2017). More 
powerfully, many of the most successful movements incorporate intersectional 
leadership (Burns, B., 2017):
Actually-existing socialist organizing and politics aren’t the ideal that these 
socialists talk about. They exist within patriarchal societies. As a result, the 
actions and thinking of socialists will inevitably be limited and deformed 
by the patriarchal gender relations that we’re committed to uprooting. So, 
socialists need to develop our politics by learning from the actually-existing 
struggle against patriarchy (as well as learning from history). To do this we 
need feminism. (Camfield, 2013, para. 7)
Marxist feminism offers one of the most effective means to address the various 
ways that women in particular experience alienation, in the form of their labor being 
produced for others’ needs; being alienated from labor processes via automation—
again for the benefit of profit and not people; alienation from others via competing 
in a framework of scarcity, and alienation from the environment (Terzakis, 2018). 
Capitalism can often feel overwhelming because it not only determines our 
experiences of the present, but it reconstructs history itself: “no past class conflict or 
gender relation will ever be wholly dead…as long as the capitalist mode of production 
remains able to create the conditions for reintroducing it within the diverse territories 
of its own domain of power” (Theweleit, 2010a, p. 359). This creates a feeling of 
hopelessness, where “the present stretches on into infinity,” that change will not ever 
happen, or that it is futile to try (Nowak & Prashad, 2016, para. 35). A revolutionary 
response therefore becomes necessary, with wider—not narrowed—demands as 
socialist feminists in Argentina demand:
We are antipatriarchal, anticlerical, anti-capitalist and internationalist 
feminists and dissidents. We want legal abortion, a completely secular state, 
comprehensive sexual education with a gender and dissidence perspective, a 
dissolution of the Senate, and much, much more. We want everything and will 
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go for everything. And, as our young activists sing during every mobilization, 
“We will overthrow patriarchy, and with it, capitalism!” (Fierro & Vasco, 
2019, p. 45)
KEY ISSUES
As Goodman (2016) notes, “the election of the misogynist, racist, xenophobic 
billionaire Donald J. Trump handed women’s liberation its most direct and malicious 
challenges in more than 100 years” (p. 258). In particular, people in the US are 
realizing that rights that were once thought of as guaranteed by law, such as access 
to legal abortion, are now under threat. Those in Western democracies are also 
becoming aware of the fact that the political oppression they have only begun to 
see has been the reality for the majority of the world’s population. At the same time, 
events like the Kavanaugh Supreme Court hearing and the backlash against sexual 
harassment awareness remind us that we have never been in a post-feminist era. We 
are now confronting the fact that people hold contradictory perspectives on issues 
they filter through their “common sense,” but this is not the Gramscian form of 
common sense that works toward liberation (Nowak & Prashad, 2016). Instead, it 
is an aggressive and regressive common sense that seeks to entrench the status quo 
with a vengeance.
While it can be profoundly demoralizing come to grips with the fact that a 
significant minority of the population never ceases in their attempts to roll things 
back at least 100 years, our collective awakening to the interconnected nature of key 
issues provides the foundation for lasting resistance. Traditional conceptualizations 
of key feminist issues have only alluded to the intersection of gender with class, race, 
age, ability and other identities whereas now we are seeing a widening, more nuanced 
dialectical analysis of how these issues connect to each other under capitalism:
The profit-logic of capitalism, with its necessarily consequent ideas about 
reason, labour, race, gender and sexuality created both the metropole and 
the colonies simultaneously, and subjects on both sides of this divide were 
constructed, through systems of domination and exploitation, in the image of 
what capitalism needed to survive. That capitalism requires multiple kinds of 
exploitation, multiple forms of dispossession, and multiple kinds of subjects 
in order to gain global hegemony is corroborative evidence for Marx’s 
fundamental diagnosis of the system’s simultaneous resilience and its ultimate 
fragility. (Bohrer, n.d., para. 50)
Through this emerging understanding we can see how power operates through 
capitalism in relational ways, creating different experiences depending on one’s 
position in society. For example, while poor and minority women bear the brunt 
of sexism under capitalism, even more privileged women are not immune from its 
effects as we saw with the media’s treatment of Hillary Clinton during the 2016 
election.
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This section examines key issues that require both a Marxian and a feminist 
approach in order to comprehend what is happening. These include rape and 
assault, which also encompasses domestic violence; issues related to labor; the 
double standard in terms of media representation of female politicians; and the 
objectification of women within the media. It is important to note that while these 
issues are discussed in turn, they also overlap, as in the example of sexual harassment 
being a regular aspect of labor for many women in the workforce or how violent 
discourse and imagery impact how women are represented as sexual objects.
Rape and Assault
According to Carter (2014), over one third of women across the globe have been 
documented victims of violence, whether physical or sexual and most of those 
incidents are at the hands of intimate partners (p. 143). When considering unreported 
cases, this number is likely much higher, with a majority of women having been 
the victim of some sort of sexual harassment, rape, or domestic violence. The 
workplace in particular represents a space where women are likely to experience 
sexual harassment along with assessments of their abilities routinely based on their 
appearance and age (Paquette, 2017). This manifestation of sexism only adds to the 
climate where harassment is fostered. Recent activism around sexual harassment 
and rape have brought things like this to light, as Roesch (2019) notes:
One is the way in which women’s oppression continues to pervade and distort 
the most intimate aspects of their lives. In a move that has prompted discomfort 
as well as a potential backlash, the conversation has expanded beyond clear 
acts of harassment and assault to a deeper reexamination of sexual relations. 
(p. 10)
Socialist feminism is especially relevant for framing rape and assault because 
of its intersectional dimensions. For the most vulnerable, including poor, working-
class women and transgender women, rejecting a man’s sexual demands can mean 
violence or death. As an example, the primary cause of non-accidental death for 
Black women is murder, the majority of which is committed by intimate partners 
(Gallant, 2018, p. 39). After Hurricane Katrina, displaced women, who were already 
facing barriers to childcare and housing, had to contend with increased vulnerability 
to sexual assault—an important impact of the effects of climate change which makes 
this an environmental issue as well (Sanders, 2017).
Activism around rape and sexual harassment have also revealed that women who 
work in public and low-wage sectors are far more vulnerable. For example, close to 
80% of women agricultural workers have experienced harassment, abuse and rape 
(Schulte, 2018, p. 17). Because the majority of these workers are undocumented, 
they fear the consequences of deportation and loss of income that their families 
depend upon. In the US military, of the estimated 26,000 incidents of sexual 
harassment, fewer than 3,200 were reported and 300 prosecuted, representing just 
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over 1% of cases (Carter, 2014, p. 48). Roughly one third of female veterans stated 
they were victims of rape while in the military, with rape by colleagues being a 
primary contributor to PTSD in women (p. 49). Further, “US appellate judges have 
ruled in several cases that female victims, after release from the military, are not 
eligible for financial help for psychiatric or other damages unless they had reported 
the crime immediately after it occurred” (p. 48). Because the commanding officer 
holds the decision whether to move forward with prosecution for rape, victims are 
hesitant to report.
The #MeToo and #TimesUp campaigns have highlighted not only the egregious 
acts of men in positions of power, but the systemic protections that shield them from 
the consequences of their actions. Additionally, the experiences of those victimized 
by rape and sexual assault repeatedly demonstrate that “the rules that claim to be 
in place to protect women from abusers are there to protect the institutions from 
women’s complaints of abuse” (Schulte, 2018, p. 20). This happens through the 
design of the criminal justice system that serves to discourage all but the most 
determined and well-resourced women to report sexual harassment and rape cases. 
If a case makes it to trial, the focus turns to the actions of the victim, with personal 
and often unrelated details laid out for all to see through virtually unlimited cross-
examination by defense lawyers (Carter, 2014; Nicol, 2016; Schulte, 2018). Even if 
a group of women testifies against a single perpetrator, any inconsistencies between 
their accounts, which is often common in cases of sexual trauma, is used to create the 
perception that the victims are unreliable witnesses (Nicol, 2016). Sociological and 
psychological research about victims of sexual assault is not taken into consideration. 
Essentially, a woman “can be raped with impunity because she is not a believable 
witness” (Nicol, 2016, para. 32).
Rape and sexual harassment are unique in that the status of the victim in terms 
of her innocence is immediately the focus. This is due to the patriarchal construct 
of the “perfect victim,” where, in order to meet this standard, a woman must have 
absolutely no sexual history whatsoever attached to her (Nichol, 2016). Instead 
of assuming that the perpetrator is innocent until proven guilty as one would with 
robbery or even murder, the default position is that the woman is lying or has 
somehow “misinterpreted” the intent of the perpetrator (Loofbourow, 2018; Nichol, 
2016). Loofbourow (2018) explains:
We don’t question the particulars of someone’s account of their mugging, but rape 
inspires people to start panning the story for possible “misunderstandings…” 
The painful experiences claimed by women make no impression at all on 
a certain kind of man’s sense of reality. Her perspective is as unreal as it is 
inconsequential to him. Result: His and her story can be, in a limited and 
horrifying sense, equally true. (para. 13)
Loofbourow provides the example of Kavanaugh’s friend Mark Judge, who Christine 
Ford asserted was in the room at the time of her assault when she was a teenager. It is 
indeed possible that Judge had no recollection of witnessing the attack, not because 
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he was deliberately lying, but, more frighteningly, the event didn’t even register as 
significant enough for him to remember.
What lies beneath patriarchal assumptions regarding rape and sexual harassment is 
the double standard, or the notion of “boys will be boys,” more recently encapsulated 
in Trump’s dismissal of his past assault of women as “locker room talk” (Weida, 
2017). However, these sayings go beyond merely excusing men’s behaviors or even 
naturalizing them, to fully stating that white men in particular are entitled to what 
they consider to be “youthful indiscretions” without any sort of consequences or 
controls on their behaviors (Loofbourow, 2018; Traister, 2018). Further, it is not 
enough that women are supposed to endure these behaviors, they are expected to 
openly forgive and absolve their perpetrators so as not to “ruin their lives.” Solnit 
(n.d.) sees this as a way to invert the important gains of #MeToo and #TimesUp as 
more men are finally facing the threat that women have had enough:
The follow-up story to the #MeToo upheaval has too often been: how do the 
consequences of men hideously mistreating women affect men’s comfort? Are 
men okay with what’s happening? There have been too many stories about 
men feeling less comfortable, too few about how women might be feeling 
more secure in offices where harassing coworkers may have been removed or 
are at least a bit less sure about their right to grope and harass. Men themselves 
insist on their comfort as a right (para. 18)
Solnit points to the example of Larry Nassar, the gymnastics physician who 
abused girls, and then complained that the testimonies of his victims made him 
uncomfortable.
The televised Kavanaugh hearing as a whole presents a case study of white male 
entitlement in live time. Traister’s (2018) account of Republican responses to vocal 
protests during the first day of the hearings described a parade of privilege and 
dismissiveness, which was only a sign of things to come. When one of the female 
protestors accused Republican politicians of how cutting health care would lead to 
her death, Orrin Hatch responded, “We shouldn’t have to put up with this kind of 
stuff” (para. 5). Ben Sasse insisted that “maybe the ladies should all just calm down” 
and stop the hysterics of exaggerating about the impact of health care cuts (para. 5). 
Then came Christine Ford’s testimony of her assault at the hands of Kavanaugh 
when she was a teenager, which was a powerful indictment of not only Kavanaugh, 
but the Trump administration as a whole:
With Ford’s story came the explicit acknowledgment of what all those 
demonstrators had been working to convey for weeks: that this fight has been 
against an administration with virtually no regard for women, for their rights, 
or for the integrity of their bodies, either in the public or private sense. (para. 4)
The impact of Ford’s testimony was immediately apparent, with even Trump 
concerned that she sounded very credible. Because of her status as an upper-middle 
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class white woman, Republican politicians couldn’t use their usual discursive 
weapons to deny her experiences as they did with Anita Hill during the Clarence 
Thomas hearings in the 90s. Something bigger would have to do, in the form of 
presenting a united white male grievance front. This involved taking the focus off 
of Ford and her believability—which they knew they had no chance of fighting—
and placing it onto their supposed victimization. Aside from Kavanaugh’s red-
faced, tear-filled angry tirade at even having to hear Ford’s testimony, there was 
Lindsey Graham’s resentful declaration of, “I’m a single white male from South 
Carolina, and I’m told to shut up, but I will not shut up” (Beauchamp, 2018b, 
para. 2). Beauchamp notes that this quote marked the moment when the stakes of 
this hearing were elevated beyond just Kavanaugh and Ford:
It’s about beating back the challenge from feminists and people of color 
demanding a seat at the table; it is about showing that white men in power are 
not going anywhere—that they will not listen, will not budge, and will not give 
ground to #MeToo or the Black Lives Matter movement. (para. 3)
In particular, Graham’s statement inverts a key assertion by women and minorities 
that “white men in positions of privilege don’t have direct experiences with hostile 
sexism or racism, and should listen to the people who have” (Beauchamp, 2018b, para. 
12). Indeed, during the hearings, one of the White House lawyers expressed concern 
that if Kavanaugh could be “brought down” by such accusations, then “every man 
certainly should be worried,” a statement echoed by other conservative politicians 
and pundits (Loofbourow, 2018, para. 3). The idea that Supreme Court Justice, one 
of the most powerful and permanent positions in government, isn’t automatically 
granted to a nominee, but said nominee is held to scrutiny is considered an affront 
too difficult for an oppressed white male to bear:
“I will not shut up” is a perfect mantra for Trumpian backlash politics. There 
is no risk that white men are, en masse, going to be silenced: They occupy the 
commanding heights of power in every walk of American life. The demands 
that they be quiet at times are a response to the overrepresentation of their 
voices, that they understand what life is like for more vulnerable people and 
then change the way they act accordingly. (Beauchamp, 2018b, para. 13)
Ultimately, rape and sexual harassment are manifestations of a misogyny that 
is not outside the norm, but built directly into the structures of institutions and 
relationships. Much of this is religiously informed as well, with women cast as 
inferior and subservient to men (Carter, 2014). In commenting on the doubling down 
of prominent politicians after the Kavanaugh hearing, Loofbourow’s (2018) sober 
assessment effectively sums up the realizations of many women just waking up to 
the authoritarian populism and fascism in their midst:
It is now clear, and no exaggeration at all, that a significant percentage of 
men—most of them Republicans—believe that a guy’s right to a few minutes 
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of “action” justifies causing people who happen to be women physical pain, 
lifelong trauma, or any combination of the two. They’ve decided—at a moment 
when they could easily have accepted Kavanaugh’s denial—that something 
larger was at stake: namely, the right to do as they please, freely, regardless 
of who gets hurt. Rather than deny male malfeasance, they’ll defend it. Their 
logic could not be more naked or more self-serving: Men should get to escape 
consequences for youthful “indiscretions” like assault, but women should 
not—especially if the consequence is a pregnancy. (para.15)
Labor
Since capitalism depends on the labor of women, including unpaid domestic 
and emotional support work, it is not possible to separate women’s inequality at 
work from the discrimination they face outside of it (Penny, 2011; Roesch, 2019). 
Globally, women are responsible performing two thirds of all work, yet 70% remain 
in poverty and 66% are illiterate due to lack of access to education or having to work 
to support their families, even as children (Carter, 2014, p. 86). Climate change also 
more dramatically impacts women, who are often displaced after weather events due 
to inability to afford housing in less affected regions:
It’s the women and children who increasingly have to go further and further 
from their homes to get water or face the daily threat of drought who do not 
have the luxury of being in denial about climate shifts. In fact, climate-change 
policy debates and ideological wars are a luxury that only men…and people of 
color with privilege can afford. The real, unfortunate truth is that the world’s 
predominantly female poor will feel the effects of any and all attempts to 
soften, silence, or deny climate change. (Sanders, 2017, p. 20)
As Weida (2017) observes, “it seems there is no resume solid enough, no political 
pedigree pure enough to overcome sexism and misogyny in America” (para.16). 
Though capitalism has adopted neoliberal feminist discourse in shaping workplace 
policies within more prosperous democracies, gender inequality is an inherent 
feature of the workplace. Despite women making up nearly 50% of the workforce 
in the US and receiving more college degrees than men, women who work full time 
still earn just over 76% of what men do (Carter, 2014, p. 168). Older women often 
face additional employment discrimination (Paquette, 2017). Even in more “liberal” 
and privileged job sectors, such as postsecondary education, women only hold 28% 
of professorships at the highest rank and earn 80% of male professors of similar rank 
(Carter, 2014, p. 170). Within attacks on K-12 education, a combination of funding 
cuts and privatization has targeted women, in particular “mass layoffs of teachers of 
color” along with increased policing of black students through the school-to-prison 
pipeline (Blanchard, 2018, p. 12).
Massive sociological changes within a short period of time have shaped the 
composition of households, with women often placed in the role as sole income 
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earner or, at the very least, vital to the survival of a two-income-earner household. 
Currently, 44% of mothers who work outside the home are the only income earner in 
their families, with 25% co-breadwinners who contribute one fourth to half of their 
household’s income (Roesch, 2019, p. 14). Black women provide over 86% of their 
household’s income, illustrating the impact of race and gender on labor (p. 14). This 
is in sharp contrast to 1950, where 93% households consisted of married people with 
children (p. 13). By 2017, just over 20% of children live in single-mother-headed 
households (p. 13). As the median age for marriage approaches 30 along with more 
people opt out of marriage, this is continuing to shape the formation of the family.
Labor also involves the harder-to-track but far more ubiquitous forms of unpaid 
labor or reproductive work, which includes things like household maintenance (itself 
a vast category of work), child care, care for older relatives, agricultural work, extra 
errands at work, and the like (Burns, B., 2017). This is borne out by the astounding 
statistic that of all goods sold in developed countries, 80% are purchased by women 
(Penny, 2011, p. 1). Often this unpaid labor is accompanied by the labor of emotional 
support that often falls on women who are already employed full time, as Piepzna-
Samarasinha (2017) aptly sums up:
They’re going to ask you to listen, do a favor, do an errand, drop everything 
to go buy them some cat food or crisis counsel them. Manage logistics, 
answer feelings emails, show up, empathize, build and maintain relationships. 
Organize the childcare, the access support, the food. Be screamed at, de-
escalate, conflict resolute. They’re going to say, “Can I just pick your brain 
about something?” and then send you a five-paragraph email full of pretty 
goddam complex questions. It’d be real nice if you could get back to them 
ASAP. They’re going to ask if you can email them your PowerPoint and all 
your resources. Some of them will be people who are close to you; some of 
them will be total strangers. Do you have a minute? For free. Forever. And you 
know what’s going to happen? You’re going to do those things. Because you 
do, indeed, care. (p. 21)
Even though more affluent women perform such reproductive and emotionally 
supportive labor, they are often able to offset it by paying poor and minority women 
for maid service and child care, at often poverty-wage levels. Penny (2011) links 
this to “western women’s despair at the very point of asking our male relatives to 
do their bit, our unwillingness to challenge the system at its root” where “an entire 
generation has been willing to simply hand down their oppression to poor, migrant, 
and ethnic minority women” (p. 61). Essentially, exploitation through reproductive 
labor is now shifted onto a specific segment of the population who are also women. 
This is reflected in women making up three fourths of the top ten lowest wage jobs, 
with much of that work in service industry occupations (Roesch, 2019, p. 15). This 
type of work is also associated with higher rates of sexual harassment, with 50% of 
all women who work in food service reporting unwanted sexual advances (Sustar, 
2018, p. 38).
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In examining issues related to labor and gender, it is clear that “working-class 
women are valued less by just about every measure—wages, benefits, housing, 
education” and that this isn’t an accidental development (Schulte, 2018, p. 23). It is 
of benefit to the capitalist class to disrupt any form of solidarity between men and 
women, especially to reinforce the idea that women are gaining too much power 
at the expense of men. At the same time, the capitalist class is all too aware of the 
consequences of women themselves coming together and saying “no”:
Female power of refusal is the single most scary, most horrifying, most 
insistently phobic thing facing any society, ever. Women could, in theory, 
refuse to cook and clean and care and keep society running. Women could 
refuse to fit themselves out in conformity with the patriarchal proclivity not 
just for staid, acceptable sex, but for social order. (Penny, 2011, p. 62)
Media Representation
Female politicians represent an important case study that is worth examining 
concerning the double standard inherent in media representation. Dittmar (2016) 
analyzes how female candidates’ appearance and mannerisms are more of a media 
focus than their intelligence or policy positions, where coverage “includes more 
attention to hair, hemlines, and husbands” (para. 12). Common examples include an 
intense analysis of voice and inflection, as in critiques of Carly Fiorina and Hillary 
Clinton for being “shrill, whiny, or unnecessarily angry or nagging,” all age-old 
sexist stereotypes applied to women (para. 10). Right-wing blogger Matt Drudge 
created a front-page headline and feature story on his website speculating on if 
Clinton wore wigs or not and Slate noting that she dressed like a lesbian, even if 
she wasn’t one herself. While all critiques of female politicians like Clinton are not 
inherently sexist, people rarely seem to ask, “am I judging this woman candidate in 
ways that no candidate could ever measure up?” (Wilz, 2016, p. 357).
A key component of differential treatment of female politicians in the media 
includes the requirement that they be “likable.” This includes having to walk a 
fine line between masculine and feminine performances and involves behaviors 
like not talking too loudly, smiling more and certainly never openly confronting 
sexism (Penny, 2011; Wilz, 2016). Even after being subjected to three years of 
Trump’s public conduct, the media continues to speculate on the likability of 2020 
presidential candidates like Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris. It is clear that male 
candidates can adopt any manner of masculine posing, and still be within the realm 
of acceptability and relatability, as with Trump’s treatment during the entire runup to 
the 2016 election as a candidate with equivalent viability. Another example includes 
Clinton and Sanders advocating the same policy positions, but Sanders’ positions 




In this sense, Hillary Clinton represents the apex of unlikability, not only due 
to her serious demeanor, but because she doesn’t let a sexist remark go unnoticed. 
During a 2015 debate with Clinton, Bernie Sanders rebutted her questioning his 
record on gun control by stating, “all the shouting in the world” wouldn’t stop gun 
violence (Dittmar, 2016, para. 11). The very next day, Clinton referred to Sanders’ 
statement at a political appearance, noting, “I’ve been told to stop, and I quote, 
‘shouting about gun violence.’ Well, first of all, I’m not shouting. It’s just, when 
women talk, some people think we’re shouting” (para. 11). The media continued to 
dismiss Clinton’s policy positions—as well as the concerns of millions of female 
voters—by focusing on unfounded conspiracies about emails, fueled by Wikileaks’ 
distribution of Russian sources: “over and over again, Clinton voters watched the 
media ignore a woman’s experience in both foreign and domestic matters and her 
extensive, well thought out platform in favor of chasing the titillating shadow of her 
alleged misconduct“ (Weida, 2017, para. 18).
A more extreme example of likability applied to Clinton was Meet the Press’s 
Twitter critique of her as being “over-prepared” when there was no comparison 
to Trump’s ill-prepared performance (Kellner, 2017). Apparently, a woman being 
prepared is too alienating and unfriendly, as Weida (2017) explains,
When given a choice between a blatantly sexist, incompetent man who spewed 
violence at every turn and a calm, controlled woman who had steered our 
country through troubled waters for the better part of a decade, 46.4% of the 
voting populace pulled the lever for the nightmare we are currently living. 
The threat of nuclear war, racism in the White House, and the slow bleed out 
of Constitutional Rights was more palatable than a woman who didn’t “smile 
enough” and seemed “too prepared.” (para. 22)
The double standard of media treatment applied to female politicians also takes 
on social class dimensions. Washington Examiner media writer Eddie Scarry shared 
a photo on Twitter of Representative Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez in office attire, with 
the caption “I’ll tell you something, that jacket and coat don’t look like a girl who 
struggles” (Del Valle, 2018, para. 4). This remark was an attack on Ocasio-Cortez’s 
embracing of her background as a working-class Latina, open solidarity with her 
younger, multi-racial constituency, and her direct critiques of the capitalist class. As 
Del Valle explains, “the underlying message in Scarry’s tweet is clear: if people are 
really from working-class backgrounds, they can’t afford to look well put together 
or elegant” (para. 9). Scarry’s remark also alludes to the common conservative 
talking point that people aren’t really be poor if they have a television or cell phone; 
therefore, “people who can’t afford things like health care or housing are blamed for 
their inability to do so” (para. 19).
Because women candidates are often vocal supporters of issues like reproductive 
rights or equal pay, this automatically “feminizes” these issues and frames them 
as less important compared to “real” policy, touted by male candidates (Dittmar, 
2016; Wilz, 2016). Hillary Clinton took on the notion of “playing the gender card” 
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by replying, “if calling for equal pay and paid leave is playing the gender card, then 
deal me in…if helping more working parents find quality, affordable childcare is 
playing the gender card, then I’m ready to ante up” (Dittmar, 2016, para. 17). Indeed, 
constant criticisms of female supporters of Clinton took the form of accusations of 
“vagina voting,” implying that the only reason women voted for her was because of 
their shared gender. The irony is that male voters continually express gender affinity 
through their voting patterns, but often get to hide behind party affiliation as well as 
men nearly exclusively running for office since the founding of the United States. 
Dittmar discusses exit polling from 27 Democratic primaries where Clinton earned 
60% of the female vote compared to 49% of the male vote (para. 18). In contrast, 
Sanders gained 38% of female voters and 48% of male voters (para. 18).
Objectification
Closely associated with the double standard in terms of how women are portrayed 
within the media is their hostile objectification and sexualization without their 
consent, as a form of diminishment and gender policing. Wilz (2016) points to 
the example of search engines, where typing in the name of a male politician, like 
Trump, Cruz, or Sanders along with the word “porn” yields far fewer graphic results 
than doing the same with Clinton, Pelosi, or Palin. This form of pornification carries 
over into the daughters of female politicians, as a way to censure the audacity of 
women seeking public office:
Pornification highlights sexuality in contexts that otherwise are not normally 
sexualized and, through the use of crude humor or gender-based parody, 
disciplines individuals who do not conform to traditional gender norms. 
Furthermore, because women candidates perpetually combat the double bind 
between femininity and competence, media frames that cast them as sex 
objects undermine their credibility as leaders in ways that the same frames do 
not undercut male candidates. (p. 358)
Not just limited to more prominent women seeking office or celebrities, 
objectification is saturated throughout all forms of media and extends into everyday 
life. As soon as a woman is perceived to have stepped “out of line”—in other words, 
going about her daily life in public—they are immediately disciplined through being 
called a slut or other sexual slurs, nearly always paired with the words “ugly” and 
“fat.” Penny (2011) asserts this is a form of backlash against the legal gains that 
women have made under feminism. The increased policing of women’s bodies. 
which has accelerated under neoliberalism, includes intensified monitoring of any 
kind of fat, in any form, and is tied to men’s fears of women gaining power:
Cellulite, saggy bellies, fat around the arms, natural processes which affect 
all female bodies, even the leanest, after puberty, are particularly loathed…
the threat that patriarchal birthright will be “swallowed up” or “suffocated” 
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by gender equality is made manifest in the fear of female fat, and that phobic 
response to the reality of physical femaleness has been internalized by women 
and men across the western world. (Penny, 2011, pp. 32–33)
Trump himself regularly demeans women through attacks on their appearance, as 
in his connecting Fox News host Mika Brzezinski’s facelift to her lack of intelligence 
(Paquette, 2017). Many women could relate to this because of how they are regularly 
judged based on their appearance, which is directly connected to age and gender 
discrimination in the workplace. During a 2016 rally, Trump referred to his debate 
with Hillary Clinton: “I’m standing at my podium and she walks in front of me, 
right. She walks in front of me, and when she walked in front of me, believe me, 
I wasn’t impressed” (Kellner, 2017, p. 5). Transgender bodies are also constantly 
surveilled, as in 2015 when Mike Huckabee, in a speech to a religious broadcasters 
convention, flippantly remarked, “I wish someone had told me that when I was in 
high school I could have felt like a woman when it came time to take showers in 
PE” (Dittmar, 2016, para. 7). Here, we see this feeble attempt at humor used to 
diminish transgender identity as a matter of flippant decision-making. With this 
type of comment, Huckabee and others also employ sexism to “present masculinity 
and sexuality as mutually reinforcing, so that masculine dominance relies upon 
heteronormativity” (para. 7).
A major contribution to the use of objectification as a form of backlash is the 
legalization of oral contraceptives in 1965 (Penny, 2011; Mason, 2016). This marked 
the moment when women’s sexual activity could be separated from pregnancy and, 
more importantly, placed that decision squarely into the hands of women. The arrival 
of the pill, along with other forms of contraception, has been one of the single biggest 
contributing factors to the growth of women participating in the paid workforce. 
Women could determine when and how far apart to space having children, assuming 
they even elected to have children in the first place. As a result, the “post-Fordist 
capitalist control of women’s gendered labor needed to be extended beyond the 
sexual and into the substantive, nutritive, and the semiotic architecture of gender 
and physicality itself” (Penny, 2011, p. 4). The monitoring of women’s bodies had to 
move into other aspects of daily life.
In particular, capitalism feeds on two powerful, gendered insecurities: discontent 
with one’s appearance and responsibility to meet men’s needs, both aspects of women 
being expected to keep themselves in check (Penny, 2011; West, 2016; Solnit, n.d.). 
Both of these insecurities have spawned massive profit in the cosmetics, lifestyle 
coaching/counseling, fitness, household maintenance, boutique foods, and other 
related industries. As West (2016) notes, women are exposed to constant media 
messaging, which has become internalized and reinforced through interactions with 
others. This “steers humanity toward conservatism and walls the narrow interests of 
men, and keeps us adrift in waters where women’s safety and humanity are secondary 
to men’s pleasure and convenience” (p. 19). An example of this is Stormy Daniels’ 
interview with Anderson Cooper regarding her past involvement with Trump, where 
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she explained, “I had it coming for making a bad decision for going into someone’s 
room alone…well you put yourself in a bad situation and bad things happen, so you 
deserve this” (Solnit, n.d., para. 14). On the flip side, Solnit notes how the media also 
portrays Daniels as an opportunist because of her financial success.
Finally, while the media superficially conflates 24/7 surveillance of the female 
body with liberation, what is actually happening is that objectification has become 
a form of alienation under capitalism. As Penny (2011) notes, “we live in a world 
which worships the unreal female body and despises real female power” (p. 22). This 
is reflected in how men’s suffering—defined as not getting what they feel entitled 
to at that very moment—is viewed as more significant than “a woman in pain who 
has never been told that what she wants might matter” (Loofbourow, 2018, para. 10). 
Ultimately, by remaining fixated on what women need to do to improve their bodies, 
this limits the scope of our political expectations to highly individualized things like 
weight or lifestyle fixes, as a form of personal responsibility, which then becomes 
the flippant go-to solution when presented with larger social problems (West, 2016).
“IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING”: AGAINST BROCIALISM
One of the more challenging problems that socialist feminists confront is sexism 
and racism on the part of leftist men. This ranges from regular dismissal of the 
importance of acknowledging the need to include feminism as part of Marxist 
analysis and organizing, to condescending forms of communication, to exploiting 
the characteristics of patriarchal constructions of leftist organizations to sexually 
harass and rape women (Goodman, 2016; Morris, 2010). “It goes without saying” 
refers to the usual opening response of leftist men when socialist feminists raise 
important issues related to gender, race, and sexuality, as in, “it goes without saying 
that these are major problems, but once capitalism has ended, these problems will 
as well.” Women are supposed to sacrifice their political interests for the larger aims 
of the group so as not to be “divisive.” Often this takes the form of “mansplaining,” 
where males will assume a condescending tone in online settings, to lecture women 
about things like what makes someone a real feminist or what is or isn’t racism. A 
more dramatic example of mansplaining took place in an online comment that went 
viral where someone identifying as male told women they were overinflating the 
estimated cost of tampons by not using them correctly (Khan, 2019).
A more recent social-media-based term for sexist leftist men is brocialist, 
combining characteristics of “bro” behavior (immature, fraternity culture, centered 
on male bonding/joking around) with socialist or left-progressive beliefs. Manarchist 
and manarchism are similar terms, referencing the anarchist community. The 
accompanying ideology—brocialism—advocates for a more aggressive insistence 
on colorblind Marxism, often using “edgy” and ironic discourse via social media, 
usually commenting rapid-fire in groups. When confronted about their sexism, they 




Brocialists are quintessentially anti-intersectional…they dominate spaces, 
manipulate women, and dismiss identity politics as “divisive.” Typically, they 
are privilege-blind cishet white men, often significantly above the poverty 
line…who refuse to acknowledge oppression and privilege, intersectional or 
otherwise, outside of classism and socioeconomic status…brocialists refuse to 
accept that within their own movement (as within society more broadly) there 
may be misogyny, from mansplaining to rape threats; resorting instead to the 
No True Scotsman fallacy by accusing feminists and other critics that they 
must be speaking to the wrong so-called “socialists.” (SJWiki, para. 3)
Morris (2010) provides an example of a meeting organizer who would dominate 
gatherings by speaking loudly, using difficult vocabulary to shut people out of the 
discussion and talk down to those he considered less intelligent. If anyone pointed 
this out, “he would feign ignorance…and complain of being infantilized” when he 
was the one patronizing the members (para. 13).
Though Sanders himself is a vocal supporter of women’s rights, a segment 
of his brocialist followers, dubbed “Bernie Bros” were described as “flustered, 
shouting white guys” who regularly dismissed feminism while aggressively touting 
a colorblind class analysis (Dittmar, 2016, para. 18). During the Democratic 
primaries, comments from Bros included “their vaginas are making terrible choices,” 
referencing the stereotype of women only supporting Clinton because of her gender, 
along with regularly using “bitch” and “cunt” to describe both Clinton and her 
supporters (McMorris-Santoro, 2016, para. 5). The comments of the Bros seemed to 
advance a nostalgic view of past elections without female candidates being gender 
neutral and not cluttered up with identity politics, when “gender dynamics have been 
at play in all US presidential elections to date” (Dittmar, 2016, para. 1).
Sensing that the online harassment was beginning to negatively impact Sanders, 
his campaign officials reached out to the Clinton campaign to apologize and try to 
more intensely monitor Facebook and Twitter pages for “Bro-y” posts (McMorris-
Santo, 2016, para. 3). Male Sanders supporters responded by either asserting that 
the Bernie Bro persona was a fictional media construct meant to attack Sanders or 
distancing themselves by calling out the Bro behavior. As McMorris-Santo describes, 
“online Sanders supporters always stress in conversation that the vast majority of 
Sanders supporters aren’t Bros—and they claim many of the so-called Bros can in 
fact regularly be found posting in conservative forums” (para. 39). Indeed, much of 
the Bro posts ranged in style from a detached mansplaining, to angry accusations of 
Clinton supporters trying to bring Bernie down, “a style of discourse that’s anathema 
to the progressive, feminist quarters of the internet that share many of Sanders’ 
policy views” (para. 29).
The foundation of misogyny and racism within leftist spaces is the refusal of 
socialist men to acknowledge the need for intersectional Marxist analysis. A recent 
example was the 2016 World Conservation Congress failing to directly acknowledge 
women or gender within the motions brought to the membership (Burns, B., 2017). 
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Because of insisting on automatically “folding in” the issues of women and minorities 
into socialist organizing by never directly using the term “feminism,” this creates a 
climate where sexism can occur unchallenged as well as making it more difficult for 
women who have been harassed and assaulted to come forward (Camfield, 2013). 
Accounts of leftist women have included organizations ignoring or covering up 
instances of patronizing behaviors, intimidation, domestic abuse, sexual harassment, 
and rape (Morris, 2010; Wrigley-Field, 2019).
As Morris (2010) points out, rather than being an anomaly, sexism is built into 
the functioning of many leftist organizations as well as representing a major reason 
these organizations often collapse because of their vulnerability to infiltration 
by informants. In recounting her experiences with leftist men within socialist 
organizations, the failure to address misogyny is apparent:
Despite all that we say to the contrary, the fact is that radical social movements 
and organizations in the United States have refused to seriously address gender 
violence as a threat to the survival of our struggles. We’ve treated misogyny, 
homophobia, and heterosexism as lesser evils—secondary issues—that will 
eventually take care of themselves or fade into the background once the “real” 
issues—racism, the police, class inequality, U.S. wars of aggression—are 
resolved. There are serious consequences for choosing ignorance. Misogyny 
and homophobia are central to the reproduction of violence in radical activist 
communities. Scratch a misogynist and you’ll find a homophobe. (para. 4)
Morris discusses the activist accounts of Assata Shakur, Elaine Brown, and Roxanne 
Dunbar-Ortiz who all noted that the same organizations that were easily infiltrated 
by informants also happened to be spaces that regularly overlooked gender violence.
It is also worth examining that the political trajectories of many older far-right 
spokesmen such as Irving Kristol, David Horowitz and Michael Savage, once involved 
memberships in New Left groups and movements from the 1930s to the 1960s (Nagel, 
2017; Packer, 2016). These movements were typically rigid, ultra-doctrinaire and 
relegated women (assuming they were part of the organizations) to service-oriented 
positions. More contemporary alt-right figures like Andrew “Weev” Auernheimer once 
participated in the Occupy actions and “now regularly posts anti-Semitic and anti-
gay rants on YouTube, has a swastika tattoo on his chest and was the self-appointed 
president of a trolling initiative called the Gay Nigger Association of America” (Nagle, 
2017a, p. 16). The discursive tone within these New Left groups (both online and in-
person) is often indistinguishable from the right-wing ones they now occupy.
Ghomeshi (2018), a Canadian journalist who was accused (and later acquitted) of 
sexual assault by multiple women, provides insight into the ability of sexist men to 
take cover in leftist organizations:
At some point, when it came to women, I began to use my liberal gender 
studies education as a cover for my own behavior. I was ostensibly so schooled 
in how sexism works that I would arrogantly give myself a free pass…before 
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2014, it was unimaginable that I would become a poster boy for men who 
are assholes. I had not been a network boss or an executive with institutional 
power; there had been no formal complaints at work that I was aware of over 
the years. (p. 29)
Ghomeshi also catalogues an extensive list of activities that provided him progressive 
street cred, including wearing the right slogans on his t-shirts, speaking at liberal 
events, participating in marches, and supporting various social justice causes.
Organizational structures and their insistence on handling things “in-house” 
(because law enforcement is an arm of the capitalist class) also provide cover for sexual 
predators. Morris (2010) recounts several sexual assaults experienced by female and 
transgender volunteers from Common Ground one year after Hurricane Katrina. These 
assaults were committed by white men, but the leadership of the organization “shifted 
the blame to the surrounding Black community,” in the form of distributing warnings 
to female activists to not be out alone at night, building on racist stereotypes of the 
Upper Ninth Ward being a “dangerous place” (para. 9). Essentially, it was “easier to 
criminalize Black men from the neighborhood than to acknowledge that white women 
and transgender organizers were most likely to be assaulted by the white men they 
worked with” (para. 9). One man was finally reported to the police, but only after 
he assaulted three women in the span of one week. The more recent example of the 
dissolution of the International Socialist Organization after it surfaced that the group 
mishandled an accusation of sexual assault is another example of the organizational 
structure providing cover for gender violence to continue (Wrigley-Field, 2019).
A subset of brocialist also openly supports authoritarian regimes like Putin or 
Assad, simply on the basis of them being considered enemies of the US. Known as 
tankies, these individuals will employ whataboutism to reference the imperialism of 
the US as a way to make excuses for oppressive rulers, similar to apologists for Stalin 
(SJWiki, n.d.). One of the more prominent tankies is Julian Assange, often celebrated 
for his self-styled whistleblower journalism through WikiLeaks. Originating with 
a specific focus on anti-war activism through releasing videos of the US military 
committing war crimes, eventually Assange’s efforts moved in a more disturbing 
and far-from-social-justice-oriented direction. In massively dumping documents 
with no vetting in the name of “transparency,”
WikiLeaks also posted links to a set of huge voter databases, including one 
with the names, addresses, and other contact information for nearly every 
woman in Turkey. It also apparently published the files of psychiatric patients, 
gay men, and rape victims in Saudi Arabia. Soon after that, WikiLeaks began 
leaking bundles of hacked Democratic National Committee e-mails. (Halpern, 
2017, para. 12)
Halpern goes on to recount how Assange refused to disguise the identity of Afghani 
civilians in the Manning leak, with the blanket response, “Well they’re informants. 
So, if they get killed, they’ve got it coming to them. They deserve it” (para. 9).
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Assange has also been tied to alt-right and nationalist figures like Nigel Farage, 
former head of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and Israel Shamir, anti-Semitic 
associate of Putin who shared documents from the Manning leak with Belarusian 
President Lukashenko, who then used the documents to “imprison and torture 
members of the opposition” (Halpern, 2017, para. 8). More recently, there is the 
example of Russian intelligence efforts to influence the US election through the 
WikiLeaks hack (Halpern, 2017; Kellner, 2017). It is also telling how Assange 
expresses open contempt for feminism. Silverman (2017) reviews footage of 
Assange responding to allegations of sexual assault by two women:
Assange’s own lawyers seem exasperated with him at times, particularly 
during a scene where he blames “radical feminists” for his legal problems. 
As the scene continues, Assange mulls how one accuser might be ripe for 
character assassination, but he decides it’s far harder to torpedo the reputations 
of two accusers. Going public with their accusations could be difficult for the 
women, Assange proposes, implying that WikiLeaks supporters would make 
their lives miserable. Perhaps, he says, adopting a vague, conditional tone, he 
could apologize for whatever hurt he may have somehow caused. Later in the 
film, he states his belief that these accusations actually brought him and his 
organization valuable attention. (Silverman, 2017, para. 7)
Ultimately, the sheer amount of resources and energy that misogyny takes 
from activist movements slowly erodes the solidarity that is necessary to confront 
oppression under capitalism. While we can expect right-wing spaces to be patriarchal, 
authoritarian, and racist, the fact that leftist groups and leaders can harbor the same 
ideologies is demoralizing. Time that should be spent on organizing and community 
outreach is instead devoted to addressing sexual harassment and assault, assuming 
that those are even acknowledged. Because of the marginalized status of leftists in 
countries like the US, instances of gender violence are often assumed to be false 
constructions by the capitalist class to divide the movement (Wrigley-Field, 2019). 
This creates a default cover for misogyny to flourish. As Morris (2010) stresses:
We have a right to be angry when the communities we build that are supposed 
to be the model for a better, more just world harbor the same kinds of antiqueer, 
antiwoman, racist violence that pervades society. As radical organizers we 
must hold each other accountable and not enable misogynists to assert so much 
power in these spaces. Not allow them to be the faces, voices, and leaders of 
these movements. (para. 22)
CONCLUSION
Socialist feminism is relevant and necessary for confronting authoritarian populism 
and fascism. It advocates an intersectional analysis, which is critical because of the 
multifaceted nature of oppression within capitalism. Power operates in a variety 
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of ways, and is experienced differently depending on one’s position in society; 
understanding this allows us to respond accordingly. As Camacho (2016) concludes, 
“we will have to utilize all of the legal, political, economic, activist/organizing, 
artistic, and religious means available to us (para. 9). Socialist feminism allows us 
to deal with the many contradictions inherent in people’s common-sense formation 
of their understanding of the world, changing common sense into “the good sense of 
our times” (Nowak & Prashad, 2016, para. 12).
It is also clear that though there have been important gains within the past few 
decades, the current political system is not meeting the needs of the working class, 
and of women in particular. The fact that much of political discourse and policy—
whether liberal or conservative— remains mired in a nostalgic past prevents the 
ability to enact a dialectical materialist vision:
The time of the present is over, and the time of the future is at hand. What 
this means is not that we are on the threshold of a breakthrough, but that the 
managers of our world order are not capable of solving our problems. That 
means that the present has no solutions for us. We need to seek our solutions 
from the future, from a different way of ordering our needs and our luxuries, 
our excesses and our scarcities. (Nowak & Prashad, 2016, para. 41)
What is needed is to build a militant, unified movement across the global working 
class that is focused on meaningful change (Goodman, 2016). Socialist feminism 
can provide a foundation for that vision and a strong enough one for confronting the 
growing threat of authoritarian populism and fascism.
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CHAPTER 2
FASCISM AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM
Similarities, Differences, and New Organizational Forms
INTRODUCTION
Historical parallels between today’s political events and pre-WW2 Germany are 
a common sight on social media, whether in meme or op ed form. This ubiquity 
has reached such heights that the memetic concept of Godwin’s Law was created, 
positing that as a comments thread on an Internet site gains activity, the probability of 
someone comparing said topic to Hitler or the Nazis approaches 1 (Godwin, 2018). 
Anyone who brings up Hitler is then deemed as having lost the debate. Initially 
meant as a satirical way to characterize online discourse, Godwin’s Law has taken on 
new relevance after the 2016 election, where even Godwin himself acknowledged 
it was no longer hyperbole to compare Trump, the alt-right, or Bolsonaro to Hitler 
(Mandelbaum, 2017).
Within liberal and leftist discourse, calls for vigilance regarding fascism and the 
political climate are ever-present, evidenced by the viral spread of posts such as 
Lawrence Britt’s (2003) Fourteen Defining Characteristics of Fascism. Even though 
he was referred to as “Dr. Britt,” Britt himself emphasized that he was not a historian, 
and had written the list in response to the George W. Bush administration post-
9/11. Since then, the list has been used by various liberal and conservative groups to 
make a point in online arguments across cyberspace, whenever rhetorically useful. 
In particular, the enduring popularity of this list has taken on a life of its own, often 
shaping how the left conceptualizes fascism and attempts to confront it, most often 
unsuccessfully.
Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, it was highly stigmatizing to the right to 
label its associated movements as fascist. However, since then, much of the right’s 
activities has moved into the electoral arena, so it becomes less effective to apply 
the fascist label. As Renton (2019) asserts, it creates an image of leftists as the ones 
always “fixated on the past” (p. 88). Much like color blind racism (Bonilla-Silva, 
2018) has resulted in the right wing claiming they aren’t racist because Jim Crow 
laws have been overturned, it no longer carries the same sting to call conservative 
politicians and voters fascist. They will just claim they aren’t fascist and accuse 
the left of hyperbole, often applying Godwin’s Law in the process. Added to this is 
the conundrum of only 6% of Americans endorsing far-right positions about sexual 
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harassment, immigration, and Muslims while rightist political parties in the US and 
globally consistently poll high among party supporters (Renton, 2019, p. 79).
Liberals, in particular, tend to portray Trump and the alt-right as sudden, local 
aberrations, failing to connect their rise to neoliberal economic policies, replacement 
of leftist analysis with centrism, and decades of coordinated right-wing messaging 
such as Fox News (Beauchamp, 2016; Fraser, 2017; Kellner, 2017). Achar (2018) 
explains that we are now in a period of “fertile ground” where the turn has not been 
so much toward socialism as much as toward the far right:
The rise of the latter typically happens when traditional bourgeois rule starts 
losing legitimacy (consent, hegemony) on a backdrop of socioeconomic crisis 
while the anti-capitalist left is not yet strong enough to take the lead of the 
people (the nation). As with the “infantile disorder” of radical left politics, the 
far-right disease of bourgeois politics can take the shape of mass movements, 
but also engender terrorist fringe activities when the former fail to arise (p. 35)
The election of Trump also connects to similar global events that represent an 
international authoritarian populist and fascist backlash to the secular dimensions of 
neoliberalism, with some signs of interest in socialist ideas in the mix (Fraser, 2017). 
These events include the outcome of the referendum on Brexit, Le Pen’s National 
Front, insurgent candidates like Bernie Sanders, and Bolsonaro’s victory. Trump is 
often portrayed as ushering in this trend, but the election of Putin in 2000, Orban’s 
2010 rise to power in Hungary, Hindu nationalist candidate Modi’s win in 2014, and 
Duterte—whom Trump openly admires—illustrates that this series of events extends 
further back and far beyond the US (Bello, 2018, para. 2). This is the result of new 
forms of right-wing messaging and organizing, both across the globe and within 
nations, such as electoral alliances between the Five-Star Movement and Northern 
League in Italy along with the far-right Alternative fur Deutschland gaining seats in 
the German legislature.
Because of the prevalence and complexity of concepts surrounding fascism and 
authoritarian populism, this chapter is organized into broader themes, with a focus on 
current media and political discourses. After an initial overview of both fascism and 
authoritarian populism, key similarities between the two will be presented. These 
include conservative enabling, enforcement of capitalism, rationalizing violence, 
rejection of liberalism, enforcement of masculinity, and rampant corruption. These 
similarities are followed by differences that are important to keep in mind when 
attempting to draw historical parallels between fascism in the past and today. An 
analysis of new forms of organizing among the right concludes the chapter, followed 
by a cautionary note regarding the current state of matters.
CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
It is estimated that 3.3 billion people are subjected to autocratic rule of some kind, 
with less than 5% of the world’s population living in what can be classified as a 
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“full democracy” (Der Spiegel Staff, 2018, para. 6). With this in mind, it should be 
no surprise that authoritarian populism and fascism make recurring appearances. 
It is also important to acknowledge the links between neoliberalism, fascism, and 
authoritarianism, which involve the dismantling of democracy. Miocci and DiMario 
(2017) assert that “capitalism as we know it” utilizes the same political ideas as 
fascism, such as the notion of a natural or organic society, limitations of human 
rights, particularly labor organizing, and privatization/corporatization (p. 2).
Next to its sheer prevalence, what makes unpacking the Right challenging is that 
there are different factions, which can be classified “in terms of how far each is 
willing to go in the defense of capitalism” (Renton, 2019, p. 85). These include 
general conservativism, which is tied more to the electoral system, fascism, and 
the non-fascist far right, which includes populists of the Trump supporting variety, 
also working within electoral systems. Renton asserts that each of these factions has 
specific goals, including maintenance of the status quo (conservatives), restoration 
of a lost past (far right populists), and counterrevolution (fascists).
Populism is a broad political philosophy that positions “the people” against “the 
elite,” the elite serving as a catch-all term for often contradictory constituents, such 
as the ultra-wealthy and minorities dependent on welfare. For Fletcher (2016), 
authoritarian populism represents “a revolt against the future” (p. 11). Its ideology 
and discourse are obsessed with a lost past which must be restored. Within the US, 
this is nearly always tied to white supremacy and Christianity, which presents white 
Christians as “authentic” Americans, positioning others as illegitimate to some 
degree and a threat to the restoration of lost values (Connor, 2018; Renton, 2017; 
Resnikoff, 2017). What is interesting about populism is that its terminology used 
to be more closely associated with demagogue, but since 1970 the term populist 
is now used at a ratio of 9:1 compared to demagogue in the Google Books search 
engine (Connor, 2018, para. 4). Renton (2017) alludes to these demagogic qualities 
in defining populism:
A populist is someone who says that the whole people supports them. But, no 
politician in history has ever been universally popular. A populist is, therefore, 
someone who deals badly with the issue of dissent. Because they are by their 
own definition popular, therefore any protesters are somehow outside the 
category of “the people” and since they are not fully human, they are entitled to 
be repressed. Populists, in other words, are suspicious, vulnerable to conspiracy 
theory and authoritarian. (para. 13)
Authoritarian populism draws its power precisely from its ability to build 
alliances with segments of the white left, because it represents itself as defending 
the common person, along with providing an acceptable electoral outlet for dealing 
with distrust of elites, fear and resentment (Connor, 2017; Resnikoff, 2017; Renton, 
2017). However, rather than leftist ideas penetrating into populism, typically the 
reverse happens, where followers are exposed to white nationalism, thus “changing 
the nature of both left and right politics in the process” (Resnikoff, 2017, para. 8). 
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Indeed, such populist movements have come and gone throughout US history with 
examples including Andrew Jackson, the Know Nothing Party in the 1850s, William 
Jennings Bryan’s campaign, the America First movement during the 1920s, and 
Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign (Connor, 2018).
Fascism carries forward the tenets of authoritarian populism, with the aim being 
a full consolidation of state power and capitalism, including all cultural apparatuses. 
Theweleit (2010b) conceptualizes fascism as “revolution’s negative image” 
that “takes the whole living social reality and forces it to approximate an image 
in negative” (p. 382). This can also be thought of as fascism being about “anti-
production,” compared to the “living labor” of human-centered activities (p. 216). 
The very concept of a fascist state is totalitarian by default, the goal being “to repress 
and discipline the population, while protecting and promoting capitalist property 
relations, profits, and accumulation, and laying the basis for imperial expansion” 
(Foster, 2017, para. 13). This seizure and holding of absolute power are essential 
components of fascism, with sheer existence being the only justification required to 
hold power (Theweleit, 2010b). Moreover, fascists are often able to easily maneuver 
the more plutocratic tendencies within liberal democracies in order to establish 
themselves (Foster, 2017; Ulrich, 2016).
Even though fascism also draws from authoritarian populism’s notion of 
restoration of an imagined past in its discourse and imagery, it takes things further 
with the aim of destruction for the purpose of ushering in a rebirth of a nation and 
its unified people (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2018; Ulrich, 2016). The unity of the 
people involves the illusion of an erasure of social class or political parties, to be 
replaced with the nation as an organizing construct:
What the fascist understands by the term “unity” is a state in which oppressor 
and oppressed are violently combined to form a structure of domination. For 
him, unity denotes a relationship not of equality, but of domination. Equality is 
considered synonymous with multiplicity, mass—it is thus the precise opposite 
of unity, since unity rigidly fuses these baser elements with what is “above 
them,” “interior” to “exterior”…the concept of nation can be seen, then, 
as the most explicit available foundation of male demands for domination. 
(Theweleit, 2010b, p. 87)
For Theweleit, fascists contrast themselves against the “mass,” or what “belongs 
below” using concepts such as culture, nation and race, where “the “individual” 
carves out a place for himself as the bearer of “culture”: a handful of (male) 
“individuals” constitute the “few”—who determine and sanction definitions of 
“culture” (p. 45).
Finally, neofascist ideology, as promoted by alt-right figures like Steve Bannon, 
represents a troubling blend of authoritarian populism and fascism (Foster, 2017; 
Renton, 2017). These include acknowledging the failure of neoliberalism, but this 
is narrowly framed as opposition to corporations or globalization from a nationalist 
perspective. Related to this are targeted attacks on immigrants and refugees from 
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specific regions such as central/south America or the Middle East. This anti-
globalization narrative asserts that both China and Islam are expanding to assert 
global dominance. In response, the United States and the restoration of Christianity 
are necessary to stem this tide. Bannon sees the alt-right’s rise in the US as the 
“Fourth Turning,” the other three turns being the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, 
the Great Depression and WWII (Foster, 2017).
The most dangerous hallmark of neofascism is the global scope of its organizing, 
which Renton (2017, 2019) discusses in depth. The problem, of course, is attempting 
to pinpoint the specific moment when liberal democracy, with the assistance 
of authoritarian populism, moves into a fascist phase, or more specifically, from 
neoliberalism to neofascism, indicating that fascism may not be as much of an 
aberration as usually presented (Foster, 2017; Theweleit, 2010b).
SHARED CHARACTERISTICS OF AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM AND FASCISM
This section outlines some of the key shared characteristics of authoritarian populism 
and fascism while acknowledging there are important differences in degrees of 
adherence to specific ideological aspects. These include (1) conservative enabling; 
(2) enforcement of capitalism; (3) rationalizing violence; (4) rejection of liberalism; 
(5) enforcement of masculinity and (6) rampant corruption. These characteristics 
constantly interact with each other, making specific boundaries challenging to discuss. 
For example, free market ideology (enforcement of capitalism) is often combined with 
appeals to racism (rationalization of violence) in discussing corporate globalization 
while misogyny (enforcement of masculinity) is used to call for a restoration of a 
unified, non-secular past (rejection of liberalism). Brecher (2017) notes how 
authoritarian populist and fascist politicians both “combine charismatic leaders, 
traditional conservative forces, and multiple forms of political repression” to steer the 
working class away from a dialectical understanding of their situation (p. 44).
Conservative Enabling
By far one of the most prominent shared characteristics of authoritarian populism 
and fascism that contributes to the relative ease of their ability to establish power 
is the enabling of these ideologies by conservatives. Whether considering Hitler’s 
electoral trajectory or media messaging leading to the Brexit referendum outcome, 
the utter facilitation by conservatives cannot be overlooked. Conservative enabling 
happens in three ways. First, conservatives seek permanent political power in any 
way they can obtain it. Second, closely related to this, is the delusion that “we can 
contain him/them” which always accompanies the rationalizations of more reluctant 
conservatives who are willing to overlook all manner of disturbing events in order to 
maintain power (Brecher, 2017). Authoritarian populists and fascists can often pull 
more centrist liberals or “undecided voters” into the orbit of this thinking, particularly 
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during uncertain economic times. Third, this is made possible by a retreat of the left, 
which creates the vacuum needed for such consolidation of power.
First, as Renton (2019) astutely notes, “If anyone is expecting the mainstream 
right to be an ally in the fight against fascism, they are likely to be disappointed” 
(p. 87). Fascism and authoritarian populism have always been extremely useful tools 
for conservatives to maintain permanent political power. The example of conservative 
accommodation to the Nazi party platform in order to suppress the spread of Marxism 
and worker uprisings is illustrative (Ulrich, 2016). Hindenburg paved the way for 
Nazi rule by invoking emergency powers, making it easy for appointed chancellors 
to move to a system of autocratic decrees rather than by majority votes (Browning, 
2018). It is more accurate to say that National Socialist leadership opportunistically 
used characteristics of the existing system (put in place by conservatives) to their 
advantage more so than Hitler being a master of strategy (Ulrich, 2016). This created 
reciprocal benefits for various conservative constituencies:
The Reich chancellor could now concentrate on crushing the political Left and 
bringing German society as a whole into line with Nazi ideals without any 
fears of military intervening. The military leadership in turn had received a 
guarantee for its monopoly position and was assured that its concerns would 
enjoy the highest priority within the new government. (Ulrich, 2016, p. 417)
In a similar manner, Trump and his populist coalition have managed to take 
advantage of Republicans’ desire to maintain permanent power by playing on shared 
policy goals like privatization, cutting taxes for the wealthy, appointing anti-worker 
Supreme Court justices, repealing the Affordable Care Act, targeting of immigrants 
and refugees, increasing the military budget, and voter suppression (Browning, 
2017; Sefla, 2017; Taibbi, 2018). This has been further enabled by Trump managing 
to earn the votes of 90% of Republicans who turned out in 2016, many of whom 
were uninspired by traditional conservative messaging (Renton, 2019, p. 82). Rather 
than seeing him as a liability, Republican politicians such as Mitch McConnell have 
viewed Trump as a clear path to permanent political power and have not deviated 
from their support, nor are there any signs of this changing any time soon (Browning, 
2018; Beauchamp, 2018a; Kellner, 2017).
Second, conservatives and even some moderates and liberals enable authoritarian 
populism and fascism by maintaining the illusion that either they can contain far-
right excesses or that the system will somehow serve as a series of checks on more 
extreme actions. Hindenburg and other conservatives assumed they could gain the 
benefits of Nazi party policies to buttress his already eroding support while asserting 
they could control Hitler at the same time (Browning, 2018; Ulrich, 2016). Thinking 
that they have a handle on the situation, conservatives fail to imagine the culmination 
of their enabling, as Gropnik (2016) explains:
To say “Well, he would not really have the power to accomplish that” is to 
misunderstand the nature of thin-skinned authoritarians in power. They do not 
FASCISM AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM
37
arrive in office and discover, as constitutionalists do, that their capabilities are 
more limited than they imagined. They arrive, and then make their power as 
large as they can. (para. 3)
Another way of rationalizing riding the far-right train as far as it will go 
involves minimizing the actions of authoritarians by continuously moving the bar 
of normalization until it is no longer recognizable (Gropnik, 2016; Sykes, 2017). 
Sykes (2017) likens this to conservatives claiming that such-and-such has to 
happen before we need to act, when “whatever people have said has to happen, 
has, in fact, already happened, over and over again, and the GOP has swallowed 
it anyway” (para. 12). By allowing increasingly extreme behaviors, the GOP 
has now created a situation where there is little to differentiate themselves from 
Trump. This includes mainstream conservative writers who situate themselves as 
“intellectuals,” attempting to “impose some coherence and substance on Trumpism” 
while “attributing to Trump an ideological lucidity that seems little more than a 
projection of their own wishful thinking” (Heilbrunn, 2017, para. 32). Sykes (2017) 
holds up the example of Mitt Romney, who is lauded for speaking out against Trump 
one day, then turns around and eats a reconciliation dinner with him the next, locked 
in a “relationship of morbid co-dependency” (para. 7).
Even disillusioned voters who once supported more liberal or leftist candidates 
feel they can safely support authoritarians, assuming that the system in place will 
protect them or that it will weed out more extreme elements while still retaining 
aspects of what they want. This was evidenced in Bolsonaro’s election, where Bevins 
(2018) provides several examples of voters who were against most of his policies, 
but justified their votes with, “I don’t think he will be great, necessarily, but he’s 
what we need right now” (para. 18) or the resentment-infused rationale, “I’m against 
the program to pay criminals in jail even more than I make” (para. 19). Another voter 
asserted that “he won’t be governing alone, and he won’t be able to do everything he 
wants” (para. 16). Taibbi (2018) notes how the ousting of Steve Bannon, an action 
much-celebrated in the media, encapsulated conservative thinking that they had been 
able to contain the situation when all the while they “overlooked who put Trump in 
power in the first place” (para. 6).
Third, none of this is possible without the additional assistance of leftists going 
into retreat, creating a vacuum that enables authoritarians to consolidate power. 
A major factor contributing to Hitler and Mussolini’s rise were the Communist 
parties in those countries deciding that social democrats were the real threat, while 
minimizing the fascist parties as an irrelevant fringe element (Browning, 2018). 
Instead of banding together to focus on confronting fascism, the liberal and leftist 
parties fought each other, as Gopnik (2016) outlines:
The militant left decided that their real enemies were the moderate leftists, who 
were really indistinguishable from the Nazis. The radical progressives decided 
that there was no difference between the democratic left and the totalitarian 
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right and that an explosion of institutions was exactly the most thrilling thing 
imaginable. (para. 6)
While the left was divided, conservatives and other right-wing parties unified, a 
situation that seems to be playing out today in a similar manner (Browning, 2018). 
When the left faced continual defeat, they “withdrew, demoralized, into private 
niches,” while “those sections of the middle classes that had previously kept their 
distance hastened to embrace the National Socialists, with flags flying” (Ulrich, 
2016, p. 431).
The retreat of the left today has manifested itself in different ways, such as electoral 
shifts among the working-class turning to nationalist political parties who hold out 
economic promises wrapped in racist discourse (Der Spiegel Staff, 2018; Alfonso, 
2017). Another manifestation is that rather than directly confronting authoritarian 
tendencies in government, liberal parties “default to bureaucratic mode,” as if 
existing laws will somehow serve as a deterrent to future actions (Gessen, 2017, 
para. 9). A prime example of this was the outcome of the much-anticipated Mueller 
report, which rationalized not taking action against Trump for obstruction of justice 
by citing existing Department of Justice policy that a sitting president could not 
be indicted (Waas, 2019). Centrists also enabled Bolsonaro’s rise by supporting 
the impeachment of Rousseff and soon found themselves quickly engulfed by 
a miniscule political party that backed Bolsonaro (Bevins, 2018). Ultimately, the 
space created by leftist retreat is also an outcome of conservative enabling of fascism 
and authoritarian populism:
Today, it’s self-evident that we have a failed liberalism (neoliberalism) wherein 
the system politicians have lost legitimacy and are increasingly hated…And it 
is precisely at such a moment, when the liberal and conservative bourgeois 
order is increasingly unstable and untenable, that fascism becomes a clear and 
present danger. (Draitser, 2017, para. 28)
Enforcement of Capitalism
Despite the ever-present use of “common man” discourse and promises of 
“overturning the system” or “draining the swamp,” fascists and authoritarian 
populists are all about enforcing the capitalist system, though it is a more nuanced 
relationship than is often portrayed by the left. The irony is that many of their 
preferred policies are destabilizing for capitalism, such as deportation of immigrants 
and nationalist positions on trade. Davidson (2017) captures this contradiction:
Here we see emerging a symbiotic relationship between one increasingly 
inadequate regime response to the problems of capital accumulation and 
another increasingly extreme response to the most irrational desires and 
prejudices produced by capital accumulation. (p. 63)
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For Davidson, the right wing as a collective uses three approaches to capitalism: 
direct support, backing ideologies that support capitalism, or destabilization, either 
intentional or unintentional. This played out in the case of Nazi Germany where 
capital was needed to enact the National Socialist vision. Yet capitalists themselves 
didn’t require anti-Semitism, but were fine with its utilization in their efforts to 
control labor. Put simply, “German capitalism did not need Auschwitz, but it needed 
the Nazis, who needed Auschwitz” (p. 64).
Authoritarian populists and fascists share three aspects of capitalist enforcement 
in its ideology and policies. The first includes having a solidly middle-class 
base, with parts of the working class drawn in. This, in turn, impacts the type of 
discourse used to gain support for such policies. A second aspect is messaging 
around the mythology of individualism and the free market, though within a 
collectivist authoritarian context, or “explaining collective events by the initiative 
of individuals” (Sartre, 1976, p. 26). Finally, the third way capitalist enforcement 
occurs is through the suppression of labor, such as targeting dialectical 
organizational strategies like unions. This represents a delicate balancing act, as 
Kimmel (2017) outlines:
The extreme Right faces the difficult cognitive task of maintaining their faith 
in America and in capitalism and simultaneously providing an analysis of an 
indifferent state, at best, or an actively interventionist one, at worst, and a way 
to embrace capitalism, despite a cynical corporate logic that leaves them, often 
literally, out in the cold. (p. 254)
First, middle class support, in addition to support of the wealthy is a universal 
trait of authoritarian movements, whether in Brazil, India, or the US (Bevins, 
2018; Bello, 2018; Renton, 2017). The strongest support for the Nazi party came 
not from the working-class, who were more likely to reject their messaging, but 
from the middle-class (Ulrich, 2016). Much of this middle-class support involves a 
fundamentally irresolvable contradiction, as Daher (2017) outlines concerning the 
growth of rightist Islamic movements:
Just like the petty bourgeoisie in general, Islamic fundamentalist organizations 
are pulled in two directions—toward rebellion against existing society and 
toward compromise with it. Either way, their reactionary project offers no 
solution to sections of the peasantry and working class that are attracted by it. 
(p. 96)
This contradiction is stark within the US, where one of strongest segments of 
Trump’s middle-class support is represented by police unions, including the Border 
Patrol (Myerson, 2017).
The mobilization of middle-class support involves presenting their position as 
being squeezed by both the “ruling elite” or “global corporatists (often liberal, secular) 
and the undeserving poor (those on welfare, ethnic scapegoats) (Daher, 2017). The 
middle class is an ideal target for authoritarian messaging during economic crises 
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because they typically have some degree of prosperity compared to the rest of the 
working class, and they often have accompanying defensive beliefs emerging out 
of fear of loss of status (Sartre, 1976). Fascists and authoritarian populists will 
play on the fears of the middle class as losing their way of life at the hands of the 
government, who enact preferential policies for minorities and other “deadbeats” 
(Ulrich, 2016). Aware of this, some fascist programs promise voters a social safety 
net, but only through welfare chauvinism, with benefits limited to the native (usually 
white) population (Bello, 2018; Resnikoff, 2017). In the US, this is similar to Trump 
supporting subsidies for farmers, but cuts for food stamp recipients.
Second, though varying in storytelling structure, capitalism is enforced by a 
prominent free market messaging. Ulrich (2016) recounts how the Nazis did not 
fundamentally alter existing capitalist structures but simply re-interpreted capitalist 
relations where “men’s social existence was not to determine their consciousness, 
as Marxist teaching had it: their consciousness was to determine their social being” 
(p. 536). Labor was presented instead as a way to earn dignity in support of a larger 
social project rather than a way for workers to organize together. This ideological re-
alignment was necessary in order to defeat the Marxist parties standing in the way of 
the National Socialists. In the end, however, nothing approaching significant change 
was ever accomplished, even though Nazi propaganda could convey “a feeling of 
social equality” with Hitler as “messianic savior” (p. 545). Similarly, Trump presents 
himself as a populist opponent of global trade, when what he and his supporters 
reject are the multicultural/global aspects of neoliberalism, not capitalism itself 
(Fraser, 2017).
Free enterprise is also presented as a pure vision that has been tainted by globalization 
and corporatization, which explains the fetishization of the small business owner in 
much nationalist and white supremacist discourse (Kimmel, 2017; Stan, 2017). This 
has been facilitated by the failure of neoliberalism to fulfill its promises of financial 
growth and stability in the face of “social dislocation, rapid demographic changes, 
a decline in the life expectancy of white women, and the election of America’s first 
black president” which “added spark and fuel to…a whitelash” (Resnikoff, 2017, 
para. 26). In many ways, the rejection of neoliberalism has not translated to leftist 
critique so much as attracting voters to white nationalism. Within the US, figures 
like Steve Bannon promote deconstructing the administrative state, deregulation, 
tariffs (even though there is not enough manufacturing infrastructure to offset costs), 
and isolationism in a quest to obtain the purest essence of capitalism, even though 
this vision totally overlooks capitalism’s global nature (Stan, 2017).
Third, the enforcement of capitalism also requires suppression of labor, either 
overtly, as through legislation or violence against unions or more indirectly, through 
insisting on sacrifice or in promoting the idea of workers being entitled to their 
position. Fascists are often associated with overt violent acts against leftists and 
workers, but usually those measures are not necessary. Instead, various carrot and 
stick strategies can be used, such as eroding worker solidarity with the promise of 
even greater fulfillment to come (Ulrich, 2016). In particular, fascists will often 
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invoke the idea of there being no meaningful differences between social classes 
and therefore no need for labor unrest so long as everyone gets behind the vision 
(Theweleit, 2010b).
Theweleit (2010b) points out how higher-ranking Nazis commonly insisted on 
workers making sacrifices, but this only referred to those beneath the top strata. An 
interesting psychology then takes place among the crowd who is expected to make 
continual sacrifices for the nation:
The audience listening to the man above the crowd must surely sense his 
absolute unwillingness to make sacrifices of his own. For this very reason, they 
follow him gladly, in the hope that remaining with him will bring deliverance. 
What he means when he says, “We must all make sacrifices” is always “We 
(the group to which I belong) must stand fast together and sacrifice others.” 
(p. 92)
To pull off this major feat of false consciousness by breaking apart worker solidarity, 
authoritarian populists and fascists often dress their discourse up in leftist trappings 
by defending entitlement programs that have mostly white recipients, invoking 
nationalism by promising to bring back American jobs, or deporting immigrants 
(Alfonso, 2017). This enables capitalists to gain the support of the very workers who 
they are actively harming. However, the ultimate outcome remains the suppression 
of the greatest impediment to authoritarianism: a united working class who rejects 
racism and sexism (Foster, 2017).
Rationalizing Violence
To varying degrees, both fascism and authoritarian populism make ready use of 
violent and eliminationist rhetoric and actions (Bello, 2018; Stan, 2017). Further, 
these ideologies provide several justifications for violence, often portraying the 
proponents of such violence as victims in an attempt to project blame and establish 
false equivalences between racist protest and when oppressed groups protest (Wise, 
2016). The core motivating force behind this violence is sheer revenge and there is 
no limit to its size and scope:
Fascist revenge is vast and expansive; it devastates the earth and annihilates 
human beings by the millions. Fascism may not have offered “justice” to the 
masses, but it did offer them the power to take revenge…these forms should be 
seen instead as orchestrating direct incursion by the fascist macromasses into 
the part of the earth which the fascists—quite simply by their own existence—
considered their own. (Theweleit, 2010b, p. 367)
For Theweleit, fascists simultaneously occupy a position of self-assertion and 
allegiance to systems that require absolute compliance—they feel the illusion of 
power but only within the limits of hierarchy. Further, the delicate balance between 
legitimate and illegitimate violence often means that authoritarians, such as Putin 
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and Duterte, will delegate more overt forms of repression to vigilantes in law 
enforcement (Gessen, 2017).
The authoritarian populist and fascist rationalization of violence (whether actual 
or discursive) shares three characteristics, the first being deployment of racism and 
xenophobia in support of ethnocentrism, cultural superiority, and nationalism (Bello, 
2018; Mishra, 2018). A second characteristic is the prioritizing of emotion and feeling 
over material reality. This is closely linked to the third characteristic, freedom from 
the responsibility of one’s actions, or permission to oppress others. Taken together, 
far from perceiving themselves as repressed or limited under authoritarian regimes, 
violence provides an intoxicating, freeing experience for supporters who seek power 
at all costs:
When Richard Spencer argues that America belongs to whites because “we 
conquered this continent” and no matter how bloody the process, ultimately  
“we won,” he reduces all complex moral and philosophical arguments, both 
for his side and against it, to a simple equation of “might makes right.” At that 
point, winning itself becomes the only necessary and sufficient standard upon 
which to rest a claim to power of any kind. (Wise, 2016, para. 10)
The first characteristic of both authoritarian populism and fascism’s rationalizing 
of violence involves the construction of a nationalist identity through the use of 
racism (targeting minority groups) and xenophobia (attacks on immigrants and 
refugees). Both racism and xenophobia serve to reinforce the cultural superiority of 
“real” citizens as compared to those who don’t belong, as a way to cement national 
identity. It doesn’t matter if these concepts are rooted in reality; what matters is 
the creation of such an ideal (Ulrich, 2016). This is often done through utilizing 
metaphors of purity juxtaposed against contamination, such as Hitler’s positioning 
of the Jews as parasitic or Hindu supremacists in India using pseudoscience to justify 
different castes (Mishra, 2018). Rather than being an aberration, the agendas of 
many of the leaders and political parties associated with authoritarian populism and 
fascism have long been building their rhetoric and actions to this global convergence 
(Resnikoff, 2017). More recent examples of this are Trump’s false equivalence 
between the actions of racists and protestors at the Charlottesville march and his 
pardoning of former Arizona sheriff Joe Arpaio (Gessen, 2017).
In terms of racism, state-sanctioned violence by police against minorities serves 
as an overt way to intimidate communities, as well as create an association in whites’ 
minds between crime and certain minority groups readily distributed by the media 
(Giroux, 2016; Stan, 2017). Trump’s initial appointment of Jeff Sessions as attorney 
general reinforced this messaging. Even when limited to discursive violence, phrases 
such as “America first” and “make America great again” directly invoke intentions to 
do whatever it takes to force minorities to submit to white supremacy (Sefla, 2017). 
Assertions about criminality and immigrants are not borne out sociologically, but 
the point of such propaganda is to leave just the smallest shred of doubt (Hamilton, 
2016). Additionally, older anti-Semitic conspiracy theories are often woven into 
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anti-immigrant discourse, as in the case with Trump and his followers constantly 
invoking George Soros or “international banks” being connected to Mexican 
investors who were supporters of Hillary Clinton’s campaign (Kellner, 2017).
Particular targets also include immigrants from Muslim countries as well as 
Muslim citizens within European countries and the US. Beauchamp (2018) provides 
the example of Hungary, where Orbán presents himself as the only barrier between 
citizens and being taken over by Muslims, even though only a fraction of the Hungarian 
population was born in another country. Because of its location, Hungary is often a 
stop for migrants due to its EU membership, a situation that Orbán exploits to stoke 
fear in his supporters. This islamophobia is reflected in Trump’s administrative pick 
of John Bolton, who advocates the “clash of civilizations” thesis between the West 
and the Middle East (Giroux, 2016). Other examples include the France’s National 
Front, the Northern League in Italy, UKIP in Britain, Wilder’s Party for Freedom in 
the Netherlands, and the Finns Party, all who use racist and xenophobic messaging 
to advocate the restriction of non-European immigrants (Alfonso, 2017; Resnikoff, 
2017). These leaders and political parties advocate solutions such as border walls, 
deportations, and the construction of detention centers to house immigrants and 
refugees.
Smith and Hanley’s (2018) analysis of the motivations of Trump supporters 
reveal important findings regarding the relationship to race. The authors find that 
Trump’s predominantly white base, “is more readily found among voters who want 
domineering and intolerant leaders than among voters of any class background” 
(p. 197). Attitudes regarding authoritarian leadership were the primary forms of 
distinction between those who voted for Trump and those for other candidates. 
Additionally, these voters more strongly agreed that whites were discriminated 
against when minorities received benefits they felt should be theirs, what the 
researchers call the perception of “line cutting”: “The defiant wish for a domineering 
and impolitic leader, which is strongest among Trump’s most fervent supporters, 
coalesces here with the wish for a reversal of what his base perceives as an inverted 
moral and racial order” (p. 198). This goes beyond simple racial resentment into a 
desire to reassert the principles of white dominance, a wish that Trump appears to 
promise to fulfill.
This leads into the prioritizing of emotions and perceptions over experience or 
reason, the second characteristic involved with rationalizing violence. As Theweleit 
(2010a) explains regarding the affirmations that fascism offers:
What fascism allows the masses to express are repressed drives, imprisoned 
desires…fascism teaches us that under certain circumstances, human beings 
imprisoned within themselves, within body armor and social constraints, 
would rather break out than fill their stomachs; and that their politics may 
consist in organizing that escape, rather than an economic order that promises 
future generations full stomachs for life. (p. 432)
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Using his media-created position as a political outsider who will make things right, 
Trump, himself resentful, mirrors his supporters’ resentments in a self-reinforcing 
prioritizing of emotion (Kellner, 2017). Likewise, Bolsonaro embodies self-truth, 
where “the content of what he says doesn’t matter: what matters is the act of saying 
it” (Brum, 2018, para. 10).
Truth is therefore transformed into a mere personal choice, to be assigned to 
the person you agree with. Whatever Bolsonaro or Trump might say is determined 
to be honest and sincere, while their critics are dismissed as having ulterior 
motives. Authoritarian populists and fascists are quite comfortable with emotion 
over consistency and it serves as a major source of their power, especially when 
conveying violent messages (Connor, 2018). Followers are drawn to a demagogic 
figure like Trump, Putin, or Bolsonaro, “not by a belief in the efficacy of his policies 
but by the emotional satisfaction they experience in his presence” (para. 28). 
For Connor, demagogy is itself a “form of expressive politics,” and is incredibly 
difficult to counter because this emotional attachment to a leader can often endure 
their failure to follow through with promises (para. 30). Anti-revolutionary social 
bonds are further consolidated over collective anger, with members mirroring each 
other’s resentments while being contained and absorbed by the crowd (Sartre, 1976). 
This is the key distinction between harnessing anger among leftist movements and 
right-wing ones: meaningful change is subdued by self-expression and the status quo 
remains (Burton, 2018a).
The third and perhaps most powerful characteristic of rationalizing violence is that 
authoritarian populists and fascists give permission to their followers to participate 
in various levels of enacting such violence, or, they are promised freedom from the 
responsibility of their actions (Theweleit, 2010b). Jacobs (2018) points out that a 
common misconception is that all authoritarians are submissive and seek approval 
from those they perceive to be strong or that they prioritize respecting authority. 
Instead, Jacobs notes that Trump supporters prefer “a belligerent, combative 
approach toward people they find threatening” over more conventional values 
such as traditional respect for authority and obedience (para. 5). In other words, 
“authoritarianism in the Trump era is not the wish to follow any and every authority, 
but, rather, the wish to support a strong and determined authority who will crush evil 
and take us back to our true path” (para. 15). Understanding this distinction is an 
essential component in fighting fascism and authoritarian populism.
This dominant totality of being (Theweleit, 2010b) requires the element of 
establishing superiority where the needs of others are viewed as a threat to the 
freedom from responsibility and the right to violence. Ethical and moral constraints 
are out the window, encapsulated in Trump’s comment that he could stand in the 
middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and still not lose voters. Giroux (2016) 
concludes that “Ruthlessness, narcissism and bullying are the organizing principles 
of Trump’s belief that only winning matters and that everything is permitted to 
further his own self-interests” (para. 8). This carries over into hostility toward public 
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institutions that adhere to principles of diversity with a preference for a vigilante-
oriented police force and self-styled militia groups (Gessen, 2017).
Ultimately, the sheer audacity of unaccountability drives violence to repeat the 
unthinkable and escalate the next time around. Yet, it is important to understand 
that freedom from responsibility never applies to everyone, just the authoritarian 
populist or fascist who is entitled to free reign of their emotions and desires 
(Sartre, 1976). The very notion of being held accountable is a major affront. What 
contributes to their perceived immunity is the relative lack of accountability of past 
perpetrators. Brum (2018) and Bevins (2018) provide the example of Bolsonaro 
openly celebrating past Brazilian and other South American dictators’ acts of torture 
and murder. He feels free to do this precisely because of the Brazilian government’s 
unwillingness to hold people accountable for those actions. As Theweleit (2010a) 
concludes:
that explains the enormous attraction of fascist celebrations and their 
overwhelming impact on participants: “I can’t believe my eyes…what in the 
world are they doing?” and then the liberating thought, “but everybody’s doing 
it…my God, they are actually doing it!” (in the name of the law, too). (p. 430)
Against Liberalism
Though the forms and degrees may vary, another commonality among those who 
hold various populist and fascist ideologies is an opposition to liberal democracy 
and secularism (Bello, 2018). After decades of progress-centered messaging about 
technology, civil rights, global connectedness, education, and science—albeit 
from a neoliberal framework—it seems jarring to see “a slide back into the age 
of authoritarianism” on a world-wide scale (Der Spiegel Staff, 2018, para. 5). 
The embracing of populist and fascist ideas builds on a form of cynicism that is 
disconnected from social action with people seeking emotional validation from 
violence, nostalgia, and scapegoating versus meaningful change. For Ulrich 
(2016), the conditions leading to Hitler’s rise reflected a similar erosion of belief in 
government which had been building for a long time:
Those in power appeared to have no solutions to the crisis, and the more 
helpless they seemed to be, the greater the demand became for a strong man, a 
political messiah who would lead Germany out of economic misery and point 
the way towards renewed national greatness. (p. 223)
Authoritarian populists and fascists channel their opposition to liberalism in 
the form of attempting to lay claim to and enforce a specific conceptualization of 
culture onto the population. Liberalism and secularism represent a degraded culture 
against which order must be restored. Theweleit (2010b) outlines the notion of 
“the mass” and the threats it represents, which have been enabled by multicultural 
permissiveness and/or lack of religiosity. In particular, war culture, whether 
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talking about the military, policing or vigilante-based enforcement, permeates the 
opposition to liberalism as it is considered the highest cultural form (Giroux, 2016; 
Theweleit, 2010b). This is encapsulated in common Internet memes which assert 
that the military or Second Amendment is what protects the First, or the Blue Lives 
Matter flag stickers meant to send a message that police violence is always justified, 
especially against minorities. Trump himself regularly invokes anger toward liberal 
institutions at his rallies, prompting his supporters and politicians to threaten civil 
war if Trump would ever be impeached (Coutts, 2017).
It is no coincidence that authoritarian populists and fascists are against the press, 
and view any sort of investigative journalism as an affront to their untouchable 
status. This has gone as far as calls for criminalizing acts of journalism that are 
viewed as hostile to authoritarian leadership, including within the US. By building 
a sense of distrust in the press, truth then becomes a matter of which point of view 
you follow, not the facts:
When citizens favor blatant propaganda as their primary source of information 
about the world, there is little hope that they will be able to separate themselves 
from reactionary, officially-endorsed fascism. The cult of Trump will provide 
cover for an administration that has long expressed contempt for freedom 
of the press, and is now indicating its support for fascist policies aimed at 
criminalizing journalists for reporting on classified intelligence the Trump 
administration would prefer be kept secret. (DiMaggio, 2017, para. 8)
Polling of Trump supporters has revealed extreme hostility toward the media (other 
than right-wing outlets like Fox News, of course), with close to half of Republicans 
endorsing the idea that the government should shut down outlets that broadcast 
“biased or inaccurate” information (para. 7). Nearly 66% of Republicans state they 
trust Trump as a source of news more than CNN, The New York Times and The 
Washington Post combined (para. 7).
Authoritarian populists and fascists also show their opposition to liberalism by 
invoking nostalgia as a way to weaponize the past, feeding into notions of what 
Kimmel (2017) calls aggrieved entitlement. Right-wing movements are rarely future-
oriented, and when the present is discussed, it is always as a form of contrast to an 
idealized past, highly gendered, with the past being a time when men ran things, “the 
way it was supposed to be.” Liberalism is therefore associated with femininity and 
weakness (Davidson, 2017; Kimmel, 2017). As Davidson (2017) emphasizes, “the 
political goal is to always push popular attitudes and legal rights back to a time before 
the homogeneity of “the people” was polluted by immigration…usually at some 
undetermined period before WWII” (p. 61). Conservative think tanks and groups 
such as the Claremont Institute advocate that the principles of government have been 
eroded by policies that have enabled dependency on welfare and rampant political 
correctness (Heilbrunn, 2017). Only a return to the “rough and ready” American 
spirit and originalism of the Founding Fathers can stop such societal decline.
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It is important to note that while both Marxists and right-wing movements utilize 
the past as part of their ideologies, there is a critical difference. The Marxist use 
of dialectical materialism involves the past being employed as a form of historical 
analysis and a way to confront the normalization of the status quo. With right-wing 
movements, nostalgia is weaponized as a way to enforce a mythical past bound up in 
racist and sexist discourse, all in the service of capitalism. Giroux (2016) discusses 
how fascism can be opposed by such use of the past in order to “protect the present 
and the future against the damage now forgotten” (para. 2). In contrast, the call to 
“make American great again” keeps Trump supporters not only locked into a past, 
but one that never existed (Kellner, 2016).
Enforcement of Masculinity
Though often not discussed in relationship to fascism and authoritarian populism, 
gender plays a pivotal role through an enforcement of a specific vision of white 
supremacist masculinity. Both share the characteristic of hyper-masculinized 
discourse which saturates their ideologies and reveals important contradictions:
It is through a decidedly gendered and sexualized rhetoric of masculinity that 
this contradiction between loving America and hating its government, loving 
capitalism and hating its corporate iterations, is resolved. Racism, nativism, 
anti-Semitism, antifeminism—these discourses provide an explanation for the 
feelings of entitlement thwarted, fixing the blame squarely on “others” whom 
the state must now serve at the expense of white men. The unifying theme is 
gender. (Kimmel, 2017, p. 255)
Gender essentialism, which extends to homophobia and transphobia, is a matter 
of absolutes and fits in nicely with right-wing movements, especially the notion 
of needing to get back to the correct order of things when men ruled. Popular 
figures like Jordan Peterson use flawed principles of evolutionary psychology and 
mythology to posit that if men simply took control, the West could be brought back 
into line in a world where “the clear borders of culture have been dissolved” (Burton, 
2018a, para. 3).
Specific interpretations of mythology and mysticism (including religion) often 
appear within such discourse, with “the theme of intense male comradeship nourished 
by violence and at odds with bourgeois family life” (Lyons, 2017, para. 13). 
This brings to mind earlier 1980s and 1990s incarnations of the mythopoetic men’s 
movement where group events like primitive camping retreats were meant to 
promote bonding through a reconnection with a lost masculinity. Peterson relies 
heavily on Jung’s archetypes, asserting that order and culture are primarily male, 
with chaos and the unknown being female (Mishra, 2018). Any form of opposition 
to male dominance is portrayed as going against the natural order of things, reflected 
in support for figures like Putin, who “embodies the longing for an unbroken, 
unambiguous identity that seems to have gone missing in pluralistic, heterogenous 
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societies” (Der Spiegel Staff, 2018, para. 45). Wolff (2018) speculates that a figure 
like Steve Bannon, who also advances similar views, could once be harmlessly 
considered a rugged antihero with a working-class background but now is dangerous 
considering the political climate. We are currently in a situation, Wolff asserts, where 
“the American man story is a right-wing story” (p. 57).
Enforcement of masculinity within authoritarian populist and fascist ideologies 
involves the three components of first, misogyny; second, women and the feminine 
(including homophobia) being positioned as threats; and third, the contradictory 
persona of man as simultaneously warrior and victim. Lopez (2017) points out 
the important distinction between more traditional, paternalistic forms of sexism 
among conservative and even liberal voters and more aggressive manifestation of 
misogyny, the latter being closely correlated with support for Trump. This reflects a 
more deliberatively misogynistic outlook toward women than simply wishing they 
would occupy more traditional roles, as is often theorized about the right wing.
In comparing the Christian right with the alt-right, Lyons (2017) finds a coming 
together around such rampant misogyny:
The two movements agree on several key points: that gender roles are based 
on innate differences between males and females and need to be aggressively 
enforced for the good of society as a whole; that it’s natural and right for men 
to hold power over women; and that women’s main functions in society are to 
provide men with support, care and sexual satisfaction, and to bear and raise 
children. (para. 7)
Common positions taken by the alt-right, especially in online forums, is that women 
should not be allowed to vote and should have major restrictions imposed upon them 
in terms of reproductive policies (Nagel, 2017). Though there may be some women 
who identify themselves members of the alt-right, the majority of the movement 
makes it pretty clear that they are hostile to women, at the very least labelling them 
as irrelevant to their overall aims.
Alt-right discourse is filled with misogynistic and homophobic language, with 
those labeled weak as “cucks” or “fags” as well as receiving graphic threats of rape 
(Romano, 2016; Lyons, 2017). Racism and misogyny are fused together within the 
alt-right, to advocate not just for white supremacy, but “more specifically white male 
supremacy,” the sexism of which often serves as a recruitment tool from misogynistic 
online groups to white supremacist ones (Lyons, 2017, para. 2). Indeed, some of 
the men’s rights and pickup artists blogs regularly assert that western civilization 
is collapsing because of women’s reproductive and economic freedom as well as 
immigration and interracial marriage (Nagel, 2017).
An interesting contradiction emerges within fascist discourse in particular 
regarding the family. In many cases, the family represented a form of order which 
reflected the ideal fascist state, beginning with the authoritarian father at the head of 
the household who expected unquestioned obedience, and the use of harsh punishment 
to police the ego. Fascism requires the family in order to acclimate people to its 
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requirements. However, the family also served as a challenge to establishing fascism 
in that feelings of care and self-preservation could interfere with establishing total 
loyalty from citizens (Theweleit, 2010b). To deal with this contradiction in Nazi 
Germany, families ceded control by registering their children in the Hitler Youth and 
Girls League, where children’s obedience shifted from the parents to Hitler. This 
broke the final self-preservation bond of the family as “it became an organization 
for the terror of formal domination” (p. 252). This was also done through rendering 
women invisible, as Theweleit (2010a) found in analyzing the diaries and memoirs 
of Friekorps members where wives were hardly mentioned:
Relationships with women are dissolved and transformed into new male 
attitudes, into political stances, revelations of the true path, etc. as the woman 
fades out of sight, the contours of the male sharpen; that is the way in which 
the fascist mode of writing often proceeds. It could almost be said that the raw 
material for the man’s “transformation” is the sexually untouched, dissolving 
body of the woman he is with. (p. 35)
A second manifestation of the enforcement of masculinity in authoritarian populist 
and fascist discourse and actions is through positioning the woman or the feminine 
as a threat. The most recent political examples of woman as threat includes violent 
reactions to Congresswomen Alexandria Ocascio Cortez and Ilhan Omar, as well as 
Hillary Clinton, perhaps the original ultimate figure of cosmopolitan liberalism and 
male displacement that has sustained conservative anger for over 30 years (Fraser, 
2017). Figures such as Clinton serve as a stand-in for blame about immigration and 
economic loss because of her association with feminism even though she is a more 
centrist political figure.
Where Theweleit (2010a) found that Friekorps members were silent regarding 
their wives, there was no shortage of descriptions of Jewish or communist women 
and the depravities they represented, encapsulated in the persona of “the proletarian 
woman” who served as a focus of male bonding over the use of violence to rid 
society of her presence:
The proletarian woman is shameless…is a whore…The women are threatening, 
because, among other reasons, they are not virgins. The sexual experience that 
nationalist soldiers sense in them seems to release a particularly powerful fear. 
That fear is brought into association with the word “communist” (p. 68)
Theweleit posits that contributing to this personification of women were dramatic 
social changes brought on by the economic conditions of the post-WWI era. Women 
were now more visible, often the single heads of households, joining in labor actions, 
becoming vocal in the Communist parties, and creating disruptions around access 
to food and necessities—in other words, changing into an alien being from the 
Friekorp male point of view. Worse still was their perceived sexual freedom, which 
was directly connected to the leftist notion of solidarity, prioritizing connections 
with others over allegiance to the state. Today, both populists and fascists openly 
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despise the transgressive figure of the poor woman, especially if she is black or 
Latina. Images of out-of-control sexuality are channeled into the stereotype of the 
welfare queen who is always having children and regularly summoned to buttress 
rage and resentment.
An additional aspect of the feminine-as-threat present in both authoritarian 
fascism and populism is homophobia, even though authors such as Lively and 
Abrams (2002) continually attempt to link homosexuality with Nazism as a way 
to both discredit LGBTQI rights and minimize the far-right’s historical record of 
targeting the LGBTQI community with violence and discrimination. Theweleit 
(2010b) presents a complex analysis of the fascist framing of homosexuality, 
acknowledging that while some key Nazi party members were gay, knowledge of 
this fact was utilized in a strategic way by the upper echelon:
In the first instance, the fascists feared the potential of permissible 
homosexuality to develop into forms of sexuality they could no longer easily 
organize and contain. Second, the legalization of homosexuality was seen as 
likely to eliminate one of the key areas of transgression into which the fascist 
had to be initiated and accepted, were he to gain access to the secrets that were 
the domain of a specific power elite. In other areas of social life, the Nazis were 
clearly denied access both to secrets and power: thus, homosexuality became 
all the more indispensable. It replaced access to social decision-making power 
with the freedom to do what was forbidden. (p. 339)
Similar to the phenomenon of Republican politicians who sponsor anti-LGBTQI 
legislation later being found to be gay themselves, if gay Nazi party members 
refused to follow orders, they would be faced with the threat of exposure. Therefore, 
the permission granted to higher-ranking officers to be gay was to further entrench a 
dependency on the fascist movement for political (and literal) survival. This created 
a constant, destabilizing dichotomy which Theweleit describes as, “thou shalt love 
men, but thou shalt not be homosexual…thou shalt do what is forbidden, yet still be 
punished” (p. 339).
The third and final aspect of enforcement of masculinity is the irresolvable 
pairing of man as both dominating warrior who establishes authority while also 
being simultaneously a victim of feminism, reverse racism, liberalism, and global 
corporatist capitalism. The warrior/victim dichotomy begins with a construction of 
the dominant white masculine persona, which is constructed by patching together “a 
theory that explains their plight—grafting together fringe elements of evangelical 
Christianity, traditional anti-Semitism and racism, and general right-wing paranoia 
into an amalgam that is loosely held together by a nostalgic vision of hardy, 
independent frontier manhood” (Kimmel, 2017, p. 248). This warrior persona is then 
set into a portrait of extreme victimization (the undeserving taking what is his), with 
his primary agenda being the restoration of the correct order of things.
The utilization of the warrior/victim dichotomy is aptly represented by DeVega’s 
(2016) account of a professor who began to field questions from students who 
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were concerned about what Trump’s election would mean for them and their rights. 
However, the professor noticed that one white male student was happy with the 
election results, and would make obvious facial expressions whenever issues of race 
or gender were brought up in class. After the election, this same student insisted on 
bringing up the topic of the election, even though the class was addressing another 
unrelated topic. After the professor attempted to redirect the class to the topic at 
hand, the student
stood up, taking off his belt and then putting it on her desk. Smiling, with a 
mix of threat and joy, he announced that “We won!” His point was made: This 
is “his” country—and by extension (at least in his mind) his classroom—now 
and again. For this angry young white man, America’s natural order of things 
had been restored with the election of Donald Trump. (para. 4)
This dichotomy also allows for the insertion of shadowy figures, such as Obama, 
or “The Scary Jew,” which enables a rhetorical “out” in allowing the victimized 
warrior to still support capitalism—which he cannot ever reject—while criticizing 
its “Jewish” or other excessive influences. As Kimmel (2017) explains, “it’s not 
the capitalist corporations that have turned the government against them, but the 
international cartel of Jewish bankers and financiers, media moguls, and intellectuals 
who have already taken over the US state” (p. 262). Indeed, much of anti-Semitic 
propaganda promulgated today emerged during the same 19th century time-frame as 
most of the ideas continually recycled in authoritarian populist and fascist discourse 
by figures like Peterson: “responding, in the same way as Peterson, to an urgent 
need, springing from a traumatic experience of social and economic modernity, to 
believe—in whatever reassures and comforts” (Mishra, 2018, para. 9).
Rampant Corruption
The final shared characteristic between authoritarian populism and fascism is 
not only corruption, but corruption on a scale that far exceeds what is found in 
mainstream political organizations. This is highly ironic because right-wing leaders 
routinely run on a law-and-order platform of ending corruption, or, as Trump 
puts it, “draining the swamp” (Der Speigel Staff, 2018). In what Kellner (2017) 
calls Trumpland, corruption involves “an amalgam of private and public interests, 
encompassing the local, national, and global empire of a new world order” that is 
run on what can best be described as incompetent secrecy (p. 98). Russia’s business 
practices are another example of the imbedded corruption in authoritarian regimes 
and they are fully connected to the United States through PR firms and foreign policy 
(Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014). Nazi Germany itself was also rife with corruption 
throughout all levels of government (Ulrich, 2016). As in the case of the Republican 
Party not only excusing but protecting Trump, conservative enabling allows corruption 
to flourish, creating a double standard for those in power and ordinary citizens.
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Corrupt regimes rely on lying as a strategy, which serves the function of 
covering the actions of authoritarian populists, but also creates a deliberately 
destabilizing climate where people are not sure who to believe, even if they are 
directly witnessing evidence in front of them (Alfonso, 2017; Gessen, 2018; 
Niman, 2019; Theweleit, 2010a). For Gessen (2018), totalitarianism requires the 
“continuous alteration of the past, and in the long run probably demands a disbelief 
in the very existence of objective truth” (para. 4). The past has to be reshaped on a 
regular basis in order to accommodate the constantly-changing present in the interests 
of the regime. Ultimately, it doesn’t even matter if people believe the lies, they have 
to simply see the lies as the only viable option (Gessen, 2018). This mirrors the 
authoritarian populist and fascist leaders’ own quest to challenge the concept of truth itself 
(Der Spiegel Staff, 2018).
Double-speak is a significant aspect of lying, where citizens are promised specific 
actions, but with no significant follow-through. Alfonso (2017) provides the example 
of Geert Wilders in the 2010 election where he promised not to raise the retirement 
age. Right after being elected, he said that he was open to considering raising the 
age. Yet this doesn’t matter as long as the leader emotionally fulfills the desires of 
their followers and reframes the double-speak in some acceptable way. Incoherence 
is another strategic aspect of corruption, because to seek power at all costs means 
doing whatever it takes to preserve it:
A demagogue can blow hot and cold, this way and that, adopt phrases or 
policies from one source one day and repudiate them the next. There may be 
nothing at the core except a vacuum that sucks into itself clichés, slogans, 
facts, factoids and fabrications, fragments of ideologies, policies developed 
by others, sometimes those others themselves—whoever and whatever might 
help him gain power at any given moment. Then, at his whim, he disgorges it 
all. The political vacuum at the core of demagogy, moreover, may correspond 
to, and perhaps derives from, a moral vacuum, the absence of concern for 
anything other than the self. (Connor, 2018, para. 26)
In order to pull all of this off, tribalism is required—the fascist or authoritarian 
populist leader relies on followers who elevate the leader to cult-like status who 
can do no wrong (McClaren, 2016). The growth of the Tea Party faction in the US 
is an example of harnessing dichotomous thinking to declare that there can be no 
middle ground (Jones, 2015). Even if a political party itself isn’t popular, the status 
of the leader can be enough to revive or sustain it, as with Trump. Ulrich (2016) 
provides the example of how German citizens would speak highly of Hitler, but not 
those around him. Therefore, “the mythology of the Fuhrer served a compensatory 
function; it blunted dissatisfaction over the problems and shortcomings of the Third 
Reich by blaming them solely on Hitler’s subordinates” (p. 520). In a similar manner, 
Republican politicians like Mitch McConnell consistently poll in the low 20s, yet 
they retain their positions because of their support of Trump, who maintains a high 
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approval rating among Republican voters (Beauchamp, 2016). Any dissatisfaction 
that Republican voters might have with the GOP are thereby channeled onto state 
and national representatives, leaving Trump untouched.
DIFFERENCES
Despite sharing several characteristics, it is important to acknowledge that there are 
key differences between authoritarian populists and fascists. In order to effectively 
confront the growth of the right wing, it is essential to accurately frame what is 
currently happening, rather than indiscriminately assigning labels. By only using 
the fascist label to categorize anything remotely authoritarian, the “opposition 
culture consistently misses the boat on the populist lure of fascism, especially in 
its incipient phases” (Weinberg, 2010, para. 31). In her introduction to Theweleit’s 
(2010a) examination of the psychology of the Friekorps, Barbara Ehrenreich notes 
how “fascism tends to become representational, symbolic” or that it is “really about 
something else” such as economic fears or repression (p. xi). The critical thing 
to understand is that the acts that Theweleit describes from Friekorps diaries and 
memoirs were things that actually happened, that their violent assaults and murders 
were not “mere gestures.” In other words, “the fascist is not doing ‘something else,’ 
but doing what he wants to do…what he wants he gets” (p. xi).
The first important difference has to do with paths to power. Depressing as it 
may be to face, authoritarian populists like Trump simply use the existing electoral 
system without having to implement any significant changes, whereas fascists, 
though they can gain access electorally, immediately seize control of the government, 
including the military and police (Browning, 2017; Renton, 2017). While those in 
favor of labelling Trump a fascist might point out that Hitler also won electorally, 
he essentially came to power through a political party that took voters away from 
other conservative parties, combined with street violence. Trump easily assumed 
leadership of a Republican Party that had been well on the way to authoritarian 
populism for decades. By contrast, fascist regimes have “reactionary ambitions 
to uproot all elements of proletarian democracy within bourgeois society…these 
goals combined with the organization of a mass base, and the use of mass politics” 
(Renton, 2019, p. 85). In one example, Hungary’s Fidesz party has assisted Orbán in 
reconfiguring the electorate by passing a law that granted citizenship rights to those 
of Hungarian ethnicity in countries such as Romania. Many of these individuals 
have never been to Hungary but they compose 10% of the electorate who supports 
Orbán’s agenda close to 95% of the time (Beauchamp, 2018a, para. 40).
One could even argue that the authoritarian populist label doesn’t even fully 
apply to Trump who routinely contradicts several of its assertions. Some examples 
include Trump’s threats of military aggression against North Korea and Syria or 
supporting Russian sanctions which conflicts with populist principles of not getting 
engaged militarily in other nations or claims of Trump being an economic populist 
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while pretty much following the typical GOP playbook with tax cuts that benefit the 
wealthy or cutting social spending (DiMaggio, 2017). In order to fully establish, at 
minimum, authoritarian populism, Trump would have to overcome a capitalist class 
who openly depends on the global nature of trade (Sefla, 2017).
A second important difference is that fascist regimes tend to reject the free market 
libertarian economics of authoritarian populists in favor of creating social programs 
within a nationalist bent, because they know they need more than ambitious rhetoric 
to gain support for what they plan to carry out (Ulrich, 2016; Renton, 2019). For 
example, France’s National Front platform includes cutting taxes for the lowest 
income voters, price controls for utilities, keeping the 35-hour work week, and 
pension benefits (Alfono, 2017). This is done within an ethno-nationalist framework 
of welfare chauvinism where such benefits are exclusively for native-born citizens, 
common platforms of the Alternative for Germany and Sweden Democrats in 
addition to France’s National Front (Resnikoff, 2017). Currently, existing US 
civil rights restrictions, regardless of how feeble they are, do not allow for similar 
discriminatory practices. Republicans in the US want to pretty much seek to cut all 
social programs across the board for everyone, though they have to be strategic in 
how they frame it.
Territorial ambitions and conquest represent a third distinction between 
authoritarian populists and fascists. Hitler’s goal of “acquiring living space” in 
order to meet the economic needs of German citizens was an integral part of Nazi 
policies (Ulrich, 2016, p. 204). Likewise, advocating nostalgia for dictatorship is a 
regular aspect of Bosonaro’s speeches, even as far back as 1999 when he declared 
on television: “Voting won’t change anything in this country. Nothing! Things will 
only change, unfortunately, after starting a civil war here, and doing the work the 
dictatorship didn’t do. Killing some 30,000 people…If some innocents die, that’s 
just fine” (Bevins, 2018, para. 10). In contrast, though white nationalists such as 
Richard Spencer commonly call for the creation of a white ethno-state by using the 
phrase “blood and soil,” when confronted by journalists as to how this would be 
specifically done, they readily retreat into avoiding the question of how an ethno-
state be carried out without mass murder, such as claiming it could happen by “free 
choice” (Wise, 2016, para. 3).
A fourth distinction includes the larger ideological aims of authoritarian populism 
being about restoration of a lost past versus fascism’s goal of total transformation, a 
form of starting over:
The revolution of the right in both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany claimed to 
be using the state to socially engineer a new man and woman with new values. 
This is a project of transformation. The non-fascist far right however insists that 
the people are already the repositories of homogeneity and virtue…by contrast, 
the enemies of the people—elites and others—are neither homogeneous nor 
virtuous. Rather, they are accused of conspiring together against the people, 
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who are depicted as being under siege from above by the elites and from below 
by a range of dangerous others. (Davidson, 2017, p. 62)
This is reflected in the different historical conditions under which fascism arose in 
Germany and Trump’s authoritarian populism. In the 1920s and 30s, Germany was 
grappling with the economy and continuing its WWI-era fight to establish rule in 
Europe. By contrast, Trump’s “make America great again” policy—which came on 
the heels of the 2008 recession—is not so much about dominating specific nations, 
but about asserting imperialism through a rebirth of the US as a center of influence 
(Foster, 2017; Renton, 2017). Additionally, 19th century fascism faced a stronger, 
more militant left that it had to violently overcome through the establishment of 
fascist organizations. Today’s left is so immobilized that the far-right is pretty much 
limited to aiming their opposition against secular democracy, as conservatives have 
been doing since the Enlightenment (Renton, 2017).
In summary, characteristics of non-fascist, far-right administrations involve 
working within existing electoral systems, including political parties; rejecting the 
concept of a strong, centralized state regarding the economy (but more authoritarian 
populist regimes might consider strategically employing welfare chauvinism); and 
they do not challenge traditional class alignments as fascism does (Renton, 2019). 
As with continually denying that they are racist, the bulk of far-right political 
parties openly reject the notion that they are fascist nor do they identify with Hitler, 
Mussolini or other 20th century figures (Weinberg, 2010; Renton, 2019). Likewise, 
while Hungary’s Fidesz seeks to destroy democracy, the GOP in the US hasn’t yet 
reached that stage because the existing system is too profitable (Beauchamp, 2018a). 
What we currently have is one of two major political parties that is “indifferent to 
the consequences of their actions” and hasn’t really been able to accomplish much 
legislatively (para. 110).
However, this does not mean that fully-realized fascism isn’t possible. What we 
are currently experiencing in the US could be an initial stage of downplaying or 
denying fascism, then slowly acclimating people to it. Neiwert (2017) asserts—and 
I concur—that Trump is a right-wing nativist populist, not a fascist. However, he 
regularly flirts with fascist and white supremacist ideas, at the very least promoting 
the notion that these ideas are “as equally bad” as leftist and social justice movements:
While it’s not inevitable that Republicans will go further in this direction, 
it’s easy to imagine them doing so as the American electorate becomes 
more diverse and more liberal: with more extreme gerrymandering, harsher 
voter restrictions, and more right-wing media consolidation and harassment 
of independent outlets. No single law or anti-immigrant speech would 
inaugurate a soft fascist regime. But a version of Hungary’s system could 





Conservatives have long relied on what Apple and Whitty (2002) characterize as 
a “power bloc” of different right-wing coalitions, including the religious right, 
neoconservatives, neoliberals, and libertarians. These groups will often unite, 
depending on the specific issue at hand. For example, religious fundamentalists often 
support neoliberalism or connect the concept of a free market to Christianity (Daher, 
2017). There may be minor disagreements amongst the right, but those differences 
can be set aside, especially when it comes to limiting the civil liberties of women, 
minorities, immigrants and LGBTQ people or to cut taxes for the wealthy in order 
to restrict social spending.
Though these patterns of coalition-building are familiar, there are many new 
forms of ideological positioning and organizing happening within the right today. 
Browning (2018) posits that a newer form of authoritarianism, illiberal democracy, 
has become a significant means of consolidating power where “opposition parties 
can be left in existence and elections can be held in order to provide a fig leaf of 
democratic legitimacy, while in reality elections pose scant challenge to their power” 
(p. 16). As an example of this, Browning goes on to explain how the Electoral 
College in the US has essentially been weaponized:
The fifty senators from the twenty-five least populous states—twenty-
nine of them Republicans—represent just over 16 percent of the American 
population, and thirty-four Republican senators represent states with a total 
of twenty-one percent of the American population. With gerrymandering and 
voter suppression enhancing even more the systemic Republican advantage, 
it is estimated that the Democrats will have to win by 7 to 11 points in the 
2018 elections to achieve even the narrowest of majorities in the House of 
Representatives. (p. 16)
Adding to this, the choice now comes down between illiberal democracy (the far 
right) or “undemocratic liberalism,” represented with more centrist politicians; 
along with a fully marginalized left (Der Spiegel Staff, 2018, para. 15). This has also 
been referred to as “soft fascism,” where the political system doesn’t have to utilize 
extreme measures in order to engender compliance since the left as well as the mass 
media is effectively neutered (Bello, 2018; Beauchamp, 2018a).
The most pressing threat is the global scale of organizing and international 
cooperation on the right, especially through social media, where “far-right activists 
can draw on funds, infrastructure, and speakers from allied groups in other 
countries” (Renton, 2019, p. 79). A key example of this is the Free Tommy Robinson 
campaign after the alt-right celebrity pleaded guilty to contempt of court. Robinson 
had established strong connections with anti-Muslim groups outside of the UK, 
including Republican State Congressman Paul Gosar from Arizona. These alliances 
have been building over the past 20 years, such as Russian media actively hosting 
and promoting political figures associated with Brexit, anti-gay organizations such 
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as the World Congress for Families, assorted white supremacists, anti-Semites and 
others who openly support Putin (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014). As different groups 
experience PR and electoral successes, they can then point to those as recruiting 
tools that their movement is strong and accomplishing things that governments 
cannot do alone. At the same time, these groups can distribute blacklists or mobilize 
attacks on social media against their perceived enemies.
Closely related to this global mobilization is the removal of obstacles related 
to gatekeeping that once faced more extreme-right candidates or those from non-
political backgrounds (Renton, 2019; Sefla, 2017). Despite being primary enablers of 
authoritarianism and fascism, conservatives did once enact some sort of ideological 
check within their parties, as they did when David Duke ran for Senate in the 1990s. 
This is no longer the case. The election of celebrities like Trump are made possible 
by him fusing a direct relationship with the media and his base, in effect bypassing 
GOP lawmakers who scramble to keep up (Beauchamp, 2016). Media outlets like 
Fox News create an airtight propaganda bubble around Trump, keeping mainstream 
news organizations in check by turning them into “yet another political enemy around 
which to mobilize grievances and resentments of his base” (Browning, 2018, p. 16).
Currently, the majority of the energy around conservative organizing is through 
the Third Position movement (Resnikoff, 2017) of the alt-right, “a sanitizing term 
applied to a collection of hate groups and their leaders” who, using anarchistic 
tropes, openly advocate the usual line-up of white supremacy, anti-Semitism, 
Islamophobia, misogyny, and xenophobia (Stan, 2017, para. 2). What makes the 
alt-right somewhat distinct from authoritarian populists and fascists is that these 
ideologies are synthesized with the ironic discourse and attack-dog mannerisms of 
social media, which facilitates their growth and recruitment of members, as well 
as successful elections of candidates such as Trump (Romano, 2016; Nagel, 2017). 
Bevins’ (2018) conceptualization of Bolsonaro’s persona as “Operation Condor plus 
the Internet” is an apt description of the alt-right as a whole (para. 10).
The alt-right is also deliberately obscurantist, as with Richard Spencer claiming 
that “the left is right and the alt-right is the new left” (Nagel, 2017, p. 51). This is 
reflected in widely-shared Third Position authors like Aleksandr Dugin, who promotes 
the concept of a Fourth Political Theory, “a necessary collaboration between a bygone 
left (communists, socialists) and a bygone right (fascists)” where a rebranding effort 
of sorts is attempting to rise above traditional political categorizations like liberalism, 
socialism, or fascism (Draitser, 2017, para. 35). Alt-right figures like Steve Bannon 
regularly utilize the discourse of leftist critique as part of reinforcing white nationalism, 
such as framing the media as “corporatist” or “globalist” (Foster, 2017).
Marantz’s (2017) account of alt-right conspiracy theorist Mike Enoch’s pathway 
from libertarianism to white supremacy and fascism reveals how people are recruited 
into the movement due to the allure of the troll identity:
As a liberal, he had dealt with troubling facts—the achievement gap between black 
students and white students, say—by invoking the history of racial oppression, 
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or by explaining why the data didn’t show what they appeared to show….But 
all those explanations were abstract at best, muddled at worst, and they required 
levels of context that were impossible to convey in a Facebook post. Now he was 
free to revert to a far simpler explanation: maybe white people had more wealth 
and power because white people were superior. After arguing himself out of every 
previous position, he had finally found the perfect ideology for an inveterate 
contrarian—one that presented such a basic affront to the underlying tenets of 
modern democracy that he would never run out of enemies. (para. 34)
Wolff’s (2018) interview with Richard Spencer also reveals many key aspects of 
the alt-right, including it’s overall “tear it all down” ethos and prioritizing of camp 
and disruption (Nagel, 2017). When Wolff (2018) asked Spencer about how to place 
Bannon and Trump on the right-wing spectrum, Spencer asserted that neither fit 
the definition of alt-rightists as he saw it, but that they regularly advanced alt-right 
talking points along with being “open to the people who are open to these ideas” (p. 
138). Commenting on Trump, Spencer didn’t hesitate to apply labels accordingly:
We are the Trump vanguard. The left will say trump is a nationalist and an 
implicit or quasi-racialist. Conservatives, because they are just so douche, say 
oh no of course not, he’s a constitutionalist, or whatever. We on the alt-right 
will say, He is a nationalist and he is a racialist. His movement is a white 
movement. Duh. (pp. 138–139)
Ultimately, Spencer, like other alt-right figures, sees Trump as a gateway to further 
infiltration into mainstream US politics by first harnessing anti-immigrant sentiment, 
then escalating to mass deportations, which will finally result in a white ethno-state 
(Nagel, 2017).
The growth of the alt-right has also revealed that traditional avenues of 
conservative messaging, like think tanks, once thought to be impenetrable, are fast 
becoming obsolete. This is especially the case with those who have opposed Trump 
and his brand of populism. Though they retain some degree of influence among 
GOP politicians and their agendas, think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and the 
American Enterprise Institute are fast losing ground compared to Fox News, Brietbart 
and online alt-right media (Heilbrunn, 2017). This shift away from traditional 
conservative media and authors is connected to larger economic changes in the wake 
of the 2008 recession and the discrediting of neoliberal optimism regarding free 
trade, pluralism, and globalization (Der Spiegel Staff, 2018). As Taibbi (2018) notes,
The Grand Old Coalition is broken. Conservative intellectuals have gone from 
faux-praising the ordinary Joe to arguing that too much democracy is a bad 
thing when dumb people are involved. And the family-values set has not only 
been stuck with an oversexed thrice-married pig as president, but left to watch in 
horror as they’ve been replaced as national moral censors by the Social Justice 
Warriors of the Internet. In the Harvey Weinstein era, the Christian right doesn’t 
even have a monopoly on bashing Hollywood mores anymore. (para. 20)
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In effect, traditional conservatives have been rendered irrelevant in the wake of the 
alt-right and new forms of right-wing organizing. Their only choice is to follow suit 
and board the Trump train.
CAUTIONS
The ideological flexibility of today’s far-right combined with the reach of a for-
profit social media represents one of its more pressing dangers (Resnikoff, 2017). 
These groups are highly adept at self-presentation. For example, the American 
Freedom Party, a strong supporter of Trump’s candidacy, recognized the need to tone 
down its white supremacist rhetoric—such as replacing the term “white nationalist” 
with “white advocate”—to make it “more palatable to moderate white voters” 
(para. 31). Likewise, anti-Muslim organizing provides a more subtle way to 
scapegoat an ethnic minority by claiming to be opposed to religion, not race 
(Sunshine, 2017). Often these groups utilize intersectional tactics, like using 
the support for LGBTQI rights to promote Islamophobia. Trump himself has no 
coherent political worldview other than strung-together talking points that are 
highly inconsistent, depending upon his current mood, need to protect himself, and 
permanent desire for attention (Browning, 2017). However, those he surrounds 
himself with, such as Steve Bannon and Stephen Miller, along with associated 
neoconservative generals, DO have specific ideological visions and see Trump’s 
impressionability as a net gain.
In the past, conservatives had to distance themselves from their supporters’ calls 
for violence. As Renton (2019) has noted, “We are living in a moment where the 
mainstream right wagers that by moving onto ground previously inhabited by the far 
right its own popularity will rise” (p. 84). Prior fears of appearing too supportive of 
authoritarian tendencies are eroding as conservative politicians are finding they need 
to join the alt-right train, or be left behind electorally (Lopez, 2017). The political 
calculus is clear, as DiMaggio (2017) remarks concerning Trump’s response to the 
aftermath of Charlottesville’s white supremacist march:
Trump knows he can’t afford to alienate racist elements on the right to get 
re-elected, and he doesn’t want to alienate them, since he himself is a racist 
and a bigot. Hence the refusal to use clear language to condemn the murders. 
His political reasoning here is completely transparent, as he’s spent his entire 
political career cultivating hate on the reactionary right. Although Trump 
eventually condemned the attack after receiving a large amount of negative 
press, his reversal is part of a broader trend Trump is known for, in which he 
initially signals to racists in his support base that he approves of their actions, 
thereby devaluing any later reversal as merely the product of political pressure, 
rather than principled opposition. The damage, of course, has already been 
done. Far-right fascists and racists know that the president supports their 
behavior when he goes out of his way to provide them cover. (para. 22)
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We also have to be alert to the fact that “early fascism nearly always plays to 
populism” with its discourse about being on the side of the forgotten or the “little 
guy” and through a racist and xenophobic lens (Weinberg, 2010). Despite our 
current conditions being different than those of 1930s Germany and that fascism has 
potentially taken on new forms, we should never overlook that the overall aims are 
the same: “openly espousing racism, nationalism, anti-environmentalism, misogyny, 
homophobia, police violence, and extreme militarism” (Foster, 2017, para. 21). In 
his sobering analysis of white supremacist Richard Spencer, Wise (2016) reminds us 
that the answer isn’t one of accommodating racism, but of opposing it:
His is not a movement of intellectual and moral principle. It is a movement of 
conquest, domination and control, which seeks power for power’s sake—an 
entirely fascist precept, incapable of existing side by side with any pretense to 
democratic norms or institutions. If we are to fight it, we must understand this. 
His is a movement that, unchecked, cannot lead to anything other than mass 
violence and the complete extirpation of those seen as standing in its way. If 
might makes right—and it does in the worldview of white nationalists—they 
cannot be expected to accept a partial victory (as they did in the past) and not 
see it through to the end. Their goals, however much they try and hide them, 
are genocidal. They must simply be stopped. (para. 20)
In this vein, traditional liberal approaches like calling for dialogue or counteracting 
fake news with factual information are not sufficient (Camacho, 2016). We are 
dealing with a right-wing that is either determined to restore nations to their former 
glory or to completely dismantle and replace them with a fascist governmental 
structure, both of which having minorities and immigrants in their sights as part 
of those plans. Evidence of the insufficiency of liberal-left responses includes the 
continuing influence of Brexit, and the global rise of right-wing nationalist and 
fascist parties in Europe, Eastern Europe, Australia, India, and South America, along 
with other regions (Resnikoff, 2017).
Renton’s (2019) advice for confronting the right is prescient. First, it is critical to 
acknowledge that opposition needs to be aimed at what the right wing is doing now, 
not so much applying the fascist label to tie it to past actions or some future dystopian 
predictions of what could be. Instead, successful strategies are intersectional, such 
as highlighting the current harms of racist and sexist policies, as well as extending 
the fight to Internet spaces where the right likes to establish dominance. Second, the 
electoral right does far more damage in the long run than the street right, yet the street 
right is most associated with traditional fascism in its symbolism, language, and 
actions. While Antifa is busy confronting right-wing speakers on college campuses, 
they completely overlook cuts to Medicare happening in Congress. Third, and most 
important, is to “cleave apart the alliance between center- and far-right” (Renton, 
2019, p. 89). We have to focus our efforts on breaking apart this coalition, whether 
in online spaces, electorally, or through organized action.
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CHAPTER 3
WHO IS THE REAL WORKING CLASS?
Moving beyond the Construction of the White Male Industrial Worker as a 
Marker of Authenticity
INTRODUCTION
The 2016 election revealed the enduring nature of assumptions about the working 
class as white male manual laborers as well as appealing to the needs of the “middle 
class,” also a stand-in for a specific type of white workforce (Winant, 2017). Even 
though overt racial language was rarely used in outlining the contours of class, it 
was pretty apparent in discourse surrounding the election that only some workers 
mattered:
The common denominator of so many of the strange and troubling cultural 
narratives coming our way is a set of assumptions about who matters, whose 
story it is, who deserves the pity and the treats and the presumptions of 
innocence, the kid gloves and the red carpet, and ultimately the kingdom, the 
power, and the glory. You already know who. It’s white people in general and 
white men in particular, and especially white Protestant men, some of whom 
are apparently dismayed to find out that there is going to be, as your mom 
might have put it, sharing. The history of this country has been written as their 
story, and the news sometimes still tells it this way—one of the battles of our 
time is about who the story is about, who matters and who decides. (Solnit, 
n.d., para. 3)
Shortly after the 2016 election, as people attempted to cobble together some 
sort of analysis of what exactly happened, a bipartisan narrative emerged of the 
beleaguered, economically targeted white working class who was driven to support 
Trump because the Democratic Party overlooked them in favor of lavish attention 
granted to minorities and women (Demeter, 2016; Walters, 2017; Mason, 2017). 
This only “reaffirmed the message that whiteness and the working class were the 
same thing and made the vast non-white working class invisible or inconsequential,” 
including the idea that their economic suffering was apparently irrelevant (Solnit, 
n.d., para. 9). This mirrors what Resnikoff (2017) identifies as a hallmark of 
populism: that the white worker is part of a vanishing working and middle class, 
despite the fact that minorities have experienced the brunt of a capitalist economy. 
Even within socialist organizing, the white, male, heterosexual, manual worker has 
CHAPTER 3
62
been presented as the universal stand-in for all of labor (Hill, Sanders, & Hankin, 
2002).
Walters (2017) outlines how both the right and the left devoted endless time and 
bandwidth to folksy interview portraits of small industrial and rural towns in economic 
ruin and their Trump supporter residents. Taken together, these stories broadcast the 
message that “racism and sexism were unfortunate side effects of the real illness 
of economic vulnerability and insecurity” while identity politics also served as “so 
much elitist petulance that ignores the populist surge at the heart of Trump’s victory” 
(para. 2). McAuley’s (2019) analysis of the right-wing drift of the mostly white Yellow 
Vest protest movement in France finds that even though the protesters represent a 
minority of the country (with other demonstrations drawing much larger crowds 
around issues of climate change and women’s rights), “the concerns of this minority 
are treated as universal by politicians, the press…working class whites command 
public attention even when they have no clear message” (p. 61).
Even two years after the election, the media remains focused on how Trump’s 
policies have impacted his supporters, not on the non-Trump voters who 
comprehended the impacts of a Trump administration to begin with (Solod, 2017; 
Walters, 2017). Their narratives remain hidden because they are not considered part 
of the authentic working class. As Demeter (2016) points out,
if we’re paying attention to reality, most members of the working class would, 
by definition, be women and/or people of color. But that’s not what people 
who talk about the politics of the “working class” mean. Women and people of 
color are engaged in ridiculed “identity politics,” while white men who haven’t 
done well economically are the sainted “working class.” (para. 2)
For all of the media attention it receives, one would expect this authentic 
working class to be highly politically engaged and dominant from a demographic 
standpoint. However, in light of the overall population, Trump’s base is essentially a 
minority. Maison (2017) provides the example of McDowell County, West Virginia, 
located in coal country which is highly supportive of Trump and other conservative 
candidates. Even though Trump won the majority of the county by 66%, less than 
35% of eligible voters turned out, compared to other parts of the state with turnout 
at almost 60% (para. 6). McDowell County is not a unique phenomenon as many 
high-poverty regions of the US have low voting rates, which, of course, benefits 
Republicans. The problem is, that as long as the meme of the authentic working class 
persists, the solidarity of the working class needed for mass mobilization remains an 
impossibility (Winant, 2017).
An important aspect of understanding the problem of working-class solidarity is 
acknowledging that color and genderblind capitalism is not possible, especially in 
a colonial settler state like the US (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2002; Cole, 2018; 
Stanley, 2018). Capitalism is intertwined with sexism, racism, homophobia and 
xenophobia. These are not mere “strategies” used by the ruling class used to control 
workers, or side effects of capitalism, as the common line of left reasoning goes:
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In the United States, the hold of racism on white workers has been a constant 
historical problem for working-class organization. It has been a barrier to union 
organizing and socialist class consciousness. There are many instances where 
white workers have actively rejected unionism, typically in the South, because 
it implied shared membership with black workers. Even in the face of utmost 
hardship, white workers have traded away economic improvement and class 
strength for illusory cultural privileges of whiteness. (Martinot, 2000, p. 43)
The left needs to confront the problem of racism within white workers and stop 
diverting it to the middle or ruling classes or minimizing racism and sexism as “just 
part of capitalism.” It needs to let go of the “authentic working class” meme. This 
will require a dialectical historical engagement with the conditions that shaped white 
supremacy and patriarchy as part of the rise of capitalism.
This chapter addresses several concepts related to the persistence of the white 
male worker as “authentic working class,” beginning with an overview of the 
impacts of neoliberalism. This then creates the conditions needed for backlash, 
which Trump and other authoritarian populists took advantage of during the election. 
Next, an examination of capitalism as constructed by race will include the historical 
development of white worker identity and why this remains a major barrier for 
socialist organizing. In particular, the strategic significance of white rural spaces will 
be analyzed along with a dialectical reading of what shapes those spaces. The chapter 
will conclude with a revised portrait of the working class as highly diverse, including 
more members than ever before due to drastic changes in the contexts of waged work. 
Examples of organizing drawing on these strengths will also be presented.
NEOLIBERALISM’S EFFECTS
Representing a specific form of capitalism, neoliberalism can be defined as “a 
corporate domination of society that supports state enforcement of the unregulated 
market” which includes limiting the rights of the working class, eviscerating the 
social safety net and shielding the capitalist class from the consequences of their 
actions (McClaren & Farahmandpur, 2002, p. 37). Also known as “socialism for 
the rich,” or “third way,” neoliberalism brings with it lower taxes for the top 1%, 
removal of environmental protections, and movement to financialization-based 
economies that trade in debt—a key factor contributing to the 2008 global recession 
(Collins, 2015). As A. Smith (2017) explains, neoliberalism replaced the older 
state infrastructure-funding philosophy of Keynesianism, which was in place from 
the New Deal era of the 1930s to the early 1970s. Reagan and Thatcher cemented 
the policies of neoliberalism in the 1980s, which continued through the Clinton 
administration in the 1990s, ushering in the politics of austerity that continue today 
(Fraser, 2017). Because it is supported by the capitalist class, neoliberalism can 
accommodate various presentation styles, from conservative and militaristic to 
multicultural and global cutting-edge.
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Currently, a significant portion of the global white working class (in particular, 
the middle class), instead of resisting the neoliberal onslaught, has been drawn to 
nationalism with its attendant isolationism and economic protectionism. This has 
happened in the absence of viable left organizational alternatives such as rank-
and-file unions (Post, 2017). Intensified targeting of minorities, refugees, LGBTQ, 
and women has been a feature of the platforms of the Republican Party in the US, 
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Marine LePen’s National Front 
in France, and the Five Star Movement in Italy, to name a few. This section will 
first present a picture of the current economic situation facing the working class 
under neoliberalism, with a focus on the philosophy of progressive and regressive 
neoliberalism and its impacts after the 2008 global recession. It is followed by an 
overview of the various forms of backlash and resentment discourse that shapes the 
ideologies of white workers, furthering their allegiance to authoritarian populism.
Current Economic Situation
Often brandishing the concept of “freedom,” the United States has always had an 
extremely limited view of human rights, which has enabled capitalism to operate 
relatively unchecked (Surin, 2018). Essentials like education, environmental 
protection and shelter are not viewed as rights while “freedom is equated with a 
specific form of individualism that is shorn of responsibility” (Dolack, 2017a, p. 14). 
In other words, the US working class is “free to compete in a race to the bottom set up 
by capitalists” (p. 14). Neoliberalism as philosophy and policy gains its power from 
the unwillingness of the capitalist class to address poverty in any sort of meaningful 
way. At the same time, neoliberalism presents itself as emerging naturally in a 
global context, when it is in actuality the result of deliberate decisions regarding the 
prioritization of markets, buttressed by military force worldwide (Sefla, 2017, p. 3).
Brenner and Fraser (2017) note that as soon as social activism began to challenge 
capitalism on many fronts in the 1970s, neoliberal restructuring began, taking the 
working class by surprise. Struggling to remain relevant against the onslaught, 
resistance groups such as unions and feminist organizations began to immediately 
shift their focus to business unionism and liberal feminism, marginalizing more 
militant forms of organizing. Since its full implementation in the 1980s, neoliberalism 
has presented itself for over thirty years as a forward-thinking type of economics, 
emphasizing diversity and upward mobility as replacements for eroding social safety 
nets. During the Clinton administration, the full financialization of the economy 
occurred, with a shift toward Wall Street and deregulation of the banking sector 
(Fraser, 2017). This was reflected in the discourse of “self-sufficiency” applied to 
single mothers after welfare reform in 1996 (Brenner & Fraser, 2017).
Though portrayed as an oppositional figure, Trump in no way represents any sort 
of cessation of neoliberalism. It needs to be stressed that “what his voters rejected 
was not neoliberalism, tout court, but progressive neoliberalism” (Brenner & Fraser, 
2017, p. 130). Trump and his supporters view progressive neoliberalism as a mix 
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of Wall Street and the media on one side and globalization and “identity politics” 
movements on the other:
Rejecting globalization, Trump voters also repudiated the liberal 
cosmopolitanism identified with it. For some…it was a short step to blaming 
their worsening conditions on political correctness, people of color, immigrants, 
and Muslims. In their eyes, feminists and Wall Street were birds of a feather, 
perfectly united in the person of Hillary Clinton. (p. 131)
In many ways, it was Obama’s continuation of progressive neoliberalism’s austerity 
and focus on individualized success that paved the way for Trump’s authoritarian 
populism (Sefla, 2017).
One immediate outcome of Neoliberalism was the massive relocation of 
manufacturing from the United States to the global South, now representing close 
to 70% of production (Foster, 2017, para. 61). The wealth from this shift did not 
“trickle down” to workers, but has been continually hoarded and transformed 
into financialized assets (Collins, 2015). Sustar (2018) points out that the loss of 
manufacturing jobs in the US was not a result of offshoring or importing goods from 
other countries as economic nationalists suggest, but to productivity shifts including 
automation. Accompanying this production shift is extreme wealth disparity, such as 
the top 1% in the US increasing its wealth by a rate of 120% between 1980 and 2015 
(Foster, 2017, para. 61). Essentially, the only significant growth experienced under 
Neoliberalism has been the capitalist class, the top 10% alone has over 70% of the 
wealth in the US (para. 61). Foster points out that six billionaires (four are from the 
US) hold more wealth than the poorest half of the world (para. 61).
In addition to the capitalist class re-asserting its hold on profits through wealth 
disparity, the other aspect of neoliberalism is mass privatization (Thier, 2019). The 
earlier tentative agreements between the working class and New Deal legislation 
were radically upended, resulting in austerity combined with deep cuts in social 
programs deregulation, and lack of access to health care. This has had several 
impacts, including the US now having the highest infant mortality and obesity 
rates among developed countries, a rise in disease incidents like the Zika virus, and 
conditions often associated with the 1800s, such as hookworm parasites in Alabama 
(Surin, 2018, p. 8). Currently, the US remains in 36th place for access to water and 
sanitation, as the crisis in Flint, Michigan illustrates (p. 8). One fourth of US youth 
live in poverty and the incarceration rate (heightened during the 1990s due to three-
strikes laws) is the highest globally (p. 8).
Housing remains out of reach for many, with home prices outpacing inflation 
and rising by 60%, also impacting affordability of rent (Dolack, 2017a, p. 14). It is 
no longer possible in the US for a minimum wage, full-time worker to afford a one-
bedroom apartment. For example, in West Virginia, a minimum wage worker would 
have to put in 49 hours a week to obtain a one-bedroom apartment, and 80 hours a 
week in the District of Columbia (p. 15). Much of this stems from the 2008 global 
recession which was caused by accumulating credit and debt, in particular rapidly 
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rising home prices due to subprime mortgage speculation, immediately followed 
by the bottom falling out of the stock market and investment banks (Thier, 2019; 
Rasmus, 2018b). The consequences were over nine million foreclosures and eight 
million lost jobs (Thier, 2019, p. 92). At the end of 2009, 18% of workers (close 
to 30 million) faced unemployment, part-time work, or ceased to be able to find a 
job (p. 93).
While the 2008 recession impacted the working class as a whole, including 
the middle class, it was the poor who were hit the hardest. Thier (2019) notes that 
households in the lowest tier of income levels had the highest unemployment rate 
of 30%. By contrast, top earning households only experienced a 3% unemployment 
rate. When combined with underemployment rates, “half of the nation’s poorest 
families experienced unemployment or underemployment during the recession” (p. 
93). And while many Trump supporters fall into that category, African American 
and Latino/a workers were especially impacted (Sustar, 2018). For example, median 
household wealth of black families will, if conditions persist, become zero in 
2053, with Latino/as hitting zero by the 2070s (p. 38). This makes the focus on the 
“authentic” white working class all the more puzzling in terms of economics.
In addition to the financial impacts of neoliberalism, traditional means of civic 
participation and organizing has been radically limited. In 2016, voter turnout 
was only 55.7%, making the US 28th in turnout compared to other countries who 
regularly average 75% (Surin, 2018, p. 8). While close to 100% of voters are 
registered in countries like Sweden and Japan, only 64% are registered in the US (p. 
8). These numbers are kept low partly due to Republican voter suppression tactics 
like partisan gerrymandering, voter ID laws, and purging voter rolls (Wang, 2012). 
Unions represent another protective form of civic engagement and organizing for 
the working class, but membership has been on an ongoing decline since the 1950s, 
from 33% of private sector workers once unionized to just under 7% today (Sustar, 
2018, p. 27). This demonstrates that the strategy of business unionism has only 
assisted in the demise of unions, not protected them as proponents asserted. Instead, 
workers have lost the ability to utilize unions as a way to leverage wages and quality 
of working conditions for all.
Backlash and Resentment
An inevitable result of neoliberalism’s failure to deliver to the working class is an 
increase of backlash and resentment, particularly among whites. Racism has long 
served as a potent form of gaining the consent of the white working class to the 
austerity cycles that are built into capitalism. So long as people can see the ability 
in the long term to retain their social position and increase their economic gains—
however minor—they will overlook the multiculturalism and diversity that is part 
of Neoliberal globalization. However, after the 2008 crisis, the deal was off, and 
blame easily shifted to a mixture of “global elites” and immigrants in particular (Der 
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Speigel Staff, 2018; Mason, 2016). Shenk’s (2017) interview of author Katherine 
Kramer reveals this dynamic:
When a substantial portion of the population perceives that they are not getting 
their fair share, and that this is the result of people in power giving their share 
to those who are less deserving, we are on fertile ground for a politics of “us 
versus them.” Political actors can step in and validate that resentment and make 
promises to stop the flow of resources, power, and respect to the undeserving. 
Situations of economic and cultural insecurity seem especially ripe for the 
success of this kind of politics. (para. 3)
Forsetti’s (2016) account of growing up in a white, rural fundamentalist Christian 
community reveals many key contradictory aspects of backlash and resentment 
discourse. These include being upset at the current state of the economy while 
continually voting for politicians that advocate for the very policies that cause 
economic collapse, or blaming government while accepting social security, welfare, 
farm subsidies, commodities insurance and other government protections. They see 
their own poverty through the lens of victimization, but refuse to allow that description 
to apply to non-white people who they claim are undeserving “moochers” (while 
also living in all-white communities far from diverse populations). Likewise, they 
reject relocating to where work is available while criticizing poor urban residents for 
remaining where they are, as in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Drug addiction 
in rural communities is a “health crisis” while in urban areas it is a “character flaw.” 
Outsiders are viewed with suspicion and denied business permits, or the community 
creates a hostile climate for diverse populations like LGBTQI people, but then 
residents complain that no businesses want to relocate to rural communities. All of 
this takes place within a global context of disrupted homogeneity in many of these 
locations, which is leading to the contradictory manifestations of white resentment 
(Der Spiegel Staff, 2018).
By far, immigration provides the most potent organizing point for this resentment 
and backlash, encapsulated in the demand to “build the wall.” This reveals the 
profound irony of white workers blaming refugees and immigrants, who are the 
first-line victims rather than the causes of neoliberalism. Immigrants from Central 
America in particular have served as fodder for the Republican Party to gain support 
for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids, detention centers (including 
detaining of children), increased militarization of border patrol, eliminating the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) college funding program and 
more recently, Trump’s family separations (Bacon, 2018; Anderson, 2017). What 
is overlooked in these efforts is any kind of commentary on what has been driving 
migrants to flee those regions of the world, such as past and present US efforts in 
destabilizing governments. Essentially, migrants “are looking for economic survival 
in countries tied to the neoliberal economic model” (Bacon, 2018, p. 33). Worldwide, 
there are more than 50 million of these individuals who are perpetually scapegoated 
by the right (A. Smith, 2017, p. 44).
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Much of the origins of xenophobic immigration policy is tied to the discourse 
surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s, 
which provides a case study of Neoliberalism’s failed promises. When NAFTA 
was first presented, it was sold as a net positive for everyone, albeit in the racist, 
paternalistic frame of a more “advanced” country (the US) bringing a more 
“backwards” one (Mexico) into modernity (Simons, 2017). Much like today, 
Mexico was portrayed in the 1990s as a corrupt and criminal regime that could be 
safely contained through trade. Now that NAFTA has gutted the Mexican economy 
as well as impacted immigration, Trump and his supporters have revived discourse 
surrounding Mexicans being a criminal element, invading the borders, bringing 
disease and taking jobs. This represents further irony in that a wall and its associated 
draconian policies would only serve to reinforce an intimidated, low-wage labor 
pool for corporations, rather than discourage immigration (Chomsky, 2017).
This targeting of immigrants is happening at the same time when the visibility 
of Latino/as and Muslims have increased in terms of political activism and post-
secondary educational attainment (Anderson, 2017; DeVega, 2018; Chacon, 2017). 
This has enabled “American exceptionalism” to be supplanted by narratives of 
“American victimization” in what can best be described as a massive national 
amnesia regarding the history of the US’s involvement with Mexico and other 
countries (Simons, 2017). At the same time, the failure of earlier administrations 
to confront xenophobic immigration policies has in many ways paved the way for 
Trump’s even more extreme proposals, as in Obama’s DACA program creating a 
separation between “deserving” immigrant college students from less educated, 
poorer immigrants in order to win centrist support (Chacon, 2017; Chomsky, 2017). 
This includes Democrats’ consistent framing of immigration in terms of “tough 
on crime” discourse, which only validates Republican talking points instead of 
challenging them.
Backlash and resentment also cluster around narratives about poverty, which 
relate to who is or isn’t viewed as the “deserving poor.” Kimmel (2017) discusses the 
concept of aggrieved entitlement as a central component of white resentment, or “the 
sense that those benefits to which you believed yourself entitled have been snatched 
away from you by unseen forces larger and more powerful” (p. 18). This is a form of 
reverse victimology, where whites see themselves as “helpless” against an incoming 
tide of women and minorities who are taking what belonged to them. Another 
powerful component of resentment around poverty is the fundamental attribution 
error or “natural tendency to see the behavior of others as being determined by their 
character—while excusing our own behavior based on circumstances (Szalavitz, 
2017, para. 4). This is enormously beneficial to capitalism:
For elites, pinpointing defective culture as an explanation for poverty deflects 
investigation and rationalizes political complacency, enabling capitalists and 
policymakers to scrutinize individuals rather than institutions. This trend is 
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most evident in the Republican Party, within which the trope of the undeserving 
poor is practically a mantra. (Stanley, 2018, p. 42)
An additional aspect shaping poverty is that its overall economic impacts are 
far greater in the United States compared to other democracies. In terms of risk 
factors, or what are commonly referred to in backlash discourse as “poor choices,” 
Americans actually have fewer of these risk factors compared to 40 years ago or to 
those living in other democracies (Brady, Finnigan & Hubgen, 2018, para. 10). The 
penalties for risk factors are just higher in the United States. For example, a lack of 
a high school education increases the likelihood of one being poor by just over 15% 
whereas in other democracies it only increases the risk of poverty by less than 5% 
(para. 11). Backlash discourse also overlooks how the majority of people in poverty 
are employed, such as 78% of the families receiving Medicaid having at least one 
employed household member (Rader, 2017, para. 8). The majority of the working 
poor are simply employed in sectors barely paying a subsistence wage, with service 
industry jobs paying in the low $20,000s (para. 8).
In the US, welfare represents a particularly racialized and gendered form of 
backlash discourse (DeVega, 2018). Though blamed for poverty and moral decline, 
people living in single mother-headed households only represent a very small 
percentage of the larger population at 8.8% (Brady, Finnigan, & Hubgen, 2018, para. 
4). For those receiving welfare, 90% have two or fewer children (S. Smith, 2017, p. 
20). Coupled with the power of fundamental attribution error within conservative 
groups, “poor people tend to be the hardest on each other,” especially white women 
who receive welfare harshly judging minority female recipients (Szalavitz, 2017, 
para. 14).
This also partly explains the tendency of Trump supporters to demand that Social 
Security and Medicare are left untouched, while they insist on resisting the Medicaid 
expansion or the Affordable Care Act, programs that cover more poor and diverse 
individuals (Thompson, 2017; DeVega, 2018). Smith and Hanley (2018) found 
that the economic pessimism of Trump supporters coupled with their willingness 
to sacrifice their own financial well-being in support of right-wing policies was 
due to racial resentment. Close to 40% of the economic policy differences between 
liberals and conservatives could be attributed to racial views alone (p. 206). 
Likewise, DeVega (2018) notes that the more that social programs were associated 
with minorities, white support for cutting those programs increased, even if they 
acknowledged this would harm white populations (para. 17). There is also a class 
dimension to this, as Kimmel (2017) observes that even among white supremacists, 
the groups they prioritize defending include middle-class whites, not poor ones, 
who are often described in the same demeaning terms as minorities. Conservative 
whites will fully support policies that primarily benefit the white middle class, like 
mortgage interest/property tax deductions and other tax benefits, for all intents and 
purposes forms of white welfare (DeVega, 2018, para. 6).
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A final area of resentment and backlash discourse involves jobs and affirmative 
action. As with issues of welfare, the notion of who deserves sympathy and support 
revolve around notions of the authentic working and middle classes. For example, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, black inner-city unemployment reached crisis levels, but advice 
was blithely given for blacks to simply move or retrain for other jobs. Now that 
economic changes have impacted labor sectors where whites are heavily represented, 
a whole new talking point has emerged, such as the need for the government to 
prop up coal and manufacturing (Hamilton, 2016). Even though the likelihood of 
a white male having just a high school diploma making a living wage at the same 
job for life has disappeared, this mythology has persisted, along with adherence 
to the American Dream, transforming into resentment when it remains unfulfilled 
(Thorton, 2016; Kimmel, 2017). Notions of merit, encapsulated in discourse around 
affirmative action reflects the enduring assumption that minorities have taken spots 
from “qualified” whites, totally overlooking generations of legacy admissions at 
colleges and nepotism in hiring (Anderson, 2017).
For Traister (2018), resentment and backlash boil down to the consistent 
privileging of the anger of white men. As she notes, “their anger is revered, respected 
as the stimulus for necessary political change” (para. 12). At the same time, this 
anger is presented as coming from intellectual and rational spaces, the implication 
being that women and minorities are emotional and irrational or too fixated on 
identity politics:
Think about how the anger of white men in the Rust Belt is often treated as 
politically diagnostic, as a guide to their understandable frustrations: the loss 
of jobs and stature, the shortage of affordable health care, the scourge of drugs. 
Meanwhile, the Movement for Black Lives, a response to police killings of 
African Americans initiated by women activists, is considered by the FBI to 
pose a threat of “retaliatory violence” and discussed as a “hate group.” (para. 12)
CONSTRUCTING CAPITALISM THROUGH RACE AND GENDER
Alternative Marxist theorizing that specifically focuses on the composition of the 
working class includes Operaismo or Workerism and Open Marxism. In particular, 
Operaismo takes up the question of the impact of technology on workers and how the 
working class shapes the actions of capital (Hardt & Negri, 1994). Open Marxism 
seeks to widen the messaging of dialectical materialism, aimed at building coalitions 
within the working class (Bonefield, 1992). Both of these anti-authoritarian left 
approaches target industrial sectors of the working class, but have also been applied 
to the changing nature of the workplace, such as a growing service industry sector 
and warehouse distribution networks. Still, this framing of the working class remains 
tied to class-based theorizing with not as much discussion devoted the role of race 
and gender within capitalism. What needs to be addressed is the construction of the 
white working class itself.
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Just as it is simplistic to assume that racism’s origins lie within the white working 
class (Myerson, 2017), it is also simplistic to assume that one’s membership in the 
white working class precludes one from being fully racist or somehow minimizes the 
impacts of one’s racism. Asserting that the working class didn’t invent racism is not 
the same thing as exonerating them from their racist actions. While racism does not 
originate in the white working class, it continues to play a prominent role in white 
workers’ conceptions of themselves as a class:
Class, for Marx, is neither simply monolithic nor static. Under capitalist 
economic laws of motion, the working class in particular is constantly 
decomposed and reconstituted due to changes in the forces of production…
class-consciousness does not follow automatically or inevitably from the fact 
of class position. (Hill, Sanders, & Hankin, 2002, p. 173)
If we want to understand why the white working class seems to persistently identify 
with the capitalist class or other whites versus forming bonds of solidarity with 
minorities as part of a larger class consciousness, we have to understand the history 
of capitalism’s construction through race and gender (McClaren & Farahmandpur, 
2002). Capitalism’s very formation is tied to colonialism, the emergence of the 
global slave trade and the corresponding racial categorizations needed to harness 
labor. This makes racism far more than a simple ruling class “strategy to divide the 
working class,” as many leftists unfortunately conclude in a form of touch-and-go, 
neat and tidy analysis. This rationale is deployed to skirt around the difficulties with 
confronting racism in activist contexts, especially when encountering racism of the 
white working class. This is a form of “competitive virtue signaling, a game that 
does little more than build the personal brands of those playing it” and “it does not 
provide an adequate account of the phenomenon it seeks to explain” (Maison, 2017, 
para. 27).
This section analyzes three components of the construction of capitalism through 
race and gender. First, a dialectical historical overview of the creation of the white 
working class is presented, with a focus on Martinot’s (2000) analysis. A discussion 
of color-blind racism follows, including how it operates ideologically in both 
conservative and left discourse. The section concludes with an examination of the 
functions of white rural geographies, in particular, Appalachia.
Historical Overview
The notion that racism is a key strategy of control used by the capitalist class to 
maintain divisions among workers is quite common on the left. However, this 
explanation is radically insufficient for understanding what has led to the persistence, 
even over hundreds of years, of racism, albeit it taking various forms (Stanley, 2018; 
Martinot, 2000). In examining the landscape of labor throughout history, we have to 
face the fact that segregation and exclusion have been the norm, not the exception. 
This is because “whiteness and white supremacy did not evolve out of race relations, 
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but were themselves the sociopolitical relations that brought race into existence” (p. 
50). While important to study, the few counter-examples of working-class solidarity 
are not enough to justify ignoring this fact. In other words, there are only so many 
times that the left can point to Bacon’s Rebellion before the tactic wears kind of thin.
Historical understanding from a dialectical materialist framework is an essential 
component of beginning to dismantle the mythology around the authentic working 
class, including simplistic leftist readings of labor. What we see today in the working-
class are “byproducts of centuries, shaped by deep-rooted systems of production 
and their social debris” (Stanley, 2018, p. 40). We have to start with the origins 
of capitalism itself in order to understand how race was an integral aspect of its 
formation. This enables us to see that race is simultaneously both durable but also 
constantly under threat (Piascik, 2018). While race as a construct has been around 
since the 1600s, it has to be continuously monitored and resurrected in different 
forms order to keep the focus off of capitalism so that the working class will not 
unite.
Martinot (2000) examines the emergence of capitalism through the use of 
colonization, involving genocide of native populations and chattel slavery:
In the colonies and the nation that emerged from them, whiteness (and from it, 
race) is the form that domination took. Within a structure of corporate social 
control, racism and white supremacy were not invented to “divide and rule” 
the working class, within an existing class structure, but to serve as the primary 
mode of organizing the structure of labor itself. Racism is the very name of the 
process whereby a class structure itself was produced. (p. 51)
The process of colonization involved providing low cost or free land to settlers in 
exchange for their agreement to police native populations, or what DeVega (2018) 
characterizes as an “intergenerational welfare payment to White America” (para. 3). 
Without over 400 years of seized resources from native populations and enforced 
labor of slavery, capitalism would have never been able to “pull itself up by its 
bootstraps” so to speak.
The plantation system itself created the foundation for the corporate state, with 
the capitalist class able to secure allegiance of white workers by using race as a 
means of identity, i.e. “not-black” (Martinot, 2000). This created the illusion of 
“white solidarity and the integration of labor relations into the white confraternal 
society” (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2002, p. 54). Even as the slave economy was 
declining, this white solidarity was transferred into the industrial workplace where 
white workers saw themselves as “productive” compared to slave labor which they 
were competing against:
This ideology derived from the Jacksonian valorization of the “producing 
class” of workers and artisans. It affirmed the dignity and honor of work, and 
opposed slavery as demeaning to labor—but only within a white orientation. 
Ideologically, it equated black workers, both free and slave, with slavery and 
WHO IS THE REAL WORKING CLASS?
73
servility. It thus became part of the rationale for advocating the exclusion of 
all African-Americans from the new territories, on the claim that their mere 
presence would degrade the honor of white labor. All in all, white workers 
opposed slavery to exclude black people, and opposed black people to exclude 
slavery. (Martinot, 2000, p. 44)
As Martinot (2000) notes, these exclusions were not so much about dividing the 
working class as they were about defining the working class as white. White workers 
envisioned themselves as upwardly mobile, embracing middle-class aspirations while 
“consigning nonwhite labor, through exclusion, to permanent proletarianization” 
(p. 45). Martinot provides the example of craft unions in the North, who initially 
supported abolition because they saw slave owners as depressing wages, but then 
excluded freed slaves from joining their unions after the Civil War. The Black worker 
then became their enemy, not the capitalist class itself. This “free labor” ideology 
was one of the key hallmarks of populism in the 1800s and continues today (DeVega, 
2018; Piascik, 2018). The extension of suffrage to women only strengthened white 
working-class identity more so than disrupted it, as “white segregationist women 
capitalized on their roles in social welfare institutions, public education, partisan 
politics, and popular culture to shape the Jim Crow Order” (McRae, 2018, p. 4).
The impact of this history continues to manifest itself in how race and gender 
operates within the working class today. For Martinot (2000), race was not simply 
a divisive tactic, it was part of the very construction of the white working class and 
has impacted how that group of workers sees its needs as oppositional to minority 
workers, thus preventing organizing:
Because white workers in the United States have a different relation to black 
workers…and because the primary relation between white workers and 
capital is not mainly across the means of production but through a social 
administrative hierarchy…the idea of working-class struggle aimed at the 
overthrow of class society has never made sense to the white working class 
in the United States, whose resistance to class exploitation rarely attempted to 
undermine profitability or contested its legitimacy…this no doubt goes a long 
way in explaining why, for instance, the United States labor movement does 
not call for solidarity with Mexican workers against NAFTA, but remains in 
solidarity with the U.S. business/corporate order even as it protests unfair labor 
practices. (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2002, p. 55)
Part of maintaining alliances within the white working class involves a reluctance 
to correct racist behavior and actions in order to not offend friends, family, or co-
workers (Waldman, 2018). Even when white women join activist efforts, they 
often limit their demands to equal opportunity, “or what is legitimate for men and 
capitalists,” thus leaving race and class intact, especially if they are middle-class 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2018, p. 179). Despite these historical limitations, there are some 
possibilities for creating openings that could lead to and have successfully led to 
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working-class solidarity. One is the proximity of working-class whites to minorities 
compared to more prosperous middle-class whites (DiAngelo, 2006). Bonilla-Silva 
(2018) found that working-class white women regularly interact and are more open 
to forming alliances with people of color compared to middle-class white women. 
The final section of this chapter will assert that fully acknowledging the diversity of 
the working class is one way to disrupt the racist historical narrative.
Thier’s (2018) analysis of the right-wing Israeli working class is instructive in 
understanding the contemporary dynamics of race and labor. Israel presents a 
challenge to socialists, who often support the Israeli working class as the best hope 
for the Middle East and a single state solution that accommodates everyone. To 
conceptualize this requires overlooking the role of the left, such as the United Workers 
Party, in carrying out the apartheid colonial-settler state, using tactics like forced 
removal and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. As Thier explains, “the commitment 
of a laboring class to colonization can only be expected when it is offered a stake 
in the settlement, an incentive to sacrifice and to struggle against the indigenous 
population” (p. 118). Even when organizing does happen among the most oppressed 
of the Israeli population today, the goal is not to extend rights to all workers, but to 
demand what they feel they are owed in an era of neoliberal decline. Thus, “the denial 
of one’s freedom is the precondition of the other’s livelihood” (p. 128).
It is obvious that while the white working-class still retains a degree of privilege 
compared to working-class minorities, they share more in common with each other 
economically speaking. Yet, throughout history, working-class whites, with few 
exceptions, have retained racist and xenophobic viewpoints which has hindered 
activism, particularly within union organizing (Martinot, 2000). DeVega (2018) 
notes a collective forgetting of the large, violent strike actions at the turn of the 20th 
century, where countless white workers were injured and killed, in favor of vague 
promises of reclaiming their share of the American Dream. For Bonilla-Silva (2018), 
racism has served to create an allegiance within capitalism that is detrimental to 
organizing:
It has been white male workers who have historically supported the racial 
order…whether in periods of economic security or insecurity, white masculinity 
has provided white men with economic and noneconomic benefits…the 
white male bond thus has prevented working-class white men from joining 
progressive racial movements in masse. (p. 156)
Colorblind Racism
Bonilla-Silva’s (2018) concept of colorblind racism is useful for understanding how 
race functions within discourse surrounding the authentic white worker. The term 
“color-blind” refers to the common statement, “I don’t see color, I see a person,” 
which also taps into the hyper-individualism that has long been a part of the American 
landscape (DiAngelo, 2006). Colorblind racism’s staying power can be attributed to 
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its deep connections with anti-dialectical and ahistorical thinking that help sustain 
its ideology. These beliefs are woven into conceptualizations of the authentic white 
working class who, as the narrative goes, works hard, abides by the rules, and is self-
reliant. Those who are not able to be successful—and many of those are minorities—
must have inherent flaws in their character that need to be addressed, but just not 
anything at a structural level.
While Jim Crow era racism was more overt and in the open, today’s colorblind 
racism is more insidious and difficult to confront because nothing, apparently, 
counts as racism anymore. This creates many contradictions between what whites 
say they support and their actions. For example, even though national annual 
surveys might show a steady increase in the percentage of whites who affirm civil 
rights concepts like equality of the races and integration, they “object in practice to 
almost all of the policies that have been developed to make these goals a reality” 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2018, p. 142). Or, whites might explain aspects of racism as an 
individual matter, such as blacks “self-segregating” rather than there being structural 
factors that lead to residential segregation. As Bonilla-Silva notes, “negotiating the 
seemingly contradictory views that “race does not matter” but, at the same time, that 
“race matters” a little bit for minorities and a lot for whites in the form of reverse 
discrimination is not an easy task” (p. 84).
Much of the backlash and resentment discourse emerging from the “forgotten 
white worker” falls within a color-blind frame. Notions of minorities as illegitimate 
recipients of welfare, or displaying negative cultural attributes while white 
workers—who have done everything right—are ignored, are regular features of this 
discourse. The most potent of these is the concept of “reverse racism,” which is 
applied to any policy or law that might be taken to redress inequality, like affirmative 
action (DeVega, 2016). As Bonilla-Silva (2018) notes, “because whites believe 
discrimination is a thing of the past, minorities’ protestations about being racially 
profiled, experiencing discrimination in the housing and labor markets, and being 
discriminated against in restaurants, stores, and other social settings are interpreted 
as “excuses” (p. 142). Myths of bootstrapism are other manifestations of color-blind 
racism that are difficult to dislodge, because the ability to be judged by characteristics 
other than skin color is a privilege reserved for whites (Waldman, 2018).
Colorblind racism is what allows Trump supporters to flat-out deny that the 
Muslim travel ban or calling Haiti a “shithole country” are racist actions, because 
they can point to other factors that might lead to those actions (concerns about 
national security or Haiti’s poverty) (Walters, 2017). Another aspect of colorblind 
racism is the notion that if white people don’t intend to be racist, then their actions 
are not racist. Instead, the problem is one of minorities “seeing race” in everything 
and overreacting, not racism itself, as DiAngelo (2006) explains:
We then spend great energy explaining to people of color why our behavior 
is not racism at all. This invalidates their perspectives while enabling us to 
deny responsibility for making the effort to understand enough about racism to 
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see our behavior’s impact in both the immediate interaction and the broader, 
historical context. (p. 55)
The segregated structure of society only further segments whites from having 
to confront issues of race to the point where its very mention tends to bring up 
defensiveness and denial (Waldman, 2018). DiAngelo (2006) points out the 
challenges that the white working class in particular has in acknowledging racism 
when they themselves experience classism or other oppressions, such as being 
identified as disabled or being gay or lesbian: “It is often very difficult for Whites 
who have not been validated for the oppression they experience elsewhere to keep 
their attention on a form of oppression from which they benefit” (p. 56).
Colorblind racism is also bound up in conceptualizations of the white middle 
class, like home ownership and its connections with property values and school 
districts. These have been used as ways to maintain the structure of segregation 
within a post-civil-rights-era context:
Their material security bound up in the value of their real-estate assets, suburban 
white people had powerful incentives to keep their neighborhoods white. Just 
by their very proximity, black people would make their neighborhoods less 
desirable to future white home-buyers, thereby depreciating the value of the 
location. Location being the first rule of real estate, suburban homeowners 
nurtured racist attitudes, while deluding themselves that they weren’t excluding 
black people for reasons beyond their pocketbooks. (Myerson, 2017, para. 7)
The anti-bussing movement of the 1970s, which was led by white women, vehemently 
denied being racially motivated, instead pointing to concepts like the right of parents 
to choose where to send their children to school (McRae, 2018). This is similar to 
the “school choice” movement today where supporters use civil rights language to 
bolster what are essentially racist policies.
The left also manifests problematic aspects of colorblind racism (and sexism) 
by their insistence that social problems be attributed to class and not to matters of 
identity. Theweleit (2010a) identifies “the patriarchal man of the left” who declares 
that “in the class struggle there may be both men and women, but only one sex, that 
of the wage earner” (p. 167). Even if leftists support racial justice, by them insisting 
on a class-only emphasis, it creates an unintentional alliance “between those who 
wish to combine emphases on race and class and those who would rather see race off 
the agenda altogether” (Roediger, 2017, p. 16).
Colorblind racism also sustains the illusion that everyone can benefit from class-
based policies without having to directly confront racism. Roediger (2017) takes 
on the flawed notion that Democrats have been so overwhelmingly focused on 
minority and women’s rights that they have completely ignored the white working 
class, noting that it is often “racial justice” that has been set aside “in the service of 
lamentably vague class talk” (p. 18). The authentic white working-class meme also 
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glosses over the vibrant and multi-racial coalitions that have been a necessary part 
of activism surrounding major legislation.
Strategic Use of White Rurality
A powerful manifestation of colorblind racism and its culmination in the construction 
of the authentic working class is the strategic use of white rurality. While the discourse 
around industrial “small town America” can also be utilized by conservative and 
liberal politicians and journalists, white rural spaces are essential touchpoints for 
minimizing issues of race through superficially highlighting class. As Maison (2017) 
explains, “contemporary privilege theory ostensibly seeks to center and defer to the 
agency of people of color, but it consistently brings the focus of attention back to the 
thoughts, motivations, and actions of white people” (para. 26). Unfortunately, the 
left plays a major role in this process by repeating the same uncritical line of, “all 
of the working class suffers under capitalism” without a more nuanced discussion 
of how specifically capital uses race to construct itself. Invoking white rural spaces 
is a way to steer the conversation away from a wider range of capitalism’s victims, 
which only serves to support conservative discourse even if that isn’t the intent.
White rural spaces are part of an overall urban/rural dichotomy which is used to 
delegitimize certain types of work while valorizing others, along with determining 
which geographic areas are treated with more sociological sympathy (Shenk, 2017; 
Jones, 2017). For example, leading up to the 2016 election, it is no coincidence that 
just as multi-racial activism was forming around racism and policing, out came a 
barrage of news stories about the forgotten white working class in rust belt and 
rural towns. Catte (2018) sees the recent spotlight on Appalachia, its decline of coal 
mining, and opioid addiction as part of this effort:
Whenever the nation turns its attention to issues of race that is when a big 
rediscovery of Appalachia happens. Because Appalachia is often thought of as 
a white space, some use it to argue we’ve been paying attention to the wrong 
problems, like police violence. (p. 72)
For Catte, Appalachia therefore functions as a “counterpoint” or “whataboutism” 
in order to minimize the impacts of racism in poor and minority communities, 
particularly large urban centers like Chicago, a discursive target of Trump during the 
first few months of his administration.
A. Nichols (2017) views the utilization of white rural spaces by prominent liberals 
and conservatives as a form of an ongoing “atonement” for class privilege, a process 
that pre-dates Trump. In bad economic situations, poor whites in particular and 
authoritarian populism in general is responded to with a form of quasi-sympathy, 
reinforcing its legitimacy. The “white trash voter” is a key figure in the tenuous quest 
to use class to not talk about class in a meaningful way:
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Scapegoat, prophet, moron, rogue—the poor white is a shapeshifter. He changes 
forms as the needs of his beholders change. When liberals need to blame 
a class for Donald Trump’s presidency, the poor white will do; never mind 
that two-thirds of all Trump supporters made $50,000 or more a year. When 
conservatives need to cast liberals as aloof elitists. they appoint themselves the 
poor white’s defenders—until their ideology is threatened, and then it is time 
to take out the trash. (Jones, 2017, para. 1)
One author who has managed to cash in on the fragile positioning of white rurality is 
venture capitalist J.D. Vance (2016), and his bestselling book, Hillbilly Elegy. Vance 
is successful precisely because he is all things to all people: liberals appreciate his 
folksy retelling of his “making it out of poverty” narrative while conservatives are 
grateful for his recycling of the bootstrapping and personal accountability messaging 
aimed at poor whites (Isenberg, 2018; Jones, 2016; Solod, 2017). The book manages 
to avoid any sort of larger social context other than descriptive markers of poverty 
that set the scenes for various retellings involving a cast of colorful characters, which 
are tied to conclusions the reader is supposed to draw about poor whites. Vance is 
able to achieve this because he declares at the start of his book that he does not intend 
to apply any kind of academic inquiry, which “ostensibly liberates him from the 
burden of analyzing the loaded, culturally constructed word ‘hillbilly’” (Isenberg, 
2018, p. 16).
Class narratives about escaping poverty reflect a specific form of literary 
capitalism where the problem is never the economic system itself, but a variety 
of “cultural” deficiencies, such as families not delaying gratification, or rampant 
laziness. These narratives can have a variety of settings but the audience is typically 
those looking to exonerate capitalism, including justifying eroding the social safety 
net (Rader, 2017). Maison (2017) and Rader (2017) note how Vance’s “making it” 
out of his white trash background is presented as evidence of a deeper failing on the 
part of rural whites he left behind. Indeed, Vance has made appearances with Charles 
Murray and relies on the conclusions of culture-of-poverty authors like Richard Bell 
and Thomas Ford (Stanley, 2018). Their ideas are reflected in Vance’s writing:
For Vance, class is not a matter of political-economic structures but cultural 
identity, something close to a racial category in itself. In his view, the poor 
Scots-Irish Americans he grew up with aren’t held back by the bleak economic 
prospects confronting them, but by a Lamarckian moral degeneracy transmitted 
from one generation of hillbillies to the next. (Maison, 2017, para. 16)
When socio-historical problems, such the kind in rural spaces, are summarized 
as a result of “mono-casual bad behavior,” problems become hyper-individualized, 
“somewhat mystic, laying beyond the analytical, the material, and the historic” 
(Stanley, 2018, p. 41). This is indicative of an additional function of white rural 
spaces—that of discouraging activist solidarity or any sort of confrontation with 
the capitalist class (unless they are liberal) and replacing these with looking to 
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the past as a solution to social crises. Jones (2016) relates how Vance extends his 
cultural argument to a gendered longing for a past when men were more religious 
and masculine, viewing secularism as one of the main contributors to drug use and 
economic collapse:
This failure to embed his family’s failings within any larger social context 
reflects Vance’s need to celebrate individual agency at all costs. For Vance, 
“hillbilly” is a term of endearment, a state of mind, a group moniker, a source 
of chaos and anger, but it is more often than not disconnected from real 
economic conditions that shaped his family’s class identity. The “hillbilly” 
that he invokes is both a composite of his memories and a literary device. 
(Isenberg, 2018, p. 18)
Luckily, there are critical responses to Vance in the form of deliberately asserting 
the dialectical, materialist history of regions like Appalachia. Stanley (2018) takes 
on the shallow analysis of culture-of-poverty proponents by directly connecting 
historical factors to the present:
Appalachians aren’t poorer than other Americans because they’re lazy or 
uneducated; they’re poorer because of a history of nonarable land, extractive 
capitalism, exploitable labor, and environmental destruction. Black Americans 
aren’t poorer because of a lack of self-responsibility or a profusion of saggy 
pants; they’re poorer because of four hundred years of enslavement, Jim 
Crow, and systemic racism. Native Americans aren’t poorer because of drug 
use or alcoholism; they’re poorer because of a past that includes policies of 
extermination, subjugation, removal, and apartheid. And women aren’t poorer 
because they prefer low paid or domestic work; they’re poorer because of a 
pervasive patriarchy that is undergirded by capitalism and exacerbated by 
economic inequality. There is no “regressive culture.” They’ve simply been 
robbed. (p. 52)
The history of Appalachia involves a complex interplay of different factors, 
beginning with the colonization of the US and displacement of native Americans from 
that region to capitalist extraction of mineral resources like coal and its environmental 
impacts. The mining industry is essentially a secondary form of colonization, with 
the seizure of resources and exploitation of workers being committed by citizens 
of the US rather than outside of the country (Catte, 2018). Isenberg (2018) traces 
the development of extraction industries and subsistence economies seen in West 
Virginia today and applies a more complex analysis which includes gender and race 
along with the impact of law. In 1891, Dillon’s Rule was upheld by the Supreme 
Court which allowed those living in a community to be considered tenants who 
could be evicted at whim. All mine owners had to do was to bribe politicians to 
minimize resistance from communities.
Another legal tactic was to assign mineral rights to coal that lay below ground. 
The inevitable poverty that resulted made it easy for “fixers” to swoop in and seize 
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land from those who couldn’t pay their taxes. It was only a matter of time until 
mountain families who had subsisted off of the land were forced into coal mining 
camps and their exploitative system of company stores which kept them locked in. It 
should also be noted that more prosperous miners participated in the exploitation of 
poor newcomers (Isenberg, 2018).
Tourism is an additional aspect of rural white geographies. Shenk’s (2017) 
inquiry into the historical shaping of rural identity within Wisconsin includes the 
politics of resentment and its development over time. This involves both a sense 
of rural identity, such as what it means to come from a small community alongside 
“distributive injustice” or “thinking that people in rural communities do not get their 
fair share of power, resources, or respect” (para. 5). Many rural Wisconsinites see the 
state as having only two geographic areas: (1) Milwaukee/Madison and (2) the rest of 
Wisconsin. This contributes to a lingering perception that rural areas pay more taxes 
to support the cities with affluent liberals and the minority populations they defend 
at the expense of authentic rural Americans (when urban revenue overwhelmingly 
goes to support rural areas). Because tourism is a major aspect of rural states like 
Wisconsin, the presence of more affluent outsiders in small towns only contributes 
to these perceptions, where “they see the construction of expensive vacation homes 
and watch as their property taxes go up” (para. 7).
A major challenge for white rural spaces is going to be their pressing through 
the accumulated history and racism in order to reject the capitalist messaging of 
resentment. Forsetti (2016) recounts his experiences growing up and living in a 
rural town for 24 years, including witnessing economic decline and infrastructure 
erosion. Yet people he grew up with never attributed these things to capitalism, but to 
liberals, immigration, welfare, and minorities. Refuting the misconception that rural 
Americans are another species, Forsetti points out that “the problem isn’t that I don’t 
understand these people. The problem is that they don’t understand themselves, the 
reasons for their anger/frustrations, and don’t seem to care to know why” (para. 2). 
Forsetti ties this resistance to dialectical understanding to a fundamentalist mindset 
and hostility toward those seen as outsiders. This is encapsulated in their notions of 
authenticity, self-reliance, and insistence on solving problems from within, often 
making them vulnerable to closed-loop messaging from Fox News, which reflects 
their existing assumptions.
DIVERSITY OF THE WORKING CLASS
One of the major challenges to building a strong, militant working class is the 
insistence that white industrial workers are a de-facto stand-in for all of labor, and 
that it is unnecessary or even divisive to address the working class as a diverse entity. 
The mass media has devoted endless resources to sustaining this “performance 
of authenticity” where those who occupy this specific segment of the working 
class receive attention way in excess of their actual numbers (Bouie, 2017). This 
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“authentic worker” proposition is based on fundamentally flawed understandings of 
today’s global working class, as Winant (2017) asserts:
Whatever program will appeal to the entity known as the “white working class” 
will not appeal to “minority groups,” who are joined together in this analysis 
with “moderate voters in the suburbs.” …The American working class is, after 
all, less white than the rest of American society, and, by all survey evidence, 
has more left-wing political views—by dint of its composition by race and 
gender, as well as its class experiences. (para. 8)
There are exclusionary aspects of framing class as the default white male worker, 
where “a small-town white American narrative is being treated as though it’s about all 
of us or all of us who count” (Solnit, n.d., para. 8). Often, the working class of small 
towns are described as undergoing extreme changes, as if immigrants themselves 
or those who live in large cities have not also experienced massive upheavals under 
neoliberalism.
The working class today needs to be reconceptualized in terms of several factors 
including “feminization, racial diversification, and increasing precarity: care work, 
immigrant work, low-wage work, and the gig economy” (Winant, 2017, para. 12). 
Additionally, issues of police brutality and mass incarceration, rising housing costs, 
unavailable child care, lack of access to post-secondary education, and privatized 
health care hit specific segments of the working class especially hard. Unfortunately, 
assumptions that the authentic working class is white and male easily lead to 
authoritarian populist assumptions that “all of us who are not like them are menaces 
and intrusions who need to be cleared out of the way” (Solnit, n.d., para.6). A 
corollary to the authentic working class is the fetishization of the “middle class” that 
is often referred to in liberal discourse. This serves to further reduce the possibilities 
of organizing as a diverse working class (Myerson, 2017).
This section first presents some demographic considerations that decenter notions 
of the authentic working class away from white male industrial workers. Next, 
divisions that persist between traditional jobs and other sectors like retail and service 
are explored. Important reconfigurations of the US workforce such as gendered 
and racialized concentrations of labor are addressed. The section concludes with 
important implications for activism and the need to acknowledge a working class 
that is the largest and most vibrant it has ever been.
Demographics
A quick look at the demographics of the US working class illustrates the diversity of 
this group and further problematizes the authentic working-class meme. While the 
percentage of white non-Hispanics is likely to experience a 20% drop by 2050 (from 
73%), other racial and ethnic group numbers will steadily rise (Bonilla-Silva, 2018, 
p. 156). Latinx and Asians alone are going to double their numbers less than 40 years 
from now (p. 156). The fastest growing segment of the working class are immigrants, 
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making up 2/3 of the Service Employees International Union, also the most rapidly 
growing union of 1.8 million members (Chacon, 2017, p. 39). Even areas less 
friendly to unions, such as the South and Midwest, boast membership in the United 
Food and Commercial Workers Union, of which half of their 250,000 members are 
Latino immigrants (p. 39). This reflects the overall global trend of internationalizing 
labor, with over 230 million people migrating to other countries (p. 40). In the US 
alone, 42 million residents were born elsewhere (p. 40). To put population changes 
into perspective, the population of immigrants in New York City alone dwarfs the 
population total in Kansas or any other rural state (Solnit, n.d., para. 8).
This increasing diversity of the working class also translates into intensification 
of economic impacts particular to race and gender. For example, many working-
class people are younger minorities who live and work in urban areas where finding 
affordable housing is difficult, especially if they have part-time or temporary work 
with few benefits (Jaffe, 2017). Additionally, despite women making up over four 
out of every ten wage earners in the US, they take home much lower wages, often 
working in sectors with the least protections (Windham, 2017, p. 10; Penny, 2011). 
Kelly (2002) notes that women’s participation in waged labor continues to increase 
at the same moment as dramatic cuts in social services are happening, putting more 
of a burden on women to make ends meet while also handling domestic labor. 
This reveals a longstanding reliance on the unpaid labor of women as a form of 
reproduction under capitalism:
These contradictions include the conflict between the need to develop the 
forces of production, including the paid labor of women, with the private 
reproduction of labor power, including fulfilling the functions once carried out 
by the welfare state; the conflict between women’s childbearing capacity and 
the role as wage laborer; and the potential conflict between the tendency to 
remove tasks of domestic labor such as cooking, laundering, sewing, education 
and health care into the profit-making sector, thus drawing more women into 
the workforce. (p. 230)
Persistent Divisions
At the same time that women make up a majority of the population and just under 
half of the working class, they occupy the less prestigious jobs, regardless of level. 
Globally, less than 23% of legislative offices are held by women, with just over 
18% as government ministers (Rothkopf, 2017, para. 8). As of January 2017, just 
10 women were heads of state and 9 as head of government (para. 8). Across all 
job sectors, women hold fewer than one fifth of senior-level positions (para. 8). 
Despite women making up nearly half of the working class as well as a significant 
number of single heads of households, the perception remains that their wages are 
supplementary and not essential (Kelly, 2002).
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This is a holdover from the earlier separation of the spheres for men and women 
during the onset of the industrial revolution in the late 1700s as capitalism solidified 
its cultural and social shifts from rural to urban centers of production (Penny, 
2011). Women’s work, particularly in the middle classes, was relegated to the 
unpaid domestic sphere, centered on reproduction of the workforce. Fewer women 
are financially able to exclusively provide unpaid labor within the home. Yet, this 
lingering gendered notion of labor has partly led to the workforce divide between 
what is considered authentic working class (male, industrial and mining sector 
workers) and the rest of labor that is seen as outside the prevue of labor policy, such 
as public employees, retail, and service industry work which often happen to be 
heavily feminized (Jaffe, 2017).
One of the challenges involved with tracking today’s working class is that entities 
such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) often perpetuate the divide between 
“traditional” and part-time or contingent work by minimizing the prevalence of the 
latter in order to “prioritize” the loss of factory jobs (Rasmus, 2018a). For example, 
gig work like Uber, Lyft, or AirBNB are not counted in BLS surveys. Temporary 
work is only counted if it is tied to a temp agency when employers often directly hire 
temps. BLS surveys are also administered in the spring, which leaves out holiday 
retail hires. Likewise, retail workers tend to get overlooked in employment discourse 
because of assumptions that these jobs are “unskilled” or a stepping stone on the way 
to more lucrative work (Jaffe, 2017). Terms like “service jobs” are also a misnomer 
because the rapid consolidation within the health care industry, for example, has 
transformed this sector into major value-producing concentrations of workers 
(Moody, 2018).
Geography also plays a role in associations of employment with race and gender. 
Retail, public sector, and service work tends to cluster within diverse large cities and 
suburban areas with the bulk of industrial and mining jobs located in rural and key 
swing voting areas, which are predominantly white (Bouie, 2017; Moody, 2018). 
Political factors such as the Electoral College and partisan gerrymandering add to 
the overall devaluation of the non-industrial workforce and reinforces notions of the 
authentic working class:
Heavy manufacturing, industrial, and extraction work is overwhelmingly 
white and male. What’s more, it’s tied to a particular image of the standalone 
(and often unionized) worker who can provide for his family on one income. 
Americans have historically had an almost romantic attachment to the hard-hat 
worker, usually white, in a way that we don’t to any other profession. (Bouie, 
2017, para. 9)
Even the media hype around Trump’s stunt of claiming to protect jobs at Indianapolis’ 
Carrier plant overlooked the fact that women made up nearly half of its workforce 




In terms of sheer numbers, less than 10% of Americans are employed in the 
manufacturing sector, with 150th of 1% working in coal mining (A. Nichols, 
2017, para. 7). As Solnit (n.d.) points out, more people in the US are employed by 
museums than in the entire coal industry. By contrast, excluding farm work, 71% of 
the workforce are employed in the service sector, with nursing and caretaking the 
fastest growing segments (para. 7). These jobs are occupied in great numbers by 
minority females. Three fourths of those who teach in public schools are women, 
making public sector work another intersectional location that also happens to be 
unionized (Catte, 2018). Then there is the uncounted sector of reproductive labor 
in the US, performed by mostly women, who “should in theory be owed for their 
unpaid caring and domestic work [that] runs into some six times the national defense 
budget” (Penny, 2011, p. 50).
Retail work, a sector which accounts for half of consumer spending, comprises 
10% of total employment in the US (Bouie, 2017, para. 2; Jaffe, 2017, para. 5). This 
work occurs in a variety of location scope and size from small businesses and malls 
to big box stores like Walmart, and an even wider range of goods. Retail labor is 
also highly gendered and racialized work, with a workforce that is 60% female and 
40% of those are minorities (Bouie, 2017, para. 8). The median hourly wage for 
retail salespeople is less than $9.50 and 90% of cashiers make below $13.30 an hour 
(Jaffe, 2017, para. 14). Additional problems associated with the retail sector include 
high turnover, withheld wages, discrimination and few promotion opportunities. 
This is evidenced by women making up nearly 60% of supervisor positions, but 
only 18% of upper-management (Jaffe, 2017, para. 13).
Slaughter (2017) addresses the vulnerabilities that women and minorities face in 
retail and service industry work. The restaurant industry itself has the largest number 
of sexual harassment claims filed, with one out of every ten employees indicating 
they or a coworker have experienced harassment on the job (p. 11). Women who do 
agricultural labor are often at the mercy of crew bosses who hold their paychecks 
hostage as are women who work late at night in janitorial positions. Female hotel 
workers are often targeted for sexual harassment and assault by male guests who 
assume that “if there’s a woman in the bedroom she must be available” (p. 11). The 
factors of isolation and immigration status only exacerbate these situations.
Moody’s (2018) scholarship tracks the growth of the logistics center or warehouse 
as a major point of production, and increasingly resembling a factory. Rather than 
just storing products, warehouses involve e-commerce, transport and organization 
of goods, and custom assembly (Abrams & Gebeloff, 2017). Warehousing has 
also transformed local geographies into intermodal hubs where a mixture of blue- 
and white-collar workers commute from various locations within a wide radius. 
Moody (2018) sees this profound shift in production as a key opportunity for labor 
organizing since former factory workforces have been re-concentrated in the form 
of the logistics center:
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What we’re looking at today doesn’t include all of what we think of as the 
working class of the 1930s or ‘40s or ‘50s. Yet it is a working class. It is 
employed by capital. It is subjected to the rule of capital at the workplace, and 
it has power. Yet these workers aren’t unionized for the most part. (p. 55)
Customer fulfillment centers like Amazon are located in urban areas of 250,000 
people or more and are considered part of the retail landscape. Following the pattern 
of decreased employment in rural areas, only 13% of e-commerce jobs are located in 
those places (Abrams & Gebeloff, 2017, para. 6).
Activism
Often the messaging around labor organizing is highly pessimistic, with a focus on 
declining membership, the growth of business unionism, and passage of right-to-
work legislation (Moody, 2018). While having a sober assessment is important, it 
is also critical to acknowledge that the working class and job sectors are far more 
diverse than often presented, with unions themselves “vastly more diverse in race, 
gender, and occupation than the overwhelmingly male, anti-immigrant, and craft-
oriented unions of the early 20th century” (Sustar, 2018, p. 28). This has revived 
the potential for widening class consciousness through labor, essential in order for 
the working class to move from forming a class “in itself” to becoming a class “for 
itself,” as Winant (2017) outlines:
It was not prior to struggle, but through struggle, that the workers established 
that English society was organized along class lines, and that they, a class, 
were a real group who held things in common, not least their enemies. The 
existence of the working class was in this sense the product of the working-
class movement, not the other way around. (para. 16)
It is important to understand that while identity politics have always been a part of 
social activism, things have dramatically changed in terms of said identities breaking 
away from the default settings of white and male. Walters (2017) explains how this 
has profoundly altered the conversation around activist movements, law and policy:
When we say “women’s rights are human rights,” we implode the assumption 
of an unmarked maleness that cannot be named. Further, today’s identity 
politics—drawing from the collective self-making of both civil rights organizing 
and feminist consciousness-raising—insists on its own definitions and mores. 
As distinct from interest groups as objects to be targeted, the social movements 
formed in and through identity politics do not signify a cordoned-off minority 
to be addressed. Rather, they assert a fundamental challenge to both white 
male hegemony and the relentless process of marking and unmarking that has 
allowed “identity” to be only located in those who have been actively denied 
citizenship and subjectivity. (para. 7)
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As part of the overall changing landscape of the working class and unions, we are 
seeing exciting and unexpected developments in rank-and-file organizing, including, 
more recently, a wave of teachers’ strikes in red, right-to-work states that primarily 
went for Trump (Blanchard, 2018). This is starting to overturn a long-standing 
tradition of top-down business unionism that features a hierarchical structure 
that discourages participation and retains patriarchal privilege, both in terms of 
organization and discourse (Theweleit, 2010a). Women and minorities are also 
heading many of rank-and-file efforts such as the Women’s March on Washington, 
Fight for Fifteen, National Domestic Workers Alliance and Restaurant Opportunity 
Centers (Windham, 2017). Currently, three of the biggest US unions have female 
presidents, with women projected to represent a majority of union membership in 
less than 5 years (p. 10). Windham sees a historical thread between working class 
feminist organizing in the 1970s, legal challenges to sexual harassment in the 1980s, 
and today’s rank-and-file approach.
Intersectional organizing is another reflection of an increasingly diverse working 
class where “white women and racial minorities increasingly share similar class 
conditions in the workplace as well as social debasement” (Bonilla-Silva, 2018, 
p. 156). This is reflected in current movements like #MeToo, created and organized 
by black women with white allies, and the later #TimesUp. Union organizer 
Priscilla Murolo, in an interview with Piascik (2018) points out how grass-roots, 
intersectional movements for causes like a living wage, tenants’ rights, healthcare, 
and the environment, have often translated into larger support for union struggles. 
Intersectionality can also be deployed in rapid fashion, as when Trump declared a 
travel ban for Muslims and protests immediately followed at airports with people 
from all walks of life joining in efforts to show support for victims of the ban 
(Chacon, 2017; Kellner, 2017).
Immigrants are often at the center of intersectional activism and as Bacon (2018) 
points out, “many immigrants bring organizing skills and working-class political 
consciousness with them, depending on where they come from” (p. 34). The example 
of the Justice for Janitors action in Los Angeles, where Central American immigrant 
janitors suffered police brutality but eventually secured a contract, illustrates the 
power of “workers on the bottom with not much to lose” (p. 34). Another example 
includes Alianza Nacional de Campesinas, an organization of 700,000 farmworker 
women in the US. After #TimesUp was created in reaction to Harvey Weinstein’s 
decades-long sexual harassment in Hollywood, the farmworkers’ association wrote 
a letter in support “expressing their sorrow and outrage over the horror stories, and 
sharing a few of their own from the fields” (Sen, 2018, para. 6). Several actresses, 
including America Ferrera, replied to the letter and created a legal defense fund.
One of the more remarkable instances of labor activism includes the recent wave 
of red state teachers’ strikes, beginning in 2017, in reaction to deep and ongoing 
cuts impacting education and other sectors (Blanchard, 2018). The Facebook page 
West Virginia Public Employees United was key to building cross-county activism 
centered around issues like insurance costs. It is important to note that the Facebook 
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page creators were teachers with a more radical orientation, including some who 
openly identify as socialists. The fact they were able to initiate momentum in a state 
with low union membership and strong right-to-work laws is remarkable, but also 
due to their understanding the importance of opening meetings and the Facebook 
group to “every public education worker regardless of what union they were in or 
whether they were even in a union or not” (p. 14).
Early rumblings of resistance began in 2018 with teachers in West Virginia 
organizing a “sick out” for one day, using their sick days in large groups and causing 
schools to close. Actions built on each other with community and parent support, 
culminating in a strike and large protests. In the end, teachers scored a major victory, 
not only a 5% raise and insurance increases, but stopping new charter schools. 
Blanchard (2018) recounts one of the highlights of the strike, when “Governor Jim 
Justice came out into the crowd and said, “We have a deal, y’all can go home now.” 
The crowd responded by chanting, “We’ll believe you when you put it in writing, 
we’re not leaving till you sign it” (p. 15). The success of West Virginia soon spread 
to other locations, with over 30,000 public education employees gathering at the 
state capitol in North Carolina and one million students walking out, “making it 
possibly the single largest work stoppage in state history” (p. 21). Most importantly, 
what the teachers’ strikes illustrated was that through participation in collective 
action centered on sound, intersectional politics, even Trump supporters started to 
gain class consciousness and began to reject right-wing populism.
Blanchard (2018) then turns her analysis to what went wrong with the Oklahoma 
teachers’ strike, the most critical factor being unfamiliarity with rank-and-file 
organizing like town halls, or in-person mobilization. While Oklahoma teachers had 
massive support from parents and the community (72% indicated support for the 
strike) they were not able to translate this into anything as significant as in West 
Virginia, partly because some superintendents kept schools open during the strike 
(p. 17). The inability to draw on rank-and-file mobilization had immediate impacts:
They felt their collective strength; but without a democratic union or bases 
of organization at the school and district level, they were unable to keep the 
walkout going after the Oklahoma Educational Association leadership struck a 
deal with the politicians based on promised funding, not real legislation. (p. 17)
Both the Oklahoma and Kentucky teachers’ strikes were also hampered by not 
taking advantage of key intersectional moments that could have increased support 
and enhanced community connections. Blanchard (2018) provides the example of 
HB 169, or the Youth Incarceration Bill, passed during the strike planning. Kentucky 
teachers should have made the fight against youth incarceration a key part of their 
organizing platform but many viewed the issue as unconnected to school funding. 
This is part of an overall blind spot that remains within union organizing, which 
Blanchard targets in her summary of red state teacher activism:
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A final common challenge in all the battles was how to confront not only the 
economic dimensions of the crisis in the schools, but also the social ones, 
especially the education system’s institutional sexism and racism. In some cases, 
the economic and social were mistakenly counterposed, instead of combined. 
For the movement to go forward, teachers will have to develop an intersectional 
approach to the class struggle that recognizes the gender and racial dimensions 
of the education crisis and raises specific reforms to redress them. (p. 13)
Another example of potential problems that can emerge within activist groups 
is the gilets jaunes, or Yellow Vest protest movement in France. The movement 
originated with rural motorists protesting the rising cost of fuel, but soon grew into 
an undefined range of economic issues (Daguerre, 2019). While on the surface the 
movement emphasizes the right to protest, worker solidarity and equality, authoritarian 
populist elements have become more prominent, such as anti-immigrant sentiment, 
demonstrators carrying anti-Semitic signs that connect Macron with the Rothschild 
family and surrounding Alain Finkielkrat, a French intellectual, while yelling anti-
Jewish insults in public (McAuley, 2019). The current nature of the movement 
seems to be universally anti-establishment and rejects political parties and leaders, 
but as history has shown as recently as 2016, this is usually ripe fodder for right wing 
elements to gain a foothold. Most disturbingly, those involved in the movement see 
any attempt to call out racism as part of a larger plot by the government to dismantle 
the movement (McCauley, 2019).
Widening our understanding of who constitutes the working class is essential. 
Beyond understanding demographics, this necessitates that we respect what the 
working class contributes to activism and to the wider world. In her extensive work 
with union organizing, Priscilla Murolo has found the diversity of the working class 
to be a major strength, especially since people engage with activism for different 
reasons:
Life has taught me that working people are multi-dimensional. They care about 
many things in addition to work and unions, and they bring multiple concerns 
and aspirations to any movement they get involved with. For some women, for 
example, getting active in a union can be a way of getting out from under the 
thumb of your husband as well as getting a fair shake at work. (Piascik, 2018, 
p. 24)
At the same time, “workers’ struggles alone will not be sufficient to unite the 
working classes” (Daher, 2017, p. 109). In addition to addressing issues of class, 
activists, including in unions, have to openly support rights and protections for 
women, minorities and LGBTQ people. Hill, Sanders and Hankin (2002) echo this 
need to understand the diversity of the working class in order for the working class 
as a whole to develop class consciousness:
This form of class consciousness must recognize practically and theoretically 
the heterogeneous nature of the working class, as well as its common 
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experience—of being in exploited wage labor. In particular, it must address 
the problematic relationship between class, gender, race, religion, sexuality, 
disability, and other aspects of subjectivity, and seek to build solidarity on the 
basis of respect and toleration for difference rather than for its obliteration.  
(p. 174)
CONCLUSION
The valorization of the white worker is not about recovering a lost voice. It comes 
with the exclusion of non-white, heterosexual, rural, Christian males. It isn’t about 
“please recognize us,” it’s about “get the hell out of my country so we can be real 
Americans again.” It would be one thing if these calls for the recognition of the 
white worker were about focusing on how capitalism harms working class whites, 
but this is not that. For leftists to continue to push the simplistic thinking behind 
“the forgotten white worker” is to assist in capitalism’s use of racism and sexism to 
perpetuate itself, thereby making it all the more difficult to overcome. It is insulting 
to those dedicated to socialist organizing to insist on waving away racism and sexism 
as “divisive tools of the capitalist class” rather than digging deep into one’s analysis 
to confront the historical construction of class through these means.
It is hoped that by deliberately decentering the white male industrial worker as 
this chapter does, we can create the space needed for an inclusive working class and 
alternatives to tired narratives that overlook how “the American dream is being used 
to rationalize a national nightmare” (Szalavitz, 2017, para. 3). To attempt to resurrect 
the American dream is to willfully ignore demographic reality, which is that white 
people make up an ever-decreasing part of the working class and no longer have the 
ability to bar women, minorities, and LGBTQI people when it comes to employment 
and education to the same degree as before. As Resnikoff (2017) asserts, “to stop 
“leaving behind” white workers would mean to reify America’s caste system so they 
can regain those privileges. The white nationalists of the “alt-right” understand this 
and make it explicit. On the white left, it remains subtext” (para. 56).
From a materialist feminist viewpoint, because women—especially minority 
women—make up a significant portion of the working class, it is no coincidence they 
are the ones constantly called upon to be civil, to reach out, to nurture, and to forgive 
those who oppress them while hiding behind their mantra of being the forgotten-yet-
authentic-working-class. As Solnit (n.d.) reminds us, “It is this population we are 
constantly asked to pay more attention to and forgive even when they hate us or seek 
to harm us” (para. 4). We see this in the media’s consistent dismissal of the reactions 
of women who had enough sense to vote against Trump in favor of a vague populism 
(Solod, 2017). Mason’s (2016) outrage is apt:
Those who tell you the left has to somehow “reconnect” with people whose 
minds are full of white supremacy and misogyny must finish the sentence, by 
what means? By throwing our black brothers and sisters under a bus? Eighty 
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years ago, the poets and miners of the International Brigades did not march 
into battle saying: “Mind you, the fascists have got a point.” (para. 17)
Rather than being an impediment to class consciousness, as center-left journalists 
assert, issues of identity are at the heart of economic policy and have been throughout 
history. Writers like Mark Lilla, who posit that identity is divisive are usually 
those who are most shielded by the impacts of identity and are able to make their 
assessments from a position of massive privilege (Young, 2016). If one examines 
major social movements in the US, they all involve aspects of identity integrated 
into solidarity, as Walters (2017) astutely points out:
Let’s be clear: most social change and political activism happens in and through 
identity politics—whether it is the righteous rage of Black Lives Matter, the 
fight for Indian autonomy and water rights at Standing Rock, the immigrant 
rights movement, or indeed the recent Women’s March in DC and around the 
world…the truth is this: feminist organizing (and, yes, by women in the name 
of women) made this happen, brought millions together around the world in a 
collective roar of resistance to (among other things) patriarchal power, racism 
and xenophobia, homophobia, economic inequality. A women’s march rallied 
the masses. Deal with it. (para. 15)
We can either recognize evolving forms of organizing and solidary or we can 
continue to insist on reviving exclusionary concepts such as color-blind class 
analysis. Whatever leftists choose to acknowledge or act upon, things are moving 
forward, and some are going to be left behind because of their unwillingness to 
share power (Solnit, n.d.). This means that workers’ stories are not only going to be 
about white male workers, but about everyone (Thorton, 2016). The trajectory of 
the working class is happening in real time and it is not an artifact of the past. In the 
words of Priscilla Murolo,
The labor movement may be down, but it’s never down for the count. Every 
day for more than 400 years, working people have been devising new ways 
to defend themselves against indignity, depravation, and injustice. When one 
line of defense fails, another takes its place, and since collective strategies 
are invariably the most effective for the most people, the arc bends in that 
direction. (Piascik, 2018, p. 28)
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CHAPTER 4
BERNIE BREAKDOWN
Challenges Facing the Left in the Wake of the Sanders Campaign
INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 2015, Senator and self-proclaimed Democratic socialist Bernie Sanders 
announced his candidacy for president, presenting, for a brief moment, a disruption of 
both the right-wing populism of Donald Trump and mainstream liberalism of Hillary 
Clinton. Part of the power of the Sanders campaign was the strategic decision of 
organizers to engage with the electoral system within the Democratic Party, instead 
of the traditional insurgent third-party route. As Trudell (2016) described, Sanders 
was unique in his bringing democratic socialist ideas that had long been marginalized 
since the post-Great Depression era and making them part of mainstream political 
demands. While there remains debate on the left of the utility or futility of working 
within the Democratic Party (Crane, 2018; Selfa, 2008) or if democratic socialism 
is radical enough or not, millions of people who were previously disengaged from 
socialist ideas or electoral participation began to more vocally support concepts like 
national health care, free college tuition, and a living wage.
It is important to situate Sanders’ campaign against the larger backdrop of growing 
activism since the 2008 financial crisis and what it represented: “the concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a tiny number of billionaires, the increasing class polarization 
of US society and the rapacious destruction of people’s lives and environments” 
(Trudell, 2016, para. 5). Movements such as Occupy Wall Street, and later mass 
mobilizations for immigrant rights, Black Lives Matter, and labor actions created 
conditions ripe for alternative possibilities. For Rehmann (2016), “the so-called 
political middle has been shrinking considerably. It has lost hegemonic traction” 
(p. 4). This also creates tensions within the left on how to most effectively organize—
via structured political parties or through more anarchist forms (Lynd & Grubacic, 
2008).
A second important background against which the 2016 presidential election 
took place was a further entrenchment of white supremacist and aggressive right-
wing populism within the Republican Party itself. Building on the success of the 
corporate-funded Tea Party movement, Trump pushed conservative rhetoric farther 
to the right, essentially dismantling the already shaky ideological structures the 
Republicans have continually used to sustain the false consciousness of their voting 
base. Any of the prior lines of thinking such as free market economics, family values, 
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personal responsibility, law and order, and patriotism have been torn to shreds by the 
conduct of Trump and his associates, including evangelical voters who have made it 
clear there is nothing Trump can do that would erode their support (Burton, 2018b). 
It is apparent by now that not only are Republicans incapable of controlling Trump 
and his base, they simply have no desire to do so (Trudell, 2016).
The third critical aspect that must be considered when examining the Sanders’ 
campaign is the role of social media and analytics in elections, as Chadwick & 
Stromer-Galley (2016) outline:
By the analytics turn we mean the increased use by campaign elites of 
experimental data science methods to interrogate large-scale aggregations 
of behavioral information from public voter records and digital media 
environments, with the aim of organizing and mobilizing key segments of the 
electorate to vote and to publicly and privately share their decision with others. 
Still in its early stages, the analytics turn is currently most advanced in the 
United States. (p. 2)
One could argue that Russia was ahead of this analytic turn with their skilled 
deployment of targeted bots and fake profiles in key swing states, as is just starting 
to come to light. In of many examples, Facebook’s economic model is based on the 
use of hyper-tailored, targeted advertising, which explains much in the way of their 
reluctance to address the problem of monitoring post content (Halpern, 2019).
So, while Trump may represent a disruption of “business as usual” for his 
supporters, his presidency has not produced any viable solutions other than further 
concentrating wealth into the hands of a few. Rehmann (2016) views the Trump 
presidency as representative of a hegemonic crisis, where prior ideologies are no 
longer sufficient to keep the working and middle classes under control. Citing 
Gramsci’s (1971) “the old is dying and the new cannot be born” (p. 556), Rehmann 
(2016) notes that the ruling class can only serve as placeholders to citizens who 
are experiencing a paralyzing form of skepticism. The problem is that contrary to 
the beliefs of some on the left, economic crisis alone does not ensure change, but 
only sets up a situation where different paths could be taken, including fascism or 
socialism:
What we face, rather, is an interregnum, an open and unstable situation in 
which hearts and minds are up for grabs. In this situation, there is not only 
danger but also opportunity: the chance to build a new left. (Fraser, 2017, 
para.10)
This chapter is organized into four sections that examine lessons learned from 
the Sanders’ campaign and how it presents an opportunity for a socialist feminist 
analysis of leftist organizing as a whole during our current hegemonic crisis. After 
an overview of key aspects of the Sanders’ campaign, the sections to be discussed 




THE SANDERS CAMPAIGN: LESSONS LEARNED
One of the more remarkable aspects of Sanders’ insurgent run for president was 
his success compared to past attempts by higher profile progressive Democrats or 
third-party candidates such as Dennis Kucinich, Ralph Nader, or Jesse Jackson. As 
Gallagher (2016) points out, Eugene V. Debs was the last candidate from an existing 
leftist political party to reach 6% of the national vote in 1912 (para. 22). Awareness 
of this history was also a likely factor compelling Sanders to run as a Democrat 
versus the usual failed third-party route. Trudell (2016) expressed the mixture of 
trepidation and support on the left at the time:
On the one hand…his candidature therefore risks trapping the aspirations of 
the social movements within the Democratic Party machine, and the party has 
a long history of co-opting the energy and hopes of social movements…On the 
other hand, however, at this stage Sanders’ campaign, precisely because it is 
taking place within the Democratic Party, is bringing the external crisis home 
to the institution and exposing the rifts and weaknesses in the Democrats’ 
electoral base. (para. 6)
Sanders’ run also reflected a major shift in the population’s political attitudes, 
stemming from the 2008 financial crisis and the Occupy movement. His platform 
included universal health care, free college tuition, regulating Wall Street and 
progressive taxation, which put in firmly in the category of outsider (Kellner, 2017; 
Warner et al., 2017). His candidacy captured not only the discontent of leftist voters, 
but 86% of Democrats and 61% of independents who agreed that “money and wealth 
should be distributed among a larger percentage of the people” (Gallagher, 2016, para. 
8). Those who were already inclined to vote for an openly socialist candidate included 
nearly 60% of Democrats and 70% under age 30 (Gallagher, 2016, para. 18; Myerson, 
p. 27). In Iowa, for example, 43% of likely Democratic caucus voters described 
themselves as socialist along with 39% of Democrats in South Carolina (Myerson, 
2016, p. 30). The notion that leftist ideas appealed to just Marxists was out the window.
A hallmark of Sanders’ campaign was his activation of younger voters, including 
those not previously attracted to politics. He was the only presidential candidate to 
have a net positive rating among younger voters hovering at around 54% (Meyerson, 
2016, p. 30). As an example of the duality of age and support, Sanders attracted 
71% of voters under 30 (including young black voters), while Clinton captured the 
same percentage with those over 64 (p. 27). In Michigan’s primary, Sanders gained 
an unimaginable 81% of the under-30 vote, leading to his unexpected win (Trudell, 
2016, para. 3). Primary wins like this only increased the funding momentum and 
dispelled myths that people would never accept a socialist presidential candidate 
beyond the state of Vermont:
The fact that Bernie Sanders actually told people what he really thought, 
specifically that he called himself a socialist, was long considered a 
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limiting factor in his career. Yet it was clearly the widespread perception of 
his genuineness that thrust him to the fore in the presidential race…if you 
wondered why Bernie Sanders was saying the things he said on the campaign 
trail, there was a simple answer: It was because he believed them to be true, 
and had in most cases believed them to be true for some time…Likewise, the 
no-frippery, let’s-get-to-the-issues style that might border on the gruff also 
seemed to work surprisingly well in the presidential arena this time around. 
(Gallagher, 2016, para. 12)
Meyerson (2016) also notes how Sanders’ base of support was different from 
past progressive Democratic presidential candidates like Howard Dean or Eugene 
McCarthy who appealed to a more upper-class white liberal voter. Sanders’ no-
nonsense discourse could appeal to both younger voters and older, blue collar ones.
Another major factor leading to Sanders’ success was his ability to mobilize social 
media organizing from the ground up, far exceeding Obama’s 2008 ground game. 
Within a matter of days, supporters created state-level Facebook pages, Twitter 
accounts and sub-Reddits, encouraging friends to join both online and in-person 
events. Spending more money on online organizing than other candidates, Sanders 
relied on the expertise of groups such as Revolution Messaging who had prior 
experience working with Obama’s 2008 campaign, combining the role of digital 
and finance management director (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016). Sanders’ 
popularity was represented by his incredible fundraising abilities, breaking prior 
Democratic Party numbers (including Obama’s) from a large swath of individual, 
small-donation contributors whose average donation was $27.00, many contributing 
as little as one dollar (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016, para. 1; Trudell, 2016, 
para. 3).
This momentum and organizing helped propel Sanders to primary victories in 
nine states, including more conservative ones like Oklahoma and Nebraska (Trudell, 
2016). Rallies drew incredible crowds—including 25,000 in Boston which exceeded 
Obama’s primary rally attendance of 10,000—as well as small towns where 25–33% 
of their populations attended meetings (para. 10). Rehmann (2016) captures this 
sense of potential:
In this regard, the Sanders campaign’s achievements were extraordinary. It 
expressed and articulated what I just characterized as the second layer of 
people’s common sense, the moral outrage against an economic system that 
produces an increasing income and wealth polarity between the 1% and the 
99%. This is the message that Sanders was hammering home to his audience, 
regardless of the concrete questions he was asked by the anchors and journalists 
of the corporate media. And by doing so, he was actually attacking neoliberal 
capitalism at the “weakest link in the imperialist chain,” to use a famous 
expression of Lenin in a different context. (p. 7)
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It is also important to point out that contrary to media efforts to draw a simplistic 
parallel between Sanders and Trump, Sanders utilized a positive, progressive 
populism versus Trump’s appeal to racism, sexism, and nationalism (Kellner, 2017).
In the end, however, Hillary Clinton secured the Democratic nomination and 
eventually won 48.5% of the popular vote in the general election, the Electoral 
College rendering this total irrelevant for the second time in 16 years. It is worth 
investigating why, when presented with a more progressive vision of populism that 
Sanders represented, “only Trump’s reactionary populism survived” (Fraser, 2017, 
para. 8). The Sanders’ campaign presents us with an opportunity to critically examine 
the mobilization of his supporters, and some of the weaknesses they reveal within 
leftist organizing as a whole. These include 1) stridency without substance within 
leftist groups; 2) rejection of party structures; 3) the narrowness of dualistic thinking 
and 4) colorblind class analysis. Each of these will be examined in turn.
Stridency without Substance
Social media is now an integral part of leftist organizing and the interactive 
platforms that Facebook and Twitter provide have magnified the intensity of 
discourse and distribution within leftist spaces. A particular form of this discourse 
can best be labeled “stridency without substance,” referring to the overall 
aggressive and unyielding tone that talks big but ultimately offers nothing to people 
interested in building a socialist future. Stridency without substance sums up a left 
that immediately and defensively derides anything hinting at incrementalism or 
mainstream popularity while valorizing hyper-masculinized authoritarian figures 
such as Joseph Stalin.
Priding themselves on “never settling,” they ignore the realities of our current 
political system and offer nothing to address the concerns of those most vulnerable 
in society other than promising the glorious instability and excitement of revolution 
as the solution to everything, as if things would magically fall into place if the current 
system were suddenly dismantled. Rehmann (2016) characterizes it as, “a hyper-
revolutionary but also empty discourse without any consideration of the hegemonic 
constellations on the ground and the subjects that are supposed to carry through the 
proclaimed revolution” (pp. 5–6).
The first characteristic of this discourse is its domineering and patronizing tone—
often gendered—as Morris (2010) recounts looking back on past email exchanges:
I am shocked at the number of e-mails from men I organized with that were 
abusive in tone and content, how easily they would talk down to others for 
minor mistakes. I am more surprised at my meek, diplomatic responses—like 
an abuse survivor—as I attempted to placate compañeros who saw nothing 
wrong with yelling at their partners, friends, and other organizers. There were 
men like this in various organizations I worked with. (para. 14)
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Morris connects her experiences to those of famous leftist women such as Angela 
Davis and Roxanne Dunbar who also put up with harassment and abuse from high-
profile men in their groups.
A quick perusal of the comments sections of Marxist and socialist Facebook pages 
such as Grouchy Socialists or Marxist Memes yields endless examples of defensive 
attacking language even when legitimate questions are posed about aspects of 
socialism. This same kind of posting discourse was rampant on Bernie Sanders’ 
social media outlets. While one can argue that aggressive discourse is a feature of 
social media overall (see: Rösner & Krämer, 2016; Daniels, 2009), the fact that it is 
occurring in so-called leftist spaces is especially ironic. West (2017) speculates that 
the attraction of the online “dirtbag left” persona offers psychological benefits to its 
adherents, even as it alienates others genuinely interested in Marxist and socialist 
alternatives:
You can be good without ever seeming uncool in front of your buddies, you 
can be an advocate for social justice without ever considering there might 
be social forces beyond your ken, you can be a crusader for positive change 
without ever killing anyone’s buzz, you can be a progressive hero without ever 
taking identity politics seriously. It’s an ambitious contortion, and one that 
affords straight white men a luxurious degree of stasis. (para. 13)
Part of the defensiveness of this discourse has to do with two closely held and 
massively contradictory beliefs within these groups: 1) we need to build a mass 
movement in order for socialism to become a reality and 2) we can’t ever be 
mainstream or “normie.” Arnove (2018) points out how Marx was adamant that 
socialism required “an immense majority” acting in the majority’s interest in order 
to overcome capitalism: “those self-identified Marxists who had built, or those who 
continue to build, sects, cults of personality, and even gulags in the name of Karl 
Marx, don’t understand the first thing about Marxists” (p. 83). Indeed, if earlier 
movements had avoided becoming mainstream, things like the 8-hour workday, 
voting rights, reproductive rights, and public health regulations would never have 
existed (Sen, 2018).
A second feature of stridency without substance connected to the idea of not 
going mainstream is “never settling.” Never settling means compiling endless lists 
of reasons why a particular leftist approach, policy, or candidate for office doesn’t 
go far enough and discussion is therefore shut down, usually by demeaning the 
person who shared the information (Leonard, 2017). This practice severely limits 
the range of options for building social movements, prompting Weida (2017) to 
observe, “whichever Conservative coined “not going to settle” deserves the prize 
of hamstringing the left” (para. 31). As one example, Democratic Representative 
and Civil Rights Movement participant John Lewis was attacked on social media 
for being a sell-out for not remembering Bernie Sanders being part of a crowd of 
250,000 at the March on Washington back in 1963 (Leonard, 2017).
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In discussing the upcoming presidential election in 2020, McEwan (2017b) notes 
how Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren were originally put forward “to routinely 
make the lists of Women We’d Vote for Who Aren’t Hillary Clinton to Prove We’re 
Not Misogynists” but who are now currently branded as “insufficiently progressive” 
(para. 2). Even Sanders himself was critiqued for not being leftist enough, despite 
his distinctive policy views compared to more centrist candidates (Rehmann, 2016). 
When proposed policies such as work requirements for Medicaid are routinely 
floated by Republicans as legitimate solutions, to immediately dismiss Sanders as 
only a progressive Democrat seem pretty shortsighted.
The third characteristic of stridency without substance is the insistence that 
revolution by itself will be the catalyst to lasting change, or that things have to get 
really bad before people will be moved to act. Wolcott (2017) levels a devastating 
reminder about the limits of this line of thinking:
The left’s romance with revolution has always been a reality-blinder, this 
thermodynamic belief that things need to get bad beyond the breaking point 
so that people will take the vape pens out of their mouths, rise up, and storm 
the Bastille. But the history of non-democracies and authoritarian personality 
cults shows that things can stay bad and get worse for a long time, leaving 
unhealable wounds. (para. 4)
One of the most disturbing aspects of the revolution at all costs way of thinking 
is the total dismissal of the most vulnerable in society, such as the poor, those 
with different abilities, older people, minorities, and children who do not have 
the resources to withstand backlash from authoritarian and right-wing regimes 
should moves toward revolution be made (McEwan, 2017b). When called out on 
their cynicism, or challenged for their vocal refusal to participate in mainstream 
politics by voting against the most lethal candidates, they “wash their hands of their 
complicity and say, ‘don’t blame me, I voted for (fringe minor party candidate),’” 
followed by a hefty helping of complaining about how messed up the world is and 
how people are too complacent (Leonard, 2017, para. 11).
Exchanges, whether on social media or in person, become a matter of competing 
and one-upping to see who has the most radial rhetoric (Rehmann, 2016). Lost in the 
contest is any kind of deep examination of the privileges involved in making these 
kinds of recommendations, as McEwan (2017b) outlines:
Marginalized people, especially those who live in states with legislatures 
governed by a Republican majority, are thrown into constant chaos by 
abortion restrictions, “religious liberty” bills, “trans bathroom” bills, housing 
and employment discrimination, voter disenfranchisement, and all the other 
political tug-of-war we are obliged to navigate, in addition to social oppression 




These kinds of concerns are misread by some on the left as marginalized voters 
being overly dependent on the Democratic Party, in thrall to bourgeois thinking, 
settling for less, or not wanting change instead of viewing them as legitimate concerns 
and potential areas to build socialist coalitions around. The political situation in 
many parts of the US are such that, “the Democratic Party—the establishment—
is the only well-funded institution prepared to hold the line against conservative 
oppression” (para. 29). While there is much analysis of Hillary Clinton’s failures 
by leftist outlets, perhaps a similar type of analysis should be done of Sanders and 
his inability to instill confidence in minority voters to support him, in light of this 
situation (Starr, 2017). It should go without saying that if a basic set of democratic 
socialist policies fail to gain support, revolutionary politics won’t, at least the way 
they are currently presented.
Ultimately, stridency without substance represents a nihilistic form of purity, an 
“everything is corrupt” cynicism that works against the very changes its proponents 
advocate:
[the belief that] there is no usefulness in trying to change or reform existing 
in judgement, ruthlessly purges people for being imperfect, and mandates 
that the current society must be completely burned down and destroyed by 
a massive revolt of the people to allow the ideologically pure to gain control 
and build a utopia for all to prosper. Hence the term nihilistic purity. (Leonard, 
2017, para. 13)
Whenever a significant form of protest occurs, as with Black Lives Matter or #MeToo, 
instead of looking to build on those actions, they are accused of being “symbolic” 
and not “real change” (Sen, 2018, para. 9). But as Sen points out, symbols can be 
a start and if the left cannot work from them, momentum has no hope of occurring.
Party Problems
The contentious relationship with traditional US political parties operating within 
a very entrenched two-party system has created a problem for the left in terms of 
how to build a workers’ party and what to do in the interim of developing the type of 
mass support needed to compete electorally, versus simply serving as an unintentional 
assistant to either the Democrats or Republicans winning every two to four years. For 
the left, current options include not voting, voting for Democratic candidates, or voting 
for third party or write-in candidates, all of which have their respective negatives. 
Another core issue to confront is the rejection of the notion of organizing by party 
itself, most recently expressed within the Occupy Wall Street movement that began 
after the 2008 economic collapse. Since the Sanders campaign emerged to a great 
degree from Occupy (Gallagher, 2016), it is important to examine the problematics 
associated with party organizing and hostility toward party structures among the left.
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Before examining party problematics, it is critical to address two interrelated 
features of contemporary approaches to participation within parties. The first is the 
impact of social media in terms of how people engage with parties:
In some cases, parties are renewing themselves from the outside in. Citizens are 
breathing new life into the party form, remaking parties in their own changed 
participatory image, and doing so via digital means. The overall outcome 
might prove more positive for democratic engagement and the decentralization 
of political power than has often been assumed. (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 
2016, p. 4)
Certainly, one could argue that the recent campaign and victory of 29-year-old 
Representative Alexandria Ocascio-Cortez has served this purpose. Her ability to 
maneuver social media has reached younger voters and others not previously engaged 
with the Democratic Party (Wagner, 2019). It has now become increasingly possible 
for more insurgent candidates to run and win within party structures precisely because 
of these changes in the landscape of campaigning (Warner et al., 2017).
The second feature is the tendency of people to frame parties as another aspect 
of personalized choice within the capitalist market as a form of expression and 
authenticity: “This party-as-movement mentality can easily accommodate populist 
appeals and angry protest—on both the right and the left” (Chadwick & Stromer-
Galley, 2016, p. 8). Both of these features interact to impact each other—the more 
that people view parties as authentic means of expressing what’s in their hearts and 
minds, the more that parties begin to market themselves to niche groups of voters. 
This can lead to the idea that voting represents one’s identity and values, rather 
than a distinct set of political platforms that may or may not directly impact you 
as much as other people. Voting becomes viewed as a matter of personal choice or 
endorsement, not contributing to larger consequences, such as rejecting a candidate 
because they aren’t leftist enough on an issue when the candidate might support 
things like health care or education far better than a right wing one. The phrase “vote 
your conscience” reflects this type of thinking.
At the same time, political parties have had to contend with a wave of participation 
of people formerly uninvolved with the political process. As Brenner and Fraser 
(2017) point out, populism has become a global phenomenon which has shaped the 
demands people are placing on political parties:
Although they differ in ideology and goals, these electoral mutinies share a 
common target: all are rejections of corporate globalization, neoliberalism, and 
the political establishments that have promoted them. In every case, voters are 
saying “No!” to the lethal combination of austerity, free trade, predatory debt, 
and precarious, ill-paid work that characterize financialized capitalism today. 
(p. 130)
Many of those participating in the 2016 primaries were not familiar with the function 
of political parties and quickly became impatient with their formal procedures 
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(Rehmann, 2016). Within the right wing, much of this anger had already been 
carefully propelled into a corporate-funded Tea Party movement, which led directly 
to Trump’s primary win. A key difference in outcome was that the Republican 
Party was more adept at rapidly accommodating itself to right-wing populism as 
compared to the Democratic Party being shaped by more leftist candidates, though 
considerable progress has been made within the House of Representatives after the 
2018 midterm elections.
Within the midst of these dramatic changes comes the temptation to view the primary 
process as diametrically opposed to street action, as if the two operate separately and 
at counter purposes (Brennan & Fraser, 2017). Certainly, the Democrats have a long 
history of derailing social movements (Selfa, 2012) but at the same time they have 
been shown to respond to pressure from social movements. Rehmann (2016) reminds 
us that “the fundamental question for any serious transformation of the system is 
how to effectively connect social movements to the struggles within the institutions 
of civil society, including the domain of political representation” (p. 6). Yet a key 
problem is that people who become involved with candidates through rallies or even 
caucus nominating systems tend to be those with the most available means, time, or 
motivation to participate. Warner et al. (2017) note that one tenth of those surveyed 
nationally had attended a rally or speech with only six percent having ever gone to an 
organized protest (p. 6). This can often create a vulnerability where those participating 
in the political process are the most partisan and less likely to shape policies for 
optimal movement building, including having patience with political parties.
Ansara’s (2016) essay on the eve of the 2016 election offers a poignant perspective 
regarding political participation as he recalls an important choice that he and his 
friends made in 1968. At that time, he had decided to sit out the election, because 
he thought that both Humphrey and Nixon would continue the war in Vietnam and 
that there was no difference between the two. He asserts that this cynical decision 
was made at a time when he and his colleagues had never experienced what right 
wing governments in the United States could do and were operating within a system 
where the worst it had been was well within the spectrum of centrist liberal policies.
Not anticipating what could happen and how much worse it could get represented 
for him a “great failure of the political and moral imagination” (Ansara, 2016, p. 24). 
He reflected that while their framing of Humphrey as a centrist democrat might have 
been correct, “our failure was not in our assessment of Humphrey but in our failure 
to understand Nixon and what was at stake” (p. 24). The consequences of Nixon 
winning went far beyond the 1968 election:
Our refusal to participate started a process of making our movement profoundly 
irrelevant. We allowed Richard Nixon to come to power. We allowed a right-
wing counter-reformation to hold power and warp American politics for most 
of the next four decades. Within our movement, we allowed militancy to 




The United States has a firmly entrenched and overarching two-party system that 
shows no sign of stopping (Feist, 2019; Selfa, 2012). This is a major contributor to 
leftists making the decision to vote for the Democratic candidate often by default, 
in order to prevent the Republican candidate from winning. Even in cases where a 
third party provides a platform more in line with leftist policies, that candidate has 
no hopes of winning, their greatest impact usually ending up splitting the vote and 
enabling the Republican to win. Not voting will accomplish the same thing and has 
shown no signs of budging political party platforms. Indeed, instead of operating as a 
means to apply pressure, lower turnout continually favors Republicans (McElwee & 
McAuliffe, 2018). Nevertheless, many on the left minimize or refuse to acknowledge 
this reality, citing the flaws of “lesser of two evil voting” (see: Bachtell, 2017; Crane, 
2018; Sanders, 2018).
This refusal to address the two-party dilemma other than the repeated and nebulous 
suggestion of building a workers’ party and not voting until that happens has led to 
a form of dualistic thinking within leftist communities that a candidate is either 
socialist or fascist/neoliberal. Related to this is the practice of detailed critiques of 
Democratic candidates for not adhering to a specific list of characteristics deemed 
“leftist enough” (the social media term is purity trolling) and somehow never finding 
a viable candidate to support. Nagel (2017) provides a compelling analysis of the 
role of social media in supporting the rise of purity discourse on the left. Notions of 
prioritizing adherence to a specific identity and branding that become amplified on 
social media have hit a crisis point now that social media participation has become 
more ubiquitous with a wider range of demographic groups:
The value of the currency of virtue that those who had made their social media 
cultural capital was in danger of being suddenly devalued. As a result, I believe, 
a culture of purging had to take place, largely targeting those in competition for 
this precious currency. Thus, the attacks increasingly focused on other liberals 
and leftists often with seemingly pristine progressive credentials, instead of 
those who engaged in any actual racism, sexism, or homophobia. (p. 77)
Discourse emerging within Sanders’ social media groups often took on the tone 
of “leftist” being defined in exclusionary terms: if you didn’t support Sanders, you 
weren’t a leftist (McEwan, 2017b). Another problematic aspect of dualist thinking is 
the notion that liberals are automatically on the side of fascism and must be opposed 
to the same degree as one would fascists. This can lead to a ready acceptance of 
oppressive regimes or groups because they might be opposed to US imperialism or 
assuming solidarity with Trump supporters because they misread them as allies in 
the fight against global capitalism. These issues are addressed in the two sections 
below, “Not Leftist Enough” and Misplaced Solidarity
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“Not leftist enough.” A key aspect of socialist solidarity is advancing a distinct 
and clearly articulated platform, such as the one stated by the Freedom Socialist 
Party, a socialist feminist organization. This platform includes universal human 
rights, reproductive freedom, environmental protection, and health care within the 
framework of seeking to abolish capitalism (Freedom Socialist Party Platform, 
n.d.). Part of establishing clarity and solidarity around this type of platform involves 
decisions about which political candidates to support or reject, based on that 
platform. Yet Roediger (2017) examines problematic aspects of an uncritical notion 
of solidarity on the left that can lead to “impossible expectations leaving us coming 
up forever short of an unexamined ideal” (p. 161).
One unfortunate outcome of dualist thinking is overlooking the possible alliances 
that could be made with liberals, who are often relegated to the “not leftist” category, 
or as McEwan (2017b) states, “you’re either a supporter of “big money elites,” or 
you’re a “Sanders Democrat” and thus a leftist” (para. 9). This viewpoint is highly 
short-sighted and overly simplistic. For example, just over half of Hillary Clinton 
supporters reported a favorable view of socialism, indicating that “the Sanders 
campaign didn’t create a new American left so much as revel it” (Meyerson, 2016, 
p. 30).
Indeed, Quam and Ryshina-Pankova’s (2016) analysis concluded that the 
linguistic strategies utilized by Clinton and Sanders in political speeches had more 
in common than either one did with Trump’s speeches. Rather than being a new 
political development, Meyerson (2016) notes how the Sanders campaign is an 
indication of how the Democratic Party has been slowing its rightward momentum 
compared to the past couple of decades. Hillary Clinton herself advanced ideas 
such as subsidized child care, increased critiques of NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, supported raising the minimum wage and expanding Social Security 
and workers’ rights.
While critique of any candidate is important and should be encouraged on the 
left, there seems to be an uncritical either/or thinking, evidenced by the typical 
rundown on blogs and social media of how a Democratic candidate fails to be leftist 
enough:
Since she “lost” to Donald Trump, the most die-hard Sandernistas have 
developed a complete loathing of anyone who represents the “Democratic 
establishment” like Corey Booker and Kristen Gillibrand. With yesterday’s 
hit piece in Mic, we’re now seeing it happen to the Democrats’ brightest rising 
star, California Senator Kamala Harris. (Fassler, 2017, para. 1)
The recent attacks from the left on Elizabeth Warren are one example, legitimizing 
the right-wing fixation about her offering DNA testing evidence to establish Native 
American heritage (Ward, 2018). Beto O’Rourke received the usual Common 
Dreams purity treatment, as if leftists should be somehow shocked that he has the 
same centrist tendencies as just about any other liberal politician currently serving 
in a capitalist government (Solomon, 2018). Based on the discourse of social media 
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coverage, some leftists appear to have somehow missed the fact that we live in a 
capitalist society where the political institutions are going to reflect that reality.
McEwan (2017b) notes how a special sort of scrutiny seems to be reserved for 
female and minority candidates, contradicting the notion that the opposition is solely 
because of their neoliberalism. During the election, it often became difficult to 
distinguish between the anti-Clinton rhetoric on pro-Sanders and pro-Trump pages, 
reflecting a decades-long anti-Clinton messaging machine (Kellner, 2017; Weida, 
2017). This was against the backdrop of Trump already receiving an unprecedented 
amount of attention from the media with few hard questions asked about things like 
his racist language or fraudulent business practices while maintaining a rolling, super-
detailed critique of Clinton’s actions, real and imagined. Kellner (2017) outlines how
for weeks Trump had been droning on about Clinton’s “criminal scheme” and 
“criminal conduct,” which was given substance by Comey’s letter, a barrage 
of rumors by Giuliani and the trump campaign that criminal indictments were 
going to be levelled against Clinton. (p. 31)
Sanders supporters inadvertently strengthened these right-wing tactics by spreading 
the same narrative and conspiracy theories, albeit utilizing leftist terminology. It 
became more about being anti-Clinton than pro-Sanders.
Though Sanders received far less media coverage than Trump or Clinton, Quam 
and Ryshina-Pankova (2016) point out how Sanders’ masculinist rhetoric and style 
of speaking assisted with his relatively positive media treatment despite his openly 
democratic socialist platform. In some ways, this has contributed to the persistent yet 
naive notion that Sanders could have beaten Trump, since the press was favorable 
to him during the primaries. A quick review of the Swiftboat Veterans for Truth 
attack on 2006 Democratic candidate John Kerry provides an important lesson in 
how the right wing will select the most dominant attribute of a candidate (in that 
case, Kerry’s military record) to target (Rosenbaum, 2017). It is foolish to think that 
the right wing wouldn’t have launched an immediate barrage against socialism had 
Sanders won the primary.
Weida’s (2017) critique of Sanders supporters adds an important perspective for 
default dualistic thinking on the left. A common misconception Weida addresses is 
that Clinton was a default “lesser of two evils” choice for voters, when many women 
and minorities adopted her as their candidate precisely because of her perceived record 
supporting policies like child care, workplace discrimination and reproductive rights. 
Related to this is the notion is the Clinton supporters were misinformed, “thinking 
with their ovaries” or didn’t know any better because they didn’t back Sanders in the 
primaries. Weida quotes black females who voted for Clinton in both the primaries 
and the general election, who were turned off by Sanders and his male supporters:
I feel like it [criticism of her support of Clinton] is extremely unfair and that he 
is a divisive figure on the left. He used us and his fans have harassed, stalked, 
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and doxed me. Bernie allows this. An old white man who ignores the identity 
of anyone not white and male is not the future. (para. 28)
While some on the left might immediately respond by citing several examples 
of Clinton’s centrism, it is critical for them to also reflect on why “the only “Bern” 
Clinton voters have felt is the one that comes from being harassed online by an 
army of Bernie bros they say are infected with rabid conspiracy theories” (para. 26). 
Maybe instead of sympathetically listening to Trump supporters, we should consider 
extending the same courtesy to liberals.
Misplaced solidarity. Rehmann (2017) presents three possible outcomes of the 
current crisis of neoliberalism and how these outcomes are adopted into popular 
thought. One possibility is to turn toward right-wing populism, authoritarianism 
and scapegoating of minority groups, immigrants, and the public sector. A second 
option is a growing awareness of economic and social inequality, even by formerly 
centrist people, with blame placed on the financial sector and the wealthy. The third 
potential outcome is a movement toward a rejection of capitalism itself, viewing it as 
ultimately unsustainable and a barrier to meaningful change. For Rehmann, the third 
option “still remains mostly latent, blocked from consciousness by fear of being 
ostracized as radical lunacy, and by the lack of an appealing democratic-socialist 
alternative” (p. 5). This essentially leaves the first two options of commonsense 
thinking as immediate challenges, and leftists are deluding themselves if they think 
they can somehow work within the first option of trying to connect with oppressive 
regimes or reactionary groups.
In the absence of a strong, organized left, it is easy for right-wing options to 
present themselves under the veneer of liberatory possibilities. A. Smith (2017) 
provides the example of those on the left who support Putin and Assad because they 
supposedly serve as checks on US imperialism, justifying this “reactionary position 
with the preposterous claim that Putin’s Russia and Assad’s brutal dictatorship are 
an anti-imperialist alliance standing up to Washington’s alleged policy of regime 
change in Syria” (p. 57). Associated with this stance is the ready acceptance of 
unsubstantiated conspiracies, such as the 9/11 Truther movement or the deep state, 
conspiracies heavily promoted by the right wing. (DiMaggio, 2017). Pomerantsev 
and Weiss (2014) explain further, presenting the role of RT America, a pay TV 
channel designed to carry a pro-Putin message:
I see how parts of the left are pulled into watching the American RT because 
it confirms their view of the world that the reality around them is rigged. 
RT doesn’t try to introduce a new vision; it’s enough to sow doubt and eat 
away at the fabric of a reality-based conversation…While RT helps feed the 
American left, religious conservatives are seduced by Putin’s anti-LGBT 
stance and libertarians like Rand Paul by the idea of a common enemy—the 
US government. A further level of pressure is added by business lobbies who 
oppose sanctions against the Kremlin. (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 28)
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Draitser (2017) notes how this is part of a larger rightist strategy of making inroads 
into the left and connecting it to the far right, creating a curious outcome where 
progressives will insist on detailed evidence regarding what the US media reports, 
while taking at face value what Russian media says. Dennis Kucinich, a former 
progressive Democratic candidate for president, congratulated Trump after he was 
inaugurated and regularly promotes deep state conspiracies as in one Tweet where he 
asserted, “#WakeUpAmerica, enough of the BS re #Russia stealing election =CIA& 
State Dept propaganda to legitimize hostilities” (Wolcott, 2017, para. 6).
The creation of left-right alliances also applies to Brexit, where “European 
right-nationalists are seduced by the anti-EU message; members of the far-left are 
brought in by tales of fighting US hegemony” (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 19). 
Other examples of the left-right alliance include George Galloway’s support of 
Saddam Hussein, and Russia’s funding of anti-fracking groups which appeals to 
leftists but is done to keep Europe financially connected to Russian energy supply 
lines (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014). It is also interesting to note how most of the 
opposition to US imperialism seems to be heavily tilted in favor of Trump, as with 
Julian Assange’s highly selective and expertly timed Wikileaks release of documents 
associated with Hillary Clinton (Kellner, 2017; Freedland, 2016). Of course, the fact 
that Putin’s regime as well as Trump and the GOP regularly attack leftist groups and 
causes remains conveniently overlooked (Kellner, 2017).
In short, when presented with the more obvious problematic support for oppressive 
historical and contemporary figures or movements, the left is going to have to come 
up with a more compelling rationale than, “well the US does/did [insert oppressive 
thing] too.” This type of whataboutism needs to hit the dustbin of history, fast. 
As A. Smith (2017) observes, “the emerging new Left must instead base itself on 
principled opposition to all imperialisms” (p. 57). At the same time, leftist groups 
often correctly point to interference by the right as a reason why their vision hasn’t 
come to pass in various global contexts (Chretien, 2018). However, the hard truth 
is that if a movement cannot withstand the problem of a repressive, well-funded, 
organized and powerful right-wing, then a Marxist future will not happen.
On a smaller scale, there have been recent proposals on the left to reach out to the 
right wing (Davidson, 2017; Renton, 2019). Davidson (2017) outlines rationale as:
the claim that working-class demands or actions which might appear reactionary 
actually contain a rational core which renders them defensible by the left: in 
relation to migration this is sometimes expressed as the need for socialists to 
pay heed to the “genuine concerns” of the working class, as if the sincerity of 
the belief rendered it valid. (p. 67)
DiMaggio (2017) provides the example of Green Party members proposing a “brown-
red alliance” with white nationalist groups and Trump supporters. The rationale is 
that the experience of being working class and exploited should be the common 
focus of organizing, with less emphasis placed on issues such as racism and sexism. 
An excellent historical analysis of similar attempts at reactionary and revolutionary 
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alliances is provided by ARoamingVagabond (2018), illustrating that unfortunately, 
this is not a new concept. Ultimately, of course, “one can’t realistically “work with” 
right-wing nationalists one minute, then claim common cause with minority groups 
that are the targets of reactionary fascists” (DiMaggio, 2017, para. 12).
Colorblind Class Analysis
One of the more problematic outcomes of the Sanders campaign was the insistence 
of his supporters on framing class apart from its associations with race, gender, 
and sexuality, particularly as a strategic form of outreach to white voters. Roediger 
(2017) sees the retreat from race as a disturbing development within liberal and 
left circles to the point where even the mention of race is discouraged in favor of 
advocating for “universal programs” (p. 35). As Walters (2017) outlines,
for these critics, identity politics are issues “we” (women, blacks, queers, etc.) 
spend too much time on, issues that ostensibly push away that white male 
voter (who doesn’t have an “identity” presumably). Under the cover of this 
so-called concern, critics can attack abortion rights, gay rights, civil rights. As 
long as these rights are the property of certain identities, they can be denied 
as distractions by many on the Left and as narrow “special rights” by most 
conservatives. (para. 10)
While Sanders himself has a long record of supporting civil rights causes and 
cannot remotely be considered a racist, there was a reluctance within his campaign 
and supporters to confront “what it means that a large segment of the US population…
is motivated primarily by white nationalism and an anxiety over the fast-changing 
demographics of the country” (Matthews, 2016, para. 29). What Sanders could have 
done was to more clearly articulate issues of class with race, gender, and sexuality; 
in other words, a more accurate depiction of how capitalism operates (Fletcher, 
2016; Roediger, 2017).
A key moment in the Sanders campaign happened in the summer of 2015 when 
Black Lives Matter activists Marissa Johnson and Mara Willaford interrupted 
his rally in Seattle to ask pointed questions about the candidate’s policies toward 
African Americans (Johnson, 2016; Warner et al., 2017). Sanders’ eventual response 
was to meet with representatives of BLM and other groups to listen to their concerns 
(McMorris-Santo, 2016). However, Sanders supporters, in particular younger white 
males, had an immediate and defensive reaction on social media, posting memes 
reminding blacks in particular of Sanders’ record on civil rights, outraged that 
Sanders was challenged and not Clinton. Johnson (2016) recounts her experience:
I’ll be honest and say that I was not prepared for this backlash. Though our 
action ended up being a great reveal of the racism in progressive spaces, I 
myself was unaware of the depths of this underlying white supremacy. I did not 
expect to have water bottles thrown at me by “socialists”—nor for progressives 
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to call for my being tased by a police department that is still under federal 
consent decree. (para. 7)
Additionally, Roediger (2017) discusses the reaction among the left to an opinion 
piece by Ta-Nehshi Coates, that challenged Sanders’ position on reparations. 
Sanders argued that reparations were not only impossible to implement, but were 
divisive compared to his proposal of a higher minimum wage or free college tuition. 
Coats was critiquing the ability of these colorblind reforms alone to fully address 
racism because of a refusal to confront the history of white supremacy, not attacking 
democratic socialism as Roediger explains:
Coates also stressed the absence of strong support for affirmative action in 
Sanders’ program, underlining that the grand universalist strategy deployed 
by some socialists, and not only the controversial specifics of reparations, was 
at issue. There was not a hint that the article opposed socialism itself. (p. 13)
Roediger observed that in response to the opinion piece, Coats was labeled 
bourgeois, attacked for his awards from the “establishment,” and implications that 
he was a class traitor using fashionable identity politics instead of focusing on class. 
An extreme example came from political scientist Adolph Reed Jr., who accused 
Coats of being an agent of the US government or working for Clinton, even though 
Coats was, ironically enough, a Sanders supporter at the time.
The inevitable outcome to the colorblind universalist approach was Sanders’ 
immense defeat on Super Tuesday and Clinton’s securing of more than 85% of the 
black female vote across most of the states (Starr, 2017, para. 12). Starr reads these 
results as Sanders making assumptions that a universalist set of social programs would 
automatically attract black voters. One example she presents included an activist 
recounting her experiences with Sanders’ reluctance to connect environmental issues 
with race:
That was a perfect opportunity to display empathy for the specific plight 
of black mothers who have to raise children in unsafe areas plagued by 
environmental racism. But, in typical Sanders fashion, he got defensive and 
refused to take on her challenge that he lacks a racial analysis. (para. 16)
Sanders’ statement shows a typical progressive attempt to steer the conversation 
toward a colorblind analysis: “What I just indicated in my view is that when you 
have…you and I may have disagreements because it’s not just black, it is Latino; 
there are areas of America, in poor rural areas, where it’s white” (Starr, 2017, 
para. 17). Additional statements about supporting Trump so long as he stands up to 
corporations further illustrates the problematic aspects of universalist approaches 
(Walters, 2017).
Vanderbeck’s (2006) analysis of race within Vermont politics is instructive in 
placing Sanders along a continuum of white progressive candidates. As he notes, 
“Vermont has been imagined as one of the last remaining spaces of authentic Yankee 
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whiteness while more recently becoming an imagined homeland for particular 
brands of white liberal politics and social practice in the United States” (p. 641). 
This type of authenticity was a major feature of the 2004 primary run of Howard 
Dean, another veteran Vermont politician who made social class a centerpiece of his 
messaging. A strategy of the white liberal progressive in this vein is to set himself 
apart from other white politicians, such as southern conservatives. This stance is 
seen by supporters as sufficient enough to demonstrate opposition to racism and 
sexism and therefore calls for more direct addressing of women and minority issues 
are seen as “divisive.” Waldman (2018) sees this tendency within white progressive 
circles as a “self-serving approach to ongoing anti-racism efforts” (para. 4).
Unfortunately, the resistance among many on the left to examining race, gender, 
and sexuality as specific instances of capitalist oppression has been an ongoing 
problem (Roediger, 2017). Essentially, this line of thinking postulates that a focus on 
issues of identity is a threat to the solidarity needed to confront capitalism because 
everyone remains in their own identity camp focused on micro-local concerns 
(Resnikoff, 2017). Race, gender, and sexuality are swept under the rug, so to speak, 
with a blanket statement along the lines of, “once capitalism is gone, racism and 
sexism will disappear” or “it goes without saying that women and minority rights 
are important but getting rid of capitalism will take care of all that.” What women, 
minorities and LGBTQI people are supposed to do in the interim remains magically 
unaddressed, other than a re-emphasis of the central importance of class.
Part of the dismissal of identity within socialist circles has originated in 
neoliberalism’s successful coopting of the language of diversity. Fraser (2017) 
explains:
Identifying “progress” with meritocracy instead of equality, these terms 
equated “emancipation” with the rise of a small elite of “talented” women, 
minorities, and gays in the winner-takes-all corporate hierarchy instead of with 
the latter’s abolition. These liberal-individualist understandings of “progress” 
gradually replaced the more expansive, anti-hierarchical, egalitarian, class-
sensitive, anti-capitalist understandings of emancipation that had flourished in 
the 1960s and 1970s. As the New Left waned, its structural critique of capitalist 
society faded, and the country’s characteristic liberal-individualist mindset 
reasserted itself, imperceptibly shrinking the aspirations of “progressives” and 
self-proclaimed leftists. (para. 5)
Roediger (2017) sees the left’s rejection of identity as a grave mistake. Just because 
corporate America has adopted practices such as diversity training and implemented 
anti-sexual-harassment policies does not automatically make diverse organizing 
oppositional to class analysis.
Meyerson (2016) acknowledges that the enthusiasm of Sanders supporters 
lies in Sanders’ ability to clearly name economic inequality as the core defining 
driver of oppression, a message that is attractive to younger, less financially secure 
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white voters who also reject Trump’s authoritarian populism. However, Meyerson 
attributes this support to something more, a colorblind notion of class:
Fundamentally, he [Sanders] is saying that the Democratic Party needs to 
pivot back to class politics, to add a renewed focus on economic inequality 
to the party’s emphasis on the inequities of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual 
orientation that has largely defined it since the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. 
(p. 28)
It is one thing to critique the Democratic Party for abandoning strong class analysis 
after the rise of neoliberalism, but it is another thing altogether to assert that white 
voters have somehow been ignored simply because Democrats have made inclusion 
a part of its outreach. This type of zero-sum thinking is a major analytical flaw, 
mainly assuming that identity issues are somehow separate from and not an integral 
part of capitalism.
Related to this is the “alt-left” edgy tone of the discourse of Sanders supporters 
which tended to alienate those not young, white, and male (Fassler, 2017). Resnikoff 
(2017) demonstrates how easily colorblind alt-left discourse can be coopted by 
right-wing groups by discussing Kilpatrick’s (2016) highly flawed Jacobin piece 
where he declared, “when racism can be blamed, capitalism can be exonerated” 
(para. 33). Not long after, the essay and that quote in particular was approvingly 
cited by American Renaissance, a white supremacist website seeking to recruit 
socialists who only focus on economics and “have little respect for theories about 
white privilege or authoritarian personalities” (Resnikoff, 2017, para. 60). The fact 
that one’s supposedly socialist discourse is that easily adopted by white supremacists 
should give one major pause.
Another issue that Sanders campaign and supporters failed to confront was their 
profound misunderstanding about the black vote, encapsulated by their insistence 
that the Democratic National Committee (DNC) somehow stole the primary victory 
from Sanders. To buy into this line of thinking means overlooking that Clinton won 
the popular primary vote by over 3 million, and a key segment of that vote came 
from women and minorities (Leonard, 2017; Walters, 2017). Additionally, more than 
¾ of black voters voted for Clinton in the primary as opposed to less than ¼ for 
Sanders (Starr, 2017, para. 11; Leonard, 2017, para. 8). Starr (2017) attributes this 
to Sanders’ targeting of younger voters while overlooking the South, a key source of 
the black vote. Reflecting on Sanders supporters, Leonard (2017) doesn’t hold back:
Most Black voters were justifiably insulted by the methods his campaign used 
to get their support, were very turned off by his rabid cult of worshippers, 
and made Sanders pay dearly for it…That really angered his cult, who made 
it clear that if Sanders didn’t get the nomination then fuck civil rights, fuck 
“elites” care about and they don’t matter anyway; only the “economic anxiety” 
of “real working-class Americans” matters (read: white males easily baited 
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by racist and sexist dog whistles) and the Democrats have to get with the 
program and win them over in order to start their “progressive revolution.”  
(para. 8)
Even though Sanders made economics the centerpiece of his campaign, it was 
shortsighted to assume that economic programs alone would win over white voters 
and end racism. As Matthews (2016) points out, while strong social welfare programs 
are important, they are no guarantee that racism and sexism will end. A form of 
welfare chauvinism exists where white voters find it acceptable to support programs, 
so long as minorities and immigrants are prevented from participating. Until the left 
recognizes this, merely suggesting student loan forgiveness or national health care 
without any connection to race and gender is doomed to failure:
Any solution has to begin with a correct diagnosis of the problem. If Trump’s 
supporters are not, in fact, motivated by economic marginalization, then even 
full Bernie Sanders-style social democracy is not going to prevent a Trump 
recurrence. Nor are GOP-style tax cuts, and liberal pundits aggressively 
signaling virtue to each other by writing ad nauseam about the need to 
empathize with the Trump Voter aren’t doing anyone any good. (Matthews, 
2016, para. 33)
Ultimately, the left is going to have to more clearly articulate what exactly is 
meant by a “universal” class analysis, or concepts like “solidarity,” especially since 
notions of the common good are irrevocably linked to race, gender and sexuality 
(Roediger, 2017; Walters, 2017). If winning over Trump supporters means removing 
any mention of race or gender in order to make socialism seem more palatable, 
then one has to wonder whose interests are being served in the process and if that 
socialist vision is really prepared to meet everyone’s needs. Rehmann (2016) sums 
it up best:
The Sanders campaign obviously did not have enough time to overcome the 
difficulty that any focus on class is still perceived as a white issue, as if poor 
blacks and women were not part of the working class. The question of how to 
overcome the fragmentation of social movements by a coherent unity, with and 
through manifold differences and contradictions, remains a difficult and urgent 
task for the left in general. (p. 8)
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the campaign of Bernie Sanders made a major impact in 
activating formerly disengaged voters while re-introducing democratic socialist 
concepts to a wide range of people, including those who might consider themselves 
centrist. It was no longer strange to talk about socialism and Marxism. The grassroots 
energy and excitement surrounding the well-attended campaign rallies and on social 
media was something not seen in a long time. People were looking forward to 
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supporting Sanders for his platform and clearly articulated views rather than just to 
prevent Trump from winning.
At the same time, discourse within the Sanders campaign and supporters on social 
media revealed some problematic aspects that have emerged within the left. Based 
on the reluctance—some would say hostility—toward including issues that have the 
most direct impact on women and minorities, one has to wonder if the default setting 
for “economic issues” remains white and male? The irony is that if the goal is to 
defeat capitalism, the worst thing for the left to do is to use colorblind class analysis. 
This only entrenches capitalism because the key ways that it functions through the 
use of race and gender are never confronted.
Further, it is not possible to have a movement both strong enough to defeat 
capitalism and white supremacy/misogyny at the same time. To confront these 
aspects of fascism and right-wing populism requires using discourse about race and 
gender to dismantle racism and sexism. Why some leftists persist in using colorblind 
class analysis remains a mystery. It is time to draw the line and give racism and 
sexism the boot rather than tolerating and accommodating them so as not to upset 
coalitions with Trump supporters. For once we need to prioritize those who are 
most impacted by racism, sexism, and homophobia versus sacrificing them “for the 
good of the cause.” While it is understandable that the working class often holds 
contradictory beliefs in these areas, there should be zero tolerance for racism and 
misogyny in all aspects of leftist organizing.
Ultimately, the Sanders campaign represents a missed opportunity. By failing 
to connect women and minority issues to class analysis in an effort to win more 
conservative white males, they lost the momentum to build a stronger movement. 
Yet, the 2018 midterms were a testament to the power of clearly articulated 
economic issues tied to race, gender, and sexuality, albeit within left-liberal 
bounds. Rather than turning away white voters, it is important to notice how 
successful candidates such as Alexandria Ocascio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib and 
Deb Haaland widened electoral participation. Illinois Representative Lauren 
Underwood, an African-American nurse, ran for and won in a majority white 
suburban/rural district, her direct message about health care attracting voters and 
giving them something to hope for. By focusing on diverse voters rather than 
avoiding the issues so as not to upset conservative ones, a possible template for 
moving forward has presented itself.
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CHAPTER 5
WELL, ACTUALLY
Cyber Sexism and Racism within Online Settings and the Enabling 
Discourse of E-Libertarianism
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the Internet has been hailed as a great equalizer, promoter of 
progress and democracy with unlimited potential and reach. What propels this 
mythology is the concept of the Internet as a neutral site, where identity is irrelevant 
other than the persona one chooses to create and share. Social life on the Internet is 
presented as an idealized, random collection of atomized individuals who happen 
to come together to interact over shared interests, with collectivity stopping there. 
Of course, this mythology has always been attractive to a certain segment of the 
population, who has always been able to utilize the Internet and shape society as 
they wished:
Straight white men, often considered the default Internet user, see the Internet 
as a neutral tool because it conforms so exactly to their expectations, everyone 
else had to make adjustments and look for loopholes in order to use the Internet 
in the way they wanted. (Poland, 2016, p. 213)
Indeed, for the women and minorities who are constantly harassed on the Internet, 
they are met with the dismissive (if not hostile) attitude that this is the price to pay 
for having the nerve to disrupt the “wide, open cyberspaces” that they are violating 
because of their unwillingness to no longer let racism, sexism, and homophobia go 
unnoticed. This can take the form of name calling, threats, and a blurring of online 
and offline stalking and violence.
Far from being a neutral, idealized space, what the Internet reveals is “a story 
of how the deepest prejudices in a society can take purchase in new settings due to 
technology” which has been in the process of “transforming not only online spaces 
but real lives and potentially even the trajectory of our politics” for some time now 
(Beauchamp, 2019, para. 9). Though presented as hip, progressive, and current, the 
very foundation of the tech industry itself is misogynistic, with women occupying 
less than 30% of jobs at major tech firms such as Apple, Google, and Microsoft 
(Jotanovic, 2018, p. 32). Among leadership jobs, women hold only 10% of higher-
level positions and these are virtually nonexistent for non-white women (p. 32). Lee 
CHAPTER 5
114
(2017) captures the experiences of being female in the tech industry, not unlike the 
experience of being a woman who interacts online:
To be a woman in tech is to know the thrill of participating in one of the most 
transformative revolutions humankind has known, to experience the crystalline 
satisfaction of finding an elegant solution to an algorithmic challenge, to want 
to throw the monitor out the window in frustration with a bug and, later, to do 
a happy dance in a chair while finally fixing it. To be a woman in tech is also to 
always and forever be faced with skepticism that I do and feel all those things 
authentically enough to truly belong. There is always a jury, and it’s always 
still out. (para. 13)
Added to this, conservative discourse on social media has experienced many 
structural changes since the late 1990s, the most important being its global organizing 
and reach. Daniels (2009) identifies this as the formation of a “translocal white 
identity” where whiteness is privileged over national origin as a point of connection 
(p. 68). This is paired with more anarchistic organizational structures that are no 
longer one-way or top-down in terms of communication as was the case in the pre-
digital era. The sheer reach of social media via its sharing features has transformed 
disinformation into a major weapon, turning “the right-wing media system into 
an internally coherent, relatively insulated knowledge community, reinforcing the 
shared worldview of readers and shielding them from journalism that challenges it” 
(Benkler et al., 2017, para. 4). Here, outright lies are not even needed, just enough of 
an insertion of doubt and let sharing accomplish the rest.
The irony is that underneath the innovative, subversive trappings of hacker culture 
and trolling, the philosophy underlying all right-wing movements on the Internet 
is profoundly traditionalist and retrograde (Nagel, 2017; Penny, 2017b). Discourse 
surrounding feminism and its contribution to the decline of the West is a common sight 
in comments, blogs, and websites. As Burton (2018a) notes, the Internet provides a 
powerful forum for cultivating right-wing political beliefs, first by promoting the 
mythic, where “the world has an inherently meaningful and exciting structure” 
(para. 20). This is then paired with participation and the immediacy of response, 
which represents the power of “belonging to a cohesive group with the thrill of 
cultural transgression” (para. 23). This combination of rigidity and transgression 
is highly alluring, making things like racism, sexism, homophobia and violence 
something refreshing and different when presented in online contexts, where “to be 
a traditionalist is, increasingly, to be countercultural” (para. 21).
While Facebook has formally banned white supremacist and separatist groups from 
its site as of March 27, 2019, and Twitter taking similar measures, this has made barely 
a dent into hostile discourse in cyberspace as a whole. This chapter first outlines the 
philosophy of e-libertarianism, which is foundational to the formation and distribution 
of discourse on the internet, in particular, harassment of women and minorities. Next, 
an overview of the persona of the troll and functions of trolling are presented as a 
major aspect of this discourse, using the countercultural frame. Cyber organizing is 
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then addressed, highlighting some key aspects of right-wing content distribution and 
translocal white identity underlying alliance-building. This culminates in a discussion 
of the misogyny inherent within the online manosphere, consisting of groups such as 
men’s rights activists, new atheists, incels, and pick up artists.
E-LIBERTARIANISM
The ideological foundation of the Internet can best be conceptualized as 
e-libertarianism. A fusion of the tenets of traditional libertarianism with online 
settings, e-libertarianism asserts that the Internet is a self-governing, neutral location 
with equal access to all that should not be interfered with by regulations of any kind. 
This is reflected in Barlow’s (1996) widely distributed acerbic and patronizing white 
male missive, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace where he states that 
the Internet is a different space, apart from society:
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this 
claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don’t exist. 
Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them 
and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This 
governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our 
world is different. (para. 5)
At the same time, e-libertarians aggressively support the notion of the invisible 
hand of the free market, self-interest, and monetizing the Internet, not seeing the 
glaring contradiction between these concepts and their claims that the Internet is 
a naturally evolving, neutral space or that it promotes equality for all. As Daniels 
(2009) explains,
those who share this perspective envision the internet as a sort of unregulated 
marketplace usually only found in economics textbooks…the cyberlibertarian 
view of the internet is one rooted in a particular American geography imbued 
with a frontier ethos, tied to both a free-market analysis of the internet and a 
very recent (mis)reading of the first amendment as an absolute protection of 
all speech. (p. 181)
E-libertarianism asserts four claims that drive its discourse and structures: (1) First 
Amendment Absolutism; (2) the Internet is neutral; (3) the Internet isn’t real, and 
(4) harassment is the price of admission. These claims are interrelated and serve 
to reinforce an overall hands-off ideology that provides the climate for right wing 
populism and fascism online.
First Amendment Absolutism
A key tenet of e-libertarianism is that unrestricted free speech, or First 
Amendment absolutism, is the optimal policy to govern the Internet. Any attempt 
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to regulate speech is viewed as an anti-democratic transgression that is evidence 
of government overreach that always seems to lurk around the corner. Citing 
“slippery slope” logic, proponents of free speech on the Internet assert that if 
something racist is banned or moderated, the floodgates to repression will open 
where an increasing amount of ideas will be banned. It is important to note 
that e-libertarians never invoke the more likely reverse scenario of the slippery 
slope argument: that allowing unrestricted white supremacist or misogynistic 
speech will result in normalization of such speech and an increase in racist/
sexist discourse and violence. For this reason, Daniels (2009) posits that the 
e-libertarian conceptualization of the First Amendment “is an interpretation 
born out of a white racial frame, rooted in colonialism, and stands at odds with 
the wider democratic global community” (p. 162). It is also a concept that is 
hegemonically embedded within cyberculture; you’ll only realize its presence 
when you attempt to challenge aspects of it online.
Free speech as envisioned by e-libertarians is hyper-individualized and devoid 
of social context (Daniels, 2009). This frames all speech as initially equal in value, 
with the “marketplace of ideas” ultimately the decider of which speech is more 
popular. If a white supremacist website that openly advocates violence happens to 
get more views than a scholarly site discussing immigration research, then those 
opposed to such sites need to compete more effectively with their own ideas rather 
than monitoring them. This stance assumes that the Internet is an open space with 
no political or market influences or things like human-designed search algorithms. 
Poland (2016) sees an immediate problem with false equivalency of speech:
By relying on an ethos that insists all conversation is valuable and must be 
treated as an individual discussion and never regarded as part of an overall 
pattern and by accepting that there is an implied burden of proof that women, 
specifically, are required to meet when sharing stories about their own lives, 
cybersexists endeavor to capture and waste women’s time and attention.  
(p. 171)
False equivalency combined with social context also end up creating severe 
disadvantages for members of minority groups, overlooking the deliberate use of the 
Internet as a global means to cultivate white supremacy (Daniels, 2009).
In particular, free speech is used as a way to justify the harassment of women and 
minorities online. If someone challenges misogynistic, homophobic, or racist ideas 
via a social media platform, all e-libertarians have to do is reframe these arguments as 
assaults on free speech rather than a critical interrogation of the status quo (Daniels, 
2009; Poland, 2016). This then places a target on the backs of the original poster who 
will likely be cyber-mobbed or doxed, with personal contact information publicly 
posted. A side benefit to this is that the content of the original post is now hijacked 
in the service of e-libertarianism. It is pretty apparent that when it comes to free 
speech proponents on the Internet, “what they all share is not a general commitment 
to intellectual free exchange but a specific political hostility to “multiculturalism” 
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and all that it entails” (Ferrell, 2018, para. 12). Or, as Penny (2017a) observes about 
Internet speech, “it was about making it OK to say racist, sexist, transphobic, and 
xenophobic things, about tolerating the public expression of those views right up to 
the point where it becomes financially unwise to do so” (para. 9).
Of course, the irony is that First Amendment absolutists fail to grasp the first 
corollary to free speech: if you have the right to speak, then others have the right to 
respond to your speech. As Poland (2016) points out, “sexists assume that free speech 
also includes the ability to be free from criticism or social repercussions” (p. 44). 
At the same time, free speech proponents demand that their perspectives be heard 
and responded to, even if this means women and minorities would have to devote 
hours of their time responding to circular arguments providing evidence that never 
seem to satisfy the e-libertarian looking for a “debate.” The second corollary to free 
speech—that one can opt out of listening to your speech—is therefore conveniently 
ignored. This was evident in right wing cyber-celebrity Ben Shapiro’s demand that 
NY Representative Alexandria Ocascio-Cortez accept $10,000 to debate him, an 
offer she turned down, comparing it to the practice of catcalling where women have 
to respond to the catcaller or they are a “bitch” by default (Foderaro, 2018).
Olson’s (2014) content analysis of child pornography boards on the hosting site 
8chan is an example of free speech fundamentalism taken to an extreme when it 
comes to the hands-off philosophy of site moderators. Noting that the presence 
of photos and videos of underage girls is often defended as “free expression” or 
equivalent to photos that parents take of their children, Olson aims his critique at the 
lack of site moderation in the name of free speech:
The content on these boards persist because while it is often very illegal the 
posters and moderators and owners of 8chan are well aware that resources for 
these cases are limited, and the situation is fraught with legal and jurisdictional 
issues. So long as they remain out of the realm of hardcore pornography they 
can, and do, fly just beyond the effort of federal investigators who spend their 
limited resources pursuing producers or trading groups for more extreme 
material. (para. 32)
Poland (2016) points out that rather than ostracizing child pornographers, other 8chan 
boards defended the site owner, hailed the bravery of the “artistic” photographers for 
pushing the boundaries of art, and accused opponents of suppressing free speech. 
Even though child pornography of the type hosted on 8chan is absolutely illegal, the 
lack of moderation is openly exploited by users to promote violence and misogyny.
More contrite e-libertarians will often agree that some things they see are 
unacceptable, but protest that there is nothing they can do about content because 
there is too much of it to oversee and therefore it is not practical to intervene (Olson, 
2014; Poland, 2016). More dedicated proponents assert that free speech needs to be 
prioritized as the very first thing to protect; those who are victimized by harassing 
speech are secondary concerns. Illing (2017b) points out how similar arguments 
were once used in support of spam—now highly regulated—during the early years 
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of the Internet, where business owners prioritized their right to advertise as they saw 
fit and besides, they claimed, it wasn’t “hurting anyone”:
But there was an obvious problem: It was ruining everything for everyone else. 
You don’t even have to get into this free speech bullshit. Was this platform 
created with the intent that neo-Nazis would harass and ruin people’s lives? If 
not, then you need to fucking do something about it, and that’s ultimately how 
spam got dealt with. This is impeding the intended function of this platform. 
This is taking up space. It is ruining this thing that we’ve built, so we need to 
actually do something about it. Now anti-spam stuff is a $1 billion industry. I 
don’t see how that is not the exact same thing going on here, except way more 
harmful for the people that are on the receiving end of it. (para. 45–46)
The Internet Is Neutral
Closely related to First Amendment absolutism is the notion that the Internet is 
a neutral space with equal access rendering markers of identity irrelevant. This 
is a form of “techno-mysticism” where technology is portrayed as free from 
race, gender, or class (Daniels, 2009). Much of this belief is wrapped up with the 
creation of the Internet, accounts of which have begun to take on the discursive 
structures of legends or myths. In these retellings, the Internet was a vast open 
realm of possibility where freedom ruled…until women and minorities began to 
hijack these spaces:
This was part of a broader trend within male-dominated geeky online subcultures 
whereby women are viewed as a threat to the edginess of the subculture, 
instead seen as a force for bringing the moral and behavioral constraints and 
the inauthenticity of the mainstream platforms into the subcultural realm. 
(Nagel, 2017, p. 112)
West (2017) sees the patronizing terms Social Justice Warrior (SJW) and political 
correctness as manifestations of associating women and minorities with regulatory 
limitations on behavior, in other words, “killing the mood.” Further, these terms 
are meant as a way to diminish the concerns of women and minorities as frivolous 
(Nagel, 2017; Poland, 2016).
This neutrality-protected hostility toward women and minorities within these 
segments of tech and geek cultures has a long history, stretching into the 1970s 
and 1980s. Auerbach (2017) traces the philosophical beliefs of right-wing science 
fiction writers such as Jerry Pournelle, Larry Niven, David Drake, and Janet Morris 
who advocated a vision of techno-futurism combined with nativist beliefs. Many of 
the white characters in their books enact rugged individualism against a backdrop 
of alien invasion. The views of these authors were adopted by Republicans like 
Newt Gingrich, who in the early 80s asserted the need for technology in the service 
of capitalism. Technology was also meant to replace the liberal concept of social 
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services, “leaving only the limits of a free people’s ingenuity, daring, and courage” 
(para. 23). Tor Books, a science fiction publishing house, even published Gingrich’s 
first book, also co-written by Drake and Morris. The intertwining of geek culture 
with conservativism was now solidified.
Neutrality also minimizes the sexist and racist face of the tech industry 
as a whole, because it points to the existing demographic composition of the 
workforce and justifies it by making bogus claims such as women not being 
interested in science or math-related fields. This was the message of “Google 
Bro” James Damore, who asserted in a widely shared manifesto that women 
were biologically less capable of handling stressful jobs like tech work 
(Rothkopf, 2017). The manifesto itself was written in a matter-of-fact scientific-
sounding tone, a common tactic that draws on the neutrality myth. Those who 
understandably reacted negatively to the manifesto were accused of becoming 
too emotional and bringing politics into the issue. Despite this, Google itself 
was forced to acknowledge that only 20% of those currently employed in tech 
jobs were women and the Labor Department reported an extreme level of 
discrimination at the company (para. 7).
As Poland (2016) outlines, rather than emerging naturally, technology has been 
situated “in the domain of cigender white men of a certain class and education level” 
where the “privileges and oppressions that exist necessarily shaped the outcome” (p. 
205). For example, in the early days of computer development and programming, 
women and minorities played a more significant role, because it was less expensive 
to hire them. Only when profit increased did we start to see an association between 
tech work and men, particularly in the US. These associations have remained, with 
survey studies showing men being linked to concepts of “science” and “work” with 
women to “family” and “arts” (Jotanovic, 2018). Rothkopf (2017) connects the 
dismissive attitudes of Google Bro and elements of geek culture to a larger problem 
of misogyny:
No problem has caused more damage to more people in the course of human 
history than the subjugation of women, who make up about half of the world’s 
population. From the millions of girls and women who still die yearly because 
they are seen as unworthy of equal medical care as males, to millions who lead 
less-fulfilling lives because they are denied opportunities by male-dominated 
societies, the suffering involved is not open to debate. (para. 5)
Neutrality provides a way to minimize misogyny by “degendering the problem 
and gendering the blame” as the status quo is upheld while women are simultaneously 
targeted as the cause of problems online (Poland, 2016, p. 52). At the same time that 
women and minorities are portrayed as “invading” or “taking up too much space” 
online, it is men, with few exceptions (and usually those are carefully monitored 
spaces), who occupy the bulk of online commenting and content creation. Women 
who seek to interact online have to continually grapple with being reduced to sexual 
terms in a supposedly “neutral” online world:
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Of course, it’s gendered. It’s sexualizing me for the purpose of making me 
uncomfortable, of reminding my audience and colleagues and detractors 
that I’m a sex thing first and a human being thing second. That my ideas are 
secondary to my body. (West, 2016, p. 117)
Ultimately, neutrality is another e-libertarian fiction because rather than being a 
choice, oppression is directly tied to group membership. As Richards (2017) explains, 
“most of the time individuals have no choice as to which groups they belong to, and 
have no agency to leave” (para. 13). Further, it is clear that “social structures are not 
built on individual experiences” but are sustained collectively, with some having far 
more capacity to function freely than others (para. 13). The claim that the Internet 
is just responding to what the public wants overlooks how the tech industry itself 
has influenced discourse and regulatory structures. It also gives social media sites 
“credible deniability” that it isn’t responsible for the content, just the algorithms 
(Siegel, 2017). Further, we cannot overlook that people don’t search the Internet in 
order to correct flawed information; “rather, they ask the electronic oracle to confirm 
them in their ignorance” (T. Nichols, 2017, p. 112). Neutrality, therefore, needs to 
be actively confronted. If the tech industry is indeed innovative like is claimed, “it 
needs to start creating for the world that is” (Jotanovic, 2018, p. 33).
The Internet Isn’t Real
Paired with the neutrality of the Internet is the assumption that things said or done 
online do not carry the same repercussions as done in person. However, the worlds 
of online and face to face spaces have been blurred for some time, especially 
when it comes to racist and violent actions such as the New Zealand mosque 
shooting and accompanying YouTube live manifesto that originated on 8chan. 
It is increasingly common to see news stories of people being fired or resigning 
for racist or sexist Facebook or Twitter posts and states have begun to enact laws 
covering cyberharassment and other crimes. Yet the idea persists that online events 
are somehow less threatening or serious and that such legal actions are overblown:
The argument that the Internet is not real and therefore cannot be harmful 
is deeply rooted in the mindset attributed to the years of the early Internet, 
when there was an assumption of unfettered freedom to do or say anything, 
because there weren’t many people around to hear it. The audience was mostly 
composed of other white men (or people presumed to be other white men) who 
were more likely to cosign stereotypes than challenge them. (Poland, 2016, p. 
90)
Indeed, this is supported by Barlow’s (n.d.) manifesto declaration that, “legal 
concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to 
us. They are based on matter, and there is no matter here” (para. 9).
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Asserting the “less real” status of the Internet serves several purposes. A key one 
is that it provides an important out for those who make harmful statements, either 
by people dismissing these actions as “trolling,” or by shielding the racist or sexist 
poster from criticism (Poland, 2016). They can simply claim that “it wasn’t them,” 
just some joke they posted online that they didn’t mean. This rationale is enabled 
by the feature of anonymity, which is “used as a shield between an individual’s 
real beliefs and their real identity” (p. 23). K. Burns (2017) notes the practice of 
response YouTube videos that are created to suppress feminist perspectives online. 
These videos often feature threats, doxing, and violent language but the creators of 
the videos “claim that their content does not itself constitute harassment” (para. 10). 
At the same time, the video creators, adhering to an e-libertarian ethos, do nothing 
about the escalating violence in the video’s comments left by viewers. Usually they 
claim their free speech rights are of primary importance.
Contrary to the idea that harassment is less real when conducted on the Internet, it 
can often be more threatening because the victim has less of a chance of discovering 
the identity of the stalkers and confronting them (Poland, 2016). These harassers 
also benefit from the convenience of social media platforms and their instant 
sharing features under anonymous cover to create cyber-mobbing situations and to 
extend the harassment in terms of length of time and audience reach. Combined 
with the reluctance and resistance of site owners to moderate content, online 
harassment becomes an entrenched practice meant to suppress the voices critical of 
racism, sexism and homophobia. West (2016) recounts her experiences with online 
harassment, illustrating that far from being less real, it encompasses the physical:
Flooding in through every possible channel, it moves and changes my body. It 
puts me on the phone with the FBI, it gives me tension headaches and anxiety 
attacks; it alters my day-to-day behavior (Am I safe? Is that guy staring at me? 
Is he a troll?); it alienates my friends; it steals time from my family. The goal 
is to traumatize me, erode my mental health, force me to quit my job. (p. 111)
Harassment Is the Price of Admission
Even when, in the face of overwhelming evidence of online harassment, e-libertarians 
reluctantly acknowledge that such practices do exist, they usually move to their final 
line of defense: that such harassment is the price we have to pay in order to have 
a free society. This argument is stunningly similar to ones used to justify access to 
military grade firearms in the US and makes it clear that the freedom is considered 
of more worth than the victims. Put bluntly, the freedom of white men to have their 
idealized Internet must be subsidized at all costs by women and minorities:
Through cybersexist harassment, men attempt to recreate the offline 
conversational patterns they already dominate, enabling them to continue 
controlling online spaces as well. Sexist harassment is intended to intimidate 
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women, silence their voices, or force them to conform to men’s chosen 
conversational norms for a specific space. (Poland, 2016, p. 99)
The belief that women and minorities must tolerate abuse and harassment is 
baked into the e-libertarian ethos. When confronting this attitude, West (2016) 
found that, “the best they could give me was a sympathetic brow-knit and a shrug. 
The Internet’s a cesspool. That’s just the Internet. We all get rude comments. Can’t 
make an Internet without getting a little Internet on your Internet” (p. 113). Women 
and minorities are continually lectured by e-libertarian males that the Internet is 
a public forum, its privatization and monetization are conveniently overlooked. In 
some cases, harassers and those who enable them attempt to point out how those in 
the US have nothing to complain about compared to citizens of other countries who 
experience “real” abuse (Poland, 2016). In actuality, those least likely to be harassed 
are the very ones getting to set the parameters for what is or is not an acceptable 
response.
Mostly in reaction to the increased unapologetic presence of women and 
minorities in online settings, harassment is a form of backlash so pervasive as to 
approach the ordinary. This is especially the case within the gaming community, as 
Illing (2017b) recounts:
Back when I was a teenager running around in game circles, this was the first 
thing. If anybody found out you were a girl, they’d be like, “Tits or get the fuck 
out.” That was the joke. You had to show your tits or get out. There’s always 
been this “you don’t belong here” attitude. The same thing happens for a lot of 
people who are Jewish or people who are not white. That stuff’s been going on 
for a long time. (para. 30)
Those who track online harassment have found that close to 75% of people reporting 
abusive situations were women, with 50% of them having no prior association with 
their harassers (Poland, 2016, p. 93). Nearly three fourths of adults on the Internet 
have witnessed harassment with 40% having it happen to themselves—a majority of 
those belonging to marginalized groups (K. Burns, 2017, para. 2).
Online harassment takes several forms, ranging in intensity from unsolicited 
mocking comments and trolling to threatening speech, cyber-mobbing and stalking. 
Typically, most interactions with online misogynists “involve an assessment of 
women’s physical appeal according to narrow standards” along with “displays 
of power and dominance in traditionally patriarchal ways” (Poland, 2016, p. 41). 
This continues to escalate, as other posters are quickly rallied in large numbers to 
harass the target (Nagel, 2017). Within moderated spaces, the ones who get removed 
tend to be because of posting spam or unrelated content, not for calling women 
and minorities snowflakes, children, social justice warriors or slurs related to their 
identity group (Szoldra, 2016).
In the Gamergate harassment campaign, women in the tech industry and those 
who supported them had their addresses publicly posted, fake pornographic photos 
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of them distributed, were threatened with rape or death, or the police sent to their 
house on a false report (Hatewatch Staff, 2018; Illing, 2017b). These tactics were 
first practiced by 4chan users targeting black women via stereotypes about the black 
family, with the #EndFathersDay hashtag (Poland, 2016). The origins of Gamergate 
itself was a personal vendetta against a game designer by her ex-boyfriend:
It picked up steam when someone floated a rumor that I had slept with somebody 
for positive reviews of my game, even though the person in question had never 
reviewed my game and worked for a site that I had already written for and I 
would have needed a time machine to make this possible, but none of that ever 
really seemed to matter. It didn’t matter that the review never existed. People 
ran with it and used it as a convenient smoke screen to say that they cared 
about ethics in games journalism. (Illing, 2017b, para. 12–13)
This illustrates that when called out on their harassing behavior, men will then 
revert to the classic tactic of portraying themselves as victims, usually within the 
framework of being a brave martyr in the cause of free speech, or turning an issue 
of misogyny into “ethics in journalism” (McEwan, 2017a). Or, they will accuse 
feminists who respond to their harassment of also posting angry content, attempting 
to create a false equivalency between the two acts (Penny, 2017b).
Several factors serve to perpetuate online harassment within an e-libertarian 
ethos. The first is the sheer accessibility of the Internet and social media sites with 
very low entry checkpoints. This means that even if a harasser is blocked, they can 
easily register under a new account and name (Poland, 2016). Second is the ability 
of social media sites to work off of tacit approval from the public at large concerning 
stereotypes, more recently aimed at immigrants and Muslims (Daniels, 2009; Poland, 
2016). Because these groups are already marginalized in the mainstream media, 
online abuse is viewed as partly justified. A third factor is the “cyberhate divide” 
in the US where white supremacist and other hate groups are able to post abusive 
content compared to other nations that have stricter hate speech laws (Daniels, 2009, 
p. 176). Abusers realize that harassment will be tolerated and overlooked within 
US hosted sites. All of this creates a climate where “misogyny is explicitly, visibly 
incentivized and rewarded. You can watch it self-perpetuate in front of your eyes” 
(West, 2016, p. 210).
Even though there has been an increase in awareness of online harassment 
and legal measures enacted, traditional responses to online harassment have been 
ineffective. This is due to the e-libertarian preference for steering solutions toward 
keyword-based filtering software which is both inefficient and runs the risk of 
blocking legitimate sites while leaving cloaked websites unaffected (Daniels, 2009). 
Individual attempts to block harassers might initially help, but not for long, as Poland 
(2016) provides in her example of the inadequacy of Twitter’s block system:
While going directly to their profile page will inform individuals if they have 
been blocked, searching for their target’s tweets by username or clicking 
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on responses from other users who are not blocked both enable harassers to 
continue seeing and interacting with tweets from someone who has blocked 
them. A link to a tweet posted by another user also allows someone who 
has been blocked to see the content and even provides the option to retweet, 
favorite, or reply to that tweet, although retweeting and favoriting will bring 
a pop-up notice that the action cannot be completed…blocking someone on 
Twitter does not prevent them from continuing to tweet at a target—it just 
prevents the target from seeing it. (pp. 166–167)
Another ineffective measure is to classify all online harassment as cyberbullying, 
which diminishes the centrality of gender or race in the majority of instances (Poland, 
2016). Cyberbullying makes harassment about the pathology of the individual rather 
than larger societal issues of racism, misogyny, and homophobia. The common 
mantra of “don’t feed the trolls” also fails to work in the cases where harassers simply 
escalate their attacks when they perceive that they are not being acknowledged to 
their liking. When victims of cyber-harassment talk about their experiences, they 
are often questioned about not going to the police; again, the neutrality-based 
assumption is that the justice system treats everyone the same. When harassment 
goes unreported (mostly due to the sheer unresponsiveness or extreme burdens of 
proof required by the legal system), this only confirms to harassers that what they 
are doing is not wrong (Poland, 2016).
In one instance, a man who assumed that his female friends’ accounts of online 
harassment were exaggerated decided to pose as a woman on a dating app. He lasted 
just over two hours:
Guys would become hostile when I told them I wasn’t interested in sex, or 
guys that had started normal and nice quickly turned the conversation into 
something explicitly sexual in nature. Seemingly nice dudes in quite esteemed 
careers asking to hook up in 24 hours and sending them naked pics of myself 
despite multiple times telling them that I didn’t want to. (Rose, 2014, para. 8)
The fact that the man had to experience online harassment for himself in order to 
acknowledge that such abuse occurs regularly rather than trusting the accounts of 
thousands of women is telling in and of itself. He had to see for himself what other 
women have always known: that “the expectation that women online should be 
present only to serve as fodder for heterosexual male fantasies is common” and that 
sexual objectification is a form of silencing women (Poland, 2016, p. 39).
Ultimately, it is unrealistic to expect women and minorities to “get off the 
Internet” if they can’t handle harassment. Setting aside the human rights violations 
of harassment and cordoning off space for exclusive white male use, the notion 
of “like it or leave it” denies the integrated online and offline spaces that we now 
occupy. Women and minorities depend on social media for their academic work, 
business presence, networking, communication with family and friends, and yes, 
sheer entertainment (Poland, 2016). The “solution” of leaving also assumes that 
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harassment will cease once the victim logs off, which is not the case. Abuse can 
easily continue on social media, blogs, videos, and websites as many have testified 
(Illing, 2017b; Nagel, 2017; West, 2016). What needs to happen is an absolute 
militant repudiation of the assumption that white men are entitled to harass women 
and minorities and that the Internet is by default a patriarchal, racist space that 
requires abuse as a condition of entry.
FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TROLLING
A major component of right-wing online interaction involves the cultivation of the 
persona of the troll. Trolling itself is a complex social activity that is profoundly 
underestimated and as a result, the practice has pretty much forced itself upon all but 
the most tightly moderated online spaces. For the purposes of this chapter, trolling 
refers to a set of retrograde discursive practices embedded in a specific philosophy 
of disruption for its own sake and often with the aim to halt meaningful discourse, 
particularly among women and minorities:
By giving women more opportunities to speak, to participate in the public 
conversation with lower barriers to entry, the Internet also provided more 
opportunity for people to insert themselves as arbiters, contrarians, devil’s 
advocates, disruptors, and silencers…the movement against smart women 
is largely led by (primarily although not exclusively) white men whose 
interactions with us are not evidently abusive, but are insistently disrespectful, 
condescending, patronizing, and hallmarked by pervasive wrongness about 
basic facts. (McEwan, 2017a, para. 10–11)
Certainly not all trolling is designed to be political, as is commonly seen with 
random, snarky, unrelated comments that appear in otherwise innocuous discussions 
of movies or TV shows. The trolling discussed here is overtly political, done in bad 
faith, and reflects authoritarian populist and fascist ideologies.
One problem preventing the effective confronting of trolling is the persistent 
stereotype of trolls as exclusively basement-dwelling thirteen-year-olds—an easy 
assumption to make based on the intellectual content level of garden variety troll 
commentary. Trolling has also become a ubiquitous term used to apply to any type 
of disruptive practice which diminishes its impact on women and minorities (Poland, 
2016). In the studies done of those who adopt a trolling persona, it turns out very few 
are directly linked to traditional conservative organizations, preferring more loosely 
organized anarchic structures (Daniels, 2009; Poland, 2019; Roose, 2019). Instead 
of focusing on issues like taxes or trade, trolls tend to comment on free speech 
and anti-feminism, which are often gateway topics into white supremacy. In one 
interview study, a participant expressed feeling like he was in an exclusive club after 
discovering conservative YouTube videos that embraced a trolling aesthetic: “When 
I found this stuff, I felt like I was chasing uncomfortable truths…I felt like it was 
giving me power and respect and authority” (Roose, 2019, para. 36).
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Cheng’s (2017) content analysis of CNN site comments found that 25% of posts 
that are flagged for abusive language are posted by those who have no prior record 
of such. This indicates that such disruptive posts are made by regular users, not just 
those outside societal norms as is often thought. Additionally, “a user’s propensity to 
troll rises and falls in parallel with known population level mood shifts throughout 
the day…suggesting that negative mood from bad events linger” (p. 1). Much of 
this is dependent on the number of posts about a topic and how those are ordered. 
Negative mood can also spread to others, increasing the likelihood that someone can 
adopt a trolling persona, even if they hadn’t done so in the past. Trolling can also 
occur across all age demographics, so it is common to have 40–60-year-old men 
leaving disruptive comments. Of course, the biggest troll of all is Trump, “asocial 
and apparently devoid of empathy, unable to grasp or articulate much beyond a 
sound-bite or Twitter blast, with attacks and invective his distinctive mode of social 
interaction” (Kellner, 2017, p. xvi).
This section first addresses the inversion of countercultural philosophy behind 
trolling, which flourishes in an e-libertarian environment. Next, an examination 
of the tactics used by trolls illustrates the varied means at their disposal to derail 
meaningful interaction. Finally, a brief overview of the larger functions that trolling 
serves connects this practice to the larger efforts by authoritarian populists and 
fascists to erode pluralism, democracy and activism.
Philosophy
An outgrowth of the e-libertarianism which sustains it, trolling encompasses a 
philosophical worldview that is best described as countercultural inversion: the 
taking of what are essentially conservative ideas and transforming those into cutting-
edge acts of rebellion and transgression (Marantz, 2017; Nagel, 2017; Penny, 
2017b). This is done using the tenets of disruption for its own sake; discursive, 
dehumanizing, winner-take-all modes of communication; and use of humor in bad 
faith to keep one’s self at arm’s length from accountability. Essentially, trolling takes 
the anarchic ideology of the alt-right as a whole and enacts it through a specific 
aesthetic performance:
The idea of the inherent value of aesthetic qualities that have dominated 
in Western pop culture since the 60s, like transgression, subversion and 
counterculture, have turned out to be the defining features of an online far 
right that finds itself full of old bigotries of the far right but liberated from any 
Christian moral constraints by its Nietzschean anti-moralism. It feels full of 
righteous contempt for anything mainstream, conformist, basic. (Nagel, 2017, 
pp. 115–116)
Essentially, the alt-right has carried forward this “allure of the transgressive” aspect 
of media culture and adapted it for its own use because they have witnessed the 
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success of the social movements of the 1960s as compared to less-inspiring attempts 
to implement traditional values (Penny, 2017b).
Countercultural inversion requires maintaining a constant tension between what 
are essentially repackaged repressive concepts and unrestrained secular society 
(Nagel, 2017). This juxtaposition has a long history, including libertarianism’s ability 
to provide an outlet for rebellion for white, conservative middle-class teenagers who 
“get to argue with their peers about social justice while rebelling against their parents 
by advocating cannabis legislation” (Gulliver-Needham, 2019, para. 10). As Burton 
(2018a) points out, rebellious traditionalists have always figured prominently in 
right-wing groups. An example of countercultural inversion is Jordan Peterson, who 
presents his 19th century worldviews packaged as daring, cutting-edge beliefs. He 
also utilizes the trope of the brave truth-teller who goes against the norm, all in the 
hopes of “owning the libs” and keeping feminists in line. As Burton (2018a) notes, 
“to follow Peterson is thus to be able to participate in the thrill of being transgressive 
without, well, having to do anything particularly transgressive” (para. 43).
Trolling also reflects the insistent need to be perceived as anti-establishment as 
possible, constantly upping the ante, but still within the boundaries of upholding 
right-wing ideology. Combined with this ideology is the absolute insistence on no 
restrictions, any challenge to such risks being labeled as “anti-fun” (Penny, 2011). 
As Nagle (2017a) explains,
It is a career disaster now to signal your left-behind cluelessness as a basic 
bitch, a normie, or a member of the corrupt media mainstream in any way. 
Instead, we see online the emergence of a new kind of anti-establishment 
sensibility expressing itself in the kind of DIY culture of memes and user-
generated content that cyberutopian true believers have evangelized about 
for many years but had not imagined taking on this particular political form.  
(pp. 2–3)
It doesn’t matter how absurd this content becomes, because ultimately trolls are 
about amusing themselves, or as Sartre (1976) says concerning anti-Semites, “they 
have the right to play” and you don’t (p. 13). Discourse is fodder for their aim to 
“discredit the seriousness of their interlocutors” and to “intimidate and disconcert” 
(p. 13).
Trolling is a deindividuated blood sport where the goal is absolute domination of 
online discourse in the absence of self-reflection (Marantz, 2017; Poland, 2016). In 
order to sustain a winner-take-all discourse, trolls have to dehumanize their targets 
and, in some cases, each other. Discursive tactics include insults, continual pointing 
out of flaws, gaslighting, or pretending to not understand what could possibly be 
offensive about what they are saying. Escalation and endurance are the characteristics 
of winners (Poland, 2016). In describing the posting style of their white supremacist 
son, Mike Enoch’s parents noted, “he strikes me as someone without a core, who 
only knows how to oppose and who chooses his positions based on what will be 
most upsetting to people around him” (Marantz, 2017, para. 24). Yet it isn’t enough 
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to utilize abusive language or humor in bad faith; trolls have to place their own 
intentions and subjectivity above all else, asserting that “they should get to dictate 
not only the content of their statements, but the emotional reactions those statements 
get” (Poland, 2016, p. 31). At no time to victims have the right to the validity of their 
own experiences or interpretations unless they mirror the troll’s.
For trolls, imperviousness is the starting point, not acting on the strength of one’s 
positions—everything begins from the choice to remain unmovable (Sartre, 1976). 
At the same time that trolls practice discursive dominance by cultivating the persona 
of a rugged yet carefree beacon of truth, they tend to launch into a massive campaign 
of outrage if they perceive that they have been insulted or treated unfairly. A double-
standard of discourse becomes readily apparent:
A fundamental tenet of far-right pro-trolling is that it’s only other people’s 
feelings that are frivolous. Their own feelings, by contrast, including the 
capacity to feel shame when they’re held accountable for their actions, are so 
momentous that infringing them is tantamount to censure, practically fascism 
in and of itself. (Penny, 2017a, para. 32)
It becomes clear, then, that the freedom to harass and abuse others in an online 
setting without consequence is the real goal, not simply seeking attention as is 
naively assumed (Poland, 2016). Nagel (2017) sees this as consistent with de Sade’s 
dominance-centered transgressive beliefs; also similar to how the Nazis adopted 
Nietzsche “to excuse and rationalize an utter dehumanization of women and ethnic 
minorities” only now this is happening in online settings (p. 38).
Tactics
Trolls utilize several discursive tactics in order to enact their philosophical beliefs, 
which culminates in derailing a discussion. Derailment itself is an elaborate style of 
interrupting by inserting one’s self into an online conversation and then assuming 
the role of arbiter of what is or isn’t an acceptable level of relevance, emotion, or 
evidence. Trolls do this in order to move the conversation to patriarchal topics and 
interaction patterns they are more comfortable with, “to challenge the participants’ 
understanding of their own conversation” while trying to “refocus women’s attention 
on another topic or even on the derailer himself” (Poland, 2016, p. 36). One thing all 
of these tactics have in common is the basic tenet that they are entitled to the time 
and energy of women and minorities, ignoring the free association component of 
free speech. The conversational strategies used by women have no effect on reducing 
trolling, with verbal harassment often continuing despite their attempts to adapt.
Mansplaining and whitesplaining are framing tactics trolls use to present 
themselves as more of an expert on being a woman or a minority than those who 
actually occupy those identities (Poland, 2016). This serves to reinforce a “not all 
men” or “not all white people” form of derailment, along with situating minorities 
and women as too “biased” to have an objective view of issues related to their 
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identity. As with other trolling tactics, there is a certain predictive quality they give 
to online interactions—you can see it coming:
When women discuss the specific, gendered forms of harassment and abuse 
often experienced in online spaces, we can safely assume that a straight white 
man will appear within a matter of minutes to remind us that everyone gets 
harassed online and that we’re just being overly dramatic about it. (p. 68)
Contrarianism is a way of engaging combatively with an audience so they become 
bogged down replying to one’s devil’s advocate style responses. At the same time, 
well-meaning replies back will never meet the satisfaction of those using contrarian 
tactics, which are deliberately designed to divert feminists and anti-racists. Circular 
logic is a crucial aspect of contrarian discourse:
When Muslims try to resist oppression using legal means, Islamophobes 
claim this is “lawfare”—an attempt to subvert the judicial system. When 
Islamophobes are called out for their bigotry, they claim that the left, which 
they paint as “in” on the conspiracy, uses “political correctness” to silence 
them. (Sunshine, 2017, para. 8)
Some trolls elect to maintain a detached, smug style of interacting, usually paired 
with academic sounding racist, sexist, or homophobic statements (Marantz, 2017). 
The idea behind this tactic is to remain calm, letting the victims of such statements 
become “triggered” so they can be declared too sensitive or emotional. Then the next 
tactic of tone policing can be unleashed, asserting that one’s point is immediately 
rendered invalid if they cannot remain calm and scientific (Poland, 2016). A related 
approach involves gaslighting, where trolls will assert that what they just said was 
a joke or simple irony (Marantz, 2017). This serves to create a disorienting effect, 
where minorities and women might start to question the veracity of their own 
experiences in an attempt to be open-minded.
In some cases, trolls turn on each other, which isn’t surprising considering the 
climate of sniping and backbiting they create. This can be likened to Theweleit’s 
(2010b) description of the Nazi criminals at Nuremburg when they were seized with 
the sudden need to chat up journalists, attempting to throw each other under the bus:
Each depicts the rest (himself excepted) as a collection of reprobates whom 
he would gladly have restrained had he been able (which he regrettably was 
not)…it became standard procedure for the accused voluntarily to express 
their distance from other Nazis, fellow defendants included; at the same time, 
almost all of them held fast to what they called the “idea” of Nazism. In so 
doing, they re-established their own sense of coherence; while others could be 
presented as deranged and incompetent, they themselves could be seen to have 
remained good Nazis. (p. 340)
The most prominent example of troll backbiting includes Milo Yiannopoulos, who 
was ousted from the Conservative Political Action Conference after his comments 
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about pedophilia. Not long after, he lashed out at fans and other right-wing figures 
for their lack of support (Link, 2018). When white-nationalist Mike Enoch was outed 
by anti-fascist activists as having a Jewish wife, commenters immediately attacked 
him by insisting he get a divorce or making statements like “I can’t believe all you 
fags still support this Jew fucker” (Marantz, 2017, para. 8).
Of course, when the more elaborate troll tactics fail to make a dent, the reliable 
standbys of misogyny and racism will always do. These include the interconnected 
strategies of shaming, intimidating and discrediting; invoking identity markers to 
undermine one’s contributions to a discussion and slurs and insults about one’s 
appearance—for women, usually the words “fat,” “bitch” or “slut” (Sobieraj, 2017). 
When trolls find themselves having to admit defeat, one of two things will happen 
so they can swiftly exit stage right: 1) a grudging acknowledgment paired with a 
dismissal of importance of the topic they just spent hours debating or 2) declaring 
that their opinions are just as valid as facts, often paired with a sexist or racist slur 
(McEwan, 2017a; Sartre, 1976). A troll will usually insist that it is then time to 
“move on” to other, more pressing matters, as if they are the final arbiter of a topic’s 
overall significance, in a conversation they were not asked to be a part of in the first 
place.
Functions
Trolling serves several key functions for right wing populist and fascist movements, 
not the least of which is convincing people that being present online isn’t worth 
it. Technological platforms operated by those with an e-libertarian ethos already 
enable harassment to flourish. The more that people leave sites because they become 
frustrated with the constant distraction and harassment of trolls means that right-
wing perspectives get the most hearing and the illusion of support. As Poland (2016) 
notes,
writers avoid engaging in discussion in the comments on their own pieces 
because the immediate and overwhelming toxicity has a tendency to render 
such conversation pointless and unpleasant, especially on topics to things like 
gender or race, or even certain areas of science. (pp. 183–184)
Further, the advice to not feed the trolls is highly naïve because it assumes that 
trolling is an aberration rather than an integral aspect of online aesthetic performance 
and organizing on the right. This advice also reinforces the message that women and 
minorities’ experiences should not be acknowledged while the problem gets pushed 
under the rug.
Another function of trolling is to normalize racism, sexism, and homophobia under 
the guise of irony, humor, and deadpan “it’s just the facts” discourse. Carter (2018) 
and Ferrell (2018) note how classical liberalism plays a similar role for those who 
want to “dress up” their racism to make it appear more respectable and academic. 
Such websites and celebrities like Jordan Petersen “are good at presenting racism in 
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a ‘we’re just being reasonable/this is what the science says, why are you acting so 
upset?’ type of way” (Hatewatch Staff, 2018, para. 22). Proud Boys founder Gavin 
McInnes commonly employs the “just joking” rhetorical out, claiming that those 
offended either don’t have a sense of humor or are attempting to impose censorship. 
Of course, these “jokes” contain racist, sexist, homophobic, ableist, and other 
aggressive discourse:
By constantly reinforcing stereotypes, he sends the subliminal message that 
there are fundamental things that are different and essential about each of these 
groups—and that the best group, and the one most in danger, is none other than 
white men. (Coutts, 2017, para. 52)
Finally, trolling is used as a means of destabilizing democracy by recruiting 
online participants to far-right ideologies, as will be explored further under the 
Cyber Organizing section of this chapter. As Hatewatch (2018) explains,
many of those who were eventually radicalized by 4chan came there relatively 
innocently. One user said memes led them to 4chan in the mid-2000s, but they 
eventually found their way to overtly racist/pol/after Obama was elected for 
a second term. Others noted they “ironically” looked at/pol/, or they were led 
there by the more absurdist “random” board,/b/. One wrote that their friend, 
who they specified was not right-wing, told them to “surf/pol/for fun.” “Humor 
is a powerful drug,” explained a poster who came for the political discussions 
but “stayed for the racist memes. (para. 34)
Trump himself regularly utilizes Twitter as a way of subverting the values of 
dialogue, deliberation, and notions of compromise and consensus (Kellner, 2017).
Ultimately, as Farrell (2018) points out, “dark web intellectuals, like Donald 
Trump supporters and the online alt-right, have experienced a sharp decline in their 
relative status over time” which is contributing to the escalation of their rhetoric in 
the face of growing diversity on the Internet (para. 5). Right-wing satire and trolling 
also fail in comparison to pointed leftist humor because it “punches down” on those 
most vulnerable rather than critiquing power. Satire also requires a sense of the 
absurd for it to work, and it is often too hard to distinguish between satire and directly 
stated right-wing views (Nagel, 2017). Despite these vulnerabilities, it is extremely 
important to maintain a vigilance about trolling. While the “standard online shtick 
for politically serious members of the alt-right has been to flirt with Nazism but then 
to laugh at anyone who took these gestures at face value,” the culmination of such 
tactics resulted in the murder of Heather Heyer during the Charlottesville alt-right 
demonstration (Nagel, 2017).
CYBER ORGANIZING
Coined by white nationalist Richard Spencer, the term alt-right—short for alternative 
right—refers to a loosely composed rightist movement of those opposed to what 
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they consider to be mainstream conservatives, in addition to liberals and leftists (Alt 
Right: A Primer, 2019; Sedillo, 2017). The term came into common parlance within 
the mass media during the 2016 election and in the aftermath of the 2017 Unite the 
Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Hatewatch Staff (2018) categorizes the alt 
right as an umbrella “motley movement” representing subcultures and ideologies 
such as libertarians, long-term white supremacist groups, the alt lite (a milder version 
of the alt right), atheist/skeptics, men’s rights activists and conspiracy theorists, with 
a few mainstream conservatives thrown in for opportunistic reasons. It is important 
to note that the term alt-left is also a creation of the alt-right and is an attempt to 
sustain the narrative of false equivalency (Sedillo, 2017).
Though the alt-right is often classified as being diverse, nearly all of its more 
prominent Internet figures are middle-to-upper-middle class white males with college 
degrees who work in professional fields like the tech industry (Wilkinson, 2017). 
However, in some cases, the right wing and racist internet celebrities are themselves 
members of the very groups they target (Bernstein, 2017). Examples include Milo 
Yiannopoulos who is gay and married to a black man, Tomi Lahren, a woman who 
combines white supremacy and anti-feminist rhetoric, and anti-Semite Mike Enoch 
(Michael Peinovich), who is married to a Jewish woman. These contradictions are 
utilized strategically and are marshalled to defeat charges of racism, sexism, or 
homophobia. It also allows a strange positioning where you one can ladder privilege 
by statements like, “I’m gay but I don’t want our borders overrun by Mexicans” or 
“pride festival was great until the trash from the South Side showed up.”
Followers of the alt-right themselves often skew younger, though the movement’s 
popularity is growing among older men who are bridging the divide between the 
aging talk radio audience and younger males on the Internet (Coutts, 2017; Kimmel, 
2017; Penny, 2017a). Coutts (2017) found that within the alt right Proud Boys men’s 
rights group, the profiles that were verified included some with violent criminal 
records, with several having served in the military and police. The age differences 
between the adult alt right celebrities, their mannerisms, and the more youthful 
image of the Internet segment create a situation where the media often treats the alt 
right as underage teenage boys. This is in stark comparison to how black and Latino 
young men are portrayed, as Penny (2017a) points out:
It is vital that we talk about who gets to be treated like a child, and what 
that means. All of the people on Yiannopoulos’ tour are over 18 and legally 
responsible for their actions. They are also young, terribly young, young in a 
way that only privileged young men really get to be young in America, where 
your race, sex, and class determine whether and if you ever get to be a stupid 
kid, or a kid at all. Mike Brown was also 18, the same age as the Yiannopoulos 
posse, when he was killed by police in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014; newspaper 
reports described him as an adult, and insisted that the teenager was “no angel,” 
as if that justified what was done to him. Tamir Rice was just 12 years old 
when he was shot and killed in Cleveland for playing with a toy gun. (para.19)
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This section addresses cyber-organizing among the alt-right by first examining 
the structural features of the Internet and social media which create the climate that 
enables its success. Next, principles of alt-right organizing are presented followed by 
common recruitment gateways to escalating extremist views. Finally, an overview 
of the manosphere serves as a case analysis of the central role of misogyny within 
alt-right online spaces.
Climate
There are numerous structural features of the Internet and social media in interaction 
with key ideologies that create the optimal climate for right-wing organizing. This is 
not just a matter of technology alone:
If technology were the most important driver towards a “post-truth” world, 
we would expect to see symmetric patterns on the left and the right. Instead, 
different internal political dynamics in the right and the left led to different 
patterns in the reception and use of the technology by each wing. While 
Facebook and Twitter certainly enabled right-wing media to circumvent 
the gatekeeping power of traditional media, the pattern was not symmetric. 
(Benkler et al., 2017, para. 8)
Rather than reality following the common narrative of “both sides do it,” the right-
wing has by far been able to more successfully take advantage of social media’s 
design features and for-profit operation. Benkler et al. note that while disinformation 
is nothing new nor the exclusive property of the Right, the fusion of attacks on the 
mainstream media with Trump’s Twitter persona and discourse is distinct.
First and foremost, cyber organizing in the US has been legally facilitated by 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (1996) which does not hold 
Internet service providers liable for most content posted. This has created a situation 
where site hosts simply declare themselves as content middlemen or domain name 
service providers, absolving themselves of responsibility. This, along with the 
Internet being composed of autonomous private networks creates the ideal climate 
for globally mobilizing the far-right in a rapid manner (Bode, 2018; Peterson, 2017). 
For example, Cloudfare is a content delivery network that shields white supremacist 
sites like DailyStormer.com from denial of service attacks (Peterson, 2017). As a 
result of the Internet’s uniquely sheltered conditions, most hate websites are based 
in the US (Daniels, 2009).
Search engines themselves, along with search features within sites like YouTube, 
rather than naturally evolving technologies, are structured around algorithms, which 
can have unintended—or some argue, intended—results:
The YouTube algorithm, which determines what will auto play after one video 
has finished and places recommended videos in the sidebar, also plays a role in 
coaxing viewers into the deeper depths of the alt-right by presenting them with 
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ever more extreme content…YouTube promotes material that tend to keep 
people on their site longer, and those videos often happen to be among the 
more extreme content on the site. (Hatewatch Staff, 2018, para. 51)
K. Burns (2017) explains how the ease of video creation combined with an algorithm 
that prioritizes prolific content, views, and comments fosters the rapid growth of 
alt-right ideas. Essentially, “gaming the very closely held secret of the YouTube 
algorithm became a de facto path to Internet stardom” (para. 14). At the same time, 
students researching topics for a class history project are more likely to see first 
page results of the likes of best-selling author Bill O’Reilly than academics who 
specialize in the period (T. Nichols, 2017).
Interactive features are designed to increase time spent on social media sites, 
which derive their profit from advertising revenue. More extreme content results in 
more interaction in the form of comments and views; as Nimen (2019) puts simply, 
“haters are the most voracious clickers” (para. 17). The Frontline documentary 
series, The Facebook Dilemma (2018) provides an in-depth examination of the 
origins and functions of the social media site. Both parts of the series demonstrate 
how the structural features of Facebook—especially its economic model—enabled 
it to be immediately coopted by global reactionary and far-right interests. The also 
reveals why no significant actions have been taken or are likely to be taken against 
racism, sexism, and homophobia on the site or other profit-dependent social media 
sites in the near future (Burns, K., 2017; Illing, 2017b; Nimen, 2019; Ryan, 2016).
Social media sites like Facebook collect countless data points that users leave 
through their interactions on the site. This feature has been readily exploited 
globally by the alt-right to conduct “media-based psych-ops campaigns,” ranging 
from the 2016 US election to Brexit as well as the earlier cooptation of the Arab 
Spring movement (Facebook Dilemma, 2018; Niman, 2019). The mass-creation of 
fake profiles on Twitter and Facebook, known as sockpuppets (human-created fake 
profiles) and bots (computer-generated fake profiles) have engineered conditions 
where entities like the “unofficial Twitter Group of Tennessee Republicans” have 
ten times the membership as the real Republican Party of Tennessee (Niman, 2019, 
para. 7). Humans then interact with these fake profiles, spreading their content as if 
it were generated by a specific person. One St. Petersburg-created sockpuppet, Jenna 
Abrams, was regularly quoted by the New York Times and The Washington Post 
among other outlets (para. 8).
Botnets then take ideological outsourcing the next level by essentially creating a 
mass following that doesn’t even require the mobilization of large numbers of real 
people:
They can almost instantly propel any tweet or post into mega-virality by 
robotically seeding a seemingly organic viral orgy of reposting—enough 
to trick social media site algorithms into seeing the messages as naturally 
trending, and thus, make them actually trend into millions of news and social 
feeds. (Nimen, 2019, para. 10).
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Nimen provides a particularly disturbing example of ProPublica’s outing of a bot 
that resulted in a replacement bot’s Tweet which instantly mustered a bot army 
numbering 60,000—thus generating more readers than the original ProPublica 
exposé. Only a few social media users are needed to share a story versus networks 
of thousands.
Taking advantage of this, the Breitbart/Yiannopoulos/Mercer connection 
illustrates the big money and interrelated networks of tech industry males who work 
together to manufacture online social movements. Buzzfeed traces these connections 
in a detailed piece (Bernstein, 2017) that uses email chains to show how the alt-
right creates the current Internet culture and climate that is hostile to women and 
minorities:
It was a brilliant audience expansion machine, financed by billionaires, 
designed to draw in people disgusted by some combination of identity politics, 
Muslim and Hispanic immigration, and the idea of Hillary Clinton or Barack 
Obama in the White House. And if expanding that audience meant involving 
white nationalists and neo-Nazis, their participation could always be laundered 
to hide their contributions. (para. 164)
The most disturbing aspect of the alt-right is how its content is regularly spread 
on a global scale by prominent conservative politicians positioning it as legitimate 
news and as inspiration for laws and policies (Bevins, 2018; Bernstein, 2017; 
Coutts, 2017). Trump’s 2016 political team including Steve Bannon, Roger Stone 
and Stephen Miller maintain ties to white supremacist organizations via spreading 
content from sites like Breitbart or groups such as the Proud Boys. As Ryan (2016) 
points out, the Trump team had no need to present original ideas because “they didn’t 
need to confirm or deny anything, they simply gave Trump’s army their megaphone” 
(para. 8).
This also highlights the enabling role of the mainstream media in creating 
the climate for alt-right organizing. Despite doing some investigative pieces on 
the Trump administration, for the most part, the alt-right, using Breitbart and its 
satellite support sites set the agenda leading up to the 2016 election, particularly 
around the issues of immigration and coverage of Hillary Clinton (Benkler et al., 
2017). Likewise, supposedly progressive sites such as Jacobin and journalist Glenn 
Greenwald “exert a powerful reality-distortion field online and foster factionalism 
on the lib-left” (Wolcott, 2017, para. 3). This includes Tulsi Gabbard who met with 
Trump after he was elected, along with Mickey Kraus who was once a progressive 
journalist and now supports Trump’s border wall.
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that alt-right ideas are personally lucrative, or, as 
Malik (2018) notes, “the Dark Web is not a black hole, it is a career ladder” (para. 
16). The fact that many alt-right celebrities are able to make a living out of speaking 
fees, publishing books and online content provides a form of justification of the 
soundness of their ideas when challenged (Penny, 2018). K. Burns (2017) found that 
“there’s a lot of money in anti-feminism,” as in the case of once-progressive Laci 
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Green who achieved more followers once she joined the alt-right (para. 13). Mike 
Enoch, founder of the Right Stuff website, has a link for making donations while 
others offer video subscriptions (Marantz, 2017).
It should be clear by now that with the ease of access and speed of social media, 
the alt-right can no longer be ignored in the hopes that it will lose popularity on its 
own. No longer confined to print media, social media has created the conditions 
where anyone who can log on can immediately find authoritarian populist and fascist 
content, often disguised and promoted by mainstream media outlets as legitimate 
(Nimen, 2019). This has created a virtual community in the form of the alt-right, 
where members (real and bot) can nurture each other’s prejudices, conspiracy 
theories and cement social bonds through
an inverted epistemology…of ignorance, ironically resulting in whites generally 
being unable to understand the world that they themselves have made. The 
epistemology of white supremacy reinforces the white racial frame by allowing 
whites to retreat from pluralistic civic engagement into a whites-only digital 
space where they can question the cultural values of tolerance and racial equality 
unchallenged by anyone outside that frame. (Daniels, 2009, p. 8)
Principles
The primary organizing principle of the alt right is what Daniels (2009) conceptualizes 
as translocal whiteness, “a form of white identity not tied to a specific region or 
nation but reimagined as an identity that transcends geography and is linked via 
a global network” (p. 7). This is reflected in the nearly all-white and mostly male 
membership of the alt-right and comes across in the majority of their discourse 
(Coutts, 2017; Torres, 2017; Wilkinson, 2016). Such discourse is either aggressively 
racist or framed more as topics “up for discussion,” such as the intelligence of Black 
people compared to whites, the eventual forced deportation of non-whites, and the 
feasibility of genocide. Often this discourse is presented in the form of anti-Islamic 
and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (Malik, 2018; Sunshine, 2017). The irony is 
that globalization—something that authoritarian populists and fascists within the 
alt-right oppose, is itself utilized to construct this translocal whiteness, which often 
takes on nationalist characteristics and ideologies.
An example of the ideology of translocal whiteness is encapsulated in the political 
theory of The Dark Enlightenment (or Neoreaction, NRx), which was promulgated 
via an online manifesto in 2012 (Hatewatch Staff, 2018). In taking libertarianism to 
its logical conclusion, “adherents believe that capitalism should be accelerated to 
the point that corporate powers rule society, allowing natural hierarchies to emerge” 
(para. 43). Democracy and egalitarianism are viewed as unnatural interferences that 
are preventing rule by a superior white race. Similar views are advanced by white 
nationalist and science fiction publisher Vox Day, who asserts that “we must secure 
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the existence of white people and a future for white children,” something that can 
only be done by enforcing a white ethno-state (Auerbach, 2017, para. 38).
A second organizing principle of the alt-right is a rejection of traditional top-
down organizational structures such as political parties or activist groups in favor 
of “loosely organized social networks of supporters rather than members” (Daniels, 
2009, p. 49). This is an extension of the e-libertarian and techanarchist ideologies 
outlined earlier where the alt-right fashions themselves as a vanguard movement that 
cannot be easily defined or contained. Much of the energy generated through anger 
is focused on dominating online spaces while setting the agenda for a mainstream 
media bent on “fair coverage.” Ultimately, this creates a dynamic where alt-right 
discourse might be inflammatory, but on-the-ground political activism is minimal, 
especially evident when comparing turnout against the Lefts’ demonstrations (Nagel, 
2017; Poland, 2016). Kimmel (2017) notes how the repressive desublimation among 
the alt right concerning a rejection of dialectical activism benefits those in power as 
it fully enables the status quo to continue.
At the same time as structural political organizing strategies are rejected by the alt 
right, overt authoritarianism is fully celebrated, creating an important contradiction. 
Figures like Putin, Kim Jong Un, and Bolsonaro are regularly highlighted and 
connected to the hopes they place into Trump that he will carry on the tradition of 
male, iron fist rule:
They’re gleeful about some of the harshest policies Trump promised: mass 
deportations, defunding Planned Parenthood, the wall. They feel like they 
have scored a victory against feminism and multiculturalism. They’re glad 
that white men are, once again, in control. They were filled with fury at the 
thought they had been toppled from their rightful place at the top of the social 
hierarchy; this is vindication. The old order has been defeated; this is their 
world now. (Wilkinson, 2016, para.11)
Among the alt-right is a growing sense that past right-wing approaches have 
been too tepid and conventional, requiring more direct policies such as building a 
border wall and detention centers (Auerbach, 2017; Nagel, 2017). This has created 
the climate for actual, on-the-ground white supremacist organizations to make 
their presence known, as in Charlottesville (Nagle, 2017b). Essentially, we are at 
a moment where the Internet “is now the prime organizing arena for white power 
groups” and the core of the conservative ideological energy is happening around the 
alt-right (Kimmel, 2017, p. 238).
This relates to the third organizing principle of the alt-right, which is absolute 
disruption, but of a regressive form. As Auerbach (2017) explains, the enthusiasm 
around Trump is more about his ability to destroy the existing system rather than 
his specific policies or goals: “What Trump does is less important than the fact that 
he kicks over the table, strengthening America’s military state while demolishing 
bureaucracy and ignoring niceties” (para. 31). Utter destruction is prioritized over 
any sort of specific vision for society, which in the absence of leftist resistance, 
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creates a dangerous vacuum for fascism. With tribalism serving as the only form of 
social cohesion, any sort of meaningful solidarity is absent (Torres, 2017).
Related to this is illiberalism, being against anything progressive, and anti-
multiculturalism, with Obama and Hillary Clinton often serving as high-status 
targets (Wolcott, 2017). This was evident in the growth of the alt-right online after 
Gamergate, which represented a backlash against the online visibility of women, 
minorities, and the LGBTQI people. As Illing (2017b) explains, “Gamergate was 
just a big recruitment drive and helped build community, and helped firm up ties 
between younger online groups and older conservatives who didn’t understand how 
to make things go viral” (para. 36). This backlash against multiculturalism also 
provided a common organizing ground between the older talk radio type audiences 
just discovering social media, the online white supremacist groups that had been 
operating a while, and the younger alt-right.
Kimmel (2017) presents different psychological components of victimhood that 
compose the angry white male, which supports the alt-right’s organizing principles 
and discourse. These include ressentiment, or the “personal sense of self that 
is defined always in relationship to some perceived injury” in combination with 
blaming women and minorities who are seen to be the source of injury (p.38). A 
second powerful rallying component of victimhood is aggrieved entitlement, or “the 
sense that we have had what is rightfully ours taken away from us by them,” them 
being the government which favors undeserving minorities (p. 23). Most importantly, 
both of these psychological factors work against developing dialectical, collective 
action against those in power, because they enable manipulation via racism toward 
the wrong targets. This is primarily because right-wing victimhood is itself marker 
of privilege denied.
Gateways
The alt-right uses a gateway form of recruiting that slowly acclimates its followers 
to authoritarian populist and fascist ideologies. Though there are people who directly 
seek out more overt white supremacist content, it is more common for people to 
follow a gradual process in forming alt-right identities. A common online pathway 
to the development of increasingly far-right views is usually one of contrarianism
libertarianism social Darwinism white supremacy:
Respondents recount a transformation that takes place almost entirely online. 
Led either by their own curiosity or an algorithm, the content they consumed 
became increasingly extreme, fostering their radicalization…Their responses 
reveal a pipeline between the alt-lite and racist “alt-right,” with many users 
explaining that alt-lite figures like Gavin McInnes were the first to introduce 
them to hardcore, veteran white nationalists. (Hatewatch Staff, 2018, para. 2)
One of the reasons a more gradual pathway to the alt-right exists is that much of 
the content on more widespread sites tends to traverse the edges of acceptability in 
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order to provide plausible deniability of racism. For example, the common portrayal 
in the media of white supremacists as ignorant, overweight hillbillies totally 
overlooks the more sophisticated and social media savvy proponents, such as early 
digital media adopter David Duke (Daniels, 2009). While Duke’s viewpoints are 
more clearly affiliated with white supremacy, other figures like Breitbart’s former 
employee Yiannopoulos “led the site in a coy dance around the movement’s nastier 
edges, writing stories that minimized the role of neo-Nazis and white nationalists 
while giving politer voices a fair hearing” (Bernstein, 2017, para. 4).
The ability of figures like Yiannopoulos to simultaneously keep racists at an arm’s 
length while cultivating a large audience that includes white nationalists is critical 
for building a following. As Bernstein (2017) notes, the very term “alt-right” serves 
as a distancing strategy, so that proponents can reassure critics that they aren’t Nazis, 
they are just members of the alt-right. This is similar to the strategy of racist sites 
denying they are racist, but insisting they are white nationalists instead. Figures like 
Yiannopoulos even have PR teams that often threaten to sue journalists who use 
white supremacist or racist labels. This delicate dance is essential for smoothing 
over the pathway to the alt-right:
TRS and the Daily Stormer both argue that, with the right optics and messaging, 
they can attract a critical mass of followers to the cause and eventually shift 
what lies within the respectable terms of political debate. The respondents in 
these threads show how the current media landscape—replete with podcasts, 
YouTube channels and blogs that contain tempered bits of white nationalist 
propaganda under the guise of patriotism, “Western chauvinism,” science or 
hard truths—can aid that agenda, coaxing the “normies” down the path to 
white nationalism. (Hatewatch Staff, 2018, para. 11)
Pathways to the alt-right are also facilitated by the presence of more extreme 
groups within supposedly mainstream spaces, or as Steve Bannon notes, “they come 
in through Gamergate or whatever and then get turned onto politics and Trump” 
(Ferrell, 2018, para. 23). The white nationalist and misogynist Proud Boys groups 
regularly feature links and invitations from global neo-Nazi organizations (Coutts, 
2017). Different content types can also mix, as in links to Jared Taylor’s race realism 
talks appearing in satirical 4chan posting boards that focus on politically incorrect 
content (Hatewatch Staff, 2018). It is also important to note that misogyny is ever-
present during this pathway and is folded into online commentary. For example, 
the new atheist movement often posits that religion is associated with the inherent 
irrationality of women (Gulliver-Needham, 2019; Torres, 2017).
While the radicalization of white males is due to a myriad of sociological factors 
that aren’t directly connected to social media, the immediacy of online content such 




YouTube has inadvertently created a dangerous on-ramp to extremism by 
combining two things: a business model that rewards provocative videos with 
exposure and advertising dollars, and an algorithm that guides users down 
personalized paths meant to keep them glued to their screens. (para. 10)
Roose goes on to explain how Google, who owns YouTube, has a vested interest 
in keeping viewers engaged by clicking links. Quoting one design ethicist, “If I’m 
YouTube and I want you to watch more, I’m always going to steer you toward 
Crazytown” (para. 11). The practice of binge-watching videos is often cited by 
those recruited into the alt-right, who look up content based on different interests, 
from students wanting to win arguments against feminists in their classes, to 
mothers concerned about their kids’ teachers being too liberal (Bernstein, 2017). 
The comments section of YouTube also provides a reinforcement of alt-right views, 
creating the sense that there are others who share the same sentiments in large 
numbers.
Humor is often an important draw into right-wing online spaces where trolling 
is rewarded and a celebrity status can often attract more followers. The more that 
humor can be ramped up to approach increasingly forbidden topics, the more that 
participants can push the boundaries of acceptability, with few challenges (Hatewatch 
Staff, 2018). Marantz (2017) cites the Opie and Anthony radio show and their “most 
offensive song contest” (winners included “Baby Raper” and “Stuck in an Oven with 
Jews”) as a major influence on neo-Nazi Mike Enoch. In this context, humor serves 
as a test of one’s endurance—those who do not find the joke funny are the ones who 
need to grow a thicker skin. Hatewatch Staff (2018) found that alt-right members 
pointed to humor as a major draw, such as one who appreciated the YouTube series 
Murdoch Murdoch as “something that doesn’t take itself seriously and then you 
reflect on it all and you realize that funny show you watched is 100% right about 
everything” (para. 63).
In terms of political philosophies, libertarianism increases the likelihood of one 
moving to authoritarian populism and fascism, as Gulliver-Needham (2019) asserts:
Libertarianism is particularly appealing to white middle class men. It seems 
fairly obvious why; this group is perhaps the most privileged in our society, 
and sees little reason for a change in the societal order in place. Similarly, the 
alt-right and all levels of far-right politics hold exactly the same goal…But 
when the advantages start to erode, that’s when they are forced to turn to more 
reactionary, authoritarian ideologies…Time and time again, libertarians have 
shown to be willing to abandon what they would claim as their core principles 
to uphold the societal order, which places them at the top. (para. 5)
Nearly every alt-right celebrity once described themselves as libertarian, including 
Yiannopoulos, Richard Spencer, and Alex Jones (Hatewatch Staff, 2018; Gulliver-
Needham, 2019; Marantz, 2017). Figures like Jim Goad, who started out writing 
contrarian-style essays about “forgotten white trash” soon moved into alt-right 
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circles. Transformations are typically described in the vein of, “vague dissatisfaction, 
and desire for social status and sexual success, to full-blown adherence to a cohesive 
ideology of white supremacy and misogyny” (Wilkinson, 2017, para. 13). Similarly, 
Marantz (2017) recounts the thoughts of one former libertarian: “Now that he 
thought about it, he wasn’t sure why he should assume that all people were equal. 
Maybe they weren’t. If this was a textbook definition of racism, then so be it—
maybe racism was true” (para. 33)
The Manosphere
One of the primary gateways to white supremacist and fascist ideologies is the 
manosphere, an assortment of male-dominated e-locations dedicated to opposing 
feminism (Beauchamp, 2019; Nagel, 2017; Poland, 2016; Romano, 2016). These 
groups include men’s rights activists (MRAs) and fathers’ rights proponents 
(also affiliated with the anti-abortion movement), pick up artists (PUAs) and the 
involuntarily celibate (INCELS) and often these labels are used interchangeably when 
referencing ideologies. In general, INCELs and PUAs tend to be demographically 
younger, with most under age 30 (Beauchamp, 2019, para. 20). In some cases, 
women can ally themselves with the manosphere as a means of building an online or 
even academic following (Poland, 2016).
Though focused on different subsets of patriarchy enforcement and the infighting 
that subsequently occurs around these issues, the groups are united by misogyny:
MRAs have decided that feminists are responsible for the harms they have 
experienced. They have attached their suffering to female advancement and 
empowerment, and as a result it is impossible for a middle ground to be 
reached. Following the MRA narrative, the end of feminism is necessary for 
the end of male suffering. (Richards, 2017, para. 3)
Working in opposition to dialectical feminist analysis, the manosphere remains 
locked a pattern of decontextualized isolated experiences/anecdotes in order to 
prevent structural and contextual understanding. This often results in a gross misuse 
of statistics and demographic information in order to make their points.
The men’s rights movement itself was once affiliated with feminism, where 
proponents asserted that just as patriarchal sex roles limited women’s lives, they also 
harmed men by promoting destructive aspects of macho identity (Beauchamp, 2019; 
Kimmel, 2017; Nagel, 2017). However, as soon as feminists began to move beyond 
gender roles to a more structural critique of the actions of men, such as rape and 
domestic violence, “the men’s libbers departed” (Kimmel, 2017, p. 104). This then 
shifted into the primary talking point of the manosphere: it is women, not men, who 
hold disproportionate power in society. A corollary to this is that “women are getting 
too out of hand” in the arenas of reproductive rights, education, the family, and the 
workplace (Romano, 2016, para. 27). Likewise, nearly every MRA talking point is 
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peppered with nostalgic hostility for a time when women’s actions were centered on 
pleasing men (Beauchamp, 2019; Kimmel, 2017).
The earliest of the manosphere organizations includes the MRA and fathers’ 
rights groups, who got their start offline within the legal system, particularly divorce. 
Kimmel’s (2017) interviews with members of these groups reveal key ideologies 
and contradictions that are bound up with aggrieved middle-class entitlement and 
whiteness. For example, though these movements often highlight statistics showing 
how men are overrepresented in dangerous occupations, MRAs simultaneously 
oppose efforts of women to break into fields like firefighting, police work, 
construction, and the military. Likewise, these groups fall silent when it comes to 
discrimination facing men who are gay, working-class, African-American or Latinx. 
The fathers’ rights movements often highlight aspects of child custody and domestic 
violence cases that they perceive to be unfair to men, but, as Kimmel notes, they are 
not interested in
promoting active, engaged fatherhood; they just want to promote intact 
marriages and restrict the options for terminating a bad marriage. They like 
no-divorce laws, covenant marriages, and other policies that restrict women’s 
choices, not promoting engaged fatherhood. (p. 153)
Indeed, Kimmel found through interviewing a custody evaluator that the men 
involved in divorce cases often overstated their roles in family life and household 
maintenance, while their children reported that they were typically ignored when it 
came to child care. Likewise, MRA celebrity Paul Elam abandoned his family twice 
and has always been financially dependent on women (Nagel, 2017).
Alt-right offshoots of the MRA and fathers’ rights groups include the Proud Boys, 
who make clear their support for Trump and the concept of “Western chauvinism,” 
which connects misogyny to notions of race purity and nationalism (Coutts, 2017). 
Alt-right Twitter celebrity Roosh echoed the Proud Boys’ support for Trump: “I’m 
in a state of exuberance that we now have a president who rates women on a 1–10 
scale in the same way that we do and evaluates women by their appearance and 
feminine attitude (Nagel, 2017, p. 90). The Proud Boys’ YouTube views and Twitter 
followers’ number into the millions (Coutts, 2017, para. 6). In addition to “venerating 
the housewife,” the Proud boys advocate for building a wall to keep out immigrants, 
free speech fundamentalism, the right to carry military grade weapons and, more 
oddly, “a loose prohibition on masturbation” (or “no wanks” rule), because sexual 
acts should only be for producing children (para. 14).
More recent incarnations of the manosphere include PUAs and INCELs, groups 
focused on sustaining a specific narrative about dating and marriage. Both of these 
groups have formed in reaction to dramatic social and legal changes emerging from 
the women’s movement:
Many men who hate women do not have the access to women’s bodies that 
they would have had in an earlier era. The sexual revolution urged women 
WELL, ACTUALLY
143
to seek liberation. The self-esteem movement taught women that they were 
valuable beyond what convention might dictate. The rise of mainstream 
feminism gave women certainty and company in these convictions. And the 
Internet-enabled efficiency of today’s sexual marketplace allowed people to 
find potential sexual partners with a minimum of barriers and restraints. Most 
American women now grow up understanding that they can and should choose 
who they want to have sex with. (Tolentino, 2018, para. 5)
As Beauchamp (2019) points out, rather than being an aberration, both of these 
groups reflect enduring beliefs about women and patriarchy within Western societies 
that has just happened to collide with social media to make it seem like a new 
phenomenon.
Though INCELs were once a tongue-in-cheek named social-justice focused 
support group for people of all genders who had trouble finding someone to date, 
they have morphed into an affiliation centered on resentment of and entitlement 
to women’s bodies (Beauchamp, 2019). The notion of “involuntary celibacy” has 
created an elaborate narrative that frames the world as a competition between alpha 
and beta males, with alpha males (known as “Chads”) being the more attractive, 
wealthy and dominant men who are able to get the most beautiful women (Nagel, 
2017). Embracing the less-attractive beta male role, INCELs divide the female 
population into “Stacys,” their name for young, sexy women who reject the “nice 
guy” betas in favor of the Chads; and “Beckys,” more desperate, less attractive 
lower-status girls. Social media posts abound relating experiences of women 
rejecting “nice guys” like themselves in favor of attractive men who mistreat them, 
a practice dubbed “friend zoning.”
INCELs describe their process of developing political awareness as inspired 
through the Matrix movies’ concepts of redpilling and blackpilling. Redpilling 
consists of recruiting members by casting misogynists and white supremacists as 
brave truth tellers spreading knowledge that feminists have somehow suppressed 
(K. Burns, 2017; Nagel, 2017). Typically, this “knowledge” consists of warmed-over 
eugenics and evolutionary psychology. Those who describe themselves as blackpilled 
assert they are now fully awake to the idea that there is a sexually stratified class 
system based on a detailed categorization of physical features, again tied to flawed 
notions of evolutionary psychology (Beauchamp, 2019). It should be noted that their 
talking point of the unfairness of appearance-based social stratification does not 
extend to “the sexual marginalization of trans people, or women who fall outside the 
boundaries of conventional attractiveness” (Tolentino, 2018, para. 12).
Though spouting the same talking points as INCEL’s, PUAs are about cultivating 
the persona of a promiscuous alpha man out to get revenge on women by sleeping 
with them and then discarding them. They justify this approach by citing the belief 
that deep-down women want to be emotionally abused in relationships; in fact, they 
will respect men the more they are mistreated. Many PUAs describe themselves as 
former beta males or INCELs, using their experiences to provide hope for betas that 
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there is an alternative avenue for getting what they feel they are entitled to. In some 
cases, this extends to the colonialist practice of fetishizing Asian women as both 
more traditional and sexually available. Some PUAs have even created a business 
out of selling travel guides and video subscriptions that detail how to roam the globe 
picking up “exotic” women (Marsha, 2018).
As with MRA and fathers’ rights groups, INCELs and PUAs hold contradictory 
positions. For example, both of these groups are united by a desire to have 
unfettered access to sexually desirable women, so one would assume they would 
be in full support of legalizing sex work. However, sex workers are continually 
portrayed as “dirty whores” to be treated accordingly (Tolentino, 2018). Women 
who work outside the home are feminists out to demasculinize their partners 
while women who opt to stay home are gold diggers. Despite INCELs and PUAs 
expecting women to maintain a high level of attractiveness, they regularly critique 
women who wear makeup or dress up as deliberately misleading men. At the same 
time, their hostility knows no bounds for any women who is perceived to have “let 
herself go” by gaining weight or going without makeup. Wilkinson (2016) reveals 
similar inconsistencies:
On their forums I’ve read long, furious manifestos claiming that women are 
all sluts who “ride the cock carousel” and sleep with a series of “alpha males” 
until they reach the end of their sexual prime, at which point they seek out a 
“beta cuck” to settle down with for financial security. I’ve lurked silently on 
blogs dedicated to “pick-up artistry” as men argue that uppity, opinionated, 
feminist women—women like myself—need to be put in their place through 
“corrective rape.” (para. 4)
Nagel (2017) notes a key hypocrisy in this discourse regarding wanting both traditional 
values but without any sort of restraint or paternalistic sense of duty like one might 
have seen within Victorian society or the 1950s. Essentially, the manosphere is about 
wanting the positive features of the sexual revolution (continued access to women) 
but without women having reproductive rights.
More disturbingly are the currents of fascist violence that run through the 
manosphere. Romano (2016) sees men emboldened by a dangerous set of 
contradictory beliefs where they “are encouraged to view women as sexual and/or 
political targets” that they must dominate, while at the same time asserting that they 
are not sexist, just “fighting against their own emasculation and sexual repression at 
the hands of strident feminists” (para. 14). Kimmel’s (2017) overview of interview 
studies with rapists and domestic abusers reveals a common theme of violence not 
only revenge-filled, but restorative where getting even becomes the solution when 
they don’t get what they are entitled to. In commenting on an account of a domestic 
abuser, Kimmel notes a key inversion:
Emile’s sense of entitlement leads him to invert cause and effect: she tries to 
defend herself from his violence, which he interprets as the initiation of violence 
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and therefore something that he then as to defend himself against. Thus, his 
escalation is reimagined as self-defense, a defense against emasculation. 
Entitlement distorts our perceptions, reverses causation, and leads to an ability 
to justify a “right” that obtains neither in natural nor in civil law. (p. 186)
This is reflected in the manosphere’s attitudes toward rape, ranging from it not 
existing to being over-reported or made up by women as a way to get revenge 
on men. A common talking point within INCEL communities is that men are 
driven to rape because they are celibate loners. Tolentino’s (2018) critique of the 
INCEL-friendly proposal that like economic resources, sex should be distributed 
more equally illustrates the normalization of lines of thinking about rape: “What 
INCELs want is extremely limited and specific: they want unattractive, uncouth, 
and unpleasant misogynists to be able to have sex on demand with young, beautiful 
women. They believe that this is their right” (para. 12). In contrast to the idea that 
rapists are mostly loners who act out of sexual frustration, Kimmel (2017) notes that 
instead rapists “have higher levels of consensual sexual activity than other men, are 
as likely to have significant relationships with women, and are as likely to be fathers 
as other men” (p. 183).
It is important to note that the lines between the online manosphere and in-person 
violence have blurred as the INCEL community have openly celebrated murders 
of women and men at the hands of self-identified INCELs like Eliot Rodgers who 
killed six people, injuring 14 and the Toronto van ramming attack which killed ten 
and injured sixteen (Beauchamp, 2019; para. 5; Tolentino, 2018). Both of these 
attackers were males under the age of 30. Nagle (2017b) poses prescient questions:
What is it about the alt-right that has captured the imagination of so many 
young people and at least intrigued a great many more? And if it is true that 
the committed alt-right becomes more isolated but more militant, what will 
become of all those young people—especially the young men, who have been 
radicalized by the alt-right’s ideas and never convinced otherwise? What will 
be the real-world consequences of forcing such figures out of their semi-ironic 
anonymous online fantasyland, and potentially thrusting them into a toxic 
flirtation with violent offline tactics? (para. 7)
CONCLUSION
Online spaces are a socialist feminist issue that must be addressed. The act of 
women and minorities spending time repeatedly explaining racism, sexism, and 
homophobia needs to be reframed as providing free labor, of taking valuable time 
away from focusing on issues critical to their communities. It is no coincidence that 
women and minorities are the ones consistently not believed and accused of bias as 
well as the ones expected to defend themselves while “educating” others. Emanating 
from e-libertarianism, white men are rarely ordered to provide endless evidence as 
justification for their assertions, which are taken at face value.
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Further, for those who do diligently moderate online spaces, time is lost in wading 
through harassing comments versus creating content that could engage or inspire 
(Poland, 2016). Again, women and minorities are typically the ones having to provide 
the labor needed to police their online spaces 24/7. One response has been to provide 
page membership screening questions that are difficult to answer for those who are 
hostile to leftist and social justice beliefs. This has been relatively successful on 
private Facebook pages and does seem to reduce trolling and harassment. However, 
it does run the risk of making these spaces harder to locate just doing a general 
search. Another common suggestion is to reach out and attempt to dialogue with 
right-wing posters. Again, this suggestion (coming from a position of privilege) 
overlooks the issue of time and labor and who ends up providing it:
Angry white male entitlement is the elevator music of our age. Speaking 
personally, as a feminist-identified person on the internet, my Twitter mentions 
are full of practically nothing else. I’ve spent far too much of my one life 
trying to listen and understand and offer suggestions in good faith, before 
concluding that it’s not actually my job to manage the hurt feelings of men 
who are prepared to mortgage the entire future of the species to buy back 
their misplaced pride. It never was. That’s not what feminism is about. (Penny, 
2018, para. 38)
When a site is taken over by toxicity, the very topics critical for women and 
minorities are buried in endless negativity. The possibility for real, in-depth online 
conversation is impeded. It is important that we recognize that this is not coincidental, 
but intentional and is supported by the structural features of the Internet and social 
media sites under capitalism. Those interested in important political issues—and, 
more importantly—those directly impacted by those issues are more likely to steer 
clear of sites where the right-wing has taken over, viewing them as more trouble than 
they are worth (Poland, 2016). There is also the risk that the presence of right-wing 
comments delegitimizes the original content, further marginalizing leftist ideas.
Within the US, it has been clear that section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act has only served to protect Internet service providers rather than the majority of 
Internet users. While a list has been compiled of such companies who regularly fail 
to protect victims, as Poland (2016) concludes, “unless legal or financial penalties 
can be applied to companies or websites hosting illegal communications, the benefits 
of such a list seem limited” (p. 240). We need to legally confront the positioning 
of site owners and hosts as content middlemen and instead hold them financially 
accountable, by revamping the Communications Decency Act (Siegel, 2017). 
Publicly owned Internet could also introduce some accountability (Bode, 2018). 
The future of online discourse is only going to get worse, especially as backlash 
continues, but this is indicative of people starting to set limits, which regressive 
segments of the Internet do not like:
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In absolute terms, dark web intellectuals enjoy far more access to the 
mainstream than genuine leftists. But in relative terms, they have far lower 
status than their intellectual forebears of 20 or even 10 years ago. They are 
not driving the conversation, and sometimes are being driven from it. This 
loss of relative social status helps explain the anger and resentment…It’s hard 
for erstwhile hegemons to feel happy about their fall. (Ferrell, 2018, para. 16)
One potential turning point includes the growing public awareness of how social 
media platforms function, particularly the economic model built on advertising and 
clicks. Rather than reflecting some sort of massive consensus of “the way things are,” 
people are starting to see the artificiality of social media, in combination with growing 
concerns about private data becoming public as well as election security. The recent 
revelations of Trump threatening to withhold aid to Ukraine unless they assisted 
with locating intel on Joe Biden, a 2020 election opponent, only highlights the global 
scale of the problem, along with casting doubt on the legitimacy of Trump’s win in 
2016, assisted by big money (domestic and foreign) channeled through social media 
platforms filled with bots and fake profiles. Indeed, 2020 Democratic presidential 
candidate Elizabeth Warren brilliantly highlighted how Facebook deliberately aids 
and abets right-wing disinformation simply because it is profitable. When Facebook 
refused to remove Republican-sponsored political ads that were blatantly false, she 
paid for a Facebook ad of her own, which claimed that Mark Zuckerberg supports 
Trump in the 2020 election (Fung, 2019). The ad included a debriefing about it being 
false on purpose, to make a larger point about the far-from-neutral practices of the 
so-called “marketplace of ideas.”
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CHAPTER 6
ABORTION THROUGH THE LENS OF FETAL 
PERSONHOOD
Social Meanings and Functions
INTRODUCTION
In the lead-up to the 2016 Republican primaries, Donald Trump asserted that women 
who seek an abortion “should face some sort of punishment,” a comment that was 
quickly walked back to place the blame on those performing the procedure, once 
again safely situating the woman as a victim (Diamond, 2016, para. 1; Smith, S., 
2017). Since the election, Trump has spoken at “right to life rallies,” reinstated the 
“global gag rule” prohibiting overseas organizations who receive US funding from 
providing abortions or even basic health information, successfully installed two anti-
choice Supreme Court Justices, and, more recently, inspired Mississippi to pass a 
ban on abortions after 15 weeks (North, 2018; Smith, S., 2017; Redden, 2017). Even 
Bernie Sanders campaigned for Nebraska’s anti-choice mayoral candidate Heath 
Mello, defending his actions as, “I think you just can’t exclude people who disagree 
with us on one issue” (Detrow, 2017, para. 8). In other words, the assault on the right 
of women to access abortion services continues apace.
However, it was the 2012 election in the United States that really brought abortion 
once again to the forefront of social issues, with an intensity of rightist discourse 
not seen since the early 1980s during the conservative restoration. Fuelled by the 
Tea Party (the precursor to Trump) and its opposition to the Affordable Care Act, 
politicians and pundits immediately targeted reproductive health services such as 
contraceptive coverage as a source of their outrage. What made this resurrection of 
abortion stand out was the lethal language aimed at women as a whole. Everything 
from dissecting the lives of poor women, to slut shaming, to attempting to define 
what kind of rape was worthy of sympathy was up for discussion.
Petchesky (2002) connects the presentation of abortion as being ancillary to civil 
rights to a fragmented political framing in the US regarding women in general:
One result is a compartmentalization of women’s movement work into discrete 
“issues”—violence, reproductive rights, sexuality, girls and adolescents, 
women in development (economics, work)—without sufficient attention to the 
vital points where these intersect. (p. 75)
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The public, then, including many leftists, see abortion and contraception as 
disconnected from the daily lives of the working class because “it’s a women’s 
issue.” Abortion is presented as an afterthought, as unimportant or a diversionary 
fringe issue, a bargaining chip for courting conservative voters. Yet far from being a 
“fringe issue”—as is often presented by the right, center-right, and liberal political 
spectra in the US—abortion and the larger aim of reproductive freedom is essential 
for women, who make up a majority of the world’s population.
According to Rowland (2004), approximately 60 million women spanning an age 
range of 15 to their mid-40s live in the US (p. 270). Of that number, 42 million 
identify as sexually active, not wanting to become pregnant at that particular time:
Research suggests that a sexually active woman between ages 20 and 45 who 
wants two children, will spend, on average, almost 5 years of her life trying to 
become pregnant or postpartum, and more than four times that long trying to 
avoid pregnancy. (p. 270)
About 75% of women of childbearing age depend on some form of private insurance 
to cover reproductive health care, with many requiring Title X funding, which, 
according to Rowland, is in constant jeopardy due to funding cuts. It is women 
who bear the physical, social, and emotional brunt of privatized childcare costs in a 
virtually unresponsive workplace should they decide to have a baby (Smith, 2005, 
2017).
Additionally, half of all US pregnancies are unplanned, with nearly a third of 
pregnancies of married women considered a “surprise” (Joffe, 2011, p. xvi, loc. 
83; Rowland, 2004, p. 272). Nearly 60% of women who have an abortion reported 
using some form of contraception at the time they became pregnant, which is why 
centrist arguments to outlaw abortion while retaining contraception are flawed 
strategy (Rowland, 2004, p. 105). Contrary to the image of a young, irresponsible, 
selfish woman seeking to end a pregnancy so that she can have fun, the majority of 
abortions performed in the US are for women (married and unmarried) who already 
have one or more children (Joffe, 2011, p. 145, loc. 1920; Rowland, 2004, p. 294). 
Even though three fourths of abortions are performed on unmarried women, a good 
portion of those receiving abortions are married and identify as religious (43% 
Protestant, 27% Catholic), further eroding media stereotypes (p. 289).
It is no coincidence that abortion and contraception have remained controversial, 
even though these can be counted among the many safe, routine, medical procedures 
used by a majority of American women. Rosen (2012) pinpoints the continuing 
controversy to how women are viewed, with ripple effects stemming from key Court 
decisions starting in the 1960s:
For most of human history, sexuality and reproduction have been intricately 
yoked together. Birth control, particularly the Pill, ruptured that link and 
gave women the right to enjoy sex without the goal of reproduction. When 
the Supreme Court formally ratified that rupture by making abortion legal in  
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Roe v. Wade (1973), many people in this country trembled at the possible 
changes women’s sexual independence might bring. (para. 14)
Indeed, Joffe (2011) locates America’s uncomfortable relationship with abortion 
to a larger uncertainty about sexuality itself. Penny’s (2011) insightful framing 
of prostitution as an economic issue references the societal terror conjured by the 
“notion of women gaining real sexual control over the proceeds of that labor” (p. 20). 
Objectification in capitalist society requires that women “remain alienated from our 
sexuality” despite it being a primary “means of survival in the meat market” (p. 21).
For Rich (1986), another aspect of this discomfort with female-driven sexuality 
involves society as a whole still dealing with women departing from the biologically 
determined role of the mother. This mother figure has to be all-suffering and asexual. 
The removal of that suffering means a severe rupture of social and self-identity, 
which is not tolerated on the Right. Abortion and contraception represent the ability 
for women alone (not husbands, fathers, boyfriends, male family members, clergy, 
police, or politicians) to determine whether or not to have children, and the spacing 
of those children. Males do not have to be involved in the decision at all, though 
working-class men also benefit from access to reproductive health care. This is simply 
not acceptable for the right wing who will continue to do everything in its power to 
marginalize women and erode working class solidarity through reproductive control.
This chapter dialectically examines, from a Marxist Feminist perspective, a 
specific ideological development in the abortion/contraction controversy distributed 
through the media, that of fetal personhood. First, an overview of recent abortion 
legislation will be presented, highlighting recent personhood bills. Next, the ideology 
of fetal personhood is examined, along with its legal implausibility. Finally, I present 
four ways that fetal personhood benefits the ruling class by objectifying women, 
eroding solidarity, increasing surveillance, and justifying public sector cuts as part 
of austerity.
ABORTION: AN OVERVIEW
The historical trajectory of abortion legislation has always been contentious, but not 
necessarily linear. As Casper (1998) explains,
Reproduction is a key site of social control over women and of women’s 
agency, both of which differ by race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality. In the 
United States and elsewhere, women’s reproductive processes are contested 
and stratified at the interpersonal, biomedical/scientific, cultural, economic, 
political, and global levels of social life. (p. 10)
Abortion itself was allowable in the early US colonies as well as English common 
law and the Church prior to the detection of fetal movement, or “quickening” 
(Rowland, 2004). It was only after the growth of medical knowledge in the 1800s 
that restrictions against abortion and contraception began to occur, continuing until 
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the first challenge in the form of Griswold v. Connecticut in the 1960s, which allowed 
access to contraception. This paved the way for a further extension of reproductive 
rights, explored more deeply in Roe v. Wade in 1973.
The Roe decision was ground-breaking, as Rowland (2004) notes:
From this language came the modern notion of ‘reproductive privacy’ and a 
shift in the landscape of women’s rights. The decision legalized first-trimester 
elective abortion, setting forth a cleanly-divided trimester framework to be 
used by the courts in balancing the rights of women against the interests of 
states. It was an important intersection of law and medicine. (p. 111)
Immediately after Roe, restrictions began. The most invasive was the Hyde 
Amendment in 1977, which denied federal funding for abortion. The implementation 
of mandatory waiting periods soon followed. In addition to targeting poor and 
minority women, laws restricting contraception and abortion services for minors 
were passed. During this time period of the 1970s and 1980s, women who sought 
abortions were portrayed as baby-killers, lesbians, and sluts and abortion became a 
litmus test for conservative politicians. By the 1990s, fetal personhood had already 
become an integral part of proposed and active legislation, including the 2007 ban 
on a second-trimester abortion procedure, the first of its kind (Joffe, 2011).
According to Rudolph (2012), the origins of the contemporary opposition to 
abortion as an organizing feature of the Christian Right wasn’t in response to Roe v. 
Wade at first, but instead had to do with a more obscure reason: protecting the tax-
exempt status of religion:
In the early 1970s, the U.S. government was looking for ways to extend 
the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The IRS opined that any 
organization that engaged in racial discrimination was not, by definition, a 
charitable organization and therefore should be denied tax-exempt status…
On January 19, 1976, the IRS…revoked Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt 
status. Bob Jones University sued to retain its tax exemption. It eventually 
lost at the Supreme Court in 1982 and conservative activist Paul Weyrich 
sensed the electoral potential of enlisting evangelical voters in the conservative 
crusade. (p. 17)
Led by Weyrich, other pastors spun the ruling against schools that practiced 
segregation into an attack on states’ rights and religious freedom. During the legal 
battle, because President Carter was for removing the tax-exempt status from Bob 
Jones University, evangelicals removed their support from him and put it behind 
Reagan. Eventually, abortion was latched onto as a way to recruit more centrist 
liberals away from the Democratic Party when original messages such as lower taxes 
and deregulation had little sway by themselves.
For all of the talk about its “fringe” status, abortion is a key legislative target. In 
2011, roughly 40,000 laws and their accompanying provisions were enacted. Close 
to 1,000 of those restricted access to abortion (Easley, Jones, Haraldsson, & Rmuse, 
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2013, para. 7). The majority of the legislative activity was at the state level, with 
135 of these provisions enacted in 36 states (para. 10). A majority of the provisions 
restricted abortion services, exceeding all previous statistics on such actions. Of the 
restrictions, six states enacted bans, three states implemented waiting periods, five 
states introduced ultrasound requirements, eight states now have bans on insurance 
coverage for abortion, four states have clinic regulations, and seven states prohibit 
medication abortion (para. 11).
Baker (2013) notes that ten states have implemented time limits for abortion as 
low as 20 weeks, based on the notion that fetuses can feel pain (para. 11). Proposals 
for a 12-week ban are in the works, which would represent the harshest measures 
to date. Much of this recent legislative activity is due to the outcome of the 2010 
midterm elections, where 44 abortion rights supporters in the House were replaced 
by opponents, with the Senate experiencing seven pro-choice losses (Clark, 2011, p. 
28). Added to this is the revised Republican Party platform which states that abortion 
is opposed in all cases with no exceptions for rape, incest, or risk to the woman’s life 
(Cohen, 2012).
The assault has also targeted poor and working-class women in the form of 
removal of state funds for abortion services. Currently, 32 states along with the 
District of Columbia will not allow state monies to be used for abortions, except as 
a result of incest, rape, or threat to the life of the woman (Smith, S., 2017, p. 21). 
Those who think that receiving private insurance shields them from these restrictions 
are wrong, with 11 states enacting restrictions on coverage of abortions (p. 20). This 
is on top of the 17 states that mandate counseling services prior to an abortion, 27 
states requiring waiting periods of 24 hours and 26 states mandating parental consent 
for minors seeking abortions (p. 22).
Easley and colleagues (2013) readily overturn the notion that the war on women 
is merely hyperbole or a media stunt by summarizing an array of anti-abortion laws 
that have been introduced by Republicans: denial of birth control in pharmacies 
known as conscience clauses (HR 1179), prohibition of all abortion except in cases 
of incest, rape, or health endangerment (HB 2988, Texas); requiring women to attend 
“spiritual counselling” before obtaining an abortion (HB 1217, South Dakota); 
mandating that doctors provide misinformation prior to patients receiving an 
abortion (e.g. that abortions cause suicide ideation or breast cancer; HB 1166, South 
Dakota, HB 1210 Indiana, Kansas); conditions applied to access to abortion (the 
“forcible rape” exempt category, HR 3, New Jersey); denial of insurance coverage 
for birth control and abortion (Senate Bill 438, Georgia; SB 92, Wisconsin), 
restricting transport to a facility for live-saving procedures (HR 358, Pennsylvania); 
effectively banning the teaching of abortion methods in medical schools (federal 
funding House amendment), onerous clinic and personnel requirements including 
licensure denial (Kansas, Mississippi, Illinois, Virginia, Louisiana, Minnesota); and 
using austerity as a rationale for ending abortion, including cuts to or defunding of 
Planned Parenthood (Minnesota, Arizona, Louisiana, Ohio).
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Many of the anti-abortion laws, whether active or overturned, are directly 
connected to the fetal personhood strategy (Easley et al., 2013). They include The 
Pain Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (SB 209, Georgia; Bill 1888, Oklahoma; 
Nebraska; H.R. 3803, District of Columbia) and the Fetal Pain Bill (House Bill 
954, Georgia); Arizona’s House Bill 206 which prohibits abortions after 20 weeks 
(technicalities in the law also classify women as pregnant even prior to conception); 
Texas’ Sonogram Bill (HB 15) which originally required even victims of rape to 
view images of their wombs prior to receiving an abortion; trans-vaginal ultrasound 
bills which require women to undergo the procedure before obtaining an abortion 
(Alaska, Texas, Virginia, Iowa, Alabama); forcing women to watch footage of an 
abortion before obtaining one (Arizona); outlawing fertility treatments and birth 
control along with abortion (SB 2771, Mississippi); defending an abortion ban 
after 20 weeks by viewing a pregnancy as a result of rape or incest as “God’s will” 
(Senate Bill 1165, Idaho); fertilized-egg-as-person bills which would also outlaw 
contraception (Ohio, Mississippi, Oklahoma); and prohibition of abortion after six 
weeks (Heartbeat Bill, Ohio).
Some of the legislative actions are directly centered on establishing personhood, 
such as those in Virginia, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Alabama (Easley et al., 2013). 
Another strategy is represented by HB1305 in North Dakota, which would make it 
a Class A misdemeanor for a doctor to perform an abortion based on the gender of a 
fetus. According to Smith (2013), this is another way of implementing deadlines on 
seeking abortions (the gender of a fetus can be usually determined at 12 weeks). The 
fact that these types of laws are often successfully challenged in the courts is beside 
the point—their very existence shows the continual threat to women’s reproductive 
rights.
Anti-abortion laws and commentary have also begun to traverse the path of 
establishing punitive consequences for abortion. These include: taxing abortions 
(H.B. 2598, Kansas); publicly posting identifying information of medical providers 
and women who have abortions (Life Defense Act, HB 3808, Tennessee); Georgia’s 
illegality of abortions and miscarriages with the death penalty applied for proven 
violations (amendment to existing state law); women and doctors undergoing 
abortion as being guilty of committing “feticide” (HB 587, Louisiana; House File 
2298, Iowa); a call for public hangings as a “deterrent” for the crimes of abortion, 
rape, and kidnapping (Representative Larry Pittman, North Carolina); no exceptions 
for rape, incest or health of the mother who would receive a life sentence with 
suspicious miscarriages being criminally investigated (House File 2298, Iowa); 
homicide charges applied to the death of an embryo (House Bill 3517, Tennessee); 
using ultrasounds to ensure that pregnant rape victims were indeed raped, along 
with invasive questions by doctors asking about marital and relationship status in 
the context of the rape (S. 1387, Idaho); forcing women to carry even dead fetuses to 
term because that’s what farm animals do in nature (Georgia Rep. Terry England in 
support of HR 954 banning abortions after 20 weeks); and legalizing the murder of 
abortion doctors (South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa).
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Citing “religious liberty” as a justification, opposition to contraception intensified 
in the wake of the passage of the Affordable Care Act, which requires that employers 
and university health plans cover contraception without copays or deductibles (Baker, 
2012). Contraception provisions as part of the Obama Administration’s health care 
reform have been challenged in Nebraska, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Alabama, and Texas, on the grounds of inhibiting religious freedom 
(Easley et al., 2013). Indiana has proposed an especially invasive ultrasound bill that 
would require women to receive two trans-vaginal probes (before and after) in order 
to receive the RU-486 pill (Strasser, 2013). The use of probes is medically irrelevant 
since a blood test could verify that a pregnancy had been ended.
FETAL PERSONHOOD: IDEOLOGY & LAW
A major organizing aspect of the anti-abortion movement is the notion of fetal 
personhood, which is the justification behind the bulk of recent legislative efforts. It 
is important to note that religion, while still a primary influencing factor behind the 
anti-choice movement, is now joined by medicine as a potential ally:
Part of the reason this has gathered steam in recent decades is something 
of a convergence of medical science and anti-abortion rhetoric whereby the 
objective and ostensibly value-free claims of science regarding the fetus 
are supplementing, even superseding, value-laden religious anti-abortion 
argumentation. In addition, parental and medical concern for the wanted 
fetus as patient tends to bolster anti-abortion claims of the personhood, if not 
primacy, of the fetus. (McCullough, 2012, p. 19)
It is understandable why the notion of fetal personhood has taken a powerful 
discursive hold in not only the United States, but across the world. What can be more 
democratic (or even social justice sounding) than everyone enjoying the protections 
of one’s nation, including those most vulnerable and voiceless? To oppose such a 
thing transforms one into a heartless bully who is no better than the Nazis were, bent 
on exterminating the “feebleminded” or those not racially fit. Needless to say, when 
the anti-choice right landed on fetal personhood, they struck gold.
A major factor in the entrenchment of fetal personhood has been medical advances 
in obstetrics, the use of the ultrasound in particular (Casper, 1998; Joffe, 2011). Joffe 
(2011) notes the increasingly common practice of parents displaying ultrasound 
documents as the first pictures of their “baby.” Even though most abortions happen 
in the first trimester with just over 1% occurring after the 20th week (Smith, S., 2017, 
p. 16), women are given detailed descriptions of fetal development as a potential 
deterrent, even going as far as mandating the ultrasound procedure as a condition of 
obtaining an abortion. Further complicating the picture are physicians who belong 
to pro-life caucuses of organizations such as the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists and groups such as the American Academy of Family Physicians. 
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Joffe points out that some of these physicians do not feel obligated to refer patients 
to those who might provide abortion and contraception services.
Using fetal personhood logic, pharmacists are also able to enact consciousness 
clauses, where they can refuse to fill prescriptions for contraceptives (including 
emergency contraception), viewed as threatening the fetus. Catholic-affiliated 
hospitals are not allowed to perform life-saving abortions or administer abortion 
pills to rape survivors (even though, according to Cohen (2012), over 30,000 
pregnancies are a result of rape (para. 9) due to the prioritization of the fetus. Ginty 
(2011) outlines the heroic action of hospital administrator Sister Margaret McBride 
who approved a life-saving abortion, resulting in her excommunication. Rowland 
(2004) traces the origins of today’s fetal personhood ideology to the struggle over 
access to contraception. In the Griswold case, doctors asserted that the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied to those yet “unconceived” and that fetuses had an interest in 
the outcome of the case.
Casper’s (1998) research into the medicalization of the fetus is useful in 
understanding the trajectory of fetal personhood, as well as who composes the anti-
choice movement. She identifies the fetal personhood movement as part of a broader 
construct of “fetal politics” that includes
the crafting of a new science called fetology, controversies over fetal tissue 
research, the emergence of fetal rights in law and ethics, debates about and 
proscriptions on pregnant women’s behavior, a cultural obsession with fetal 
images, and the relentless pursuit of new reproductive technologies. (p. 4)
Casper explains that success rate of fetal surgeries is extremely low. Of those 
fetuses that survive and are eventually born, many are maimed for life, assuming that 
that life is a long one to begin with. There is also a social class dimension to this, as 
these are extremely expensive procedures that only the wealthiest (and white) can 
afford. As the media focuses on the miraculous medical achievements of fetal surgery, 
it also masks the growing heath care crisis as more and more people are unable to 
achieve basic health services. The cultural myths surrounding motherhood often 
cover the reality of drastically uneven access to basic prenatal care, for example. As 
these medical advancements close in on women, rendering them invisible in favor of 
the fetus, a darker ethics emerge, which Casper (1998) explores. If a woman declines 
the option of fetal surgery, is she then culpable in the death of her child? Or, harder 
to consider, is if a woman opts for fetal surgery even knowing that her child will be 
profoundly disabled the rest of her/his life. Apparently, that type of “choice” is fine 
with the Right.
New (2013) speculates that attitudes toward abortion are tied to views about 
the morality of premarital sex, with hardline Catholics and evangelicals taking the 
most oppositional stances against both. The impossibility of implementing controls 
over sexuality in the face of a secular society appears to perplex New, who remains 
against abortion:
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I always remind pro-lifers that a promiscuous society will never support 
significant restrictions on abortion. While pro-lifers are good at talking about 
fetal development and personal responsibility, we are less comfortable with 
subjects such as sexual activity and contraception. Indeed, it is doubtless more 
difficult to advocate for sexual restraint than for the unborn. However, this is a 
battle in which pro-lifers must continue to engage if we are to succeed in our 
goal of providing legal protection to all unborn children. (para. 3)
Yet Marty (2013) points to surveys that show that close to 95% of adults have 
had premarital sex, with a respectable 60% not viewing such relations as sinful. For 
Marty, the strategy of ending abortion by trying to convince people that premarital 
sex is wrong seems like a herculean task at best. What is interesting is how New 
(2013) tentatively acknowledges that it is easier to talk about the fetus than to broach 
the topic of adult sexual conduct, pointing to some of the psychology behind the 
anti-abortion movement and reasons for its staying power.
For McCullough (2012), there are only two outcomes of the fetal personhood 
movement. The first is one where the concept of citizenship becomes so broad 
as to be rendered null. If eggs and sperm can be human beings entitled to rights, 
property, etc., then the legal implications lead quickly to inertia and an inability 
to apply universal definitions of citizenship to a range of situations. The second 
outcome is one of dystopia aimed at women, along the lines of Margaret Atwood’s 
(1998) The Handmaid’s Tale. McCullough (2012) describes the aftermath of the fall 
of communism in Poland and how it contributed to the country making abortion 
unconstitutional, enacting a “Poland’s traumatic transition away from communism 
played into this portrayal of the fetus as a democratic citizen fetus—a kind of blank-
slate citizen, or future citizen, onto which the hopes and dreams of the nation could 
be projected,” (p. 20). McCullough further emphasizes that in the case of Poland, 
fetuses were not simply transformed into citizens, but the purest form of citizen: the 
“innocent” person.
Rowland (2004) reviews two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment relevant to 
the issue of abortion and women’s rights: The Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause. There are two forms of due process, procedural (which has to do with 
compliance before the intervention of state or federal authorities), and substantive 
(having to do with previously undefined concepts of liberty). What fetal personhood 
ideology has done is attempt to extend these same protections to fetuses, embryos, 
and even eggs. Reacting to these efforts, Crist (2010) distinguishes between “person” 
and one who is granted constitutional rights, noting that fetal personhood laws fall 
apart under legal analysis:
Personhood is not a one-dimensional construct. In fact, there are different 
types of legal personhood, and not all of them fall within the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In other words, the fetus can be a “person” in some legal ways, 
but not a “person” of the type contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we can 
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refer to the fetus as a person without necessarily granting it a constitutional 
right to life. (p. 862)
Crist distinguishes between natural persons, i.e. human beings viewed as worthy 
of dignity for simply being human, and juridical persons, non-human entities who 
are afforded legal protections such as corporations:
The fetus, like the corporation, is not entitled to protections because of what it 
is innately. Instead, the law recognizes that there is a natural person, the mother, 
who has fundamental interests at stake. Her rights are invested in another 
entity, the fetus. The law gives that entity juridical personhood to ensure that 
the rights of the mother may be secured, just as the law gives the corporation 
juridical personhood to protect the rights of the shareholders. (p. 865)
A law can refer to a fetus as a “person” but that doesn’t necessarily mean it is granted 
a right to life via the Constitution.
Crist therefore appears to have full confidence in Roe’s standing:
Even if a legislature wanted to create full fetal personhood, it would be without 
power to do so. Simply put: fetal laws do not confer personhood upon the fetus 
because procedurally, they cannot…The Supreme Court has already made clear 
that the fetus is not a “person”‘ under the Constitution, and thus is not entitled 
to protection from deprivation of “life, liberty [or] equal protection of the 
laws.” Legislatures cannot declare otherwise, since this would be in derogation 
of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe v, Wade. Thus, 
if a legislature attempted to establish natural fetal personhood, its law would 
simply have no effect unless Roe’s essential holding was overturned. (p. 867)
This analysis points to a rationale behind attempts to overturn Roe. If it were to 
fall, then the final barrier to fetal personhood would be achieved, and the end 
of reproductive freedom. Of course, one could argue that the entire purpose of 
personhood laws is to end abortion, so both means would point to the same end.
Crist (2010) also asserts that there does not have to be a conflict between fetal 
homicide laws and access to abortion. Much depends on the purpose of the laws. For 
example, feticide laws are in place because of a recognition of the unique biological 
situation of a pregnant woman. They are not in place to challenge the right to an 
abortion (even though supporters for such laws may have that intent in mind). 
California and Maryland are two states that make it explicitly clear that feticide and 
abortion are separate situations, with abortion’s status remaining legal. There is also 
the matter of abortion and feticide laws being focused on the rights of the actor (the 
woman and the attacker, respectively) and not the object of the action (the fetus). 
Under the law, a woman deciding to obtain an abortion is not held to the same legal 
consequences as someone who murders a pregnant woman and her fetus:
If we take this actor distinction one step further, we come to the issue of 
consent. Forgetting entirely that the fetus even exists, abortion is a medical 
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procedure performed on the autonomous body of a pregnant woman. Bodily 
invasion requires consent. This is the very difference between a battery and a 
hug. When a woman chooses abortion, she consents to the actions taken upon 
her body. Women do not consent to brutal attacks that end their pregnancies. 
(p. 882)
The problem with Crist’s analysis, however, is that it assumes that the matter of 
the actor is settled in terms of public perception. For Crist’s assurances to hold up, 
there has to be agreement that consent is the purview of the woman. Yet anti-choicers 
continually assert a false equivalency of personhood by arguing, “what about the 
fetus’ consent—do they have say?” What anti-abortion activists have essentially 
done is to craft a fetal separatist movement where not just embryos, but eggs are 
prioritized over grown women (Burroughs, 2012). Ultimately, relying on Roe’s legal 
protections is a shaky proposition in the face of a group that is not really motivated 
by who is represented in abortion law, but by limiting women’s rights—a group who 
has made it clear they will use any form of legislative discourse to achieve that end.
OPPRESSIVE OUTCOMES OF FETAL PERSONHOOD
When approaching history from a dialectical perspective, it becomes clear that rather 
than remaining static, laws shift and change under capitalism to maintain key benefits 
for the ruling class (Marx, 1845). In the case of reproductive rights, to a large degree 
the ruling class appears tolerant of the existence of contraception and abortion on a 
social level. That doesn’t mean, however, that they do not benefit from its continued 
opposition by conservative groups. For example, the resurrection of attacks on 
abortion and contraception during the lead up to the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act was utilized by the ruling class who has a key interest in making sure that national 
single payer healthcare does not happen. This section looks at four key ways that the 
construct of fetal personhood contributes to the continuing oppression of women, in 
particular working-class women. These include objectification, erosion of solidarity, 
increased surveillance, and justification for slashing the public sector.
Objectifying Women
As Rowland (2004) points out, “An independent female sexual identity, one devoid 
of maternal instincts or disinclined to have heirs, has been perceived throughout 
history as nothing less than dangerous” (p. xxvii). Fetal personhood represents a 
powerful form of objectification of women, that of rendering them invisible so as 
to remove some of that danger. Casper (1998) describes how the fetus being placed 
front and center has automatically removed the adult woman from the picture:
Like the oversized fetus in 2001: A Space Odyssey, fetuses are increasingly 
portrayed as free-floating and larger than life. Where fetuses were once 
confined to anonymity and invisibility inside pregnant women’s bodies, the 
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fetus has now gone solo. Never mind that most fetuses cannot live outside of 
a woman’s body. Contemporary fetal representations routinely erase women’s 
agency and bodies. (p. 16)
Understanding how objectification functions can be helpful in situating the 
abortion issue. According to Nussbaum (2010), there are seven key ways that people—
women especially—can be objectified by those in power. Though Nussbaum was 
speaking to the objectification of women in Internet forums, these different means 
of objectification can also be applied to the fetishizing of the fetus over the humanity 
of the woman. First, is instrumentality, where those who do the objectifying envision 
their victim as nothing more than a means to an end. In the case of the anti-choice 
concept of pregnancy, women are vessels for carrying the fetus. Second is the denial 
of autonomy, where those who objectify refuse to acknowledge the capability of a 
woman to make independent decisions. Anti-abortion groups are resistant to the idea 
of women rationally considering their own bodies in making reproductive health 
choices, as evidenced by the endless regulations they propose. Third is inertness, 
where women are viewed as passive, waiting to hear what they need to do next. The 
framing of “alternatives” to abortion, such as crisis pregnancy centers or adoption, 
operate under the notion that women are frozen in a perpetual state of indecision 
when it comes to reproductive choices.
Fourth is fungibility, where women-as-objects are anonymous and interchangeable 
with each other. The insistence of the anti-choice movement on women carrying each 
and every pregnancy to term regardless of context is an example of the anti-choice 
movement objectifying women as interchangeable entities: all pregnancy is the 
same pregnancy. All children must be welcomed children. Fifth is violability where 
women who are objectified are viewed as having no boundaries with an assumed 
permission to invade or destroy. Anti-choice support for trans-vaginal ultrasound 
bills and denial of abortion in the case of rape are prime examples of violable 
objectification. Sixth is ownership, where women are treated as property. Countless 
anti-choice propaganda sends the message that women of reproductive age do not 
fully own their bodies. Instead, those bodies belong to males via the fetus. Finally, 
the seventh form of objectivity is the denial of subjectivity, where the emotions and 
life experiences of women do not matter. Certainly, this is most characteristic of the 
conspicuous absence of women to begin with in the abortion conversation.
Nussbaum (2010) goes on to note that there are three additional forms of 
objectification which include reducing women to body parts (with abortion, women 
are walking wombs), reduction to appearance (when women are discussed among 
anti-abortion circles, those who violate the norms of motherhood are “sluts,” 
including rape victims), and silencing (women are not allowed to have a voice in 
reproductive decision making beyond the range of birthing options). Autonomy can 
be more than denied; it can be violated, where “the objectifier forcibly removes, 
or curtails, the woman’s autonomy” (p. 72). The ideological invisibility of women 
in the abortion debate is therefore a particular form of uber-objectification where 
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adult women are forced to the margins of the abortion question. Their presence is 
unwelcome:
Arguments against abortion have in common a valuing of the unborn fetus over 
the living woman…The woman is thus isolated from her historical context 
as woman; her decision for or against abortion is severed from the peculiar 
status of women in human history. The antiabortion movement trivializes 
women’s impulses toward education, independence, self-determination as self-
indulgence. (Rich, 1986, p. xvi)
An example of objectification in action is noted by Davis (2010), who examined the 
prevalence of males in the profession of editorial cartooning and how this affected 
the framing of current issues like abortion. Female political cartoonists such as Jen 
Sorensen tend to highlight the irony of males making decisions about abortion. By 
contrast, a content analysis of abortion-related political cartoons created by males 
from 2005 to 2010 showed no images of a pregnant women speaking: “A common 
device is for the fetus to speak instead of the mother” (p. 20).
Eroding Solidarity between Women
Fetal personhood is a fundamental attack on the solidarity women can experience 
through socialist feminist awareness. Sexuality and reproduction are key biological 
and social ways of shared experience that cut across many boundaries such as age, 
income, race, ability, and sexual orientation. All humans are sexual beings yet 
women in particular often bear the brunt of current sexual policies. This is not to 
say that there are not important differences across these identities when it comes 
to reproductive rights; just that in the feminist movement of the early 1970s, 
conversations began to emerge along socialist lines about the need for recognizing 
that working class women had to maintain control of all decisions regarding their 
own bodies, regardless of their particular background or identity. This was especially 
critical in terms of economics. For example, the most economically vulnerable 
women were the first to be targeted after the gains of Roe v. Wade, in the form of 
the Hyde Amendment (Joffe, 2011; Rowland, 2004; Smith, 2005). As Smith (2017) 
points out,
the most typical abortion patient is Black or Latina, in her 20s or 30s, who is 
living below or slightly below the federal poverty line and already has one or 
more children. Furthermore, 54% of abortion patients pay for it themselves, 
without Medicaid or insurance funding. First trimester abortions can cost from 
$400 to $1500 according to planned parenthood. (p. 16)
Rape is often used as a dividing line between women, with advocates of fetal 
personhood questioning the long-held notion of rape being an exception to banning 
abortion even among many anti-abortion advocates. The endless parsing of 
imaginary categories of rape into “acceptable” and “unacceptable” or “forcible rape” 
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versus some less violent version is a testament to slut shaming at its finest. Former 
Republican Missouri State Senator Todd Akin’s famous quote about legitimate rape 
and abortion comes to mind: “That’s [pregnancy as a result of rape] really rare. If 
it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down” 
(Cohen, 2012, paras. 2–3). In 2006, Republican South Dakota State Senator Bill 
Napoli supported legislation to ban all abortions in the state. When asked if he would 
allow for any exceptions to the ban, he went into great detail adding conditions to 
an exception for rape:
[She] would be a rape victim, brutally raped, savaged. The girl was a virgin. 
She was religious. She planned on saving her virginity until she was married. 
She was…sodomized as bad as you can possibly make it, and is impregnated. 
I mean, that girl could be so messed up, physically and psychologically, 
that carrying that child could very well threaten her life. (Joffe, 2011, p. 62,  
loc. 882–886)
These statements carry with them several cultural assumptions about women and 
sexuality: that somehow rape is more traumatic and unwanted if one isn’t a virgin, 
that extra-vaginal rape is more violating than the “right way” to have sex, that 
lifestyle choices somehow “bring on” rape, and that pregnancies as a result of rape 
imply a form of consent on the part of the victim who is therefore selfish for seeking 
an abortion. The obsession with locating true victimhood is not much different than 
the quest for the perfect innocent person: the fetus.
Joffe’s (2011) interviews with abortion clinic staff and patients revealed 
heartbreaking accounts of isolation and eroded solidarity between women, 
particularly patients who considered themselves anti-abortion:
“I am a Christian-I am not doing this casually,” one woman said, clearly 
suggesting that others in the waiting room were not so thoughtful or moral. 
Another woman said, “I think that people should be held accountable for their 
actions, and a lot of times it’s the convenience of the situation that makes it 
easy…to get an abortion, and if I wasn’t the person that I was, I mean, this 
would be real easy, just real simple…I wouldn’t support them because…it 
might become a habit for everyone.” (Joffe, 2011, p. 116, loc. 1565–1570)
The anti-choice women had to reconcile the contradiction of their own anti-
abortion beliefs and narratives with the stark reality of sitting in the clinic, facing 
the very situation they had openly derided others for in the past. Many of the women 
Joffe interviewed already had children. The only way out of their moral contradiction 
was to distance themselves from other patients by ascribing legitimate reasons to 
their own choices while framing other women were being promiscuous. For Joffe, 
this represented manifest shame, in particular as the women often expressed concern 
that someone might recognize them in the clinic. Indeed, many of the women 
deliberately chose to travel long distances to ensure that would not happen. After 
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their repeated encounters with anti-choice women, clinic staff wryly described the 
three exceptions for abortion as being “rape,” “incest,” and “mine.”
The Right has also been using multicultural strategies in their divisive attacks on 
reproductive rights. Kamoa (2012) provides the example of how homophobic laws 
and policies are presented as a way to stem the time of “Western” secularism that 
is targeting “Christian” populations in African countries. This successfully plays on 
legitimate concerns of the ravages of colonialism on the part of Western nations. 
Mixed into the message of resisting Western forces, however, is extreme nationalism, 
as in the case of Zambia’s “kill the gays” laws. As Kamoa puts it, “this deep-seated 
view of LGBT rights as a neocolonial import puts Westerners hoping to stand in 
solidarity with those under threat for their sexuality in a difficult spot” (p. 15).
A similar tactic occurs with anti-abortion laws and policies being promoted to 
African-American and Latino/a communities with an anti-eugenicist message 
through websites like blackgenocide.org and groups such as the National Black Pro-
Life Coalition, Blacks for Life, and Human Life International. This decontextualizes 
the historical and ongoing reality of eugenic overpopulation discourse and policies 
such as sterilization, overwhelmingly aimed at majority world countries and African-
Americans in the US (Rich, 1986). Additionally, Martinez (2002) notes the short-
sightedness of mainstream feminist organizations who often assume that women of 
color are anti-choice or are not interested in reproductive rights issues:
The problem has often been rooted in a racist arrogance underlying the 
attitude of many Anglo women toward Latina views on reproductive rights…
If we look more closely at Latina views, we find that reproductive freedom 
is a major concern of Latinas and not some taboo subject or minor matter. 
In 1977, when Congress ended federal funding of abortions, the first victim 
was a 27-year-old Chicana—Rosie Jimenez from McAllen, Texas, daughter of 
migrant workers—who died at the hands of an illegal abortionist after six days 
of suffering. (p. 273)
These collective efforts of the anti-choice movement see eroded solidarity as a key 
victory for anti-working-class policies as a whole.
Expanding Surveillance
Marcotte (2013) notes that part of the long-standing strategy of a focus on fetal 
personhood has been the ability to cultivate sympathy for an embryo without 
appearing to be too harsh in one’s responses to women who seek and obtain abortions, 
or, as she explains, “Claiming they don’t believe that women who get abortions are 
murderers even while calling abortion “murder” has been a huge part of the anti-
choice movement for years” (para. 6). For example, when pressed as to who should 
be penalized for seeking an abortion if the procedure were to become illegal, the past 
response was a call for punishing the doctors performing abortions (Rowland, 2004). 
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The woman was carefully avoided as a topic of conversation so as to distance the 
anti-choice movement from appearing to be anti-woman.
To maintain this line of messaging, the woman, who has no ability to think 
independently concerning medical decisions (regardless of her age), has to “fall 
prey” to the malicious intentions of a highly funded abortion network. She should 
not be to blame, just the liberal, anti-family feminists and the medical establishment 
who deliberately target the most vulnerable. The default position sustaining this 
thinking, of course, is that all women “naturally” want to have children so something 
malicious and out of the ordinary must be at work if a woman seeks an abortion or 
even oral contraceptives.
However, a recent shift has emerged where we are seeing calls for punitive actions 
against women who seek abortions (Joffe, 2011; Marcotte, 2013). Marcotte (2013) 
describes efforts in Iowa to introduce a bill that would define abortion as murder, and 
require the appropriate legal response aimed at women who engage in such murder. 
The bill also reaches further by targeting oral contraceptives:
The point of this bill is, simply put, to throw women in jail for “murder” for 
deliberately ending pregnancies—and quite possibly for trying to prevent 
them, as many anti-choicers continue to insist, despite the evidence against 
them, that the pill and emergency contraception work by “killing” fertilized 
eggs…The language of this is quite expansive. They’re not only counting 
women who reach out to legal providers for abortion as “murderers,” but also 
women who go online and buy drugs for this purpose. (para. 4)
Marcotte (2013) speculates that this recent attitudinal shift is due to a growing 
number of women taking matters into their own hands, including seeking in-home 
use abortion remedies obtained online or traveling to Mexico to have the procedure 
done. Women have had to do this because of within-state barriers such as mandatory 
waiting periods, clinic closures, and economic constraints in the wake of the Hyde 
Amendment (Rowland, 2004). An increasing number of women independently 
seeking abortions through other means contradict the stereotype of helpless victims 
who are prey to evil feminist forces and nefarious doctors. It turns out that a 
significant number of women were not waiting for anti-abortion laws to “change 
their minds” and are not interested after all in carrying an unintended pregnancy to 
term, including many women who identify as anti-choice (Joffe, 2011). Marcotte 
(2013) feels that this has created a gloves-off attitudinal shift in the anti-choice 
movement, laying bare its deep misogyny in its call for imprisoning women who do 
not want to be pregnant and insist on defying the natural order of things.
Initially, fetal homicide laws were designed as part of a recognition by law 
enforcement and social services agencies that pregnant women faced increased crime 
risk, including domestic violence (Jones, 2013). What has happened instead is that 
fetal homicide laws have been used punitively against pregnant women, specifically 
those who are from marginalized groups:
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These laws shifted the balance of power in favor of the state and the language 
of the debate began to change. Developing fetuses so clearly defined by the 
Justices in Roe v. Wade became “unborn children” in need of the protection 
of the state. Child abuse statutes were used to bully or prosecute women in 
aggressive, heavy-handed campaigns undertaken—as often, no doubt, in the 
stated effort to “help people”—as part of a larger political effort intended 
to change the nation’s perspective on “unborn children” by taking aim at 
the easiest targets: poor, downtrodden, drug-and alcohol-addicted women. 
(Rowland, 2004, p. 318)
Fetal homicide laws essentially created the category of the unborn human, tried apart 
from the mother carrying it. What this resulted in was making women subject to the 
control of the state and their actions placed under intensified surveillance (Jones, 
2013).
The problem is that fetal personhood immediately throws us into a competing 
rights framework where the more rights the unborn receive, the fewer rights the 
woman carrying the fetus is entitled to (McCullough, 2012). For example, while 
citizens are afforded protections by the country in which they live, they are also at 
the same time granting the state access to engage in particular legal behaviors such as 
surveillance, seizure of property, and access to one’s home, etc. Those who propose 
a fetal personhood legal framework seem to want to transfer all of the protections 
of citizenship to the fetus, with all of the intrusion-oriented state functions falling to 
the adult woman who is carrying the fetus. The woman then serves as an appendage 
whose sole purpose is to absorb the trials of citizenship without question. On the 
other hand, the fetus experiences no legal sanction whatsoever.
Feticide laws exist in 38 states (Cohen, 2011, para. 11). Of these states, 10 set 
boundaries at viability while 21 states count the entire pregnancy as prosecutable 
(Crist, 2010, p. 858). Burroughs (2012) notes, “The state could charge and imprison 
women who harmed their fetuses by using over-the-counter medications, smoking, 
or drinking alcohol. The feticide statute could be construed as covering a full range 
of pregnant woman’s behavior” (p. 47). Substance abuse during pregnancy is viewed 
as grounds for civil convictions in Minnesota, South Dakota, and Washington. More 
than 200 women have been arrested based on fetal separatist convictions (Rowand, 
2004). A majority of these women are minority and poor (Cohen, 2011; Rowland, 
2004; Tilly & Albeda, 2002).
Burroughs (2012) and Cohen (2011) relate the situation of Bei Bei Shuai, who 
had attempted suicide during her pregnancy in reaction to finding out her boyfriend 
was married and planning to leave her. She was stabilized but her fetus died a few 
days after being born. Not long after, Shuai was arrested and charged with attempted 
feticide. Indiana’s law recognizes the fetus the same as a person—since Shuai’s 
fetus’ death was viewed as a result of her attempted suicide, she is being charged 
according to the law. The impact of the Shuai case is far-reaching in terms of not 
only prosecution, but surveillance as a whole. According to Jones (2013), this could 
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create a legal precedent that would make every woman legally responsible for the 
outcome of her own pregnancy. This could include giving police the authority to 
determine which miscarriages and stillbirths would garner investigation and possibly 
arrests. If Roe were to be overturned, women who choose to end their pregnancies 
by any means necessary would be charged with murder.
McCullough (2012) outlines several examples in New Zealand of personhood 
actions such as proposing to assign each fetus a registration number tied to the national 
health care system and child protection alert systems where pregnant women who 
are victims of domestic violence or take part in harmful behaviors would be placed 
on a special watch list. Along a similar vein, the high rates of arrest among minority 
women in the US for fetal harm are not due to minorities using drugs at a greater 
rate than whites, but because hospitals in poor neighborhoods automatically perform 
infant toxicology screenings (Cohen, 2011). Rowland (2004) relates an extreme case 
of fetal privileging in a Massachusetts criminal trial where, as part of the defense 
strategy, a woman had to stand by and listen as her rapist and kidnapper accused her 
of being a baby killer because she once attended a pro-life rally.
Increased surveillance also extends to every habit of a pregnant women being 
placed under intense scrutiny. As Joffe (2011) notes,
The antiabortion movement has long recognized the power of outing abortion 
patients as a means of discouraging other potential patients. This explains 
the movement’s numerous efforts to photograph the license plates of cars in 
clinic parking lots and film those entering and leaving the clinics. (p. 116,  
loc. 1563–1564)
This form of monitoring has extended into proposed laws, such as the Texas 
Administrative Code (2012), which requires that abortion providers gather detailed 
information (assured to remain confidential) from their patients in a 16 point list 
including date of last menstrual cycle, demographic information, number of previous 
abortions, and if the patient was given the sonogram results prior to the abortion. 
Grimes (2013) reports that the Texas Department of State Health Services did not 
consider the feedback of experts to revise these invasive rules, but instead took action 
by enacting the Texas Administrative Code, based on the input of 10 individuals, all 
men, including state legislators and representatives of anti-abortion groups.
The function of fetal personhood laws is also tied to nationalism (McCullough, 
2012). As one fights to preserve the national identity of citizens” then the elevated 
position of the innocent person only aids in the move to a fascist concept of the correct 
citizen, and the need for outside groups to rush to the aid of the most vulnerable. 
Cohen (2011) quotes Samuel Casey, who heads the Legal Christian Society:
In as many areas as we can, we want to put on the books that the embryo is 
a person…that sets the stage for a jurist to acknowledge that human beings 
at any stage of development deserve protection—even protection that would 
trump a woman’s interest in terminating a pregnancy. (para. 13)
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Indeed, much anti-immigrant rhetoric in the United States refers to declining birth 
rates of whites as a point of collective anxiety, as in a White Extinction Awareness 
Blog post linking demographic changes to negative social outcomes (Facts About 
White Decline, n.d.). The fact that US birth rates across all racial and ethnic groups 
are dropping overall (Wetzstein, 2013) appears to be missed by contemporary racists 
who are all too eager to link abortion to social decline.
Ultimately, it becomes difficult to disconnect the use of abortion restrictions to 
justify increased surveillance of poor women, as Rowland (2004) notes:
In addition to being written by middle class Americans, these laws are supposed 
to appeal to middle class Americans. For soccer moms and PTA parents. For the 
“middle of America” and people who have settled—usually comfortably—into 
child rearing and, who, therefore, cannot imagine, or don’t care to consider, 
the harsh realities of other people’s lives. It is toward these people that state 
officials have aimed when announcing the prosecutions of poor, urban and 
mainly minority women for drinking or living out the tragedies of addiction 
while pregnant. It is for these people—the middle-class parents—that graphic 
arguments about “partial birth” abortion are made and for whom placards were 
waved. (p. 331)
As Coontz (1998) has pointed out, any time a social policy is implemented along the 
lines of moral justification, as in the family values movement’s vision for America, 
the sanctions invariably fall hardest on the most vulnerable, leaving the ruling class 
relatively unscathed, because exceptions are always granted for their situations or 
they have the means to locate solutions on their own. In the case of feticide laws, 
poor and minority women bear the biggest brunt of the sanctions (Tilly & Abeda, 
2002).
We are facing a situation where, in an era of intensified privatization, women’s 
reproductive organs are becoming public spaces. As soon as a fetus is defined as a 
person, women are automatically put under surveillance and control:
Given that women’s reproductive role has long been a basis for inequality 
and inferiority under the law, a good case can be made that transforming the 
fertilized egg into a citizen is a way of reinstating at least some of the control 
over women that has been lost in the wake of the sexual revolution and the pill. 
Rather than controlling women directly, that control is now exerted on behalf 
of an innocent fellow citizen. (p. 21)
Thesee (2013) views the panoply of violence against women as “misogynistic 
tyranny,” (p. 192) where the family is the initial portal of control of women. This 
control is then buttressed through laws and institutions. Fetal personhood is a perfect 
mechanism for justifying intensified surveillance of women in general, all in the 
support of the security state as a whole.
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Supporting Public Sector Attacks
According to Baker (2012), public sector attacks aimed at women are coming from 
a variety of fronts, including churches, corporations, conservative politicians at 
the state level, and high-profile media figures such as Rush Limbaugh and Sean 
Hannity. For example, Congress aimed to transform Medicaid into block grants, 
which would result in drastically cutting funding to the program. Medicaid recipients 
are overwhelmingly women from low-income backgrounds, 70% of recipients, to 
be exact (p. 31). Fetal personhood is used as a justification for ending access to 
contraception and abortion, which directly impact women economically:
Once the government wins the right to deny aid to women who have children 
while on welfare and to otherwise limit the reproductive rights of poor women, 
it becomes that much easier to tamper with the reproductive rights of all 
women. The pattern already exists. Shortly after 1973, when the Supreme 
Court (in Roe v. Wade) granted women the right to an abortion, the right-to-
life forces won passage of the Hyde Amendment, which forbids the use of 
Medicaid dollars for abortions. Since then, abortion foes have successfully 
limited the reproductive rights of women regardless of their economic class. 
Welfare reform follows suit. (Abramovitz, 2002, p. 224)
In the United States as well as the rest of the world, women make up the majority 
of low-wage, no-to-low-benefit, service industry work and public-sector workforces 
(Madland & Bunker, 2012; Minimum Wage Fact Sheet, 2013; Vivas 2013). Women 
are also overwhelmingly negatively impacted by cuts to entitlement programs such 
as social security and welfare (Schilling, 2013; Vivas, 2013). Because cuts to abortion 
and health care services are often connected to the wider attack on the public sector 
as a whole, understanding fetal personhood takes on immediate relevance, as Cohen 
(2011) articulates: “Todays feticide laws extend the assault on reproductive rights just 
as more and more women face unemployment, eviction, and the slashing of public 
services—in other words, just as the potential need for abortion grows” (para. 19).
Indeed, the very structure of our privatized health care system contributes to the 
stigmatization of women who seek abortion services. In the United States, over 90% 
of abortions occur in clinic type settings, with the remainder happening in hospitals 
and through private doctors’ offices (Joffe, 2011, p. 48, loc. 694). Compounding the 
problem of access, there has been a drastic reduction in the number of places where 
women can obtain an abortion. Over 80% of American counties have no abortion 
provider, even though roughly 33% of women between 15 and 45 live in those 
counties (Rowland, 2004, p. 288). The Catholic Church operates four out of ten of 
the largest health care entities in the US, further restricting medical services such as 
abortion and contraceptives (p. 289). Catholic hospitals are now the largest source 
of non-profit health care in the US with 1 in 6 patients treated annually (Ginty, 2011, 
p. 32). Joffe (2011) also notes that many women who do have private health coverage 
for abortion choose not to use it for fear of leaving a paper trail for others to find out.
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In Europe, by contrast, abortion is a routine procedure, occurring in public 
hospitals insured by national health care systems. Because abortion is automatically 
part of national health care, harassment is minimal. This points to the emptiness 
behind Democrats framing abortion as merely a matter of “choice,” because women 
from different income backgrounds do not have the same type of options when it 
comes to reproductive health care:
Choice has to include having all the healthcare services and information that 
enable a woman to make her own decision freely…While a Medicaid-funded 
abortion may be hard or impossible to get in some states, sterilization services 
are provided by states under Medicaid, and the Federal government reimburses 
states for 90% of those expenses. (Martinez, 2002, p. 273)
Much of the discourse surrounding the controversy that emerged after the passage 
of the Affordable Care Act in the US focused (in varying degrees of severity and 
insult) on the construct of decent, hard-working, middle class Americans having 
to support the sexual peccadillos of poor, slutty women who were a burden on the 
system. Joffe (2011) explains how this plays out against the larger context of a 
declining social safety net for the working class as a whole:
Women who otherwise have a great deal in common-because of the failures 
of both government and the private market to meet many families’ needs-are 
separated by their positions on abortion. Even people who are profoundly anti-
choice don’t have health insurance and are losing their pensions and can’t send 
their kids to college…conservatives’ focus on abortion and ‘bad mothers’ has 
led to a situation where it is more acceptable to deny welfare to `bad mothers’ 
and where it is more acceptable to have the U.S. be the only industrialized 
country without paid parental leave. (pp. 141–142, loc. 1876–1880)
It becomes all too clear that the nuclear family construct is no longer sustainable 
for a growing number of women (Coontz, 1998; Smith, 2005). Yet Kandiyoti (2002) 
speculates that the motivation of a good number of female anti-abortion activists is 
due to their resistance to separating sexuality from reproduction because they feel 
this separation lets men off the hook in terms of family responsibility. In the absence 
of a supportive public sector (such as childcare), many women attempt to resurrect 
the nuclear family instead as a solution to the problem of men who abandon their 
children.
Kaplan (2002) identifies nostalgia for the nuclear family and “good mothers” as 
going hand in hand with an intensified decrease in the interest of existing children—
particularly children from lower income backgrounds—along with hostility toward 
their mothers. The pro-life position apparently does not extend to poor women’s 
rights to have children. Additionally, “good families” are those families who do not 
bother the rest of society with their economic problems. Good families take on all 
expenses silently and without complaint. Joffe (2011) notes how compared to other 
countries which view childcare as a socialized duty, a virtual consensus exists in the 
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US that only people of means should have children. Rich (1986) expresses the grave 
limitations of this perspective:
A movement narrowly concerned with pregnancy and birth which does not 
ask questions and demand answers about the lives of children, the priorities of 
government; a movement in which individual families rely on consumerism 
and educational privilege to supply their own children with good nutrition, 
schooling, health care can, while perceiving itself as progressive or alternative, 
exist only as a minor contradiction within a society most of whose children 
grow up in poverty and which places its highest priority on the technology of 
war. (p. xii)
CONCLUSION
On May 15, 2019, Alabama Governor Kay Ivey signed the most restrictive anti-
abortion law in over 40 years. Citing God as leading her to decide to sign, the law 
would make abortion a felony, with no exceptions in the cases of rape or incest 
(Madani, 2019). It is way past time for us to act. With this in mind, a starting point 
for responding to the assault on reproductive freedom is militancy, not compromise. 
With the recent connection of the #MeToo movement and the Women’s March to 
larger issues like reproductive rights, racism, police brutality, workers’ rights, and 
the LGBTQ community, a more direct, insistent discourse is saying, “enough is 
enough.” Even with the Democratic Party finally openly defending abortion and 
reproductive rights, largely as a response to the Trump administration, women 
remain unrepresented and relegated to “fringe issue” status in mainstream politics, 
especially poor and working-class women. Because reproductive laws do not remain 
static nor adhere to linear notions of progress, access to contraception and abortion 
remain vulnerable (Rich, 1986). Militancy is therefore necessary.
Planned Parenthood’s disastrous decision to “tone down” their language used in 
advertising and promotions by removing “pro-choice” is an example of how the 
right wing has successfully eroded reproductive freedom (Abortion Shouldn’t be 
a Dirty Word, 2013; Smith, S., 2017). Because of the ideological (and sometimes 
actual) attacks on Planned Parenthood clinics, the organization had assumed that 
a simple removal of terminology would reduce these assaults. This pragmatic 
approach only emboldens rightist responses and does nothing to ease legal actions 
on the part of anti-choice groups. Rowland (2004) expresses concerns about this 
strategy of civility:
Genteel. Polite. With battles that are carefully chosen and calmly planned by 
a close circle of highly celebrated and roundly educated women who have 
tended to take the high road. All seem to agree that it is a nice way to handle it: 
not to stoop to “their level.” The problem with this approach, however, is that 
the high road is rapidly leading women to defeat. (p. 757)
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Joffe (2011) asserts that the contradiction between public discourse on abortion 
and contraception and polling which consistently shows that majorities believe both 
should remain legal, is due more to people not wanting to stir up controversy than to 
any sustained opposition on moral grounds. This leads to the increased stigmatization 
of abortion and contraception in the media that does not reflect reality as well putting 
the lives of poor, working-class and disabled women on the line. Since most of 
the recipients of Planned Parenthood rely on Medicaid public health and Medicaid 
funding, for this service to end would mean no options for safe reproductive health 
services (Smith, S., 2017).
In June 2013, Texas women turned the genteel approach on its head. In response 
to a special session to discuss draconian anti-abortion legislation which would 
criminalize all abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy, hundreds of reproductive 
rights activists (including males in solidarity) gathered at the state capitol to protest 
the actions of legislators (Culp-Ressler, 2013). Even though Democrats brought 
legal challenges to the proposed bill, the street action inside and outside the Capitol 
was the remarkable highlight of the story:
All this led to the “people’s filibuster” on the final day of the special session 
on June 24, in which protesters in the gallery and the Capitol rotunda took over 
for a filibuster by Democratic Sen. Wendy Davis and yelled at the top of their 
lungs long enough to prevent the bill from passing by the midnight deadline.
Undeterred this outpouring of protest, Perry quickly called another special 
session to try to pass the bill. Though many people were no doubt exhausted 
from the activism during the first special session, pro-choice activists continued 
to come out in droves during the second special session. They arrived at the 
Capitol before dawn to fill the House and Senate galleries, they shared their 
personal experiences about abortion at committee hearings, and they attended 
rallies and marches throughout the session. (Taylor, 2013, para. 8–9)
Immediately Wendy Davis and her supporters were portrayed as unreasonable, 
unfeminine, and as not being “respectful” of those in power, even dangerous. The 
tone policing didn’t work. Protests were ramped up after attempts were made to 
silence the women, with police responding by going as far as disallowing tampons in 
the legislature (though firearms were apparently fine). This only resulted in a more 
abysmal image for the Republican Party, whose support among women was already 
on shaky ground.
Even though the bill still passed, an important lesson was learned. Fighting back 
still means something and being loud is the way to get things done. The Texas 
legislature had assumed that the feminist movement was docile, irrelevant, and 
too afraid to appear militant or even…feminist! They were wrong. Unmoved by 
a fetus baiting counter-rally which featured a bussed-in audience and the reality 
television mega-sized Duggar family, Texas women and others around the country 
took organizing and protest to a whole new level, using multiple strategies, none 
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of which involved compromise or toning down the message. Taylor (2013) quotes 
one of the activists who had obviously had enough and didn’t care about appearing 
“angry”:
It’s infuriating and insulting to watch the past 40 years of progress be so 
aggressively rolled back by those least affected by a bill like House Bill 2. I 
went to the Capitol not because I believed we could stop the bill from passing, 
but because I felt the spark of a new movement for reproductive justice, and I 
wanted to be a part of that energy.
Also, I was really mad, and I wanted to yell. A lot. I wanted the senators of the 
Texas legislation to hear the enraged voices of the people they so carelessly 
disregarded. If this bill was passing, it wasn’t passing quietly. (para. 25–26)
With the recent resurgence of authoritarian populism and fascism, we can expect an 
urgent need for more of this type of active resistance. 
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CHAPTER 7
IN DEFENSE OF SCIENCE, THE PRESS AND 
EXPERTISE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
INTRODUCTION
Two contradictory phenomena are happening within media discourse. The first 
is the rapid rise of the Internet and social media, which has vastly increased the 
reach of ideas. At the same time, because of search tracking and the revenue models 
of social media such as click through ads, people are increasingly isolated within 
narrow thought collectives, only receiving information tailored to their indicated 
interests and viewpoints. Truth becomes more elusive, and not in a fun, playful 
postmodern way (DeVega, 2017). The interaction of these two aspects has shaped 
how people approach truth and reality, creating openings for those in power to 
exploit vulnerabilities (Illing, 2017a; Pomeranstev & Weiss, 2014; Starbird, 2017).
Once viewed as democratizing and liberating, it has become clear that the Internet 
and social media are just as subject to the ruling ideas of the capitalist class as any 
other endeavor. Pomeranstev and Weiss (2014) note that political leaders no longer 
have to rely on manifest oppression, they can “manipulate from the inside” by 
exploiting “the idea that ‘truth’ is a lost cause and that reality is essentially malleable” 
(p. 17). Because the Internet facilitates the distribution of copies of copies without 
much fact checking, it is fertile soil for these efforts. Additionally, the data produced 
from interactions on the Internet has caught the attention of private companies who 
regularly contract with governments, corporations, political campaigns, etc. to 
analyze such data to optimize influencing (Shaw, 2018).
The power of the “big lie” that is often attributed to Hitler and Goebbels has 
far outgrown its original constraints, such as they were. In the past, propaganda 
would be distributed with a specific message or set of ideas meant to shape public 
perception. Today, the lie itself is the goal:
We live in a time when intentional, systematic, destabilizing lying—totalitarian 
lying for the sake of lying, lying as a way to assert or capture political power—
has become the dominant factor in public life in Russia, the United States, 
Great Britain, and many other countries in the world…engaging with these lies 
is unavoidable and even necessary. (Gessen, 2018, para. 15)
It is fast becoming clear that even efforts at using leftist alternative media have 
not been able to penetrate “how information is shared and consumed, and, more 
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profoundly…how narratives around that information are shaped and by whom” 
(Starbird, 2017, p. 1).
In the recent past, concepts that were considered too outlandish and unacceptable 
for mainstream journalistic discourse have now been given a hearing in those venues. 
As Goldberg (2018) notes, “an opinion section that truly captured the currents of 
thought shaping our politics today might include Alex Jones, the conspiracy-mad 
Sandy Hook truther; the white nationalist Richard Spencer; and CliffsNotes fascist 
Steve Bannon” (para. 11). This is the culmination of “the coming of a networked 
society” much heralded by the left in the early days of the Internet, where traditional 
journalism would be unseated by more democratically produced, leaderless 
crowdsourcing and just-in-time-content (Nagle, 2017a, p. 3). Unfortunately, “this 
network has indeed arrived, but it has helped to take the right, not the left, to power” 
(p. 27). In all of the excitement over the Internet, people failed to see that the content 
of what was being distributed does indeed matter.
Added to this is a profound dialectical-materialist disconnect between people and 
the views that they hold. This starts with a misunderstanding about the source of 
one’s beliefs, which do not simply originate within one’s self apart from external 
factors:
An individual’s ideology doesn’t come from inside them, but is an effect of 
time and place. But it’s much easier to understand how this was true of some 
stranger in the distant past than to accept it about yourself—that you’re a 
product of the social processes of your time, and your ideas are not crystals 
of pure rationality, but the residue of these processes. (Winant, 2017, para. 1)
An example of this is the lack of political engagement about the very beliefs that 
people claim to have, which leads to not being politically informed. When asked to 
situate themselves along a continuum of government providing more social services 
on the left to reducing spending on the right, 15% of respondents declined to answer 
because “they have not thought about it” (The Power of Groupthink, 2017, para. 8). 
The same percentage will indicate where they appear on the continuum, but are not 
able to correctly place Democratic or Republican party platforms. This means one 
third of the electorate has a profound misunderstanding where the politicians they 
vote for stand regarding the role of the state (para. 4).
At this point it should be pretty clear that we have moved far beyond Karl Rove’s 
Bush-era declaration of an empire creating its own reality into there being no reality 
at all unless it meets the approval of Trump and his supporters:
Trumpland…knows no national loyalties and recognizes no transcendent or 
democratic values beyond power and profit. Trumpland is post-truth and lives 
on the propagation of fake news. For Donald Trump himself, discourse serves 
the interests of Trumpland and has no relation to truth and falsity. (Kellner, 
2017, p. 100)
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At the same time, much of the left clings to the futile hope that simply repeating 
facts at the right wing will disrupt their efforts at misinformation (Cloud, 2018). 
This chapter presents five primary ways that the right wing has attempted to manage 
perceptions related to their dismantling of the public good and eroding rational 
thought. These include an attack on the notion of expertise, reviving pseudoscience 
around race and gender, manufacturing fake news, promulgating both-sides-ism in 
the press and intensifying the spread of conspiracy theories.
ATTACK ON EXPERTISE
As discussed in Chapter 2, anti-intellectualism has long been a hallmark of right-
wing populist and fascist movements. However, rightist discourse has more recently 
moved into a more intense focus on a particular facet of intellectualism: expertise 
(DeVega, 2017; T. Nichols, 2017). Trump and his supporters regularly portray 
experts as elitist, out of touch, and purveyors of leftist bias. Experts are bogged down 
by an adherence to tedious, time-wasting details when what is needed is a man (it is 
always a man) who will get down to business. Dworkin (2017) includes an excerpt 
from a right-wing blog which encapsulates this hostility toward expertise:
Trump is slaying sacred cows…The only thing anybody knows is that the things 
we are seeing have never been done before and Donald Trump is refusing to 
follow any of the proper conventions…Think of the glory of it all. This is the 
fight we have been waiting for. This is the turmoil we need. The president is 
making common sense policy decisions that don’t need the backing of long 
reports authored by “experts”…It is almost as if he thinks the people should 
rule, not supposed expertise…This will undoubtedly result in pushback from 
bureaucrats and “experts,” and timid culture warriors who apparently enjoy 
self-emasculation or have realized (incorrectly) that they have more to gain 
from maintaining the status quo. (para. 11)
What this blog post illustrates is that the right-wing view of expertise is also 
highly gendered, with common sense and “gut instinct” being masculinized, and 
experts relegated to the realm of the feminized. Disruption is also valued, especially 
if it stops experts who spend too much time thinking when they should be acting—in 
right-wing directions, of course. The irony is that while the right-wing continually 
complains about overly sensitive liberals, their discourse runs entirely on appeals to 
emotion, such as the talking points surrounding Brexit in 2016. Despite warnings 
from economists, proponents of England remaining in the EU were portrayed as 
“enemies of the ordinary voter” or fearmongers (T. Nichols, 2017, p. 209). Michal 
Gove, one of the key figures behind the Brexit movement, “argued that facts were 
not as important as the feelings of the British voter” (p. 209).
It is also contradictory that expertise is seen as being out of touch with reality, 
when what expertise involves is a series of reflections on lived experiences 
and integrating those reflections into one’s practice and existing set of content 
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knowledge (T. Nichols, 2017). This is the key difference for the right—experience 
is rarely reflected upon—and it becomes a form of dogma which reinforces existing 
prejudices. The idea is to barge ahead and act in-the-moment with the resolve of a 
heat-seeking missile.
Within anti-expertise frameworks, the mediocre is elevated and becomes a 
celebrated value. Sartre’s (1976) analysis of anti-Semitism found that its anti-
intellectual adherents, far from being humble and “just regular folks,” were the 
embodiment of arrogance: “there is a passionate pride among the mediocre, and 
(p. 16). Dorfman (2017) sees the Trump administration as equating expertise with 
liberalism. Therefore, experts are replaced by “know-nothing fundamentalists” who 
represent industry and seek to defund public programs and agencies (para. 6). As 
T. Nichols (2017) notes, “the public space is increasingly dominated by a loose 
assortment of poorly informed people, many of them autodidacts who are disdainful 
of formal education and dismissive of experience” (p. 14).
Under these conditions, the nature of education itself is radically altered, where 
patriarchal hierarchies are valorized and expressed in narrow, all-male terms. Loyalty, 
in particular, is held above all other values, with curriculum and messaging stressing 
concepts like reverence and respect for those holding the appropriate values, over 
time-tested expertise (Theweleit, 2010b). Sartre (1976) sees this as a manifestation 
of “a longing for impenetrability” that is held up as an important personality 
characteristic (p. 12). The anti-expert has to develop this survival strategy in order to 
“choose to reason falsely” (p. 12). Sartre locates the fear of truth not in the content 
of that truth (what is usually dismissed as unimportant), but in the various forms that 
truth can take, which are harder to control.
The attack against experts is accompanied by a resentment of any type of 
oversight, which is built into professional structures and credentialing. Though 
imperfect, these protective structures exist to maintain the integrity of the 
profession and to ensure that ethical standards are being met (T. Nichols, 2017). 
Jones (2015) relates the views of education privatizer Wendy Kopp, founder of 
Teach for America when asked to comment on hiring less-experienced teachers 
instead of veteran ones:
There’s also a power in inexperience—that it can make a huge difference to 
channel the energy of young people, before they know what’s “impossible” 
and when they still have endless energy, against a problem that many have long 
since given up on. They can set and meet goals that seem impossible to others 
who know more about how the world works. (p. 81)
It is important to note, however, that right-wing resentment of professionals is not 
applied to conservative wealthy people (DeVega, 2017). Combined with the disdain 
for professional expertise is a desire to aspire to be rich and ambitious, but still retain 
one’s folksy, populist values.
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Part of what contributes to a hostility toward experts is that much of the systematic 
problem-solving processes they use are not easily seen and can be shrouded in mystery. 
T. Nichols (2107) points out how the multiple revisions that are part of professional 
communities take place outside of the public eye where all that is visible is the final 
result. And even then, it’s not as apparent unless something malfunctions. In the case 
of repealing the Affordable Care Act, it is difficult for people to conceptualize the 
degree of economic impacts that a repeal could have, even if they have some vague 
ideas. Society is also structured in such a way that people are alienated from the 
processes that produce most of the artifacts of modern life. This can lead people to 
think, “how hard can that be?” when contemplating the role of expertise (para. 13). 
A lack of transparency also applies to how projects like think tanks are funded and 
the impact of the private sector on shaping laws (Pomeranstev & Weiss, 2014). It 
is no surprise that political leaders take advantage of an overall lack of political 
knowledge to create messaging in support of right-wing ideas like Brexit that fall 
apart under scrutiny (T. Nichols, 2017).
There is also a cognitive aspect to anti-expertise thinking, involving confirmation 
bias and reasoning shortcuts (Ehrenreich, 2017; T. Nichols, 2017). All people, 
including experts, have to grapple with how to explain phenomena and start with 
a set of assumptions; otherwise nothing would get done. While strategies like 
shortcuts can assist with decision-making, they can also be misleading and end up 
reinforcing one’s own prejudices. Confirmation bias also tends to involve critique-
averse concepts that are not falsifiable. Ehrenreich (2017) explains that people tend 
to “underestimate the risks of events that unfold slowly and whose consequences are 
felt only over the long term (think global warming) and overestimate the likelihood 
of events that unfold rapidly and have immediate consequences (think terrorist 
attacks) (para. 11). Laypeople also tend to conflate experts’ errors with systemic 
error, and point to instances of experts being wrong in order to reject, across the 
board, findings they don’t agree with (T. Nichols, 2017).
Contrary to the arbitrariness that is often associated with experts, Santer 
(2017) recounts the thought processes involved with scientific expertise, from the 
perspective of being a climate scientist:
You put in a long apprenticeship. You spend years learning about the climate 
system, computer models of climate and climate observations. You start 
filling a tool kit with the statistical and mathematical methods you’ll need for 
analyzing complex data sets. You are taught how electrical engineers detect 
signals embedded in noisy data. You apply those engineering insights to the 
detection of a human-caused warming signal buried in the natural “noise” of 
Earth’s climate. Eventually, you learn that human activities are warming Earth’s 
surface, and you publish this finding in peer-reviewed literature. (para. 4)
Part of this process involves extensive peer review and assessments, along with a 
deliberate decision to consider one’s own bias, hold up a range of scientific findings 
against your own, and work within the limits placed by industry and government. 
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On top of this careful practice, climate scientists deal with constant criticism of their 
findings and are held up to extremely rigorous standards. Yet their conclusions, like 
those of other experts, are dismissed as “opinion.”
It should come as no surprise that educational institutions and professionals are 
the continual target of right-wing discourse opposing expertise. At a recent Trump 
rally, Donald Trump Jr. directed young conservatives to “keep up that fight, bring it 
to your schools. You don’t have to be indoctrinated by these loser teachers that are 
trying to sell you on socialism from birth” (Mazza, 2019, para. 3). Not limiting their 
wrath to public schools, early 60% of Republicans see universities as negatively 
contributing to US society, marking the first time a majority of conservatives viewed 
postsecondary education in this light (Sitrin, 2017, para. 2). Trump’s election and the 
strident anti-expertise thinking that comes with it has impacted conservatives, 54% 
of them who as recently as 2015 viewed universities as having a positive impact on 
the country (para. 2). One contributing aspect of the backlash is the fact that Trump 
is actively resisted on college campuses and the loyalty aspect of anti-expertise 
thinking kicks in.
Jones (2015) also connects recent hostility toward teachers to an overall de-
professionalization of teaching, where teachers are expected to align themselves 
with the business world and “willingly agree to repeal tenure, give up collective 
bargaining, and accept job performance evaluation based largely on student test 
scores, and support merit pay” (p. 36). Jones also notes how notions about expertise 
surrounding the saying “those who can’t do, teach” have long been a part of the 
teaching profession, hinting at the perceived lesser quality of teachers who couldn’t 
survive in more prestigious professions. The irony is that the increased surveillance 
and rigidity of evaluation schemes paired with lower salaries and no workplace 
protections that conservatives advocate for would not be tolerated by higher-paid 
professionals.
Ultimately, anti-expertise thinking occurs against a backdrop of overall distrust 
of government and any kind of public service, including education. “Education 
reformers” and others with an interest in eroding expertise, “draw upon the economic 
understanding and political will of a sizable number of citizens and politicians that 
has taken shape since the economic downfall of 2008 and the rise of the Tea Party” 
(Jones, 2015, p. 9). This contributes to an attitude of “cutting the waste,” the waste 
being experts who are blamed for social problems. Dorfman (2017) recalls more dire 
consequences of this line of thinking in 1973 Chile:
Books were turned to ashes, musicians were shot, scientists and educators 
were tortured. Meanwhile, the military, inspired by the same fundamentalism 
and loathing that had raged in Franco’s Spain, derided intelligence and reveled 
in death. The intelligentsia, they insisted, was to blame for Chile’s upheavals 
and supposed decline. (para. 3)
McCandless’ (2017) investigative piece on the city of Von Ormy provides a recent 
case study of the consequences of rejecting expertise. Back in 2006, a few residents 
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were hostile to the idea of the city becoming annexed by San Antonio as well as 
resistant to any solution that involved formal roles of government. The libertarian 
mayor, Arturo Martinez de Vara, floated the idea of Von Ormy becoming a “liberty 
city,” essentially “a stripped-down, low-tax, low-government version of municipal 
government” touted by the Texas Tea Party (para. 6). According to the plan, the town 
would first collect property and sales taxes, but eventually the property tax would 
be reduced to zero.
To make up for the revenue loss, residents were promised that businesses would 
be attracted to the low tax base and eventually only sales taxes would be needed to 
support the city. Martinez de Vara attempted to recruit major chains but immediately 
ran into a problem because there was no sewer system in Von Ormy and connecting 
to San Antonio’s was too expensive. The City Administrator suggested accepting 
a bond, which most cities do when faced with major expenses. Martinez de Vara 
turned down this advice since liberty cities were supposed to stand on their own 
without assistance.
By 2011, Texas Republicans took notice and began to tout the city as an 
impressive example for other smaller localities, recruiting Martinez de Vara to 
serve as chief of staff to Representative John Garza and later Senator Konni Burton. 
However, an attempt to pass Senate Bill 710, recognizing the liberty city concept as 
an official category of municipal government never made it out of committee. The 
promised businesses never materialized. By 2016, the police and fire departments 
had to close down. City officials ended up bickering over who was supposed to be 
police chief, with the new mayor attempting to fire the existing police chief who 
was accused of misrepresenting his law enforcement resumé. Three city council 
members were arrested on the assumption that they violated the Open Meetings Act 
and others kept things at a standstill by refusing to show up to vote for important 
measures. Essentially, the only thing left in the town was enough blame to go around 
(McCandless, 2017).
PSEUDOSCIENCE
Feeding off of anti-expertise sentiment, pseudoscience uses a different strategy by 
presenting itself as connected to the scientific community while using superficial 
markers of science as a way to obfuscate and insert confusion surrounding important 
public health issues. Pseudoscience practitioners use visual and discursive symbols 
of academic science as a way to add credibility to their messaging while supporting 
science in the service of capital. Currently, there are three primary approaches that are 
part of pseudoscience. First is the presentation of flat-out false or unscientific ideas 
under the guise of science. Second includes the tactic of using different means to 
interfere with or suppress the development and distribution of scientific knowledge. 
Finally, a third way that pseudoscience is promoted involves the selective support 
and funding of science projects that can be monetized in a capitalist system while 
ignoring projects for the common good.
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The Guise of Science
Regarding the first approach, Trump’s election, friendliness toward white 
supremacists and receptivity to pseudoscientific thinking has revived debunked 
concepts such as race realism and evolutionary psychology, which uses academic 
language to carry racism, sexism, and homophobia to the mainstream. Additionally, 
movements like the flat earthers and anti-vaxxers often use scientific-sounding 
arguments to support faulty reasoning, creating just enough confusion while taking 
advantage of the both-sides-ism of the media. For Gaspar (2018), concepts like 
scientific racism, though regularly refuted, have to be repeatedly debunked because 
the inequality that feeds these ideas has never really gone away. In other words, 
“because scientific racism is driven not by scientific evidence but by the racial 
animus of some and the unexamined assumptions of others, these hopes have not yet 
come to fruition” (p. 104).
A hallmark of pseudoscience is pointing to indirect evidence that is neither 
refutable nor testable, such as attributing differences to specific genetic traits 
(Gaspar, 2018; Penny, 2018). Science often gets mixed together in a hodgepodge of 
religious assertions, as Penny (2018) colorfully explains:
The simultaneous appeal to both science and religious mysticism, to God-and-
or-genetics, is an ingenious arse-covering mechanism: if God didn’t strictly 
say he created man to compete in a series of vicious status battles and fuck 
the other guy, then genetics probably did, and any blue-haired social justice 
neuroscientists popping up to explain that that’s really not how gene expression 
works simply haven’t grasped the larger cosmic context. If there’s no actual 
scientific evidence for it, then it’s all a metaphor. It’s a prosperity gospel for 
toxic masculinity, The Art of the Deal via the Book of Leviticus. (para. 48)
To support pseudoscientific notions of race, past research such as the classic twin 
studies (where identical twins are raised separately yet have similar personality 
traits) are often cited (Gaspar, 2018). The problem with these studies is that the 
socio-environmental conditions where the twins were raised are just as identical as 
the twins themselves.
Gaspar (2018) notes that pseudoscience’s preoccupation with genetic causation is 
ultimately connected to right-wing efforts to end social programs that are designed 
to ameliorate poverty. He presents the case of childhood asthma, which is almost 
entirely environmental, yet funding continues to prioritize genetic studies. Even 
when motivations are more positive, such as including non-white patients in 
medical research, they end up reinforcing flawed thinking about race and genetics. 
For example, white medical students often hold false beliefs about Black patients, 
including that they process pain differently or that their blood coagulates faster 
(para. 109). Likewise, despite evidence that the environment is a more significant 
shaper of intelligence than genetics, beliefs about biological differences in 
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intelligence between whites and minorities persist in differing degrees of intensity 
(Hatewatch Staff, 2018).
The interconnection between white supremacist groups and race realism is 
represented by figures like Sam Harris and Jared Taylor, who are able to appeal 
to the more secular, non-religiously-based demographic known as “skeptics.” On 
the Daily Stormer, a white supremacist website, Taylor is cited by one out of five 
members as having introduced them to white nationalism (Hatewatch Staff, 2018, 
para. 29). During one podcast, Harris used flawed data to assert that Muslim bans 
were rational because of their inherently violent traits and stressed that “this is not 
an expression of xenophobia; this is the implication of statistics” (para. 30). Similar 
pseudoscientific speculations are regularly broadcast on the news media to imply 
that immigrants from southern hemispheric nations are genetically and culturally 
inferior to whites, along with harboring diseases (Dorfman, 2017).
Torres (2017) explains that in communities that authentically value rationality, 
those who might not have the expertise tend to take a wait and see attitude when it 
comes to more complex scientific issues. Pseudoscientists like Sam Harris or Jordan 
Peterson violate this epistemic protocol by immediately declaring that characteristics 
related to race and gender are genetically based. In turn, they get rewarded by those 
in the right-wing atheist community for being bold and edgy and are in turn cited by 
other conservatives. Because of their atheism, they feel insulated from their views 
being critiqued for their religiosity, as often happens with Christian pseudoscience 
practitioners. Torres also sees an ethical violation in their taking up the question of 
the inferiority of races and genders to begin with, especially when members of those 
groups are often the most vulnerable to the consequences of those ideas taking hold 
in society as white supremacists become empowered. The irony is that by alienating 
women and minorities, right-wing atheists lose a significant number of allies in 
confronting the excesses of religiosity.
Interfering with Science
The second approach to pseudoscience involves direct interference with scientific 
work. This can take several forms including appointing corporate cronies to scientific 
posts, censorship of data that doesn’t conform to right-wing policies, and harassment 
of scientists who work in fields that challenge profit. These strategies often occur 
in combination. A recent example is the Trump administration’s Scott Pruitt not 
renewing the contracts of Environmental Protection Agency scientists involved 
with oversight of research and development and then replacing these positions with 
oil and gas industry representatives (Geiling, 2017; Dorfman, 2017). The rationale 
provided? “EPA advisory boards did not include a diversity of views and therefore 
frequently presented a biased perspective on issues before them” (para. 5). In other 
words, the EPA scientists were not exclusively promoting research to prop up energy 
companies and were therefore “biased.”
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While it isn’t possible to outright ban scientific research, private sector companies 
know that it is relatively easy in a nation with low scientific literacy (Miller, 2016) 
to introduce just enough industry-friendly perspectives under the guise of scientific-
sounding language to create confusion:
Both mistrust of scientists and other “experts” and mistrust of the mass 
media that reports what scientists and experts believe have increased among 
conservatives (but not among liberals) since the early ‘80s. The mistrust has in 
part, at least, been deliberately inculcated. The fossil fuel industry publicizes 
studies to confuse the climate change debate; Big Pharma hides unfavorable 
information on drug safety and efficacy; and many schools in conservative areas 
teach students that evolution is “just a theory.” The public is understandably 
confused about both the findings and methods of science. (Ehrenreich, 2017, 
para.7)
During the 1990s when the tobacco industry was facing increased scrutiny, Philip 
Morris funded the Orwellian astroturf group, The National Smokers Alliance, 
and distributed newsletters to cigarette consumers (Halpern, 2015, p. 8). Tobacco 
companies also created legal entities, the American Smoker’s Rights Foundation and 
American Smokers Alliance used to delay the legal process and produce publications.
Scientists are also directly harassed by well-funded organizations and corporations, 
specifically by the use of public records laws such as the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) (2016). These laws were originally intended to promote open inquiry 
and discourse on a variety of important topics and were meant to provide an 
important check against harmful research. Currently, they have been seized upon 
by conservatives as an important tactic (Kurtz, 2017). Public universities, which use 
taxpayer funds, are especially subject to FOIA requests (Halpern, 2015). Nearly 66% 
of these requests are from private organizations with the goal of targeting researchers 
whose work presents a threat to their profits (p. 4). Essentially, conservatives have 
gone beyond using public records to gain an advantage in scientific knowledge 
to weaponizing FOIA. Examples that Halpern shares includes groups publishing 
contact information of scientists, including their home location and private phone 
numbers, which has led to cyber-mobbing and death threats.
A specific example that Halpern provides is the Wisconsin Republican Party 
using FOIA to obtain the email correspondence of a history professor, William 
Cronon, who was researching labor history and collective bargaining, topics hostile 
to Governor Scott Walker’s efforts to squelch labor. Around the same time, another 
industry group in Michigan targeted three other professors who specialized in labor 
studies (p. 9). Emails have become a specific goal of conservatives because most 
communication now occurs in this fashion:
Snooping on researchers’ emails has become the twenty-first-century equivalent 
of tapping their phone lines or bugging a lab’s water cooler. Further, social 
expectations around transparency are shifting. More and more, hackers are 
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illegally obtaining private information—from emails to intellectual property 
to credit card files—from major corporations, government agencies, and 
scientific institutions and disclosing it online. (p. 2)
The scope of who is targeted can also exceed the researchers themselves. 
Markowitz and Rosner’s (2013) book on the history of industrial pollution and how 
chemical industries intentionally suppress environmental impact research resulted in 
conservatives attacking their reputation as researchers. Lawyers working for chemical 
companies not only legally harassed the original authors, but sent subpoenas to those 
who peer reviewed the book. Eventually, “industry representatives later used a FOIA 
request to the National Science Foundation to seek “all records relating to research 
conducted by David Rosner and/or Gerald Markowitz on the history of lead that has 
been funded by NSF” (p. 4).
These types of efforts do result in pushback by scientists and concerned citizens. 
Williams (2017) points to the creation of Alt-National Park Service Facebook 
and Twitter pages to directly share scientific information with the public as a 
countermeasure to the Trump administration. Large-scale marches for science occur 
annually, with protest signs indicating a more systemic critique of how science serves 
profit over people (Molteni, 2018). Another issue that people are mobilizing around 
is how anti-immigration policy in the form of travel bans harms science, since 20% 
of scientists working in the US are not native-born (Williams, 2017, p. 35).
Science for Profit
The final approach to pseudoscience is the privileging of scientific development 
and research with the most potential for monetization over projects that have less 
of an immediate profit potential. An example would be funding science in support 
of smaller-scale alternative energy companies or carbon tax schemes rather than 
putting the full weight of scientific knowledge behind confronting climate change as 
a whole. While not attempting to mislead or interfere with the scientific process like 
the first two forms of pseudoscience discussed above, this third form has larger and 
more dangerous implications. By failing to examine science in dialectical materialist 
terms, the default position remains limited by what can or can’t produce profit. 
This starts with the funding of public universities, which has dropped to states only 
funding 19% of expenses and public universities receiving fewer federal grants than 
private ones (Halpern, 2015, p. 2).
The question of how to address pseudoscience must be approached within a 
dialectical materialist frame. Galileo is often held up in a limited way as an example 
of how new scientific ideas are penalized. Williams (2017) points out how Galileo’s 
confrontation with the Catholic church is often presented as a matter of religion’s 
censorship of science. In actuality, there were more far-reaching issues at play, not 
unlike our current era:
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Galileo’s conflict with the Papacy was, in fact, just as rooted in material 
considerations of political power as it was with ideas about the nature of the 
solar system and our place within it…Under pressure from what came to be 
known as the Thirty Years’ War raging across central Europe between Catholic 
and Protestant armies, Urban was attempting to shore up and re-establish 
the might of Rome though the Inquisition, racking up massive Papal debt 
from increased military spending, while promoting rampant nepotism and 
corruption. (p. 34)
This example is important because it highlights how science does not exist apart 
from social forces nor does it come down to simple binaries of “either religion or 
science.” There are additional factors that work against science serving human need.
Advocating for science by itself is no guarantee that it will serve in the public’s 
interest because currently the majority of scientific efforts take place within a 
capitalist system that prioritizes profit over human need. On the one hand, it is clear 
that science itself has been under attack by both religious and right-wing secular 
forces. Yet at the same time, science is a field that exists within a class society, so it is 
going to reflect the interests of the capitalist class to begin with. As Williams (2017) 
notes, “Trump is not telling businesses to stop doing science. He wants the federal 
government to stop doing science in the public interest. He wants to end fact-based 
discourse wherever the facts run counter to right-wing ideology” (p. 37). For Gaspar 
(2018), defeating pseudoscience necessitates taking on capitalism and its utilization 
of racism and sexism.
FAKE NEWS
On July 4, 2017, National Public Radio (NPR) continued its nearly 30-year practice 
of highlighting the Declaration of Independence, that year using the format of 
Tweeting line-by-line excerpts. Immediately, NPR was attacked on Twitter by 
angry Trump supporters, accusing the media organization of fomenting rebellion 
and spreading propaganda (Rosario, 2017). The fact that they assumed the line “A 
Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is 
unfit to be the ruler of a free people” referred to Trump was telling enough, but “what 
leapt out…is the fact that Trump supporters are so detached from reality that they 
literally thought NPR was openly calling for a violent overthrow of the President of 
the United States” (para. 2).
Additionally, only one fourth of those who voted for Trump believe that climate 
change has been impacted by humans and just over 40% of Republicans acknowledge 
human evolution (Ehrenreich, 2017, para. 2). After the inauguration, even when 
shown photographs comparing Trump’s and Obama’s inauguration crowds, nearly 1 
out of every 6 Trump voters declared that Obama’s inauguration crowd was smaller 
(para. 3). Further edging into the terrain of the unreal, 66% of conservatives believe 
that Sharia law is being practiced in US courts and just under half “either thought that 
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Hillary Clinton was connected to a child sex trafficking ring run out of the basement 
of a pizzeria in Washington, D.C., or weren’t sure if it was true” (para. 3). And for 
those who argue that this is just a phenomena among the less educated, “college-
educated Republicans are actually more likely than less-educated Republicans to 
have believed that Barack Obama was a Muslim and that “death panels” were part 
of the Affordable Care Act.” (Ehrenreich, 2017, para. 5).
Narayanan et al. (2018) identify five characteristics of fake news: (1) not using 
proper journalistic standards such as citations; (2) style that includes hyperbole, 
emotionally charged language, misspellings, communication via memes; (3) 
spreading of conspiracy theories and self-referential evidence; (4) partisan reporting, 
and (5) using counterfeit tactics like pretending to be an academic site. If distributed 
information includes three of these characteristics, it is likely to be fake news. In 
Starbird’s (2017) analysis of fake news sites, much of the discourse was not limited 
to traditional political frames such as liberal/conservative, but instead floated stories 
related to anti-globalism (closely tied to anti-Semitic conspiracy theories) and 
criticisms of Western governments in general. These sites present themselves as “an 
alternative to mainstream media” whom they label as “fake news” (p. 9).
A general distrust in traditional media has been growing, particularly since the 
exposure of the manufactured evidence leading the invasion and occupation of Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Narayanan, 2018; Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014). Trump himself 
has made it his mission to dismantle the media, mostly as a form of revenge for it not 
providing non-stop positive coverage of him and his administration. This is ironic 
considering the free and mostly positive coverage he received during his campaign, 
exceeding that of any prior candidate (Kellner, 2017; Illing, 2017a).
T. Nichols (2017) also views American skepticism toward the media is part of 
a larger tendency to not trust anything anymore—or at the very least people more 
intensely distrust sources that tell them things they don’t like to hear. Even though 
just over 60% of Americans view news organizations as inaccurate, that number 
is reduced to 30% when people are asked about the sources that they use the most 
(p. 158). National media distrust is also divided along partisan lines, with a 10/85 
approval/disapproval split for Republicans, beating out labor unions which stand 
at 33/46 (Kilgore, 2017, para. 5). As a contrast, nearly 45% of Democrats and 
Independents see the media as a positive entity, an increase of 11 points since 2016 
(Sitrin, 2017, para. 7).
The media itself has been the single biggest contributing factor to Trump’s rise, 
starting with a decades-long right-wing talk radio onslaught, culminating in Fox 
News 24/7 echo chamber of misinformation (DeVega, 2017). Pomeranstev and 
Weiss (2014) see the liberal ethos of stepping back and letting the viewers make 
up their minds as having created a major vulnerability that the right wing eagerly 
exploited:
Freedom of information and expression are sacrosanct in Western culture. They 
are key to any idea of globalization based on liberal democracy. The more 
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freedom of information we have, the thinking goes, the greater the debate, 
and the greater the common good. But what if a player uses the freedom of 
information to subvert its principles? To make debate and critical thinking 
impossible? Not to inform or persuade, but as a weapon? (p. 14)
Making this situation even more urgent is that the very people who see themselves as 
highly informed and above the fray in avoiding the mainstream media are the most 
receptive to fake news, representing “an abandonment of objectivity that precludes 
and abandonment of accuracy” (p. 35).
A key driver of fake news has been emotion, closely followed by group 
membership, which are prioritized over evidence. Coupled with a lack of clarity 
regarding the political process, people are able to now receive immediate validation 
on social media, “a projection of themselves” where “they’re wedded to the notion 
that they are the peer of the person they’re talking to” (DeVega, 2017, para. 24–25). 
Emotion and loyalty can be easily used to walk around inconvenient facts, such as 
evangelicals viewing Obama as the antichrist and Trump a God-fearing Christian 
(The Power of Groupthink, 2017, para. 10). Which attributes are prioritized is 
another aspect of the psychology of right-wing media, with conservatives more 
highly rating conformity, tradition and authority while dismissing kindness, fairness, 
and ambiguity as evidence of weakness (Ehrenreich, 2017).
The manipulability of emotion has not gone unnoticed. Shaw (2018) recounts 
the investigation into Cambridge Analytica and their use of behavioral and 
psychological research to influence not only elections in places like Nigeria in 2007, 
but the 2016 US election by distributing targeted inflammatory fake news. Global 
Science Research, another company associated with Cambridge Analytica, utilized 
an app that collected data from Facebook users via a personality quiz, under the 
guise of academic research. However, the app also gathered data from Facebook 
friends of the quiz takers, who never consented to having their data harvested. Only 
after it became known that Cambridge Analytica was contacted to work with the 
State Department and the Pentagon did the story break.
However, Shaw outlines how the connections between psychological research 
and warfare is nothing new:
Much of the classic, foundational research on personality, conformity, 
obedience, group polarization, and other such determinants of social 
dynamics—while ostensibly civilian—was funded during the cold war by the 
military and the CIA. The cold war was an ideological battle, so, naturally, 
research on techniques for controlling belief was considered a national security 
priority. (para. 6)
Other civilian programs utilizing behavioral research include the Well Being 
Institute, focused on developing characteristics like “resilience” and “optimism” to 
work hand-in-hand with big data so that employees will become more productive and 
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less resistant to the neoliberal workplace (para. 11). Essentially, behavioral science is 
being used to prioritize the manipulability of people over fostering rationality.
Fake news is therefore the manifestation of the transformation of journalism 
from a profession that distributes information meant to benefit people into a form 
of public relations (PR) (West, 2016). This branding-focused PR is hyper-targeted 
toward different interest groups, a form of micro-individualism:
What once called itself a provider of news now sees itself exclusively as a 
platform for a plurality of (pre-approved) “voices” and identities, all marching 
to the beat of same consumer ethos: “do you,” “be one of a kind,” “be together, 
not the same“…where the power of something like criticism…is overtaken 
by the more pressing desire to confirm one’s mind, one’s self, as it is, and 
to guarantee its equal representation in the cultural and political marketplace. 
(Alvarez, 2017, para. 2)
In one example, West (2016) describes an online platform Kinja, where commenters 
start blogs hosted by Gawker, the content of which is “mined for re-posting on the 
main sites” (p. 115). The fact that salaried journalists would be working alongside 
“the anonymous ramblings of the unpaid commentariat” (p. 116) is cause for concern 
but not surprising considering how there are now nearly five PR people for every one 
journalist in the US (Pomeranstev & Weiss, 2014, p. 34). This, against a backdrop of 
a 33% reduction in journalistic personnel since 2006 (p. 34).
The social media model for news has worked in tandem with the PR approach, 
especially since 67% of Americans now receive at least some of their news from 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Shearer & Gottfried, 2017, para. 1). While 
reputable news outlets are on these platforms, they are mixed in with an array of 
fake news sites, often incidentally popping up in the form of ads or links during a 
search. Narayanan (2018) notes how highly targeted algorithms used on social media 
platforms are able to gather information about users and the type of information they 
share, so it was only a matter of time until the discovery that this feature could be 
used for a variety of political purposes, including Russia’s use of automated accounts 
and bots. The hyper-polarization of media discourse leading up to 2016 is locked 
into a cyclical relationship with the social media model which feeds the discourse, to 
the point where it is hard to know where it begins or ends.
Narayanan (2018) tracked the spread of computational propaganda and identified 
two primary distributors of fake news, the Trump Support Group and the Conservative 
Media Group, both with coverage rates in the mid-90% range (p. 4). The Trump 
Support Group alone spread more fake news than all of the other groups reviewed 
put together. Far from being a “both sides do it” activity, Narayanan found that there 
was limited overlap between the sources that Democrats and Republicans shared on 
social media, with Democrats preferring mainstream media sites and Republicans 
preferring fake news sites. The one exception is the Occupy-related sites which have 
significant overlap with conspiracy-theory sites.
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A recent example of fake news cutting out the middleman is the Trump TV 
endeavor, in particular its purposefully Orwellian-named Real News Update series. 
Overseen by Lara Trump, Trump’s daughter in law who once produced Inside Edition, 
Trump TV operates out of Trump Tower yet presents itself as a legitimate television 
news network (Illing, 2017a). Trump TV is supported by Trump’s reelection fund 
and is for all intents and purposes a state-owned propaganda arm no different than 
those in authoritarian regimes. Illing points to the cable channel GOP TV in 1995 
as an earlier example of rightwing propaganda, but whose reach was nothing like 
today where information is distributed openly vs. the underground networks of video 
cassettes in the 1990s used to recruit younger media conservatives.
The benefit of the hermeneutically closed-loop nature of Trump’s base regarding 
the media they consume is that there appears to be no combination of actions that is 
enough to budge their support, with 20% of his supporters declaring unconditional 
loyalty (The Power of Group Think, 2017, para. 5). Further, because the Republican 
Party depends on this same base for political survival, they have taken no actions to 
censure Trump, despite the growing evidence of collusion with Russia, obstruction 
of justice, and fraud, let alone sexual assault (Kellner, 2017). This then sets the bar 
for what Trump and the GOP are able to get away with. A major contributor to the 
extreme loyalty of Trump’s base is the construct of fake news and the projection of 
the fake news accusation onto any source that attempts to criticize Trump and his 
actions (Kilgore, 2017). Such critics are dismissed as being politically biased, even 
if evidence is presented, creating an impasse:
You cannot reach out and find common ground with people who do not 
acknowledge reality in any way. There is literally no amount of evidence that 
can persuade them once Fox News, AM Hate Radio and Breitbart sell them 
the lie. Every word Trump speaks is infallible and if he directly contradicts 
himself, the fake new media is guilty of taking his statements out of context. 
(Rosario, 2017, para. 8)
BOTH-SIDES-ISM
The centrist counterpart of fake news, both-sides-ism, advances the claim that if a 
liberal or leftist perspective is included in journalistic media, then other perspectives 
must be included for balance. This is embodied in Fox News’ original motto of 
“fair and balanced,” (which has now tellingly been dropped) the idea being that 
there is such a preponderance of liberal values within the media that a marginalized 
and powerless right wing has to endlessly struggle for survival in order to gain a 
hearing. Reality paints a different picture with conservative leaders of major media 
outlets, such as the broadcast company Sinclair, which owns the largest number of 
TV stations in the US (Graves, 2017).
Even in cases where the leadership of these companies and their programming 
may accommodate centrist or even liberal perspectives, they fully support and 
IN DEFENSE OF SCIENCE, THE PRESS AND EXPERTISE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
189
privilege capitalism and discourse friendly to it. Far from there being a clandestine 
conspiracy among right-wing media owners to target liberals, suppression of leftist 
views in the media are baked into the formula by default:
It is enough that corporate-inspired ideologies pervade a society and that 
corporate ownership ensures that decision-making positions are filled with 
those who hold to some variant of prevailing ideologies or are inclined to play 
it safe by cautiously remining within acceptable boundaries. The mass media 
will then simply reflect these dominant ideologies, and continual repetition 
through multiple mass-media outlets reinforces the ideologies, making them 
more pervasive until the emergence of a significant countervailing pressure. 
(Dolack, 2017b, p. 35)
The two-part rationale supporting both-sides-ism is the idea that a) all opinions 
are of equal weight and value and b) all opinions have the imperative to be heard. 
A key problem with this is the notion of automatic protective rights surrounding 
opinions, or the idea of entitlement to one’s opinions, which “devalues the ways that 
opinions are supposed to earn serious consideration through logical argumentation, 
persuasion, rigorous research, and expertise” (Alvarez, 2017, para. 6). Within media 
outlets, it doesn’t take long for this entitlement rationale to slip into demands to 
“respect” opinions, which means protecting opinions from external challenge. 
Because of the highly individualized nature of opinions (“it’s my opinion!”), it serves 
as an automatic shield from critical discourse, as if those interrogating opinions are 
violating some sort of sacred space and veering into personal attack (Goldberg, 
2018).
The pressures then mount for centrist media spaces to not be closed-minded and 
to find aspects of individualized opinions (that cannot be challenged) to hold up for 
discussion, thus giving some sort of serious weight by merely being mentioned in a 
publicized and prestigious format (Ganz, 2018). It’s important to note that invariably 
these demands come from conservative groups. What ends up happening is that the 
news stories which prop up dominant discourses are covered more frequently and for 
longer time periods, thus magnifying conservative and pro-capitalist ideologies. At 
the same time, “stories that are ideologically inconsistent are reported briefly, often 
without context, then quickly dropped” (Dolack, 2017b, p. 35). It then becomes 
easier for both-sides-ism to reinforce right-wing views under the veneer of an open 
and tolerant democratic ethos, which gives it deeper cover.
This is illustrated by the actions of the Atlantic magazine’s recent hire of 
anti-choice advocate Kevin Williamson, who advocated abortion be treated as 
premeditated homicide. Though eventually fired after public outcry, the idea that a 
mainstream outlet would feel pressured to incorporate someone with Williamson’s 
views when there are many conservative media outlets available to him is troubling 
(Goldberg, 2018). The blurred lines and deliberate destabilization generated by 
fake news and its insertion of doubt has apparently hit moderate outlets who seem 
incapable of reaching a basic level of consensus.
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Alvarez (2017) presents an overview of other mainstream elite outlets like the New 
York Times who hired climate-change denier Bret Stephens as a regular columnist. A 
frightening rationale for hiring Stephens was provided by the Times’ editorial page 
editor, who claimed “there are millions of people who agree with him” (para. 13). 
CNN used a similar justification for hiring commentators Jeffery Lord and Corey 
Lewandowski because of their “expertise.” Alvarez concludes:
In one sense, it’s baldly a question of money and ratings—news outlets 
maximize their chances of drawing in bigger audiences by giving platforms to a 
more “diverse” range of opinions. In another sense, though, this rationale takes 
for granted that the job of a news outlet is not so much to present consumers 
with “truth” as to represent an array of rigid viewpoints with which consumers 
can potentially identify. (para. 13)
However, media consumers can fight back in a big way. In October 2018, The 
New York Review of Books (NYRB) decided to publish an essay by Jian Ghomeshi, 
a Canadian broadcaster who was accused, and later acquitted, of seven counts of 
sexual assault, including choking, by several women (Gollom, 2016). The essay 
appeared without any accompanying information about the charges or responses 
from any of the women who had accused him. In the essay, Ghomeshi (2018) briefly 
summarizes how he was accused of “criminal charges including hair-pulling, hitting 
during intimacy in one instance, and—the most serious allegation—non-consensual 
choking while making out with a woman on a date in 2002” (p. 29). That pretty much 
ends any mention of his actions as he proceeds to go into a litany of rationalizing, 
free from the constraints of any sort of counter-perspective, which is how both-sides 
journalism actually operates.
Referencing his celebrity status, Ghomesh and that “I was the guy everyone hated 
first” (p. 29). Ghomeshi then dismisses the importance of public apology because 
he himself had always doubted other men who had publicly apologized after being 
accused, and because the response to being accused of sexual assault is too all-
encompassing to really be able to sincerely atone in that manner. He also explains 
how apologies are not a reliable way to ensure the whole mess gets turned around in 
one’s favor: “What you truly fear in the first days after being publicly accused is fear 
and anger, in that order” (p. 29). If the apology could make the whole thing go away, 
then it might be a worthwhile thing to do.
What is remarkable is how, over several paragraphs, Ghomeshi proceeds to detail 
his suffering, such as being afraid to leave the house, losing friends, being attacked 
online, and stereotyped with other rapists. This entire account is made rhetorically 
possible by his brief and breezy dismissal of the accounts of the women involved 
early on in the essay. Their absence makes his essay plausible at first glance. 
Immediately, he pivots to his supporters, who over time, are less likely to vouch for 
him: “as the storm grew, many backed away, too scared or conflicted or shocked at 
the headlines to make a public stand” (p. 30). The phrase “as the storm grew” is more 
accurately a stand-in for his female friends probably reading the actual testimony 
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from several women and having second thoughts, not so much them being afraid or 
shocked at the scandal itself as he claims.
The essay ends with Ghomeshi describing an anonymous conversation he had 
with a woman on a train about music. His account has him resisting impulses to tell 
her about his notoriety, the overall message being “she just liked me for ME and not 
because of my fame.” The reader is apparently supposed to be impressed that he 
didn’t give in to his former ways and has now reformed. What is the most striking 
about Ghomeshi and others like him is the expectation that they should not only 
continue to have a normal life, but also get to parlay their experiences into a revival 
of their careers, with a nice glossing over of the women involved and a silencing of 
their voices. The media is a direct partner in these efforts.
After facing an outcry by regular subscribers, feminist groups, and academics, 
The NYRB published an extensive “letters to the editor” section in the following 
issue, thinking that would hold back the heat. Taken together, these letters serve as 
a critical corrective to the account Ghomeshi provides and reveals both-sides-ism 
for the hollow farce that it is. The reader is immediately struck by the collective 
characteristic of the writing in the letters, far exceeding the quality of Ghomeshi’s 
essay. Collectively, the letter writers made it clear that this goes way beyond a 
free speech issue (as it is often reduced to), but an issue of editorial discretion, 
considering that publications do not have to print everything they receive, as Meghan 
G.’s response summarizes:
By publishing this, you are telling us that the people who violated us can get 
away with it, relatively unscathed. Hell, they can even write an article about the 
difficulty of leaving the house post-persecution. You tell us that our security, 
safety, and lives mean less than those who harmed us. (Responses, 2018, p. 58)
One of the best letters was written by Joanne O., who was victimized by Ghomeshi 
in 2013. She viewed the decision to publish his essay as having consequences 
reaching far beyond just telling his side of the story. By a respected publication 
such as the NYRB giving legitimacy to Ghomeshi and not including any contextual 
information, it served as a public reminder that his story would be believed, and the 
victims’ accounts wouldn’t. His story was therefore worth more as well as getting a 
double hearing, the first being in court. Joanne then took on the usual media tactic 
of questioning women’s own experiences with sexual assault and the notion of them 
imagining things:
My experience is so similar to other women’s you may think we must have 
colluded. But no, we don’t have to speak to one another to know how this reality 
feels because this reality is so common for far too many of us…our stories are 
rarely ever heard beyond a sensational article in which we rip ourselves open 
to expose our wounds for the salacious reader. (Responses, 2018, p. 54)
Linda Redgrave, another letter writer, notes how Ghomeshi’s essay may have been 
an attempt on his part to put a career back together, but that it is not sufficient and he 
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now must face “the court of public opinion” which is “a very large court, and we are 
trauma-informed judges” (Responses, 2018, p. 54).
Since the NYRB wasn’t able to do some basic journalistic follow-up on the 
essay’s claims, Lisa Guenther’s letter stepped up to the task:
The fact that you published Ghomeshi’s point of view on the numerous 
allegations against him without minimal fact-checking is reprehensible. For 
one thing, he was not fired by the CBC because of “allegations circulated 
online” by an ex. He was fired because he literally showed CBC brass photos 
of a woman he had beat the hell out of, and tried to pass it off as “rough sex.” 
Oh, and there are no such things as charges of hair-pulling, etc., not even in 
Canada. (Responses, 2018, p. 54)
One letter writer, Lester Bergquist, simply quoted an excerpt from the trial transcripts 
of one of the victims, letting the account speak for itself: “I’m terrified. I don’t know 
why he’s doing this, I don’t know if he’s going to stop…And my ears are ringing, 
and I felt like I was going to faint. I’m going to end up passed out on his floor” 
(Responses, 2018, p. 56).
Some readers extended their critique of the essay’s publication to the larger 
systemic lack of diversity of the NYRB, connecting the decision to publish the 
essay with the idea that even a mediocre essay from a male celebrity broadcaster 
is more important than the voices of women and minorities. Rohan Maitzen takes 
on the common tactic of an organization referencing their “quality” standards as a 
rationale for not having diverse writers. If “quality” was the primary criteria driving 
the decision to publish, then how to explain the NYRB publishing such a mediocre 
essay?
Diversity is an aspect of quality, and the apparent recalcitrance of the NYRB’s 
editors in the face of reasonable pressure to feature a wider range of voices 
in its prestigious pages has been an ongoing disappointment…that you have 
room for his story but are indifferent to the lack of wider representation in your 
pages is frankly shocking to me. (Responses, 2018, p. 58)
Elizabeth Wurtzel wrote to suggest that instead of just sitting back and waiting for 
women and minorities to magically appear, the editorial staff needs to be actively 
seeking them out, including mentoring up-and-coming writers. Other letters also 
echoed continued disappointment at the publication not featuring diverse writers and 
more inclusive perspectives.
Taken together, the letters provide a damning critique of the both-sides-ism of 
today’s press and how people are beginning to speak back against it. In particular, 
Bridget V.’s response takes aim at the social media model of reporting in its eroding 
public journalism while upholding edginess as the supreme value:
Perhaps this piece is tailored to appeal to an imagined readership of intellectually 
lazy men looking to indulge their narcissism. Maybe it’s for the thousands of 
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rage-clicks readers will inevitably give you to see what this trash pile consists 
of. Maybe you truly and honestly think you’re showcasing a subversive new 
perspective on a subject. Regardless, you’re reinforcing the notion that men 
who abuse women still have a place in their professional field. (Responses, 
2018, p. 55)
Similarly, Leanna Brodie’s letter posed some wry questions regarding the 
intellectual laziness that is both-sides-ism:
Can we expect an upcoming guest editorial from Harvey Weinstein on the art 
of pitching woo; the cops who beat Rodney King on their contributions to the 
civil rights movement; or Kevin Spacey swearing that from now on he will 
always check ID? Or can we agree that widely known sexual predators and 
the beneficiaries of miscarriages of justice have forfeited the public perks of 
celebrity, as well as the considerable prestige of your publication? (Responses, 
2018, p. 56)
Building on this, Elizabeth Wurtzel declares “no, men do not have a side in this. That 
is like white supremacists saying white lives matter too” (Responses, 2018, p. 57). 
When one thinks about the amount of time wasted parsing the basic boundaries of 
what is considered “up for debate,” one starts to realize the deliberateness of keeping 
people mired in such enterprises. Maybe it is time for centrist and liberal media to 
stop doing the right wing’s work for them.
CONSPIRACY THEORIES
Defining what constitutes a conspiracy theory, let alone determining which are or are 
not legitimate conspiracy theories, has been a source of ongoing disagreement. Since 
this section is primarily focused on the political and personal functions of conspiracy 
theories as part of a larger capitalist effort to destabilize social institutions, a basic 
definition can be helpful. Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) conceptualize conspiracy 
theories as “an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the 
machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role (at least until 
their aims are accomplished)” (p. 205). This is echoed by Ellis’ (2018) definition 
of conspiracy theories as “an unfounded, deeply held alternative explanation for 
how things are—often invoking some shadowy, malevolent force masterminding the 
coverup” (para. 2). The unfounded component is critical because this differentiates 
conspiracy discourse from actual documented events of the powerful operating 
in often protected or concealed ways to harm the powerless, as in government-
sponsored medical and military projects.
There is no doubt that conspiracy discourse has become increasingly mainstream, 
especially as distributed through the media. Figures such as Curt Schilling and 
Roseanne Barr regularly post conspiracy theories on social media and in televised 
interviews. Fox News’ Sean Hannity and Alex Jones weave conspiracy theories into 
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their discussions of current events (Chang, 2018). Republican politicians regularly 
distribute conspiracy theories as current events talking points, including former 
Trump administration national security advisor Michael Flynn who made conspiracy 
theories a regular part of his communication, “ranging from stories that Hillary 
Clinton “is involved with child sex trafficking and has secretly waged war on the 
Catholic Church, as well as charges that Obama is a ‘jihadi’ who ‘laundered’ money 
for Muslim terrorists” (Kellner, 2017, p. 69). Of course, Trump himself is one of the 
most prolific conspiracy distributors, considering the power of his political office 
and use of Twitter. The “birther” conspiracy theory—that President Obama could 
not produce a birth certificate documenting his US citizenship—was a key factor 
leading to Trump’s candidacy for president.
Of all of the strategies of the right discussed so far, conspiracy theories present 
the most challenging to dislodge. Part of this is due to the features built into the 
structure of conspiracy narratives, which requires three interconnected elements of 
vastness (too big to comprehend, but not to speculate on), multi-level infiltration 
(they are all in on it), and a sense of urgency (if we don’t reveal the conspiracy, 
their plan will succeed) (Kimmel, 2017). This relates to Muirhead and Rosenbulm’s 
(2018) conceptualization of “conspiracism,” which is an apt term for describing a 
worldview as well as the overall practice of integrating conspiracy theories into all 
aspects of public life. They acknowledge that while the practice of conspiracism has 
been seen before, “the conspiracism we see today does introduce something new—
conspiracy without the theory” (para. 2).
In its more mainstream networks of adherents, conspiracy without the theory is 
more about innuendo and less about complicated narratives that one might see from 
more dedicated adherents (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2018). The phrase “people are 
saying” is a way to safely distance one’s self from originating or taking part in the 
narrative: “The manner of coy insinuation that marks the new conspiracism both 
absolves the speaker of responsibility for the charge he’s putting forth and invites 
endless investigation” (para.10). For example, when the political usefulness of the 
birther conspiracy expired, a new talking point emerged on the right that it was 
Hillary Clinton who originated the birth certificate story, not Trump (Prokop, 2016).
Conspiracism is also a form of conspiracy for its own sake and serves different 
aims, such as the birther movement seeking to delegitimize Obama’s presidency or 
interrupting climate science work by claiming that government climate data is made 
up to enhance the urgency of global warming (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2018). This 
illustrates that conspiracy theory adherents have existing political beliefs that seek out 
self-affirming conspiracy narratives. For example, Trump supporters unequivocally 
reject actual acts of collusion, such as energy companies suppressing research that 
illustrates their role in climate change. When given a choice between two narratives, 
one of which has energy companies being motivated to suppress climate science 
because of potential profit loss or a group of climate scientists banding together to 
seek fame, the former narrative is rejected in favor of the latter conspiracy theory.
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In particular, after 9/11, conspiracy discourse intensified its right-wing talking 
points to create a special sub-category known as “conspiranoia” (Weinberg, 2010, 
para. 6). This resembles the constructs of superstition, which is rife with confirmation 
bias and common-sense notions that are difficult to disprove through traditional 
means (T. Nichols, 2017). As T. Nichols explains, “each rejoinder or contradiction 
only produces a more complicated theory. Conspiracy theorists manipulate all 
tangible evidence to fit their explanation, but worse, they will also point to the 
absence of evidence as even stronger confirmation” (p. 55). In other words, the only 
thing that can defeat a conspiracy theory is a bigger conspiracy theory.
In the past, the potential reach of conspiracy theories was limited to brochures, 
books, video recordings and public talks. There was also more of an underground 
element to conspiracy theories, where tight-knit groups would form to share evidence 
(Ellis, 2018). With the advent of social media, conspiracy theories have added to the 
issue of increased reach an important participatory element, which further binds 
proponents to the narrative as it evolves over time. In some cases, older conspiracy 
theories, like UFOs or the Kennedy assassination, can find renewed interest by the 
ability of adherents to archive publicly available materials on websites and blogs. 
These can then be linked to and shared quite easily.
Several websites devoted to the distribution of conspiracy theories include 
beforeitsnews.com, nodisifo.com and veteranstoday.com and these are linked to 
Twitter posts, often generated by bots (Westneat, 2017). This creates “strange clusters 
of wild conspiracy talk, when mapped, point to an emerging alternative media 
ecosystem on the web of surprising power and reach” (para. 10). As one example, 
Alex Jones Infowars.com has the same number of page views as the Chicago Tribune 
(para. 13). What ends up happening is that a person visiting these websites sees the 
same conspiracy theory referred to by different sites and in different forms, which 
gives it “the false appearance of source diversity” (Starbird, 2017, p. 9).
There are two aspects to conspiracy theories that are important to examine. 
The first is the political function of conspiracy theories, or that the spread of these 
narratives assists the ruling class in various ways. This is often uncovered through 
noting the common themes or threads that run through conspiracy discourse, 
which “pretends to own reality” while carrying us “beyond partisan polarization to 
epistemic polarization, so that Americans are in conflict about nothing less than what 
it means to know something” (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2018, para. 12).
A second key aspect is the personal enhancement that conspiracy theories offer 
to proponents. This includes a sense of participating in a conspiracy narrative as it 
unfolds, made possible by social media and the Internet as well as the concept that 
you are “in the know” unlike the rest of the population who unquestioningly follow 
along. It is important to note that both of these larger aspects regularly interact with 
each other and never occur in isolation. For the conspiracy theory to have power, it 




Far from being relegated to the fringe, conspiracy theories have important political 
functions that help to propel and make mainstream anti-expertise and fake news 
narratives. These functions are part of conceptualizing all of history itself through 
the lens of conspiracy rather than understanding that “it is political economy, 
not conspiracy theory, that explains what is fundamentally wrong with society” 
(Weinberg, 2010, para. 1). The first political function of conspiracy theories is 
that by serving up the target of the “big entity”—whether it is a powerful wealthy 
person, group of wealthy people (often Jewish), multinational corporation, or 
government—this serves to conveniently take the pressure off of capitalism and its 
functions. Weinberg views conspiracy theories as serving a compensatory function, 
much as fascism giving “the little man” superficial changes or scapegoats instead of 
fundamentally confronting oppression.
The big entity can be utilized in various ways. With events like the Boston 
Marathon bombing, airline disasters or mass shootings where causation is pretty 
clear, more elaborate rumors immediately surface assigning blame to those other 
than the perpetrators in order to create the false flag or crisis actor type of conspiracy 
narrative (Starbird, 2017). This delegitimizes efforts like legislation controlling 
access to lethal firearms or associate liberals or the Democratic Party with terrorist 
activities. Another political function of the big entity is that it serves to divert attention 
to more fringe groups like the Illuminati or Trilateral Commission rather than the 
larger military infrastructure or capitalism (Weinberg, 2010). This is different than 
traditional notions of propaganda which is to shape thinking around a specific topic. 
The idea of the big entity is “to keep the viewer hooked and distracted, passive and 
paranoid, rather than agitated to action” (Pomeranstev & Weiss, 2014, p. 11).
A second political characteristic of conspiracy theories is their attack on the global, 
usually partnered with classic anti-Semitic talking points such as the Rothschilds, 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion and, more recently, George Soros. It is important to 
note that the anti-globalization sentiment of these conspiracy narratives is always 
bounded by the “big entity” and never moves toward a critique of capitalism, other 
than to add descriptors like “global capitalism,” as if the problem is its international 
status or multiculturalism. Westneat (2017) finds that anti-globalist conspiracy 
theory adherents are also “anti-mainstream media, anti-immigration, anti-science, 
anti-US government, and anti-European Union” (para. 20). Trump continually uses 
anti-globalist talking points in order to cement connections with his nationalist base 
(Muirhead & Rosenbulm, 2018).
As with the big entity, anti-globalization serves to divert attention from 
capitalism’s role in the current economic condition. For example, almost one third 
of people in the US think a global elite is attempting to take over the world, with 
15% believing that the government, working in tandem with this global elite, has 
installed mind-controlling devices into televisions and broadcasts (T. Nichols, 
2017, p. 59). For these individuals, the problem isn’t capitalism, it is that a small 
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number of Jewish elites are attempting to take over. Weinberg (2010) notes how the 
conspiracy theory of history has right wing nationalistic and xenophobic roots going 
back the 18th century and continuing through The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 
and eventually adopted by Hitler. The same can be said for anti-Muslim conspiracy 
theories emerging after 9/11 and The Money Masters DVD which exposes a cabal 
of international bankers. Most anti-globalist conspiracy theory sites never fail to 
track George Soros and the Rothschilds, more recently connecting them to global 
pedophile rings (Starbird, 2017).
Third, related to the attack on the global is the messaging of distrust in “big 
government” or any type of structural social program. Instead, the emphasis is 
on individual, isolationist, and nationalist solutions. Again, this helps to take the 
focus off of capitalism and place it onto efforts to support politicians who advocate 
for dismantling the social safety net. It is pretty easy to see how this serves as a 
major benefit to the capitalist class, since “the ultimate consequence of the new 
conspiracism is the destruction of the administrative state, a state with the capacity to 
design and implement long-term policy” (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2018, para. 13). 
Conspiracy theories serve to “obscure any perception of governmental integrity” 
and “feeds the assumption that the government is staffed by those who are actively 
hostile to the common interest” (para. 13). In terms of partisan politics, the majority 
of big government conspiracy theories attempt to tie the Democratic Party to efforts 
to allow minorities to take over, as in the notion that undocumented immigrants are 
voting in large numbers.
The fourth political characteristic of conspiracy theories is to foster a hostility 
toward experts, specifically around important issues of public health, climate, 
education, and science. Conspiracy theories also help promote a distrust in the 
media, with everything except the conspiracy narrative viewed as “fake news” or 
being in on the coverup:
The effect of conspiratorial thinking…is delegitimation. The new conspiracist 
accusations seek not only to unmask and disempower those they accuse but 
to deny their standing to argue, explain, persuade, and decide. Conspiracism 
rejects their authority. In the end, the consequences of delegitimation are not 
targeted or discrete but encompassing. (Muirhead & Rosenblum, para. 8)
This has been assisted by the decline in the number of professionally trained 
journalists and “the work of gatekeeping shifting to end-users” (Starbird, 2017, p. 
2). Profit-driven social media information distribution models have become conduits 
for content, which has “challenged the traditional authority of journalists, both 
directly and indirectly” (p. 2).
An additional outcome of hostility toward expertise is evidenced by the inability 
of the mainstream media to intervene by fact checking or other forms of debunking 
conspiracy narratives. Within the conspiracy mindset, fact checks only serve to 
further adhere followers to the conspiracy narrative: if the media is debunking us, 
then what we believe must be true (Westneat, 2017). This provides “the ultimate 
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bulwark against expertise” because any knowledgeable professional is automatically 
a part of the larger conspiracy (T. Nichols, 2017). At the same time, mainstream 
media are referred to for evidence in support of the conspiracy narrative when 
the opportunity arises (Starbird, 2017). Oxenham (2017) found that the only way 
to counteract conspiracy thinking was to “inoculate” people with more rational 
assertions prior to them being exposed to conspiracy theories, “before they have the 
opportunity to take hold in the wild” (para. 7).
Personal Functions
Though powerful enough on their own, the political functions of conspiracy theories 
do not by themselves serve as a sufficient means of attracting and retaining adherents. 
There also have to be aspects of the conspiracy theory experience that personally 
bonds proponents to the narrative and to its further distribution and construction. 
This is incredibly important as the conspiracy discourse descends further into the 
realm of implausibility. You have to have such a degree of loyalty to the narrative 
that it approaches religious fervor in order to sustain it:
Paranoid politics is thus a psychological disposition—projecting one’s problem 
onto the fiendish machinations of others, so as both to uphold one’s own purity 
and goodness and simultaneously to identify the source of the problem. As 
with many projects that rely on psychological displacement, the groups often 
produce the very thing the most fear. (Kimmel, 2017, p. 230)
The first key personal function is the participatory nature of conspiracy theories, 
especially within the context of social media where responses to one’s contributions 
can happen in a fraction of a second. Chang (2018) and Starbird’s (2017) tracking 
of online conspiracy networks is invaluable in understanding the relevance of 
participation. In particular, Chang (2018) examines the QAnon conspiracy cascade 
(Sunstein & Vermuele, 2009), which emerged in cyberspace. Essentially, proponents 
of QAnon assert that both Trump and Robert Mueller are collaborating to reveal a 
group of pedophiles that are funded by the Democratic party. Chang (2018) traces 
the narrative to a poster on 4chan who claimed to have “Q-level security clearance” 
and became known as simply “Q.” Eventually, conversation about the conspiracy 
moved to the/r/greatawakening subreddit where participation jumped.
Because of his obvious need for anonymity, Q would post vague statements that 
kept the online community constantly speculating, such as telling posters “to follow 
former Clinton staffer Huma Abedin and to figure out why billionaire George Soros 
donated all his money recently” (Chang, 2018, para. 23). These and other “bread 
crumbs” would become increasingly cryptic and mysterious, leaving the subreddit 
community (known as “bakers”) to be the ones to propel the narrative. As Chang 
explains, “this community…has turned an internet conspiracy theory into a live-
action role-playing game. They are the main characters — except they don’t think 
it’s a game; they believe this conspiracy is real” (para. 15). As the participation 
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reached a fever pitch, QAnon proponents compared themselves to the reporters who 
broke the pedophilia story about the Catholic Church.
Eventually, Trump supporters appeared at his rallies wearing QAnon t-shirts, 
prompting further investigation of the conspiracy theory. Chang (2018) and 
his associates conducted a cyber content analysis to track the network of/r/
greatawakening users and found that the majority of them were not hard-core 
adherents. In other words, support for Trump is what drove them to participate in the 
QAnon conspiracy, along with other factors like cryptocurrency, men’s rights, and 
martial arts, often associated with white males (para. 10). The bulk of the content 
was generated by only one fourth of the commenters, or about 200 posters (para. 11). 
Chang found that 700 other users contributed another fourth of the comments. The 
rest of the participants on the subredit (11,000 commenters/42,000 lurkers) were just 
“along for the ride” (para. 12).
Starbird (2017) gathered conspiracy theory tweets on Twitter, focusing on mass 
shootings. The research group then tweeted the URLs of the stories to recreate a 
quantitative visual of the network accompanied by a qualitative analysis of the 
different themes that arose from the networks. Results indicated that conspiracy 
theory adherents build connections across different conspiracy sites “in a mutually 
reinforcing manner,” such as retweeting sites that reinforced existing political beliefs 
(p. 5). Additionally, much of the retweeted material was attributed to bots, with the 
most activity around The Real Strategy, a fake news site: “The temporal signature 
of tweets citing this domain reveals a consistent pattern of coordinated bursts of 
activity at regular intervals generated by 200 accounts that appear to be connected 
to each other…and coordinated through an external tool” (Starbird, 2017, pp. 5–6).
A second personal function of conspiracy narratives is the allure of being among 
the few who are “in the know.” Being in the know serves to set you and your fellow 
adherents apart from the masses of people who are duped into believing what the 
government or other big entity wants you to believe. DeVega’s (2017) interview with 
Tom, a conspiracy theory adherent, reveals this enjoyment of conspiracy narratives:
Yes—they are fun. Yes—it’s empowering. It tells you that you are one of the 
people who has the secret knowledge of what is really going on. It makes you 
feel superior to other people. It makes you feel good; it’s self-actualization. 
(DeVega, 2017, para. 21)
This form of wheel spinning is of enormous benefit to the capitalist class because to 
them, nothing is better than people being kept safely tucked away thinking they are 
“in the know” when all along they are happily accomplishing their work for them.
One study involving 238 participants from the US completed a survey that 
measured their “need for uniqueness” by indicating the degree to which they agreed 
or disagreed with various statements (Oxenham, 2017, para. 2). After completing the 
instrument, participants noted which common online conspiracy theories they believed 
in from a list of 99 possibilities. Researchers found that belief in one conspiracy 
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theory was correlated with beliefs in others as well as a stronger endorsement of the 
conspiracy theories correlated with a need for uniqueness (para. 2).
In one of the more dramatic examples of the need to be in the know, an experiment 
was conducted where researchers made up a conspiracy theory related to smoke 
detectors creating a dangerous hard-to-detect sound (Oxenham, 2017). Half of the 
participants were told that over 80% of Germans believed in the conspiracy with 
the other half of participants told that over 80% doubted the theory (para. 4). Just 
knowing the conspiracy theory was popular tended to impact the strength of the 
belief of those prone to conspiracy narratives:
Their belief in the made-up smoke detector conspiracy was enhanced on 
average when the conspiracy was framed as a minority opinion. Just as people 
are known to stop liking a band as soon as it becomes popular or “mainstream,” 
it appears conspiracy theorists can behave in a very similar fashion upon 
learning about the next big new conspiracy theory. (para. 5)
A final revealing finding occurred after the participants were debriefed by the 
researchers about the conspiracy theory being created for the study. One fourth of 
the participants refused to recognize that the theory was researcher-generated and 
became even more attached to it, rejecting all efforts to convince them otherwise.
The third personal function of conspiracy theories is they provide proponents 
with a sense of being in control and channel the desire to bring order to chaos 
through the conspiracy narrative (T. Nichols, 2017). For this reason, conspiracy 
theories tend to intensify during times of great historical and political upheaval 
(DeVega, 2017; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Because the large, imposing problems 
facing neoliberal society can often cause a sense of helplessness, the conspiracy 
theory provides a sense of relief because you can finally “see it all” and structure 
some semblance of order to chaos. This can go in both optimistic and pessimistic 
directions:
When conspiracists attribute intention where in fact there is only accident and 
coincidence, reject authoritative standards of evidence and falsifiability, and 
seal themselves off from any form of correction, their conspiracism can seem 
like a form of paranoia—a delusional insistence that one is the victim of a 
hostile world. (Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2018, para. 6)
Of course, the irony is that the real, evidence-based problems that are happening 
within capitalism are totally rejected in favor of an alternative narrative that will never 
really address the situation. This, too, benefits the capitalist class because instead of 
taking to the streets in mass actions that could change things, that energy is spent 
on further refining and adding details to the conspiracy theory’s tenets. Ultimately, 
conspiracy theories also take the energy that could be spent developing dialectical 
materialist skepticism and channels it into unproductive, formless skepticism that 
discourages acting on knowledge to change the status quo.
IN DEFENSE OF SCIENCE, THE PRESS AND EXPERTISE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
201
CONCLUSION
While nowhere near the dangerous levels of nationalism that countries such as Brazil 
are experiencing, we can safely say that the United States is currently in the grips 
of direct, sustained attacks on reason, knowledge, and the notion of truth (Dorfman, 
2017). The hostility toward facts and lack of critical thinking we currently see reflects 
a profound failure of schools to educate for the protection of democracy, in a time 
when no one appears to be able to hold Trump and his administration accountable 
(Kellner, 2017). Ganz (2018) speculates that the historical era that we are in could 
easily be called the Age of the Charlatan:
Everywhere you turn there seems to be some kind of quack or confidence 
man catering to an eager audience: Fox News hosts like Sean Hannity have 
moved from pushing ill-informed opinion to flat-out conspiracy mongering; 
pickup artists sell “tried and true” methods for isolated young men to seduce 
women; and sophists pass off stale pedantries as dark and radical thought, 
selling millions of books in the process. (para. 1)
The attraction to charlatans and what they offer seems to happen during times 
of immense change, when it is more challenging to handle the sheer amount of 
information appearing at any given time. Fake news and conspiracy theories provide 
convenient narratives that self-reinforce existing political beliefs and notions of 
common sense, along with providing the illusion that we are taking action.
When feelings become the barometer for truth, dangerous things can happen. This 
is especially the case where the feelings of those in power and their supporters are 
prioritized. For example, Trump’s Tweets continuously validate the feelings of white 
males who are troubled by women and minorities refusing to stay quietly tucked 
away. As Penny (2018) points out, “Just because young white men are experiencing 
hurt feelings does not make those hurt feelings rational, or reasonable, or a sound 
basis for policy-making. It certainly doesn’t oblige anyone to dignify those hurt 
feelings with the status of cosmic wisdom” (para. 36).
It is pretty obvious that finding a way out is going to be a challenge, especially 
when the ruling class has unprecedented access to the media and routinely uses 
strategies like fake news, both-sides-ism, pseudoscience, and conspiracy theories. 
The deployment of these attacks has real consequences, especially for the Earth’s 
climate, where capitalists “can deny, delay, defund, distort, dismantle” and “fiddle 
while the planet burns” (Santer, 2017, para. 10). We are going to have to mobilize, 
and before we do, we have to face some important dialectical truths:
There are a number of claims circulating in political culture with no basis 
in reality that are persuasive nonetheless. They are largely impervious to 
challenges based on empirical evidence…the left, armed with science, history, 
and buckets full of facts, attempts to speak truth to power. In other words, we 
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assume that in any controversy, the person who has the truth on their side will 
eventually win the day. Here’s the uncomfortable part: this assumption is just 
not true. The truth does not necessarily set us free; indeed, the powerful often 
control the circulation and authority of what counts as truth. (Cloud, 2018, 
para. 15)
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CONCLUSION
Enough Is Enough
At the time of writing this conclusion, an impeachment inquiry of Trump is underway, 
prompted by anonymous whistleblower accounts of his threatening to cut off funding 
for Ukraine unless officials agreed to investigate Joe Biden, a 2020 Democratic 
presidential candidate. The impeachment inquiry is accompanied by a daily rundown 
of subpoenas, arrests, and investigative reporting, revealing the increasingly deep 
and complex networks of corruption, a hallmark of both right-wing populism and 
fascist governments. In the September 26, 2019 House Intelligence Committee 
hearing, acting director of national intelligence, the perpetually incompetent Joseph 
Maguire, faced what appeared to be two radically different groups of questioners. 
One group, the Democrats, posed direct and intense questions, related to the contents 
of the whistleblower report and transcript of the phone call between Trump and the 
Ukrainian president. The other group, the Republicans, wrapped conspiracy theory 
talking points in question form, peppered with constant genuflecting to Maguire’s 
military service and aggrieved whataboutism in attempts to deflect onto Democrats. 
Enough is enough.
As momentum for impeachment builds, the GOP, much of its membership 
compromised if not complicit in what we are only beginning to understand as their 
monumental, global corruption, continues to present conspiracy theories as official 
statements. They fully understand that their base of support relies only on Trump 
and the true believers in his flailing administration for sources of truth and have 
crafted specific messaging to solidify the closed information loop. One could even 
argue that the entire motivation for threatening the Ukraine was itself based on a 
conspiracy theory that they had a secret server with information about the Bidens. 
At the advent of key conspiracy talking points being invalidated by Trump’s own 
actions along with individual refutations, new ones emerge to take their place. With 
the 2020 election ramping up, these talking points are infiltrating Trump campaign 
ads on social media with Facebook privileging profit over truth by refusing to take 
down ads with false claims. This renders their earlier promises of a “crackdown” on 
fake news hollow and irrelevant. Enough is enough.
Social media has also facilitated dangerous misogynist and violent verbal 
attacks on Congresspersons of color, including “the squad” Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez, Rashida Tlaib and Ayanna Pressley and Ilhan Omar. The presence of these 
four women in positions of power have fuelled the rage of white males’ sense of 
aggrieved entitlement, to the point of their unleashing death threats on and outside 
of social media, all while claiming to be victims. At a Minneapolis rally, Trump 
extended his attacks on Tlaib to targeting Somali immigrants and citizens in order 
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to create intimidation and fear. Sixteen-year-old climate activist Greta Thunburg has 
been regularly attacked, from her autism being made fun of, to grown men claiming 
that if she is old enough to speak her mind, then she should be old enough to consent 
to sexual activity. Because all of these women are extremely savvy with social 
media, their ability to talk back and engage in public pedagogy while attracting an 
increasing following continues to perplex and frustrate the alt-right who will likely 
escalate their rhetoric. Enough is enough.
Early abortion bans, ranging from six to twelve weeks, have passed in several 
states. Alabama passed the most restrictive law, with a total ban on abortion unless 
the woman’s health is at risk. Though these are likely to be overturned in the courts, 
they demonstrate the extension of misogyny into the control of women’s bodies. 
They also represent cynical and deliberate attempts to get the Supreme Court to 
wing judges. The irony is the level of evangelical support for Trump, who has 
marshalled love and devotion of his religious followers who never seem to extend 
such a degree of forgiveness to those outside of their narrow fellowship. Apparently, 
women who seek abortions are “sluts” while no one is supposed to point out the 
hypocrisy of Trump’s past sexual conduct because “God has forgiven him.” Enough 
is enough.
Finally, the 2020 election features more progressive Democratic candidates this 
go-round than just Bernie Sanders. This is due to there being more demands placed 
on centrist Democrats like Joe Biden by voters who are frankly fed up. When a 
Democratic candidate hedges on single payer health care, they are immediately 
confronted on social media and at public appearances. It is no longer tolerable 
to defend the detention of immigrants and our existing immigration policy as 
a whole. Women in particular are seeking to build on the electoral anger of the 
midterm elections to not only vote, but to run for office. Activism continues apace 
with mobilizations growing and increasing in diversity. Though there may still be 
attempts at colorblind class rhetoric this election cycle, the white male working class 
meme has lost its power. Let’s hope that enough is enough.
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